INDIANAPOLIS AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. KENNEDY (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Kelli Kennedy was injured when a stall door at a restroom in the Indianapolis International Airport came loose and struck her on the head. Kennedy filed a negligence complaint against the Indianapolis Airport Authority (“IAA”). IAA moved for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. In this discretionary interlocutory appeal, IAA claims that the trial court erred by denying IAA's motion for summary judgment. We agree and, accordingly, reverse and remand.

Issue

[2] IAA presents one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court erred by denying IAA's motion for summary judgment.

Facts

[3] The facts appear to be undisputed. On April 18, 2021, Kennedy flew into the Indianapolis International Airport after a family vacation in Florida. While waiting for her luggage, Kennedy went to the restroom and entered a stall. When Kennedy entered the restroom stall, she had no issues with the stall door. When she exited the stall, however, the door came loose at the top hinge and struck Kennedy on the head. Kennedy reported the accident to IAA personnel. IAA maintenance workers Bob Stierwalt and Guy Osborn were summoned to inspect the stall at issue. They observed that the top stall door hinge had “sheared through” between the door and the stall. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 65, 68. Stierwalt replaced the damaged hinge. Neither Stierwalt nor Osborn had seen a hinge shear in such a manner before or since the incident involving Kennedy.

[4] On October 11, 2021, Kennedy filed a complaint against IAA claiming that IAA was negligent under a theory of premises liability.¹ IAA answered the complaint on December 8, 2021, and moved for summary judgment on December 13, 2023. In its motion for summary judgment, IAA argued that there was no genuine issue of material fact that IAA had neither actual nor constructive knowledge regarding any issue with the hinge. Kennedy, in response, argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether IAA had constructive knowledge of the issue with the hinge.

[5] The trial court denied IAA's motion for summary judgment on February 12, 2024. On March 1, 2024, IAA moved to certify the summary judgment order for interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted on March 12, 2024. This Court accepted interlocutory jurisdiction on May 10, 2024, and this appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

I. Summary Judgment Standard

[6] “ ‘When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we stand in the shoes of the trial court.’ ” Minser v. DeKalb Cnty. Plan Comm'n, 170 N.E.3d 1093, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020)). “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Id. (quoting Murray v. Indianapolis Pub. Schs., 128 N.E.3d 450, 452 (Ind. 2019)); see also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).

[7] The summary judgment movant bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Burton, 140 N.E.3d at 851). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party which must then show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. On appellate review, we resolve “[a]ny doubt as to any facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom ․ in favor of the non-moving party.” Id. “We review the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo, and we take ‘care to ensure that no party is denied his day in court.’ ” Id. (quoting Schoettmer v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind. 2013)). “ ‘We limit our review to the materials designated at the trial level.’ ” Id. (quoting Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep't of Nat. Res., 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018)).

[8] We also observe that Kennedy has not filed an appellee's brief. In such cases, we will not develop an argument for the appellee, and we will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error. Hahn-Weisz v. Johnson, 189 N.E.3d 1136, 1140-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020)). “This less stringent standard of review ‘relieves [us] of the burden of controverting arguments advanced in favor of reversal where that burden properly rests with the appellee.’ ” Id. at 1141 (quoting Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). We remain obligated, however, to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record to determine whether reversal is required. Id. (citing Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d at 352).

II. Premises Liability

[9] In general, to prevail on a claim of negligence, the plaintiff must show: (1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) the defendant's breach of that duty by allowing conduct to fall below the applicable standard of care; and (3) compensable injury proximately caused by the defendant's breach of duty. Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016).

[10] Kennedy's claim of negligence is based on the theory of premises liability. Over thirty years ago, our Supreme Court adopted the following language regarding the liability of a premises owner when an invitee is injured by a condition on the premises owner's property:

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he

(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and

(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and

(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.

Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637, 639-40 (Ind. 1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965)); accord Griffin v. Menard, 175 N.E.3d 811, 813 (Ind. 2021). “[A]lthough a landowner must exercise reasonable care for the safety of invitees, the landowner is not an insurer of the invitee's safety.” Walters v. JS Aviation, Inc., 81 N.E.3d 1160, 1163 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Schulz v. Kroger Co., 963 N.E.2d 1141, 1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)), trans. denied.

[11] IAA admits that Kennedy, who was an incoming airline passenger, was a business invitee of IAA. Accordingly, to prevail on her premises liability claim, Kennedy needs to prove that IAA had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition—the faulty stall door hinge. See Griffin, 175 N.E.3d at 813 (citing Burrell, 569 N.E.2d at 639).

[12] IAA argues that, in its summary judgment motion, it designated evidence that established it had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of this condition. In her response to IAA's motion for summary judgment, Kennedy admitted that there was no evidence that IAA had actual knowledge of any safety issue with the stall door hinge. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 83 (“Plaintiff concedes there is no evidence that Defendant had actual knowledge of the broken bathroom stall door hinge.”). Thus, the question is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether IAA had constructive knowledge of any problem with the hinge. If it did, then it may be liable under a theory of premises liability; if it did not, then it cannot be liable.

[13] In the context of premises liability, “[c]onstructive knowledge ․ refers to a ‘condition which has existed for such a length of time and under such circumstances that it would have been discovered in time to have prevented injury if the [premises owner], his agents or employees had used ordinary care.’ ” Espinoza v. St. Mary Med. Ctr., Inc., 233 N.E.3d 1009, 1013 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Schulz, 963 N.E.2d at 1144), trans. denied.

[14] IAA argues that the undisputed designated evidence shows that it had no constructive knowledge of any safety issue with the stall door hinge. Specifically, it notes that IAA Terminal Services staff inspected the restrooms multiple times each day and that Building Maintenance conducted nightly maintenance checks, which included checking the stall doors and the hinges. Despite this, no issues with the stall door hinge were revealed or reported before Kennedy's accident. We agree with IAA that this evidence establishes, prima facie, that IAA had no constructive knowledge of any safety issue with the stall door hinge.

[15] We also agree with IAA that Kennedy designated no evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on whether IAA had constructive knowledge of any safety issue with the stall door hinge. Although she has not provided us with an appellee's brief, Kennedy's brief in opposition to IAA's motion for summary judgment argued that IAA may have had constructive knowledge of the issue with the stall door hinge because IAA's nightly inspection reports do not mention the word “hinge.” Kennedy, thus, argued that this supports a reasonable inference that the hinges were not checked. This mere speculation is insufficient to counter the affidavit of IAA's facilities supervisor, who asserted that “nightly restroom inspections include checking stall doors, stall door locks, stall door hinges[,] and stall door hooks.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 74. According to the facilities supervisor, had a problem been reported with any hinge, it would have been repaired when reported. Id. We, therefore, conclude that IAA's designated evidence established that it had no constructive knowledge of any safety issue with the hinge and that Kennedy designated no evidence to counter IAA's designated evidence.

[16] We find support for this conclusion in Gasser Chair Co. v. Nordengreen, 991 N.E.2d 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In that case, the plaintiff was injured while sitting at a casino when the gas cylinder that was used to adjust the height of the chair in which she was sitting failed. The plaintiff sued the chair's manufacturer and the casino, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the casino. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Id. at 127. We explained that the designated evidence showed that: the casino inspected the chairs every day; there had been no problems reported with the chair at issue; when a gas cylinder fails, it usually fails slowly and does not collapse suddenly; the chair's manufacturer did not warn the casino that the gas cylinder could fail suddenly; and, although the chairs had “issues” with the gas cylinders, none of these issues ever resulted in injuries. Id. This was sufficient to show that the casino had no constructive knowledge of any problem with the chair. Id.

[17] Similarly, here, IAA's services staff went into the restrooms multiple times a day and noticed no issues with the stall door. And IAA's maintenance staff conducted nightly inspections of stall doors, stall door locks, and stall door hinges. Despite this, no issues were reported until after the door hinge failed. Thus, there is nothing to suggest that the condition with the hinge “ ‘existed for such a length of time and under such circumstances that it would have been discovered in time to have prevented the injury,’ ” if IAA, its agents, or its employees had used ordinary care. Espinoza, 233 N.E.3d at 1013 (quoting Schulz, 963 N.E.2d at 1144). We, therefore, conclude that the designated evidence does not demonstrate that IAA had constructive knowledge of any safety issue with the stall door hinge that sheared and caused Kennedy's injuries.

[18] Because the designated evidence reveals no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether IAA had actual or constructive knowledge of any issue with the stall door hinge, IAA cannot be liable under a theory of premises liability for any injury caused by the failure of the hinge. The trial court, therefore, erred in denying IAA's motion for summary judgment.

Conclusion

[19] The designated material evidences IAA's lack of actual or constructive knowledge of any safety issue with the stall door hinge that failed and caused Kennedy's injuries. The trial court erred by denying IAA's motion for summary judgment. We, therefore, reverse and remand with instructions to grant IAA's motion for summary judgment.

[20] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Kennedy made no claim that IAA was liable under a theory of res ipsa loquitur.

Tavitas, Judge.

Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.