COFFER v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] John Coffer appeals his convictions for Level 6 felony obstruction of justice and Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. Coffer raises four issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as follows:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his convictions.

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to disprove Coffer's necessity defense.

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it assessed probation fees.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On February 12, 2022, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Jonathon Willey and other officers were surveilling Brandon Williams at an apartment complex because Williams had outstanding warrants. Officer Willey saw Williams in the driver's seat of a Dodge Charger, and he saw a black male, later identified as Coffer, sitting in the passenger seat.

[4] As they approached the Charger, Officer Willey and other officers were in marked police vehicles and they had activated lights and sirens on those vehicles. Officer Willey and other officers exited their vehicles and instructed Williams and Coffer to get out of the Charger, but they did not comply. Williams was “reaching around [and] making real[ly] furtive movements” before he put the Charger into reverse and fled the scene. Tr. p. 52. Officers pursued Williams, who drove out of the apartment complex, traveled east on 21st Street, and then south on Emerson Avenue. As Williams crossed a bridge, he handed Coffer a handgun, and Coffer threw the gun out of the passenger-side window. The officers discontinued their pursuit at some point because of “safety concerns.” Id. at 64. However, less than an hour later, officers recovered the gun that Coffer had tossed out of the window. And, later that same day, Officer Willey saw Williams and Coffer in another vehicle and arrested them.

[5] The State charged Coffer with Level 6 felony dealing in marijuana, Level 6 felony obstruction of justice, and Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license.¹ The State dismissed the dealing charge before the bench trial. The trial court found Coffer guilty as charged and entered judgment accordingly. The court sentenced Coffer and ordered him to pay probation fees. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[6] Coffer argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Our standard of review is well settled.

When an appeal raises “a sufficiency of evidence challenge, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses ․” We consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences that support the [judgment]. “We will affirm ‘if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”

Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Joslyn v. State, 942 N.E.2d 809, 811 (Ind. 2011)). We address each conviction in turn.

[7] To prove Level 6 felony obstruction of justice, the State was required to show that Coffer removed the gun from the Charger with the intent to prevent it from being used as evidence in any legal proceeding or criminal investigation. Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-2(a)(3) (2021). Coffer maintains that he was “an unwilling passenger in a police chase[ and he] was handed a gun by the driver, which he threw out of the car while crossing a bridge.” Appellant's Br. at 15. Thus, he argues that he did not have the requisite intent to obstruct justice. We do not agree.

[8] A person engages in conduct “intentionally” if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a). And as our Supreme Court recently explained,

“[k]nowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the defendant, the trier of fact must resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence.” Stokes v. State, 922 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. So given this real-world constraint, a defendant's mens rea may be proven by “circumstantial evidence,”—that is, it may be reasonably “inferred from a defendant's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Id.

A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064-65 (Ind. 2024) (alteration original).

[9] Here, the State presented ample circumstantial evidence that Coffer intended to prevent the handgun from being used in a criminal investigation when he threw it out the window. Officer Willey testified that he and other officers were pursuing the Charger in a chase when Williams handed Coffer the gun and Coffer threw it out the window. Coffer's conduct made it difficult for the officers to recover the gun.² Coffer's argument on appeal is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

[10] To prove Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license, the State was required to show that Coffer, without a license, knowingly or intentionally possessed a handgun. I.C. § 35-47-2-1 (2021). Coffer's sole argument as to this conviction is that his possession of the handgun was neither voluntary nor willing because Williams had thrust the gun into his hands during the police chase. But, once again, Coffer asks that we reweigh the evidence. The State presented circumstantial evidence to show that Coffer's possession of the gun, however brief, was knowing or intentional. See, e.g., A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1065 (holding evidence sufficient to prove that the defendant, who possessed a gun for thirty seconds during a police chase, knowingly or intentionally possessed a modified machine gun).

Issue Two: Necessity Defense

[11] Coffer next argues that the State failed to negate his defense of necessity with respect to both of his convictions. In order to prevail on a claim of necessity, Coffer had to show: (1) the act was done to prevent a significant evil; (2) there was no adequate alternative; (3) the harm caused by the act was not disproportionate to the harm avoided; (4) he had a good faith belief that the act was necessary to prevent greater harm; (5) this belief was objectively reasonable; and (6) he did not substantially contribute to the creation of the emergency. Belton v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1043, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The State can refute this defense by disproving at least one element beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision whether a claim of necessity has been disproved is entrusted to the fact-finder. Id. “Where a defendant is convicted despite [his] claim of necessity, this court will reverse the conviction only if no reasonable person could say [at least one element of] the defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

[12] Coffer asserts that, “[g]iven the choice between maintaining possession over a handgun during a dangerous police chase and abandoning it, Coffer did the only reasonable thing.” Appellant's Br. at 18. Coffer argues that he threw the gun out the window to prevent the “significant evil of possessing a handgun without a license.” Id. at 20. He maintains that he “removed a deadly weapon from a dangerous situation,” namely, the high-speed car chase. Id. And he argues that there was no adequate alternative to throwing the gun out the window because keeping it inside the car would have resulted in his constructive possession of the gun. He contends that the evidence shows that he satisfied all six elements of the defense of necessity.

[13] We agree with the State that it sufficiently negated at least one element of the necessity defense at Coffer's trial. The evidence supports a reasonable inference that, rather than avoiding the significant evil of possession of a handgun without a license, Coffer's actions resulted in his conviction of both that possession and Level 6 felony obstruction of justice. Further, as the State points out, Coffer's disposal of the gun in a public place created a dangerous situation in that any member of the public could have found the gun before the officers were able to retrieve it. Once again, Coffer merely asks that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. The State presented sufficient evidence to negate Coffer's defense of necessity.

Issue Three: Probation Fees

[14] Finally, Coffer argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay probation fees after finding him indigent. We review a trial court's assessment of costs and fees for abuse of discretion. Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 771 (Ind. 2024). “This standard allows reversal only when a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id.

[15] The following colloquy transpired at sentencing:

[Defense counsel]: Thank you, Judge. My client has previously been found indigent. He has not had any change of circumstances, so he is still indigent ․ Additionally, I'd be asking that he be found either indigent to probation costs and sign-up fees and regular user fees or that that be put on a sliding scale. I know that since it's kiosk -- I don't know that there are actually user fees involved in that --

THE COURT: Okay.

[Defense counsel]: -- but I am uncertain.

THE COURT: All right. Anything on that, State?

[State]: No, other than to say although the Court is aware that I would normally argue for almost a Draconian imposition fines and fees, I do believe that with the defendant having been found to be needing pauper counsel for the purpose of the appeal, that additional fines and fees are not necessary. ․

THE COURT: Okay. So as to fines, fees, and costs, I'm going to find you indigent to court costs. I'm not going to impose any fine. I am going to impose the standard costs of probation, which is $100 initial user fee, I think, $100 administration fee, and a $30 -- $30 a month monthly user fee. That may be different based on kiosk. But I am going to ask that Probation do a financial assessment on you. That way they're going to make a look -- make a determination and evaluation of your finances -- make a determination as to what you need to pay based on that. I want you to make a good-faith effort, pay what you can, when you can while you're on probation. But if there is a balance of your fees at the conclusion of your probation, we can determine at that point in time whether to find you indigent to that balance. Okay?

Tr. pp. 86-87.

[16] Coffer contends that, “[i]n ordering these fees, either the trial court violated the Indiana Code ․ by neglecting to perform an indigency hearing or finding Coffer indigent and assessing fees anyway. It then scheduled payment in violation of statute. All these errors are abuses of discretion requiring remand for resentencing.” Appellant's Br. at 23. In support, Coffer cites our Supreme Court's recent opinion in Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767 (Ind. 2024). With respect to probation fees, in particular, the Court stated that “a trial court must ask questions about a defendant's ‘actual ability to pay’ ” before imposing those fees. Id. at 778 (quoting Burnett v. State, 74 N.E.3d 1221, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (emphasis added)).

[17] Here, rather than asking about Coffer's actual ability to pay the probation fees, the trial court stated that the probation department would assess his ability to pay, and the court encouraged Coffer to pay what he could when he could. The State argues that this was proper and that the trial court could have delayed the indigency hearing until Coffer had completed his probation.

[18] However, as our Supreme Court stated, such a delay in the indigency hearing is appropriate only “[h]ad the trial court suspended [the] fines and costs[.]” Id. at 777. Because the trial court here did not suspend the probation fees but encouraged Coffer to try to pay them, we agree that the court's order does not comport with Spells. Accordingly, we remand with instructions that the trial court either suspend Coffer's probation fees pending an indigency hearing or hold an indigency hearing to inquire about Coffer's ability to pay the probation fees, including a consideration of his (1) assets, (2) income, and (3) necessary expenses pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-33-7-6.5. See id. at 778 (citing Burnett, 74 N.E.3d at 1227).

Conclusion

[19] For all these reasons, the trial court did not err when it found the evidence sufficient to support Coffer's convictions. The State presented sufficient evidence to negate Coffer's defense of necessity. However, the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed probation fees. We therefore remand with instructions to either suspend the probation fees pending an indigency hearing or hold an indigency hearing.

[20] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State initially sought to enhance the Class A misdemeanor charge to a Level 5 felony in light of a prior felony conviction, but, after Coffer was able to get the prior felony reduced to a misdemeanor, the State abandoned the proposed enhancement.

2.   The parties make much of the fact that Coffer threw the gun out of the car as it drove over a bridge. Whether that was intentional to make it more difficult for officers to retrieve the gun is of no moment. The act of throwing the gun out of the window is sufficient to support the conviction.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and Felix, J., concur.