T.S., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Law enforcement discovered DNA on a pistol found in a stolen vehicle and discovered the DNA was a match for T.S., a juvenile. The State filed a delinquency petition, alleging T.S. committed dangerous possession of a firearm, and the juvenile court adjudicated T.S. as a delinquent on this allegation. T.S. now appeals and presents a single issue for our review: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to adjudicate T.S. as a delinquent.

[2] We reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In August 2023, 15-year-old T.S. was dating N.N., who lived with her grandmother Carol Leedy in South Bend, Indiana. On August 26, 2023, Leedy was sleeping when N.N. came into her house acting “hysterical,” Tr. Vol. II at 24, claiming that someone had stolen her Ford Fusion and asking Leedy to call 911. Leedy reported the Fusion as stolen, and, at the time, she suspected that T.S. had taken the Fusion because she believed he was the only person, other than N.N., who had ever been in the car.

[4] Shortly thereafter, Officer Rodewick Chappell of the South Bend Police Department located the vehicle being driven near the area of Ironwood and Cleveland Drive. Officer Chappell activated his lights and sirens, but the Fusion failed to submit to the traffic stop. After a short chase, the Fusion stopped and two people exited the vehicle, running away from law enforcement—Officer Chappell gave chase but was unable to apprehend or identify these individuals. Later, upon review of his body camera, Officer Chappell realized that two other people were also in the car. Unfortunately, his testimony did not reveal through either direct or cross examination who those two additional people were or what happened to them. See Tr. Vol. II at 15. Officer Chappell conducted a search of the Fusion and discovered a loaded pistol under the driver's seat.

[5] Law enforcement sent the firearm to the South Bend Crime Lab to be tested for DNA evidence, and executed a search warrant to collect DNA swabs from T.S. At the lab, forensic scientists took four DNA swabs from the firearm, finding that three swabs were inconclusive—meaning they could not provide any identification. The remaining swab, taken from the front sight of the firearm, indicated that T.S.’s DNA was present on the firearm.

[6] The State filed a delinquency petition, alleging T.S. committed the offenses of auto theft, a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult, and dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult. At trial, the State dismissed the auto theft charge, and the juvenile court adjudicated T.S. as a delinquent for dangerous possession of a firearm. T.S. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] T.S. claims that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove he committed the offense of dangerous possession of a firearm. In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in a juvenile adjudication, we show substantial deference to the juvenile court's decision:

When reviewing sufficiency claims in the special context of a juvenile adjudication, such as here, “we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility,” but appraise “only the evidence favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences supporting it.” B.T.E. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ind. 2018) (citing K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 543 (Ind. 2006)). We will affirm a juvenile adjudication “if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the [respondent] was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024) (alteration in original). To adjudicate T.S. as a delinquent for dangerous possession of a firearm, the State had to prove that T.S. “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possess[ed] a firearm for any purpose other than a purpose described in [Indiana Code section 35-47-10-1].” Ind. Code § 35-47-10-5(a).

[8] “[O]ur jurisprudence on the issue of ‘possession’ is rather straightforward: it can be either actual or constructive.” Sargent v. State, 27 N.E.3d 729, 732–33 (Ind. 2015). “Actual possession occurs when a person has direct physical control over the item.” Id. (citing Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind. 2004)). Here, the trial court found that T.S. had actual possession of the firearm, and T.S. argues that the State failed to show he had actual possession of the firearm. We agree with T.S.

[9] On appeal, the State argues that T.S.’s DNA on the firearm supports an inference that T.S. had actual possession of the firearm in the Fusion. There is no evidence in the record demonstrating that T.S. exerted direct physical control over the firearm. Neither law enforcement nor Leedy testified to T.S. carrying the gun or being in the Fusion on the night it was stolen. The only evidence linking T.S. to the firearm is the DNA found on the front sight, which proves no more than that T.S. touched the front sight of the firearm.

[10] We look to our recent decision in Williams v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), for guidance. There, Williams was driving his vehicle with two passengers in the car when law enforcement conducted a traffic stop. Williams, 240 N.E.3d at 1287. During the stop, law enforcement discovered a handgun in plain view on the back seat of the vehicle. Id. at 1288. Williams denied having knowledge of the firearm in his vehicle, but DNA testing revealed that Williams's DNA was found on multiple places on the firearm, including the trigger and the firearm's holster. Id. A jury found Williams guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. Id. On appeal, Williams argued that the State failed to prove that he possessed the firearm. Id.

[11] In Williams, we noted that, although Indiana case law had not yet addressed whether DNA evidence can prove actual possession of a firearm, “courts in other jurisdictions have held that the presence of a defendant's DNA on a firearm found near a defendant is sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant was in actual possession of the firearm.” Williams, 240 N.E.3d at 1289. Because Williams's DNA was present in multiple places on the firearm and holster found in the back seat of the vehicle he was driving, we determined that “the jury could reasonably conclude that Williams’ DNA was present on the handgun because he had actually possessed it.” Id. at 1290.

[12] Here, the evidence does not support the type of inference made in Williams. T.S.’s DNA was found only in one place on the firearm—the front sight. More importantly, the State failed to demonstrate that the firearm was found near T.S. Law enforcement was unable to identify any of the occupants of the vehicle, and the State provided no evidence that T.S. was in the Fusion the night it was stolen. As far as admissible evidence goes, the trial court had nothing other than Leedy's speculation that T.S. was present in the Fusion. Ultimately, even Leedy had to concede she, “just assumed it was [T.S.].” Tr. Vol. II at 25. N.N. did not testify even though she was supposedly present when the car was taken. Notably, the trial court acknowledged “the State has not established that [T.S.] was in the vehicle.” Id. at 59. While the State argues that Leedy did not know of the presence of the firearm in her vehicle and that she had never seen it before, the car was driven on a regular basis by N.N., not Leedy. Thus, we conclude that the State failed to prove that T.S. had actual possession of the firearm.

[13] The State argues that Meehan v. State, 7 N.E.3d 255 (Ind. 2014), is applicable and should control the conclusion of this matter. In Meehan, the defendant's DNA was found on and inside of a glove left at the scene of a burglary. 7 N.E.3d at 256. Meehan was found guilty of burglary after a jury trial. The appellate court determined that insufficient evidence was presented to permit a reasonable inference that Meehan had committed the offense. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Id. In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of Meehan's DNA being found in a place where he had no right to be nor should be, and that when Meehan was arrested, he had “burglary tools” in his possession. Id. at 259. We find the factual differences between Meehan and this case to cause a different result. Here, T.S. was allowed to be in Leedy's car, the car was regularly driven by N.N., and no evidence places T.S. at Leedy's home the night of the auto theft or in the car that day or evening. The dearth of evidence regarding T.S.’s presence or participation in the auto theft prevents a reasonable inference that T.S. was in actual control over the firearm.

[14] “When the State cannot show actual possession, a conviction for possessing contraband may rest instead on proof of constructive possession.” Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011) (citing Goodner v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1058 (Ind. 1997)). “A person constructively possesses contraband when the person has (1) the capability to maintain dominion and control over the item; and (2) the intent to maintain dominion and control over it.” Id. (citing Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1275 (Ind.), modified on reh'g, 685 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. 1997)).

[15] The State failed to provide any evidence demonstrating T.S. had the capability to maintain dominion or control over the firearm. We reiterate that the State failed to prove that T.S. had been in the Fusion the night it was stolen or had been at Leedy's house that day. Thus, the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that T.S. had actual or constructive possession of the firearm found in the Fusion, and we reverse the trial court's delinquency adjudication.

[16] Reversed.

May, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

Felix, Judge.

Judges May and Kenworthy concur.