LLC v. Joan Miller, Appellee-Plaintiff (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Joan Miller sued Indiana Home Pro, LLC (“IHP”) to recover damages caused by IHP's faulty flooring installation in Miller's home. The trial court awarded Miller a $10,000 judgment against IHP—the maximum amount permitted in a small claims action. IHP now appeals, arguing Miller failed to allow it to cure under the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Chapter of the Indiana Code and the trial court erred in calculating damages. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In May 2021, Miller contacted Jason Lawyer—the owner of IHP—to request an estimate for renovations to her home in Corydon, Indiana. Lawyer sent Miller an invoice for $30,065.20 relating to the installation of new flooring and cabinets. $11,845.90 of the total was for vinyl plank flooring. The invoice sent to Miller by IHP did not notify her of IHP's right to cure.

[3] IHP began installing the flooring in Miller's home in July 2021. After IHP finished the installation in November, Miller noticed certain parts of the floor would go “up and down” when she walked on it. Tr. Vol. 2 at 9. By June or July 2022, parts of the floor started to make “a popping noise” when walked on. Id. Miller messaged Lawyer, explaining her granddaughter had tripped over an elevated piece of the floor. Believing parts of the floor presented a “safety issue,” Miller asked Lawyer to resolve the issue as quickly as possible. Ex. Vol. 1 at 18.

[4] IHP sent two of its employees to inspect Miller's flooring in February 2023. Because the issues were unlike what IHP had seen before, it submitted a warranty claim with its supplier. In April, the supplier sent Miller the inspector's conclusion that the problem with her flooring was “an installation related issue and therefore ․ not a manufacturing defect.” Id. at 20. Soon after, IHP sent Miller an offer to repair, saying it would help reinstall Miller's floor. Miller viewed the offer but took no further action.

[5] Because her relationship with IHP had frayed, Miller sought and received an estimate from another flooring company. This company told Miller the flooring installed by IHP would have to “come up” because it was “poor quality” and “too thin.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 28. Miller received an estimate from the company of $17,390 to re-install the floors and complete unrelated bathroom renovations Miller had requested.

[6] In June 2023, Miller sued IHP in small-claims court. During a hearing on Miller's claim, a witness with thirty-three years of home improvement experience—including involvement in hundreds of floor installations—detailed several errors made by IHP when installing Miller's floors. In his opinion, the floor needed to be removed and re-installed correctly. Miller requested $10,000 in damages—the statutory cap in small-claims actions—because the flooring she bought from IHP “alone was valued at ․ $11,845.” Id. at 54.¹ The trial court entered judgment for Miller against IHP for $10,000 plus court costs.²

Standard of Review

[7] Judgments in small claims actions are “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). We will not set aside the factual findings or judgment entered in a bench trial unless clearly erroneous. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A); Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1067 (Ind. 2006). In determining whether a judgment is clearly erroneous, we do not reweigh the evidence or determine witness credibility. City of Dunkirk Water & Sewage Dep't v. Hall, 657 N.E.2d 115, 116 (Ind. 1995). We consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. Id. This “deferential standard of review is particularly important in small claims actions, where trials are ‘informal, with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law.’ ” Id. (quoting S.C.R. 8(A)). We review questions of law de novo. Trinity Homes, 848 N.E.2d at 1068.

1. Miller was not required to let IHP cure under Indiana Code Chapter 32-27-3.

[8] IHP first claims Miller was required to allow it to cure the installation defect under Indiana Code Chapter 32-27-3.³ In IHP's view, the trial court should have dismissed Miller's complaint based on her noncompliance with several provisions of the chapter.⁴ Miller counters, arguing this Chapter does not apply to her claim, so she did not need to allow IHP to cure. Resolving this dispute involves a question of statutory interpretation, which we undertake de novo. See Performance Servs., Inc. v. Randolph E. Sch. Corp., 211 N.E.3d 508, 511 (Ind. 2023).

[9] Indiana Code Section 32-27-3-12(a) requires a construction professional, upon entering into a contract for sale, construction, or substantial remodeling of a residence, to “provide notice to each home owner of the construction professional's right to offer to cure construction defects before a home owner may commence litigation against the construction professional.”⁵ If a construction professional fails to give a home owner the notice required under this section, Chapter 32-27-3 “does not preclude or bar any action.” I.C. § 32-27-3-12(c); see also I.C. § 32-27-3-1(1) (defining an “action” as “any civil lawsuit or action in contract or tort for damages or indemnity brought against a construction professional to assert a claim ․ for damage or the loss of use of real or personal property caused by a defect in the construction of a residence or in the substantial remodeling of a residence”).

[10] Even if IHP offered to repair Miller's flooring, it did not notify Miller of its right to do so, let alone by using language substantially similar to that provided in Indiana Code Section 32-27-3-12(b). In other words, IHP did not trigger the provisions it alleges Miller breached. Chapter 32-27-3 does not apply to Miller's claim, and she did not have to give IHP a chance to cure.

2. The trial court did not err in awarding Miller $10,000 in damages.

[11] IHP next claims the trial court erred in awarding Miller $10,000 in damages.⁶ Computing damages is a question of fact within the discretion of the trial court. See Ponziano Const. Servs. Inc. v. Quadri Enters., LLC, 980 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). We therefore do not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility when reviewing a damages award. Winters v. Pike, 171 N.E.3d 690, 701 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Although a trial court is not required to calculate damages with mathematical certainty, “the calculation must be supported by evidence in the record and may not be based on mere conjecture, speculation, or guesswork.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Maples Health Care, Inc. v. Firestone Bldg. Prods., 162 N.E.3d 518, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (explaining a damage award “must reference some fairly defined standard, such as cost of repair, market value, established experience, rental value, loss of use, loss of profits, or direct inference from known circumstances”) (quotation omitted). “The appropriate measure of damages in a breach of contract case is the loss actually suffered as a result of the breach.” Mahvash K, LLC v. Hardwood Timber & Veneer, Inc., 236 N.E.3d 689, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). That said, the non-breaching party cannot be placed in a better position than it would have been if the contract had not been broken. Id.

[12] At the hearing on Miller's claim, Miller submitted the initial invoice she received from IHP for $30,065.20. True, this invoice covered work in addition to installing new floors in Miller's home. Yet the invoice specified $11,845.90 of the invoice's total was for vinyl plank flooring. The trial court also heard evidence that the flooring installed by IHP would need to be removed and re-installed correctly. It is not our role to reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility when reviewing a trial court's damages award. See Winters, 171 N.E.3d at 701. Contrary to IHP's assertion, the trial court's damage award was supported by the record and not mere speculation, conjecture, or guesswork. The trial court therefore did not err in awarding Miller $10,000 in damages.

Conclusion

[13] Miller was not required to allow IHP to cure under Indiana Code Chapter 32-27-3 and the trial court did not err in awarding damages.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code Section 33-29-2-4(b)(1) limits the jurisdiction of small claims courts to “[c]ivil actions in which the amount sought or value of the property sought to be recovered is not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000).” Ind. Code § 33-29-2-4(b)(1) (2021).

2.   At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court gave the parties thirty days to submit written briefs on the issues raised at the hearing. On the thirtieth day—but before the deadline to submit briefs had passed—the trial court entered its final judgment. Both parties submitted briefs later that day. Thereafter, IHP motioned for the trial court to reconsider its decision. The trial court denied IHP's motion.

3.   Indiana Code Chapter 32-27-3 is the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Chapter of the Indiana real property code provisions.

4.   More specifically, IHP alleges Miller failed to comply with Indiana Code Chapter 32-27-3 by not providing it with written notice of her claim sixty days before filing, see I.C. § 32-27-3-2(a), or filing and serving it with a list of known construction defects, see I.C. § 32-27-3-11(a). IHP argues Miller's noncompliance warranted dismissal. See I.C. § 32-27-3-6 (“Any action commenced by a claimant before compliance with the requirements of this chapter is subject to dismissal without prejudice[.]”).

5.   This required notice must be in “substantially” the same form as the language provided in Indiana Code Section 32-27-3-12(b).

6.   The trial court also awarded Miller $115 in court costs. See S.C.R. 11(B) (“The party recovering judgment shall also recover costs regardless of the amount.”).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Felix concur. Altice, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.