JACKSON v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Crissy A. Jackson appeals the trial court's sanction upon the revocation of her probation and community corrections placement and raises a due process claim. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2015, the State charged Jackson with level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, level 2 felony conspiracy to deal in methamphetamine, level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine, and level 3 felony conspiracy to deal in methamphetamine. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 3, 16. In February 2016, Jackson pled guilty, and the trial court entered a judgment of conviction on one level 2 count of dealing methamphetamine and on one level 3 count of dealing in methamphetamine. Id. at 16-17. The trial court sentenced her to a ten-year aggregate sentence, suspended to probation supervised by community corrections. Id. at 17-18.

[3] In June 2016, the Jefferson County Community Corrections Department filed a petition to revoke Jackson's community corrections/probation. The petition alleged that Jackson had violated the terms of her probation when she failed to report to community corrections, left her residence without permission on three separate occasions, failed to notify community corrections of her changed address, and failed to pay fees. Id. at 25-26. Following a December 2016 hearing, the trial court issued a January 2017 order finding that Jackson had violated her probation and revoked one year of her suspended sentence. Id. at 28-29.

[4] In January 2023, Jackson was still on probation when probation officers conducted a probation check and search of her house Tr. Vol. 2 at 6. The probation officers “found some guns” and methamphetamine. Id. at 6-7. That same month, Jackson was charged in cause number 49D31-2301-F2-2786 (F2-2786) with level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine, and level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. Id. at 6; Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 34-35.

[5] In April 2023, a second petition was filed to revoke Jackson's community corrections/probation. This subsequent petition alleged that her arrest and charges in F2-2786 violated the “obey all federal, state and local laws” condition of placement. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 32-33. In June 2023, Jackson signed an agreed order in which she admitted to violating probation. Id. at 59. In December 2023, Jackson entered into a plea agreement to level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine in F2-2786. Ex. Vol. 1 at 6-7.

[6] At a February 2024 sentencing hearing, Jackson acknowledged that she had admitted to possessing methamphetamine in cause F2-2786 but claimed that she had relapsed after her friend died. Tr. Vol. 2 at 6-8. She denied that the firearms in the house were hers and insisted that her son owned the firearms. Id. at 6. Jackson also presented evidence that she had completed a twenty-eight-day substance abuse recovery program during the summer of 2023 at the Hickory Treatment Center after being charged in F2-2786. Ex. Vol. 1 at 3-4. In an order signed in March 2024, the trial court found that Jackson “violated probation by being arrested and charged in” F2-2786 and ordered that she serve the remainder of her aggregate eight-year and 347-day suspended sentence in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). Appealed Order at 1-2. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanction for Jackson's probation violation.

[7] Jackson contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to serve the entirety of her remaining sentence without, in her view, properly weighing certain asserted mitigating considerations. She maintains that she should be placed back on probation.

[8] Probation and community corrections programs serve as alternatives to commitment to the DOC, and both are made at the sole discretion of the trial court. Treece v. State, 10 N.E.3d 52, 56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Indeed, a defendant is not entitled to serve his sentence in either probation or a community corrections program; rather, such placement is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right. Id. “Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h) offers the trial court the following options when it finds a defendant has violated the terms of probation: (1) “[c]ontinue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions[,]” (2) “[e]xtend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period[,]” or (3) “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.”

[9] We review a trial court's selection of a sanction for an abuse of discretion. Overstreet v. State, 136 N.E.3d 260, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied (2020). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. “When reviewing an appeal from the revocation of probation, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, and we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 954-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[10] Jackson does not dispute the fact that she violated probation again. Rather, she faults the trial court for not placing more weight upon various facts that she believes cut against the imposed sanction. Specifically, she focuses upon her addiction, which she claims led to her violation. In addition, she notes her depression, for which she has started taking medication. She also highlights her employment cleaning houses plus her completion of a four-week drug treatment program after her arrest for F2-2786 and before her sentencing on that matter. However, it is well established that so long as the trial court follows the procedures outlined in Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3, the court may properly order execution of all or any part of a suspended sentence upon a finding of a single violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Moreover, “in determining the appropriate sentence upon finding a probation violation, trial courts are not required to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Id.

[11] Faced with Jackson's first violation, which involved multiple lesser transgressions, the trial court extended grace and ordered a one-year revocation of her suspended sentence. The instant case constitutes her second probation violation, and this time her violation involves not a technical offense but the commission of a new serious methamphetamine offense not unlike her original offenses. In her recent case, F2-2786, Jackson pled guilty to level 3 felony methamphetamine possession, which requires at least twenty-eight grams of the drug or between ten and twenty-eight grams plus an enhancing circumstance. See Ind. Code. § 35-48-4-6.1(d). After her plea, she received a reduced sentence with the possibility of further modification based upon substance abuse treatment.

[12] We acknowledge that five-plus years elapsed between Jackson's first and second probation violations, but her recent serious criminal conviction in F2-2786 indicates that she is unable or unwilling to comply with the terms and conditions of probation. Her employment ¹ , depression diagnosis, and brief treatment stint prior to her sentencing for F2-2786 do not change the fact that she violated the probation condition requiring her to obey all federal, state, and local laws. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to execute the remainder of her previously suspended sentence in the DOC.

Section 2 – The trial court did not violate Jackson's due process rights when it revoked her probation.

[13] Jackson also asserts that the trial court “offered no reasons for it imposition of” the revocation of the remainder of her probation and thus, violated her due process rights. Appellant's Br. at 8.

[14] Once the favor of probation or community corrections is granted, it cannot simply be revoked at the State's discretion. Terrell v. State, 886 N.E.2d 98, 100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Probation revocation implicates a defendant's liberty interest, which entitles her to some procedural due process. Cox v. State, 850 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Because probation revocation does not deprive a defendant of her absolute liberty, but only her conditional liberty, she is not entitled to the full due process rights afforded a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Id.

The minimum requirements of due process include: (a) written notice of the claimed violations of probation; (b) disclosure to the probationer of evidence against her; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a neutral and detached hearing body; and (f) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation.

Sanders, 825 N.E.2d at 955.

[15] When, as here, a probationer admits to the violations, the procedural due process safeguards and an evidentiary hearing are unnecessary. Id. Instead, the court can proceed to determine whether the violation warrants revocation. Id. In making the determination of whether the violation warrants revocation, the probationer must be given the opportunity to present evidence that might explain and mitigate her violation. Id. Jackson was provided with that opportunity.

[16] It is well established that the written statement requirement is simply “a procedural device aimed at promoting accurate fact finding and ensuring the accurate review of revocation decisions.” Crump v. State, 740 N.E.2d 564, 568-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)), trans. denied (2001). As such, the writing requirement may be satisfied by placement of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing in the record if the transcript contains a clear statement of the trial court's reasons for revoking probation. Id.

[17] Jackson contends that her due process rights were violated because the trial court did not explain why revocation of her probation was appropriate “in the face of her circumstances[.]” Appellant's Br. at 11. Again, she points to the five-plus years of successful probation, the death of her friend, which she asserts led to her relapse, her four-week treatment program, and her depression diagnosis.

[18] In its written revocation order, the trial court stated that it had “heard evidence and arguments of counsel[,]” found that Jackson violated probation by being arrested and charged in F2-2786, and consequently ordered her to serve her previously suspended sentence in the DOC. Appealed Order at 1-2. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the defense minimized Jackson's first violation, downplayed her second violation, highlighted that she had not “caught a new charge” after her second violation, and implied that she deserved another chance. Tr. Vol. 2 at 38. In arguing for the full revocation of her probation, the State asserted that Jackson only recently completed a treatment program to benefit her in sentencing for F2-2786 and had not done treatment after her original methamphetamine offenses. The State summarized:

I don't think what we've seen today here is someone who's ready to leave that life behind. She's not ready to talk about who provided her with the methamphetamine, and she's stating that--her statements are inconsistent with what she told the detective on the night of her arrest in January. It's her second violation. It's a serious violation. She didn't have a dime bag of marijuana. She had multiple grams of methamphetamine in her house. In her mother's house.

So, Your Honor, I think the appropriate sentence is to revoke the balance of the time, the eight--which is eight years and 29 days.

Id. at 39-40.

[19] After confirming that the defense had nothing to add, the trial court stated:

All right. I am particularly in agreement with the State. And based on the testimony today, and the evidence we heard, I'm going to revoke the remaining time of eight years, 21 days. I have a note here. She does have credit for time served for May 4th through the 26th. So that's 31 days total.

Id. at 40.

[20] Although the trial court could have included more detail in its written statement, it was “not required to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances” when it determined the appropriate sentence upon finding a probation revocation. Killebrew, 165 N.E.3d at 582. There is no doubt that the trial court revoked Jackson's probation due to her admitted second violation, which occurred when she was arrested and charged in F2-2786. Additionally, given the trial court's stated agreement with the State's closing statement, it is abundantly clear that Jackson's explanations regarding her recent plea to level 3 felony methamphetamine possession and her claims of change did not persuade the trial court to place her back on probation.

[21] Looking at the petition to revoke, the transcript of the factfinding hearing, and the trial court's written revocation order, we are satisfied that the trial court produced a sufficient written record for us to meaningfully review the reasons and evidence underlying the revocation order. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 758 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming trial court's revocation of defendant's probation where transcript of revocation hearing, which had been placed in record, disclosed that trial court revoked defendant's probation on basis of his admission that he committed actions alleged by probation department). We therefore conclude that Jackson's due process rights were not violated.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the context of sentencing, we have often stated, “many people are gainfully employed such that this would not require” employment being noted as a mitigating factor. Newsome v. State, 797 N.E.2d 293, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied (2004). In the probation revocation setting, employment may be similarly uncompelling and, in any event, trial courts need not balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances in probation revocation sentencing decisions. See Treece, 10 N.E.3d at 59.

Crone, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.