SANDERS v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] John Sanders appeals his forty-nine-year aggregate sentence following his convictions for Level 1 felony attempted murder and Level 5 felony strangulation and his adjudication as a habitual offender. Sanders raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In October 2020, Sanders was convicted of Level 6 felony intimidation and sentenced to 728 days probation. In the course of serving that sentence, Sanders was placed on work release. In May 2022, he failed to return in accordance with the terms of his work release, and the State charged him with Level 6 felony failure to return to lawful detention.

[3] The State arrested Sanders, and, in August 2022, he was an inmate in the Hendricks County Jail awaiting disposition of his Level 6 felony failure to return to lawful detention charge. At that time, Michael Baca was also an inmate in the Hendricks County Jail.

[4] On August 29, Sanders, unprovoked and with no apparent history with Baca, grabbed a mop and approached Baca while Baca watched a television. Sanders then struck Baca in the head with the mop, saying, “I'm going to kill you.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 242. Sanders hit and strangled Baca until other inmates intervened and pulled Sanders off of him. Once restrained, Sanders stated, “I'll do it again, I tried to kill him.” Id. at 174. Sanders's attack left Baca with a broken left arm, a large bump on the back of the head, and several scratches, abrasions, and bruises.

[5] The State charged Sanders in relevant part with Level 1 felony attempted murder and Level 5 felony strangulation. The State also alleged Sanders to be a habitual offender. After a jury found him guilty of the Level 1 and Level 5 felony allegations, Sanders admitted to being a habitual offender.

[6] The court then held a sentencing hearing, at the conclusion of which the court stated as follows:

There are significant aggravators. I've not been presented with any mitigating circumstances. Let me start with ․ [the] aggravators ․ The criminal history in this case is significant. Just the criminal history in and of itself. Six prior felonies and eight prior misdemeanors before we ever get to this case. The Defendant did recently violate the terms of community corrections, pretrial release or probation by being charged with escape from work release which is what ultimately landed him in the Hendricks County Jail[,] so that's a second aggravator. A third ․ is that he did commit or has committed additional criminal offenses while in custody on this case. I do agree that the Defendant has some prior history with regard to strangulation․ One of the other aggravators ․ is ․ the character of ․ the accused and in this particular case I'm looking at a very angry individual and I think that that's carried out in terms of the number of victims․ [B]ut for the three [inmates] who stepped up we would have been looking at a murder case and not an attempted murder case. I do agree that another aggravator [exists] in this case[:] ․ it was an ambush style attack․ I ․ also separately consider ․ [that] Mr. Sanders scored very high ․ risk on the risk assessment score. I do not believe he's an appropriate candidate for work release, probation[,] or other form of alternative incarceration.

Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 21-23. The court then ordered Sanders to serve an aggregate term of forty-nine years.

[7] This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] On appeal, Sanders asserts that his aggregate forty-nine-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Making this determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). Sentence modification under Rule 7(B), however, is reserved for “a rare and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam).

[9] When conducting this review, we generally defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). Our role is to “leaven the outliers,” not to achieve what may be perceived as the “correct” result. Id. Thus, deference to the trial court's sentence will prevail unless the defendant persuades us the sentence is inappropriate by producing compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense—such as showing restraint or a lack of brutality—and the defendant's character—such as showing substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of positive attributes. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[10] Sanders was convicted of a Level 1 felony and a Level 5 felony. A Level 1 felony carries a sentencing range of twenty to forty years, with an advisory term of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(b) (2022). A Level 5 felony carries a sentencing range of one to six years, with an advisory term of three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). Sanders was also adjudicated a habitual offender under Indiana Code section 35-50-2-8(b), which carried an additional fixed term between six and twenty years. Thus, for his convictions and adjudication as a habitual offender, Sanders faced a maximum term of sixty-six years.

[11] We cannot say that Sanders's forty-nine year sentence is inappropriate. Regarding the nature of the offenses, Sanders brutally ambushed his unsuspecting victim and did so with no apparent motivation. His attack left Baca with serious injuries and, had other inmates not intervened, may well have resulted in Baca's death. Regarding his character, Sanders has a long criminal history, including six prior felonies, and prior attempts at lesser placements have been unsuccessful.

[12] Sanders presents no compelling evidence that portrays the offenses in a positive light or shows that his character has substantial virtuous traits or positive attributes. Instead, he simply seeks to have our Court substitute its judgment for the trial court's, which we will not do. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. We therefore affirm Sanders's sentence.

[13] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.