BOND v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Leonard Bond was convicted of murder and later sought post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied relief, and Bond now appeals that denial. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The underlying facts of this case are as follows:

At approximately 5:00 am on April 20, 2013, Bond and his girlfriend, Louisa Tranbarger, went to a Denny's restaurant in Marion County. Bond had a gun visibly protruding from his right pocket. Several of the other patrons at Denny's were concerned about the gun and asked a member of the wait staff if it was legal for a person to bring a gun into the restaurant.

Bond and Tranbarger ordered drinks and then walked to the crane machine near the entrance of the Denny's. At approximately 5:30 am, Mario Wilson, his fiancée, Karen Dunbar, Annette Smith, and Carl Smith arrived at the Denny's. When they entered the restaurant and passed Bond and Tranbarger, Bond said “look at [the] old people, what just dragged in at night when they get old.” State's Ex. 4. The four ignored this statement and continued to their table.

The group was seated at a window table close to the entrance. Sometime after they had been seated, Bond and Tranbarger sat down at a booth directly behind them. Bond again began making comments about how old the group was. At that point, Wilson and Dunbar turned around to ask Bond if he had a problem with them. Bond stated that he did not, but continued to talk about old people being out at night. The other patrons in the restaurant heard raised voices and became uncomfortable, as they knew that Bond was carrying a gun.

At some point, Bond got up because he was upset and went to the bathroom. As he passed Wilson's table, Bond lifted up his shirt in a way that allowed others to see the gun he was carrying. When Bond returned, he and Wilson began to argue again, this time more loudly. This made other patrons so nervous that they decided to leave.

Eventually, Bond stood up and tossed money for his meal on the table. He then turned around, flipped off Wilson with his middle finger, and told Wilson they could take the fight outside. Wilson ignored this and continued talking to the group at his table. Bond and Tranbarger walked outside of the Denny's, but they did not leave. Instead, Bond began banging on the window next to Wilson's table with his fist and then tapped on it with his gun. Bond motioned to Wilson that he should come outside.

Tranbarger told Bond they should leave, but Bond walked back towards the Denny's. Wilson stood up and yelled, “do not let that man back in.” Id. Wilson then walked towards the entrance. Wilson then went outside, and Bond shot him three times. Wilson was unarmed.

Dunbar and Carl Smith then went outside, where they saw Wilson hanging from Bond's arm in an attempt to stay upright. Dunbar and Carl Smith wrestled Bond to the ground, where they kept him until the police came and handcuffed him.

Wilson was transported to the hospital, where he died as a result of his gunshot wounds. One bullet had fractured his left cheek and lacerated the right carotid artery, another struck his chin, and a third hit his right shoulder and lacerated the right brachial artery. The autopsy showed that Bond was more than three feet away from Wilson when he shot him. Any of the three shots would have been fatal.

Bond v. State, No. 49A04-1412-CR-554 (Ind. Ct. App. May 22, 2015) (formatting altered), trans. denied.

[3] The State charged Bond with murder.¹ Bond hired a private attorney. A jury trial was held in September 2014. Bond testified that he shot Wilson in self-defense because Wilson, who was much larger than him, kept “coming directly at” him after he told him to stop. Trial Tr. p. 290. Bond explained that it was “a situation that there was no way to get out of” and that he had “no time to deliberate.” Id. at 294. Bond acknowledged that he didn't know whether Wilson was armed and that Wilson hadn't threatened or touched him before he shot him. Bond speculated that if he hadn't fired the shots, Wilson could have “choke slammed [him], picked [Tranbarger] up, threw her down on her neck.” Id. at 296.

[4] The jury was instructed on self-defense as well as the lesser-included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and reckless homicide. The jury found Bond guilty of murder, and the trial court sentenced him to fifty-eight years.

[5] Bond appealed to this Court, arguing the State failed to disprove his self-defense claim and his sentence is inappropriate. We affirmed. See Bond, No. 49A04-1412-CR-554.

[6] In January 2016, Bond, pro se, petitioned for post-conviction relief. He later hired a private attorney, who amended the petition three times. Bond alleged, among other things, that his trial counsel failed to adequately advise him about the risks and benefits of exercising his right to trial versus accepting a plea offer made by the State on the morning of trial.

[7] A hearing on Bond's petition was held in July 2021. Bond testified that right before his jury trial started in September 2014, he asked his trial counsel about the possibility of a plea agreement. According to Bond, trial counsel was “gone for like five minutes and came back and said, forty-five [years].” P-C Tr. p. 28. Bond said that trial counsel advised him to reject the offer because he thought “we can win.” Id. Bond took this to mean that he would be acquitted. Bond also said that trial counsel never explained to him that forty-five years was the minimum sentence and sixty-five years was the maximum sentence for murder. Bond claimed that had he known that an acquittal wasn't guaranteed and that the maximum sentence for murder was sixty-five years, he would have accepted the State's offer of forty-five years.

[8] Trial counsel did not testify at the post-conviction hearing, but Bond submitted an affidavit from him, which provides:

2. I represented Leonard Bond at his murder trial in 2014. I recall that Bond got into a dispute with an intoxicated man who was larger than Bond. Our defense at trial was self-defense. I used still shots from a surveillance video to show that Bond acted appropriately. The State's position was that the incident could have been avoided if Bond had left the scene.

* * * *

5. The only plea offer I recall was an open plea to murder. I do not recall if any negotiations took place on the morning of trial or at any time during trial, but if they had, I would have informed the client.

6. I requested instructions on voluntary manslaughter and reckless homicide as lesser included offenses of murder. The court gave those instructions․

P-C Ex. 20, p. 162.

[9] The post-conviction court denied relief in October 2022. Specifically, the court found that trial counsel forwarded the State's verbal offer of forty-five years for murder to Bond on the morning of trial and advised him to reject the offer. In addition, the court found that trial counsel did not guarantee an acquittal and that Bond knew about the minimum and maximum sentence for murder from his initial hearing.² The court concluded, “Given the strong presumption given to trial counsel's advice, [Bond] has failed to meet his burden to show counsel's advice was unreasonable.” P-C App. Vol. III p. 167.

[10] Bond, pro se, now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Bond appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. A defendant who petitions for post-conviction relief must establish the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Hollowell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 263, 268-69 (Ind. 2014). If the post-conviction court denies relief, and the petitioner appeals, the petitioner must show that the evidence leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Id. at 269.

[12] Bond argues that his trial counsel was ineffective. When evaluating a defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, we apply the well-established two-part test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1280 (Ind. 2019). The defendant must prove (1) counsel rendered deficient performance, meaning counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as gauged by prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, i.e., but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. “Failure to satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail.” Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 283 (Ind. 2022) (quotation omitted), reh'g denied.

[13] Bond claims that his trial counsel was deficient for “advis[ing] [him] to reject” the State's offer of forty-five years. Appellant's Br. p. 13. “In analyzing whether counsel's performance was deficient, the Court first asks whether, considering all the circumstances, counsel's actions were reasonable[ ] under prevailing professional norms.” Conley, 183 N.E.3d at 283 (quotations omitted). Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. Id. This is because even the best and brightest criminal defense attorneys may disagree on ideal strategy or the most effective way to represent a defendant. Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001), reh'g denied. Accordingly, we do not “second-guess” strategic decisions requiring reasonable professional judgment even if the strategy in hindsight did not serve the defendant's interests. State v. Moore, 678 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (Ind. 1997), reh'g denied; see also Bradbury v. State, 180 N.E.3d 249, 252 (Ind. 2022) (“The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight.” (quotation omitted)), cert. denied.

[14] In support of his argument that his trial counsel was deficient, Bond claims that the evidence is “uncontested” that he did not act in self-defense and that “any competent criminal defense attorney would have, without the slightest doubt, understood” that (and therefore advised him to accept the State's offer). Appellant's Br. pp. 16, 17. But this is contrary to what Bond told police after the shooting and testified to under oath at trial. That is, Bond claimed that he shot Wilson, who was much larger than him, in self-defense and feared that if he didn't shoot Wilson, he or Tranbarger would have been injured.

[15] Based on this evidence, trial counsel succeeded in getting the jury instructed on self-defense as well as voluntary manslaughter and reckless homicide, both of which have lower sentencing ranges than murder. See Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-3 (2013), 35-50-2-4(a) (at the time of the shooting, voluntary manslaughter with a gun was a Class A felony, with a sentencing range of twenty to fifty years); I.C. §§ 35-42-1-5 (2013), 35-50-2-6(a) (at the time of the shooting, reckless homicide was a Class C felony, with a sentencing range of two to eight years). Trial counsel's advice to reject the State's offer was consistent with a strategy to gain an acquittal or reduce Bond's sentencing exposure, and there was evidence in the record to support self-defense (as detailed above) and the lesser-included offenses. See Trial Tr. pp. 296-97 (Bond testifying that he was “angry” at Wilson), 294 (Bond testifying that he had “no time to deliberate”), 291 (Bond testifying that he didn't think he was “hitting” Wilson when he fired his gun). Although Bond was ultimately convicted of murder, this does not mean that trial counsel's advice to reject the offer was unreasonable given Bond's version of events. Bond has failed to prove that his trial counsel rendered deficient performance.³ We therefore affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State also charged Bond with Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. Bond pled guilty to this charge in June 2014 and ultimately received a concurrent sentence of 365 days.

2.   Bond argues that the post-conviction court failed to make findings regarding two exhibits he tendered at the hearing, Exhibits 21 and 22. But as the State points out, the post-conviction court did not admit these exhibits into evidence, and Bond did not challenge that ruling in his opening brief.

3.   Because Bond has failed to prove that his trial counsel was deficient, we do not address prejudice.

Vaidik, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.