NAHRWOLD v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Victoria L. Nahrwold (“Nahrwold”) brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the denial of her motion for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 29, 2022, the State arrested Nahrwold and charged her with various drug, handgun and theft felonies in addition to a drug related misdemeanor. On August 3, 2022, an initial hearing was held where counsel was appointed for Nahrwold, a pretrial conference was set for October 7, 2022, and a jury trial was set for November 18, 2022. At the pretrial conference, Nahrwold's counsel informed the trial court of his intent to file a motion to suppress “either hopefully by the end of today or by the first of next week.” Tr. Vol. II p. 14. Nahrwold's counsel further stated that “we may end up having a different [trial] date with enough time to [hear] that suppression issue.” Id. In order to set a hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court asked Nahrwold's counsel, “How long would the suppression take?” Id. Nahrwold's counsel responded, “Probably a maximum of two hours.” Id. The trial court then asked, “You are going to file [the motion to suppress], right?” to which Nahrwold's counsel responded, “I am.” Id. As a result, the trial court converted the November 18 trial date to a pretrial conference and set a two-hour hearing for December 15, 2022 “in anticipation of [Nahrwold's] [m]otion to [s]uppress[,]” without an objection from Nahrwold. Id. at 15.

[3] The November 18 pretrial conference was held, and Nahrwold's counsel informed the trial court that he “got [the motion to suppress] finished” and that “[i]t will be filed before the day's over today.” Id. at 18. The trial court then asked the attorneys whether there was a need “to set another date” before the suppression hearing took place to which Nahrwold's attorney responded that there was no need. Id. The trial court also conducted a bond review hearing and denied Nahrwold's request to reduce her bond.

[4] Nahrwold filed her motion to suppress on November 22, 2022. On December 15, 2022, the trial court rescheduled the suppression hearing to January 5, 2023, “by request.” Appellant's App. Vol. II. p. 11. The CCS did not state who made the request. A CCS entry from December 21, 2022, indicates that Nahrwold's counsel moved to continue the December 15 suppression hearing because Nahrwold was ill, which the trial court granted, rescheduling the hearing to January 5, 2023. See id. at 50–51.

[5] The suppression hearing was held on January 5, 2023, and the trial court took the matter under advisement. Nahrwold's counsel notified the trial court of his intention to file a motion for Nahrwold “to be released on her own recognizance” because the period of her incarceration was nearing 180 days, and Nahrwold had not waived Criminal Rule 4. Tr. Vol. II p. 54. The court scheduled Nahrwold for trial as a secondary setting on January 10 and 11, 2023. The trial court also scheduled a pretrial conference for January 6, 2023. At the pretrial conference, Nahrwold told the court that she did not wish to waive Rule 4. The court reset the trial for January 24 and 25, 2023, to give both parties more time to prepare while still complying with Rule 4. The trial court also set January 23, 2023, as the deadline for the parties to submit their briefs on the suppression issue, to which Nahrwold's counsel informed the court that he would “get [the brief] to [the trial court] beforehand.” Id. at 63.

[6] On January 9, 2023, the State filed a motion to continue the trial due to pending laboratory test results. A hearing on the State's motion was held on January 12, 2023, and the State informed the trial court that the laboratory results would not be ready by the scheduled trial date. The trial court granted the State's motion and released Nahrwold from incarceration on her own recognizance in order to avoid running afoul of Rule 4(A). The jury trial was reset to June 7 and 8, 2023.

[7] On March 1, 2023, the trial court denied Nahrwold's motion to suppress. Following the denial, three pretrial conferences were held: one on March 3, 2023, another on April 28, 2023, and the third on May 12, 2023. At all of these conferences, the June 7 and 8, 2023, trial dates were confirmed. On May 15, Nahrwold's appointed counsel withdrew, and new private counsel filed an appearance on Nahrwold's behalf.

[8] On May 18, 2023, Judge Kukelhan disqualified himself from the case, without explanation, and appointed Judge Samuel K. Conrad, who declined the appointment as special judge. On June 15, 2023, Judge Jennifer Newton was appointed as special judge, and on July 24, 2023, she accepted the appointment.

[9] On August 3, 2023, the State filed a request for immediate trial, citing a potential Rule 4(C) violation. In response, the special judge rescheduled the pretrial conference to August 23, 2023. On August 21, 2023, Nahrwold filed a motion for discharge under Rule 4(C), arguing that more than one year had passed since the charges were filed, with none of the delays attributable to her. On August 23, 2023, the special judge held a hearing and denied Nahrwold's motion for discharge, attributing sixty-seven days of delay to Nahrwold “because of the [m]otion to [s]uppress, and then the continuance of the [m]otion to [s]uppress, which both cause[d] the trial date to be moved.” Id. at 102. The special judge issued an order effectuating its denial of Nahrwold's motion for discharge. Nahrwold filed a motion to certify the order for interlocutory appeal which the special judge granted. Nahrwold perfected this interlocutory appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Nahrwold claims that the special judge erred when she denied Nahrwold's motion for discharge filed under Rule 4(C). Criminal Rule 4 is a procedural rule implementing the right to a speedy trial.¹ See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 857 N.E.2d 378, 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). If a trial does not begin within the time prescribed in the rule, the defendant is entitled to discharge, i.e., dismissal of charges. See Ind. Criminal Rule 4. Here, Nahrwold brings an interlocutory appeal challenging the denial of her motion for discharge.

[11] “We generally review a trial court's ruling on a motion for discharge for an abuse of discretion,” Battering v. State, 150 N.E.3d 597, 600 (Ind. 2020), which occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, e.g., Small v. State, 112 N.E.3d 738, 741 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). However, to the extent the trial court makes findings in support of a ruling under Criminal Rule 4, we review those findings for clear error. See Grimes v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1224, 1231 (Ind. 2024). “Findings of fact are only clearly erroneous if there is no factual support for them in the record whatsoever, either directly or by inference.” Johnson v. Wysocki, 990 N.E.2d 456, 460 (Ind. 2013). Moreover, to the extent the “relevant facts are undisputed and the issue is a question of law, we evaluate a Criminal Rule 4 motion for discharge de novo.” Battering, 150 N.E.3d at 600.

[12] The State brought charges against Nahrwold on July 29, 2022. Nahrwold contends that “388 days passed from the day that [she] was charged ․ to the day she filed for discharge, on August 21, 2023.” Appellant's Br. p. 10. According to Nahrwold, “all 388 ․ counted against the [Criminal] Rule 4(C) period.” Id. Criminal Rule 4(C) provides:

No person can be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate exceeding one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of the arrest on such charge, whichever is later. Delays caused by a defendant, congestion of the court calendar, or an emergency are excluded from the time period. If a defendant is held beyond the time limit of this section and moves for dismissal, the criminal charge against the defendant must be dismissed. The one-year time limit does not apply to a retrial following a mistrial or vacation of a conviction or sentence following a motion to correct error, appeal, post-conviction relief, or habeas corpus proceedings. The trial court must commence the retrial within a reasonable time.

[13] “[A] motion to suppress is not automatically considered a delay attributable to the defendant under Rule 4(C): ‘[T]he mere filing of a motion to suppress does not of itself engender any delay ․ within the period of the rule.’ ” Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1150 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Moreno v. State, 336 N.E.2d 675, 684 n.10 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975)). “ ‘[W]hen determining the extent of the delay caused by the defendant's actions, we must proceed on a case-by-case basis.’ ” Id. (quoting Wheeler v. State, 662 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)).

[14] Here, the trial court attributed sixty-seven of the 388 days to Nahrwold because the motion to suppress and a continuance regarding the motion caused the trial date to be moved. Nahrwold claims that the “first trial date was vacated by the [c]ourt without sufficient explanation” because Nahrwold did not request that the trial date be vacated and, by that point, “no motion to suppress was filed” and “no arguments for suppression were presented to the [t]rial [c]ourt.” Appellant's Br. p. 12. Therefore, Nahrwold asserts that the trial court's vacation of the trial date “was premature” and “not warranted.” Id. We disagree.

[15] The record clearly reveals that at the October 7, 2022, pretrial conference, Nahrwold's counsel informed the trial court of his intent to file the motion to suppress which spurred a discussion about the time needed to conduct the suppression hearing. Nahrwold's counsel informed the trial court he anticipated that the suppression hearing would take two hours of court time and was concerned that there would be insufficient time to conduct the hearing during the November 18, 2022, pretrial conference. In reliance upon Nahrwold's counsel's representations, the trial court converted the November 18, 2022, jury trial date to a pretrial conference and set a two-hour suppression hearing on December 15, 2022. Therefore, the delay caused by the vacation of the trial date and the trial court setting a two-hour hearing for the motion to suppress was attributed to Nahrwold. See Curtis, 948 N.E.2d at 1150 (noting “a pretrial motion's proximity to a set trial date weighs in favor of attributing a delay to a defendant”).

[16] Nahrwold further argues that the motion to suppress and the hearing on the motion “did not cause a delay attributable to Nahrwold ․ [because] no trial date was set during the time that Nahrwold filed her [m]otion to [s]uppress or argued her [m]otion to [s]uppress.” Appellant's Br. p. 14. Because the trial court set trial dates without ruling upon Nahrwold's motion to suppress, Nahrwold claims that her motion and the subsequent hearing on the motion “did not cause delays ․ attributable to Nahrwold.” Id. at 15. We again disagree. Nahrwold overlooks that the original trial date was vacated to accommodate her motion to suppress. Moreover, Nahrwold later moved to continue the suppression hearing, which was granted and caused the trial court to postpone the hearing until January 5, 2023, and eventually schedule the trial for January 23, 2023. Therefore, the delay caused by rescheduling the suppression hearing was also attributed to Nahrwold. See Carr v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1096, 1101 (Ind. 2010) (finding no error in the trial court's decision to charge both delays to the defendant when both delays resulted from the defendant filing a motion to continue on two separate occasions).

[17] Finally, Nahrwold contends that “releasing Nahrwold on her own recognizance for Criminal Rule 4(A) purposes ․ indicates that the [t]rial [c]ourt did not find any delays attributable to Nahrwold.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. Once again, we disagree. The trial court's decision to release Nahrwold under Rule 4(A) does not nullify the delays attributed to Nahrwold for Rule 4(C) purposes. Rule 4(A) provides:

If a defendant is detained in jail on a pending charge, a trial must be commenced no later than 180 days from the date the criminal charge against the defendant is filed, or from the date of arrest on such charge, whichever is later. Delays caused by a defendant, congestion of the court calendar, or an emergency are excluded from the time period. Any defendant detained beyond the time period of this section must be released on recognizance but continues to be subject to the criminal charge within the limitations provided for in section (C).

[18] The trial court's decision to release Nahrwold was made after the State moved to continue the January 24–25 trial due to unavailable lab results. The record reveals only that the trial court released Nahrwold out of a concern that the rescheduled trial date would be beyond the 180-day limit imposed by the rule. The record does not reveal that the trial court made any findings, one way or another, that attributed delay to either the State or Nahrwold. Therefore, the trial court's decision to release Nahrwold does not support her argument for discharge under Rule 4(C).²

[19] Based on the foregoing, the special judge's denial of Nahrwold's motion for discharge filed under Rule 4(C) was not erroneous.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Effective January 1, 2024, Indiana Criminal Rule 4 was amended, but none of those changes are pertinent to this matter.

2.   Although Nahrwold does not address the delay caused by the appointment of the special judge, the State argues that the appointment extended Rule 4(C)’s deadline. Appellee's Br. p. 16. We need not address this issue given that the special judge did not consider the delay between the trial judge's recusal, the appointment of the special judge, and the acceptance of the appointment in her order denying Nahrwold's motion for discharge.

Foley, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Weissmann, J., concur.