KELLENBARGER v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Janelle Kellenbarger appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to correct error, claiming that the trial court erred in awarding her only five days of accrued pre-sentence jail time credit. Kellenbarger maintains that she was entitled to an additional day of accrued time because the trial court failed to calculate the correct number of days that she was confined prior to posting bond.

[2] We reverse the denial of Kellenbarger's motion to correct error and remand this cause to the trial court with instructions that it enter a corrected sentencing order affording Kellenbarger six days of accrued jail time credit.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On May 13, 2023, Officer Mason Wine of the Union City Police Department observed a maroon Jeep crossing the fog line multiple times on South Stateline Road. Officer Wine stopped the Jeep, which was driven by Kellenbarger, and obtained her license and registration. As Officer Wine was verifying Kellenbarger's license and registration, Officer Nate Detro arrived with a police dog. At some point, the dog alerted to the presence of drugs and the officers searched the Jeep. During the search, the officers seized a substance from the front passenger floorboard that subsequently tested positive for methamphetamine.

[4] Kellenbarger was arrested and booked into the Randolph County Jail at 10:50 p.m. Kellenbarger was searched at the jail and officers found a clear plastic baggie containing a crystal-like substance inside her bra that tested positive for methamphetamine.

[5] The State charged Kellenbarger with two counts of Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine, and on May 18, 2023, she posted bond and was released from jail. Thereafter, on January 10, 2024, Kellenbarger entered into a plea agreement where she agreed to plead guilty to one count of Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine. The agreement provided for a sentence of two years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction followed by two years suspended to probation for an aggregate sentence of four years. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining count of possession of methamphetamine and other unrelated drug charges. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Kellenbarger pursuant to the agreement.

[6] At the sentencing hearing, Kellenbarger argued that “any portion of the calendar day should count as credit time.” Transcript Vol. II at 21. Hence, she maintained entitlement to six days of accrued credit time because she was arrested and booked into jail on May 13, 2024, and did not post bond until May 18, 2024. The trial court, however, determined that Kellenbarger was entitled to only five days of accrued time because “when you calculate jailtime credit you don't count the first day, but you count the last day, so that you're counting twenty-four-hour periods.” Id. at 22.

[7] On April 4, 2024, Kellenbarger filed a motion to correct error, arguing that she was entitled to six days of accrued time because she was “booked in[to jail] at 10:50 p.m. on May 13, 2023.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 87. The trial court denied Kellenbarger's motion to correct error, and she now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Presentence jail time credit is a matter of statutory right. Adams v. State, 120 N.E.3d 1058, 1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Thus, trial courts generally have no discretion in awarding or denying such credit. Id. This appeal presents only a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. See Niccum v. State, 181 N.E.3d 993, 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[9] In determining the amount of credit time to which Kellenbarger was entitled, Ind. Code § 35-50-6-0.5(2) provides that

(1) “Accrued time” means the amount of time that a person is imprisoned, confined, on home detention as a condition of probation, or on home detention in a community corrections program. In determining the number of days a person has been imprisoned, confined, on home detention as a condition of probation, or on home detention in a community corrections program, a partial calendar day is considered to be one calendar day.

(2) “Calendar Day” means the period of elapsed time that begins at midnight and ends twenty-four (24) hours later at the next midnight.

(3) “Credit time” means the sum of a person's accrued time, good time credit, and educational credit.

․

(5) “Good time credit” means a reduction in a person's term of imprisonment or confinement awarded for the person's good behavior while imprisoned, confined, or on home detention.

(Emphases added).

[10] In this case, the record shows that Kellenbarger was booked into the Randolph County Jail at 10:50 p.m. on May 13, 2023, where she remained incarcerated until she posted bond at some point on May 18, 2023. In accordance with I.C. § 35-50-6-0.5(2), the State concedes—and we agree—that Kellenbarger's hour-plus confinement at the jail on May 13, 2023, amounted to one day of accrued time. Therefore, the trial court should have afforded Kellenbarger six days of accrued time. See Niccum, 181 N.E.3d at 998 (accrued time commences on the day that the defendant was confined in jail); see also Adams v. State, 120 N.E.3d at 1064 (hours spent in pre-trial incarceration count as one day for purposes of calculating accrued time).

[11] The denial of Kellenbarger's motion to correct error is reversed, and we remand this case to the trial court with instructions that it issue an order awarding Kellenbarger six days of accrued presentence jail time credit.

[12] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Crone, J., concur.