IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of S.B. (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] S.B. (“Father”) and C.B. (“Mother”) (together, “Parents”) jointly appeal the trial court's order terminating their parental rights to E.B. (“Child”). They raise two issues for our review:

I.  Whether the trial court violated Parents’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; and

II. Whether the trial court's judgment was clearly erroneous.

[2] Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Parents are the biological parents of Child, who was born May 10, 2022. Child is the eleventh child born to Parents. At the time of Child's birth, Parents’ ten older children (“Siblings”) had been removed from their care and were the subject of ongoing Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) proceedings.

[4] Siblings were initially removed from Parents’ care in October 2019 after the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Siblings were suffering physical abuse at the hands of Parents. A video showed Father striking one female child with a belt approximately twenty-seven times, throwing her to the floor, and hitting her with his hands. The video showed younger siblings walking around the room while this was occurring and showed Mother entering the room, making no attempt to stop the beating. Mother admitted to knowing about Father's actions and that the discipline was excessive. She also admitted to DCS that Father had hit other children with a belt in the last month. Both Parents had used hot glue sticks to whip Siblings as well. Siblings were home schooled, but DCS found very few books in the home and no internet access.

[5] Both Father and Mother were criminally charged as a result of this physical abuse and neglect. The State charged Father with ten different felony counts ranging from Level 3 to Level 6 felonies for aggrevated battery, domestic battery, and strangulation. The State charged Mother with Level 5 felony neglect of dependent resulting in bodily injury and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. In February 2020, the trial court adjudicated Siblings as CHINS after Parents stipulated that DCS could meet its burden of proof. The trial court entered its dispositional decree in May 2020. DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Siblings in December 2021.

[6] While that petition was pending, Child was born. On May 19, 2022, nine days after Child was born, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS based on the physical abuse that had resulted in Siblings’ removal and CHINS adjudications, the ongoing CHINS cases for Siblings, and the pending termination proceedings for Siblings. Child was removed from Parents’ care that same day and placed in foster care with five of her siblings. Child was removed “due to the inappropriate physical discipline that was pervasive in the home with [Siblings]” when Siblings’ CHINS cases opened, which “ha[d] not been remedied.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 110.

[7] In July 2022, the trial court adjudicated Child as a CHINS after a factfinding hearing. The trial court based the adjudication on the determination in Siblings’ CHINS cases, Parents’ pending criminal charges, the pending termination petitions, Parents not discussing the reasons related to the removal of Siblings with their therapist and not addressing the reasons for their involvement with DCS, and DCS's inability to ensure Child's safety in the home. The following month, the trial court issued a dispositional decree ordering Child to remain outside Parents’ care and ordering Parents to participate in reunification services including “home[-]based case management, individual therapy, as well as standard conditions of disposition.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 p. 90. Child was never returned to Parents’ care since her removal in May 2022.

[8] In August 2022, the trial court issued its order terminating Parents’ parental rights to Siblings. Parents appealed the order, and this court affirmed the trial court's decision in a memorandum decision. See S.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 22A-JT-2138, (Ind. Ct. App. June 19, 2023) (mem.), trans. denied. Parents sought transfer with the Indiana Supreme Court, which was denied.

[9] In June 2023, Father was tried by jury in the related criminal matter. Father was ultimately convicted of Level 3 felony aggravated battery, Level 6 felony strangulation, Level 6 felony domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, and two counts of Level 5 felony domestic battery resulting in bodily injury to a person less than 14 years of age. He was sentenced to an aggregate thirteen-year executed term in the Indiana Department of Correction. His earliest possible release date is December 4, 2033.¹

[10] Mother testified at Father's criminal trial, waiving her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. At the trial, Mother testified that she believed in corporal punishment and that she believed such punishment is “Biblical” and “called the rod of correction.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 43. She also testified that she did not tell Father to stop the punishment that occurred in September 2019. Mother described the older children as having defiant attitudes and testified that they became violent and aggressive. Mother also admitted to using glue sticks “on the children.” Id. at 44.

[11] Throughout Child's CHINS case, Parents participated in court-ordered services but failed to make meaningful progress. At a November 2022 CHINS review hearing in Child's case, the trial court found that Parents had each partially complied with the case plan. Mother participated in services but did not demonstrate “an ability or willingness to ‘do the work’ that will address the prior physical abuse” that occurred or “her role in the abuse” or to “identify the trauma the children had experienced.” Ex. Vol. 3 p. 65. The trial court found that Father's participation in home-based services “mirror[ed]” Mother's, noting that Father's therapist was unwilling to share session notes or report on Father's goals, objective, or progress in therapy. Id. Based on these findings, the trial court found that it was difficult to assess whether Parents had made any progress in therapy.

[12] In January 2023, the trial court suspended reasonable efforts to reunify or preserve the family under Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.6(c) due to Parents’ pending criminal charges. Parents did not request any services thereafter. At the April permanency hearing, the trial court ordered that supervised visitation between Child and Parents was to continue despite the trial court's January order suspending reasonable efforts for reunification. However, on July 7, 2023, the trial court suspended Parents’ visitation with Child after approving a permanency plan for adoption.

[13] DCS filed its petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child on July 10, 2023. On September 29, 2023, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the termination petition. At the time, Child was sixteen months old and had been in the same foster home since she was nine days old. Child was in the same foster home as five of her siblings, and she was bonded to them and her foster parents.

[14] At the hearing, the trial court played the video of the incident that led to DCS's involvement and Siblings’ CHINS adjudications, which showed “Father repeatedly hitting [older child], knocking her to the floor, and continuing to hit her while she was on the floor. The video also shows Mother come into the room and remove a younger child from the room while Father was hitting [older child].” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 88. Mother and Father both invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during their testimony, but they answered some questions. Mother's criminal charges remained pending at the time of the evidentiary hearing. The trial court advised each of them that because the evidentiary hearing was a civil proceeding, the court could draw an adverse inference based on their assertion of their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. However, the trial court did not compel Parents to answer questions.

[15] Father testified that it would be in his discretion when to “use the rod of correction according to the Bible” but did not think using it on an infant would be necessary because of the lack of “cognizant disregard for rules.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 75. Father testified that he recalled testifying during Siblings’ termination case that “God requires fathers to use their discretion on what kind of discipline are [sic] used. Generally, ․ within the construct of the rod of correction. It could be physical discipline, or it could be other measures.” Id. at 79. He stated that he still held this belief at the time of Child's termination hearing.

[16] At the evidentiary hearing, the family case manager, Amy Grafton (“FCM Grafton”), testified that, although Parents participated with services, they “never did the work towards making changes and identifying the changes” needed to be made because “they have insisted that the [Siblings] were never unsafe in their home.” Id. at 119. FCM Grafton testified that it was important that Parents recognize these issues so that they do not repeat the behavior that led to the physical abuse and that “[m]erely check marking a box, merely being compliant does not demonstrate a meaningful or lasting change.” Id. at 120.

[17] FCM Grafton never recommended that Child be returned to Parents’ care due to ongoing safety concerns. She testified that Parents refused to address the reasons DCS became involved with the family in 2019, which was the excessive discipline in the form of physical abuse occurring in the home, stating, “[i]n order to rehabilitate the reasons that those events were occurring, we have to identify the underlying need” and “work to correct those [events].” Id. at 119. Parents also denied that Siblings experienced any trauma, so Parents never tried to address this trauma at any time during the case. Evidence was presented that nine of the older Siblings received mental health services within a month of their removal to address their trauma and were still in therapy.

[18] Although FCM Grafton understood that Parents were facing criminal charges, she testified that she did not specifically ask them about the charged conduct, instead stating that Parents “could talk about the pervasive physical abuse without specifically addressing the details of the video.” Id. at 125. FCM Grafton explained that Parents needed to identify the reasons that physical abuse was happening in the home and at no point did they ever acknowledge that there was physical abuse or that there were safety concerns.

[19] Cali O'Connor (“O'Connor”), Mother's therapist, testified that while Mother made progress on her goals of reducing anxiety and developing communication skills, she “did not complete the goals ․ related [to] accountability and responsibility” concerning “the substantiated physical abuse and neglect.” Id. at 93. Mother discussed these issues in general terms but not specifics. O'Connor testified that she stopped working with Mother in March 2023 due to the order ceasing services, but that even if she had continued, O'Connor did not believe that Mother would have benefited because Mother needed to change her “willingness ․ to discuss [the] details of the case” and “the physical abuse and the neglect.” Id. at 94.

[20] Child's CASA, Melissa Kelley (“CASA Kelley”), was also Siblings’ CASA and attended the termination hearing for Siblings. She testified that what “stood out” to her from that hearing was Parents’ testimonies on the first day of the hearing that they “fully intend[ed] to keep using physical discipline and that ․ was their right.” Id. at 140. However, on a later day of Siblings’ termination hearing, Parents changed their testimonies and said they were not going to use physical discipline anymore. CASA Kelley recalled Father's testimony during that hearing that “stopping the use of physical discipline in its entirety was contrary to the word of God and infring[ed] upon his ability to follow the Bible.” Id. at 141. She also stated that Father had testified that what is appropriate discipline is “a very sticky issue” and that was “why the father should be the major arbiter” as to “what is or is not abuse.” Id. at 141–42.

[21] CASA Kelley testified that she believed that termination was in Child's best interest, expressing concern that Parents continued “to say that they [had] a right to do what they did” and did not acknowledge that they did anything wrong. Id. at 147. CASA Kelley also stated that she would be concerned that Child would be in danger both mentally and physically if she were to be reunited with Parents and that returning Child to Parents’ care would be “very frightening” given their lack of progress and failure to have accountability or demonstrate a willingness to change. Id. at 149. FCM Grafton also testified that she believed that it was in Child's best interest not to be reunified with Parents because, due to Parents’ lack of progress in making changes and accepting accountability in their disciplinary approach, it was not safe to place Child back in their care. She believed that reunification would be harmful to Child and that termination of parental rights and adoption by her foster parents was in Child's best interest. Child was well-bonded with both her foster parents and the five siblings she was placed with and was doing “remarkably well.” Id. at 122.

[22] On December 14, 2023, the trial court issued its order terminating Parents’ parental rights to Child. Mother and Father now jointly appeal.

Discussion and Decision

I. Violation of Fifth Amendment

[23] Parents assert that their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated because they claim that, in order to reunify with Child, DCS and the trial court required Parents’ admission of guilt or wrongdoing with respect to the physical discipline of Siblings. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a person from being “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Generally, in any proceeding—civil or criminal—the Fifth Amendment protects an individual from being forced to answer questions when the answers might be used in a future criminal proceeding. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 46 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. We review a Fifth Amendment challenge de novo. See id. at 45.

[24] The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to “protect children, not punish parents.” In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 580 (Ind. 2017). Thus, in a CHINS proceeding, a court cannot compel a parent to admit to a crime if that admission could be used against the parent in a future criminal proceeding. See In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 46–47. When a Fifth Amendment violation claim is raised in a CHINS proceeding, the question is whether any court action forced the parent to choose between losing his parental rights and waiving his right against self-incrimination. Id. at 47. A court-ordered case plan that mandates admission of culpability for family reunification violates the Fifth Amendment, whereas a case plan that requires meaningful therapy for family reunification does not. Id. Although a trial court cannot compel a parent to admit to a crime, in a civil proceeding, the court can draw a negative inference from a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id.

[25] Our Supreme Court addressed the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in In re Ma.H. There, the oldest stepdaughter of a blended family alleged long-term sexual abuse by the father, and DCS removed the nine children from the home. Id. at 44. After the children were found to be CHINS, the father was ordered to complete services, including sex offender treatment. Id. He began treatment but stopped attending when the program required him to admit wrongdoing following a polygraph test that showed deceptive responses. Id. at 45. The mother continued to support the father and disbelieve the abuse allegations, and the father never completed sex offender treatment. Id. Both parents appealed the termination of their parental rights and argued that the father's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated. Id. at 46. The Indiana Supreme Court, however, held that there was no Fifth Amendment violation because the trial court's order did not compel the father to admit to a crime, and instead, only required him to select and complete a course of sex offender treatment. Id. at 47. The father voluntarily chose the specific program and took a polygraph test, and there was no evidence that he sought alternative programs or that no other options were available that did not require admission of guilt. Id. In affirming the trial court, our Supreme Court distinguished between court orders mandating admission of culpability (which would violate the Fifth Amendment) and those requiring meaningful therapy (which do not) and concluded that because the order in the case fell into the latter category, it did not violate the father's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 47–48.

[26] Here, as in In re Ma.H., the trial court's order did not compel Parents into a specific program that required them to confess to a crime or admit guilt as part of their treatment. Instead, the order required Parents to engage in services toward family reunification including therapy and home-based case management. Part of these services required Parents to take meaningful steps to address the reasons for the removal of both Child and Siblings from their care, which was the excessive physical discipline, and work toward the goal of using other non-excessive ways to discipline Child. Although Parents continued to participate in services throughout the case until services were ordered to be stopped, Parents never made sufficient progress in addressing the reasons for removal or in identifying any changes that needed to be made for Child to be safe in their care. We note that the trial court in this case did draw an adverse inference for each question that Parents did not answer, as it was allowed to do. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 96. However, Parents’ parental rights to Child were not terminated because they were compelled to make incriminating statements but, instead, because they failed to meaningfully engage with services or take accountability for past conduct. Additionally, the circumstances here are similar to those in In re Ma.H. in that Parents point to no evidence that they sought out alternative programs that would better address their parenting issues, that they requested DCS to provide them with other options, or that there were no other treatment programs available that would better assist them in becoming fit parents. See In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 47.

[27] In light of these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not violate Parents’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when it issued its order terminating their parental rights to Child.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[28] While the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise their children, the law allows for the termination of parental rights based on a parent's inability or unwillingness to meet parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005); In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Thus, parental rights are subordinated to the child's interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re. J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the child. In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1231. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[29] As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts ․” E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). In evaluating the trial court's findings and conclusions for an order terminating parental rights, we review only for clear error, and we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” Id. If the evidence and reasonable inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State must allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a [CHINS];

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State's burden of proof for establishing these allegations is one of clear and convincing evidence. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Moreover, “if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added). Further, because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written such that, to properly effectuate the termination of parental rights, the trial court need only find one of the three requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) has been established by clear and convincing evidence, we need not address all of the requirements if we find that one has been proven. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B); A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1157 n.6.

A. Conditions for Removal Not Remedied

[30] Parents do not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, so they have waived any arguments relating to the unchallenged findings, and we therefore accept all of the trial court's findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting this court accepts unchallenged trial court findings as true). Instead, Parents first argue that the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the removal of Child and the reasons for placement outside of the home would not be remedied was not supported by sufficient evidence. In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, a court engages in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, the court must determine what conditions led to the child's placement and retention in foster care, and second, the court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id.

[31] In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing a parent's recent improvements against “ ‘habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.’ ” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). Under this rule, “[trial] courts have properly considered evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment.” In re D.B., 942 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[32] In addition, DCS need not provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it must establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “We entrust th[e] delicate balance to the [trial] court, which has [the] discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. When determining whether the conditions resulting in removal would be remedied, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the offers of help from DCS or the service providers. D.B., 942 N.E.2d at 873.

[33] Here, Child was removed from Parents’ care in May 2022, nine days after her birth, based on the circumstances of the CHINS cases involving Siblings and that Parents were facing criminal charges because of the extensive and excessive physical discipline occurring in the home. Child has continued to remain outside of Parents’ care for sixteen months because of their failure to acknowledge the harm that Father's excessive physical punishment had on Siblings or can have on children in general, continued belief in that degree of corporal punishment, failure to make progress in the services provided by DCS, and DCS's continued safety concerns for Child.

[34] The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing revealed that both Mother and Father continued to express their belief in corporal punishment as a Biblical mandate, with Father testifying at Child's evidentiary hearing that he would use the “rod of correction” at his discretion. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 79. And there was no indication that they believed the degree of corporal punishment Father previously administered to the Siblings—which resulted in felony convictions—constituted an excessive degree of corporal punishment. Throughout the case, Parents consistently failed to acknowledge the harm caused to their children, denying that Siblings experienced trauma or were unsafe in their care. Although Parents participated in services, they made little progress toward reunification with Child. FCM Grafton testified that Parents did not identify necessary changes for Child's safety in their care, insisting their children had never been unsafe in their home. O'Connor, Mother's therapist, reported that Mother did not complete goals in her treatment program related to “accountability and responsibility” for the substantiated physical abuse and neglect. Id. at 93. Because safety concerns persisted, FCM Grafton never recommended Child's return to Parents’ care due to the risk of physical abuse. Father's thirteen-year incarceration for his convictions based on abuse of Siblings further complicated reunification efforts. Over the course of Siblings’ and Child's CHINS cases, neither Mother nor Father demonstrated meaningful accountability, with Parents continuing to believe “they had a right to do what they did” and make excuses for their behavior. Id. at 147. This evidence underscored Parents’ persistent and continued failure to address the issues that led to Child's removal and continued placement outside of their care.

[35] Parents argue that the trial court erred because they testified at the evidentiary hearing that they had changed their position and would no longer use corporal punishment in the future. However, this argument is just a request to reweigh the evidence, which we must decline. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642. Further, Parents’ compliance with some of their court-ordered services did not demonstrate their meaningful or lasting change, and the trial court could reasonably conclude that based on their historical patterns of conduct, there was a substantial probability of future neglect or abuse if Child were to be returned to their care. Id. at 643. As the Indiana Supreme Court has observed, a child “ ‘cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49 (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648). Based on the foregoing, we identify sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home would not be remedied was supported by sufficient evidence.

[36] Parents also briefly assert that there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of Child. However, we need not address this argument because of the disjunctive nature of the subsection (b)(2)(B) and because we have concluded that the trial court's determination that the conditions for Child's removal and continued placement outside of the home would not be remedied was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

B. Best Interests

[37] Parents also argue that there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that termination was in the best interests of Child. In determining what is in the best interests of the child, a trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. dismissed. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of a parent to those of the child. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. (citing In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable, stable home environment along with the parent's current inability to do so supports a finding that termination is in the best interests of the child. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d at 82. Testimony of the service providers, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1006 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. As earlier noted, before terminating the parent-child relationship, the trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child. Id. (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

[38] Our review of the totality of the evidence leads to the conclusion that, at the time of the termination hearing, Parents had not appreciably improved their ability to safely parent Child and had failed to identify necessary changes for Child's safety in their care. Indeed, Parents failed to demonstrate meaningful accountability for the substantiated physical abuse and neglect that resulted in trauma and the need for therapeutic services. Parents failed to acknowledge the harm and trauma caused by their abuse and neglect, and although Child had been removed from their care for sixteen months, Parents never progressed to unsupervised visitations with Child. As discussed above, DCS presented sufficient evidence that there was a reasonable probability that Parents would not remedy the reasons for Child's removal from their care.

[39] Additionally, both FCM Grafton and CASA Kelley testified that termination was in the best interests of Child. Because of Parents’ failure to identify any changes that needed to be made so that Child would be safe in their care, FCM Grafton never recommended that Child return to Parents’ care. CASA Kelley testified that she believed that termination was in Child's best interest because of similar safety concerns related to Parents’ failure to take accountability for their actions, their lack of acknowledgment that they had done anything wrong, and the fear that Child would be a victim of Parents’ abusive behavior if returned to their care.

[40] The trial court “need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 649 (Ind. 2015). Child should not have to wait any longer for Parents to acknowledge their harmful actions and to make changes to demonstrate that they are able to safely parent Child. The trial court's conclusion that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Child's best interests was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Conclusion

[41] We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not violate Parents’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and did not err in its judgment terminating Parents’ parental rights to Child.

[42] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father filed an appeal of his convictions, and a panel of this court recently issued its opinion affirming the trial court. See Blattert v. State, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2024 WL 3733956 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2024).

Foley, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Weissmann, J., concur.