JOHNSON v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Joshua Johnson appeals the trial court's sentencing order, and he and the State agree that remand may be appropriate to clarify how Johnson is to pay his costs and fees. Given the confusion between the trial court's oral and written sentencing statements, we remand for the court's clarification.

Facts

[2] Johnson was convicted of Level 5 felony unlawful carrying of a handgun and Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended. The trial court sentenced him to a total of three years in community corrections, with one year served on home detention and two years suspended to probation. The court also found him “indigent with regard to court costs and indigent with regard to community corrections and probation for the first 30 days of [his] sentence.” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 81-82. The court, however, made varying statements as to Johnson's payment of costs and fees after his initial 30-day indigency period.

[3] At Johnson's sentencing hearing, the trial court stated: “After 30 days, I would hope and expect that you'd get a job and pay your fees to the best of your ability.” Id. at 82. But in both its written sentencing order and order of probation, the court stated: “[Defendant] is indigent for the first 30 days then sliding scale for[ ] fees.” App. Vol. II, pp. 16, 19. In its written order on conditions of home detention, the court further stated: “You shall ․ pay a home detention fee set by the court in addition to the probation user's fee required under [the Indiana Code].” Id. at 17 (emphasis omitted).

Discussion and Decision

[4] On appeal, Johnson claims there is a discrepancy between the trial court's oral and written sentencing statements. The oral statement requires Johnson to pay costs and fees to the “best of his ability” after his 30-day indigency period. Tr. Vol. II, p. 82. The written sentencing order and order of probation require him to pay fees on an unspecified “sliding scale.” App. Vol. II, pp. 16, 19. And the written order on conditions of home detention requires him to pay an as of yet undetermined home detention fee without qualification.

[5] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). “When oral and written sentencing statements conflict, we examine them together to discern the intent of the sentencing court.” Vaughn v. State, 13 N.E.3d 873, 889 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We then have “the option of crediting the statement that accurately pronounces the sentence or remanding for resentencing.” McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ind. 2007).

[6] Johnson suggests the trial court intended to allow him to petition the court for a determination of his ability to pay costs and fees after the first 30 days of his sentence. As we understand his argument, Johnson contends the oral sentencing statement accurately reflects that intent, but the written sentencing order does not. He therefore seeks remand for the court to correct its written statements, presumably by eliminating the sliding scale references in the written sentencing order and order of probation. It is not clear what relief, if any, Johnson seeks as to the written order on conditions of home detention.

[7] The State sees no discrepancy in the trial court's oral and written sentencing statements. But it, too, suggests the court intended to allow Johnson to petition the court for a determination of his ability to pay costs and fees after the first 30 days of his sentence. As we understand the State's argument, it contends the court's written references to a sliding scale simply indicate how the court would calculate Johnson's cost and fee payments after determining his ability to pay.

[8] That being said, the State acknowledges that “[r]emand may be appropriate to allow the trial court to clarify its intention with respect to sliding scales.” Appellee's Br. pp. 2, 6. We agree and therefore remand for that clarification.

remanded

Weissmann, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.