O.R., Appellant-Respondent v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following an en masse advisement of rights, O.R. admitted to the State's allegation that he had committed domestic battery, as a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult,¹ and the court adjudicated him a delinquent. O.R. filed a Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment seeking to set aside the court's adjudication. The court summarily denied his motion three days later without a hearing. O.R. now appeals and raises the following dispositive issue: whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion. The State does not directly respond to O.R.’s claim of error but requests that we remand this case to the trial court for a hearing on O.R.’s motion. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 24, 2023, the State filed a petition alleging that O.R. was a delinquent for having committed strangulation, as a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult (Count 1),² and domestic battery, as a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult (Count 2). On May 5, a hearing was held on the State's petition. At an initial hearing, the court gave an en masse advisement of rights. In that group statement, the court also stated: “When your case is called in, you'll receive a copy of what I have read to you. If you would, please sign and date it[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 14. That form advised O.R. of his right to an attorney and also that he had a right to “confront and cross-examine or question witnesses,” “present his own evidence and witnesses,” “require witnesses and evidence be produced for him,” and “remain silent.” Id. at 12. O.R. and his Mother signed that form.

[3] When the court called O.R.’s case, the court confirmed that he was represented by counsel. The court then asked: “And how will he answer his petition?” Id. at 16. O.R.’s counsel responded that he is “admitting Count 2[.]” Id. At that point, the State established a factual basis, and O.R. admitted that he had battered his sister. The court accepted O.R.’s admission and, on the State's motion, dismissed Count 1. The court then adjudicated O.R. a delinquent and placed him in at Gibault Children's Services. O.R. remained there until October 12, when, because of O.R.’s behavioral problems, the court granted wardship of him to the Department of Correction.

[4] Thereafter, on March 8, 2024, O.R. filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) and (8). In relevant part, O.R. alleged that his “admission to the delinquent act was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary” because the court did not properly secure a waiver of his rights pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-32-5-1 (the “Juvenile Waiver Statute”). O.R. asserted that the “en masse advisement of rights” and the advisement of rights form were “inadequate substitute[s] for an in-court, personal interrogation of O.R.” Id. at 64. On March 11, the court denied O.R.’s motion without a hearing.

[5] O.R. then filed a motion to correct error on March 21. In that motion, O.R. alleged that “the Court failed to directly ask O.R. about his constitutional and statutory rights during his hearing” and that, “[b]efore this case is resolved, O.R. has a right to present pertinent evidence including the transcripts from the delinquency hearing and the dispositional hearing ․ to prove this claim.” Id. at 69. O.R. attached the transcripts and requested either relief from his judgment or an evidentiary hearing. Four days later, the court again summarily denied his motion without a hearing. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] O.R. appeals the trial court's denial of his Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. That rule provides that a court “may relieve a party ․ from a judgment” for a variety of reasons. Ind. Trial Rule 60(B). In particular, O.R. contends that the court should have granted his motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8), which provides relief for “any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment[.]” Whether relief is warranted under that subsection “ ‘is left to the equitable discretion of the court,’ and thus, we review the court's decision for an abuse of discretion.” T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719, 724 (Ind. 2023) (quoting State v. Collier, 61 N.E.3d 412, 416 (Ind. 2016)). A trial court abuses its discretion if it misinterprets the law or if its decision clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.

[7] O.R. contends that the court failed to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute. A juvenile court “shall” inform the child and the child's parent of the nature of the allegations against the child as well as the child's right to: be represented by counsel, have a speedy trial, confront witnesses against him, cross-examine witnesses against him, obtain witnesses or tangible evidence, introduce evidence on his behalf, refrain from testifying against himself, and have the State prove that he had committed the delinquent act as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. I.C. § 31-32-12-5(2). Pursuant to the Juvenile Wavier Statute, those rights may be waived “only” by counsel retained or appointed to represent the child or by the child's parent if the child “knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver.” I.C. § 31-32-5-1(1) and (2).

[8] The statutory “safeguards” found within the Juvenile Waiver Statute require “strict compliance,” and “our trial courts must take particular care to ensure a valid waiver of rights before accepting a juvenile's admission.” T.D., 219 N.E.3d at 724-25. As such, trial courts “are required to comply with the statute by either confirming or securing waiver during the hearing at which the court obtains the juvenile's admission.” Id. at 727 (emphasis added).

[9] Here, the record reveals that the court gave an en masse advisement of rights. However, it is well settled that an en masse advisement of rights passes constitutional muster only “when coupled with a trial judge's personal interrogation of the defendant[.]” M.R. v. State, 605 N.E.2d 204, 206 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). At no point during the hearing did the court explain O.R.’s rights to him, ask O.R. if he had heard the advisement, or otherwise confirm that O.R. had understood what it had explained.

[10] The record also reveals that O.R. and his mother received and signed a written advisement of rights form. However, there is no indication in the record that O.R. and his mother were given the opportunity to read and review that form. Rather, in its en masse advisement, the court merely stated that everyone would receive a copy of the form when his or her case was called and then asked that everyone sign and date it. The court did not make any inquiry on the record into whether O.R. and his mother had read the form, whether they understood it, or whether they had a meaningful opportunity to discuss it with O.R.’s attorney.

[11] Stated differently, there is no indication that the court either confirmed or secured O.R.’s waiver during the hearing at which O.R. admitted to the allegations. We therefore agree with O.R. that, under these facts, he made a prima facie showing that the court failed to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute. As a result, the court erred when it denied O.R.’s Trial Rule 60(B) motion.

[12] However, we agree with the State that the proper remedy is to remand for further proceedings. As our Supreme Court has stated:

if a juvenile makes a prima facie showing in proceedings on a motion for relief from judgment that the court failed to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute's requirements, the juvenile has established a meritorious claim that amounts to exceptional circumstances justifying relief. Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the State to produce evidence establishing that, before the court accepted the juvenile's admission, the waiver was nevertheless valid under the statute.

Id. at 728. Because O.R. made a prima facie showing of error, the burden shifted to the State to show that O.R.’s waiver was nonetheless valid. But the court summarily denied O.R.’s motion three days after he filed it. As a result, the court denied the State the opportunity to respond to O.R.’s motion and to present evidence, if any, to support its claim that his waiver was valid.

Conclusion

[13] O.R. made a prima facie showing that the court did not comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute. But the court did not give the State an opportunity to respond. As such, we reverse the court's order denying O.R.’s motion and remand with instructions for the court to allow the State an opportunity to respond to O.R.’s motion.³

[14] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1) (2024).

2.   I. C. § 35-42-2-9(c).

3.   Trial Rule 60(D) “generally” requires trial courts to hold a hearing on any pertinent evidence before ruling on a Trial Rule 60(B) motion; however, when there is no pertinent evidence to be heard, a hearing is unnecessary. Thompson v. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Thus, while the State is entitled to an opportunity to respond, the court will only need to hold a hearing if there is pertinent evidence to be heard.

Bailey, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.