DAVIS v. DAVIS (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Josiah Davis (“Husband”) appeals the Randolph Circuit Court's final decree dissolving his marriage to Menisha Davis (“Wife”). Husband presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it included certain real property in the marital estate for division.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it calculated the equalization payment he owes to Wife.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Husband and Wife were married in 2008 and have two children together. During their marriage, Husband ran a construction business, and Wife “primarily stayed at home and raised the children.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 54. In August 2021, Husband's business started a project known as “Vision Corner,” and that project netted his business $96,000 in the first quarter of 2022. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 136. But Husband's work on that project ended at the end of that quarter. Husband's other work from May through December netted his business only approximately $10,000.

[4] In the meantime, on April 3, 2022, the parties separated, and, on April 19, Husband filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. Wife remained in the marital residence. In June or July, Husband bought a house (“the Winchester house”) with “profits from the business” and a line of credit. Id. at 114.

[5] Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court divided the marital estate 55% to 45%, with Wife receiving the greater share. The trial court included the value of the Winchester house in the marital estate. And the court ordered Husband to pay to Wife an equalization payment of $21,574.24. Husband filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[6] The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: first, whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings of fact support the judgment. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 103 N.E.3d 690, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. We will set aside findings only if they are clearly erroneous, which occurs if the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference. Id. To determine that a trial court's findings or conclusions are clearly erroneous, this court's review of the evidence must leave it with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Campbell v. Campbell, 993 N.E.2d 205, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[7] Our review of family law matters is conducted with a preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges. Anselm v. Anselm, 146 N.E.3d 1042, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

Appellate deference to the determinations of our trial court judges, especially in domestic relations matters, is warranted because of their unique, direct interactions with the parties face-to-face, often over an extended period of time. Thus enabled to assess credibility and character through both factual testimony and intuitive discernment, our trial judges are in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common sense․

Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011). “It is not enough on appeal that the evidence might support some other conclusion; rather, the evidence must positively require the result sought by the appellant.” Hamilton, 103 N.E.3d at 694. “Accordingly, we will not substitute our own judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court's judgment.” Id.

Issue One: Winchester House

[8] Husband first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it included the Winchester house in the marital estate. Husband bought the house after he had filed his petition for dissolution. Thus, he maintains that it should have been excluded from the marital estate.

[9] Husband is correct that property “acquired prior to the date of final separation is subject to division by the trial court as part of the marital pot.” Crider v. Crider, 26 N.E.3d 1045, 1048-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). However, Indiana Code section 31-15-7-4(a)(3) also provides that property “acquired by the[ parties’] joint efforts” is subject to division. There is no timeframe restricting that provision. Here, the trial court found that the Winchester house “was paid for at least partially with funds earned during the marriage.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 54. Accordingly, the trial court included the house in the marital estate.

[10] As Wife points out, Husband testified that the Vision Corner project started in August 2021 and it “kind of shut down” in March or April 2022. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 113. Husband also testified that his net profits from that project during the first quarter of 2022 were $96,000. After the first quarter, Husband earned only $10,000 in profits for the rest of the year. Again, Husband testified that he used “profits from the business” and a line of credit to buy the Winchester house for $83,500 in June or July 2022. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 114. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Husband had bought the house using “funds earned during the marriage” and included it in the marital pot. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 54; see, e.g., Rocca v. Rocca, 760 N.E.2d 677, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming trial court's inclusion in marital estate real property husband had bought four months after dissolution petition was filed where evidence showed that money used to buy it was earned by the parties’ joint efforts), trans. denied.

Issue Two: Equalization Payment

[11] Husband next contends that the trial court erred when it calculated the equalization payment he owes to Wife. Husband first argues that there was no evidence to support the court's valuation of the parties’ 1999 Suburban at $1,000, which was awarded to him. Further, Husband argues that, without the equalization payment, the court's division of the marital estate comes out to the desired 55%-45% split. Husband maintains that, in calculating the net estate awarded to each party, the trial court appears to have accidentally counted three items of personal property in his column that were really in Wife's column. Thus, Husband contends that, keeping those three items in Wife's column, which have a total value of $19,930, and eliminating the value of the 1999 Suburban results in no equalization payment.

[12] On the other hand, Wife argues that the undisputed evidence shows that the 1999 Suburban was worth $1,800, and we agree. Thus, the trial court erred when it valued that vehicle at $1,000. Second, Wife appears to question whether the three items in dispute on appeal are worth $19,930, but, because there is evidence to support the court's valuations of those items, we cannot say that the court erred in that regard.

[13] However, Wife also points out that the trial court erroneously found that a debt to Citizens State Bank (“CSB debt”) assigned to Husband was $33,996.32 when the undisputed evidence shows that it was only $3,996.32. Indeed, Husband's own proposed property distribution list shows the debt as $3,996.32. Ex. Vol. 4, p. 7. Husband's argument to the contrary is not well taken. Wife is correct that the trial court clearly erred when it found that the Citizens State Bank debt was $33,996.32.

[14] Correcting for that error, and adding an additional $800 to the value of the 1999 Suburban awarded to Husband, the total marital estate is $375,956.80, with $206,776.24 (55%) going to Wife and $169,180.56 (45%) going to Husband. That corrected distribution results in an equalization payment owing from Husband to Wife in the amount of $18,584.24. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's division of the marital estate only with regard to the erroneous valuations of the 1999 Suburban and CSB debt, and we remand with instructions to correct the decree and to order Husband to make the revised equalization payment.

[15] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

Mathias, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.