BOYD v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Alexander David Boyd (“Boyd”) challenges the revocation of (1) his direct placement on in-home detention and (2) 300 days that were suspended to probation, claiming the trial court abused its discretion. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 16, 2023, the State charged Boyd with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony possession of a syringe, Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Boyd and the State reached a plea agreement under which Boyd would plead guilty to only the methamphetamine charge in exchange for a 730-day sentence that consisted of 154 days of credit for time served, 180 days directly placed on in-home detention, and 396 days suspended to probation. On January 31, 2024, Boyd pleaded guilty and was sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement. As conditions of his in-home detention and probation, Boyd was required to refrain from using illegal drugs and submit to drug screens.

[3] On February 23, 2024, the State filed a petition to revoke. In support, the State alleged that Boyd violated conditions of in-home detention and probation by (1) testing positive for methamphetamine on February 5, 2024, (2) failing to report for three required drug screens, and (3) failing to call the random drug screen line on eleven different days. The trial court held a hearing on February 26, 2024, at which Boyd admitted to the allegations. Boyd told the trial court that he initially had transportation issues but had subsequently resolved those issues, set up counseling, and had a job interview scheduled. The State voiced “serious concerns” and argued that, in light of Boyd's drug use and missed drug screens so soon after sentencing, Boyd needed “significant” jail time and involvement in programming aimed to address his addiction. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 9.

[4] The trial court found that Boyd had a “pretty strong substance abuse issue” that Boyd was not adequately addressing. Id. at 10. The court decided to revoke the direct placement on in-home detention and order that time served in jail. The court also revoked 300 days of the suspended sentence. The trial court said that imposing these sanctions was “best for [Boyd's] safety ․ [and] community safety[.]” Id. As for the selected sanctions, the court said that it gave Boyd “some credit for admitting” the violations and, if he completed an addiction program, it would consider modifying the sentence in favor of placement on in-home detention or a suspended sentence. Id. Boyd now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Boyd claims the trial court abused its discretion in not only revoking his direct placement on in-home detention and ordering him to serve that time in jail, but also in revoking 300 days of his previously suspended sentence.

[6] Regarding Boyd's direct placement on in-home detention, the court imposed this aspect of Boyd's sentence pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-3, which specifies that the court may “impose reasonable terms on the [direct] placement[.]” Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-3. Under a related statute, if a person “violates the terms of the [direct] placement,” the State “may request that the court revoke the placement and commit the person to the county jail ․ for the remainder of the person's sentence.” I.C. § 35-38-2.6-5. Along these lines, when a person is placed on probation, the trial court has “considerable leeway” in deciding how to address a violation. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). Indeed, when a person violates probation, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) allows the court to impose one or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

[7] We review the sanction imposed for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ind. 1999). The court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. In conducting our review, we consider the evidence favorable to the judgment without reweighing the evidence or assessing witness credibility. Luke v. State, 51 N.E.3d 401, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.

[8] Boyd claims that, rather than revoke his direct placement and 300 days of his suspended sentence, the trial court should have shown more leniency. Boyd points out that he admitted to the allegations and had taken steps to address certain issues affecting his compliance with conditions of his placement. Boyd also attempts to minimize the nature of his violations, noting that he “did not commit a new criminal offense” or “threaten to harm any person,” but instead “violated his probation by relapsing on methamphetamine and [committing] the technical violation of not following the random drug testing procedures.” Appellant's Br. p. 9–10. All in all, he claims the trial court “abused its discretion by converting all of his home detention time and revoking his probation.” Id.

[9] We cannot say it was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances for the trial court to determine that Boyd was not presently a suitable candidate for in-home detention or probation. Boyd committed multiple violations just shortly after sentencing. Boyd's positive drug test for methamphetamine was directly related to his underlying drug offense, and his repeated failures to comply with drug testing procedures went to the heart of the court's ability to monitor his compliance through a community-based sentence. Moreover, although Boyd claims the trial court should have been more lenient, Boyd's argument overlooks that the court gave him “credit for admitting” to the violations and left open the possibility of sentence modification if he completed certain addiction programming. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 10. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the sanctions imposed were not an abuse of the court's discretion.

[10] Affirmed.

Foley, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Weissmann, J., concur.