P.T. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] While P.T. (Mother) was incarcerated, the trial court terminated her parental rights to her one-year-old child, J.T. (Child). Before terminating Mother's rights, the trial court held two hearings: one of which Mother joined telephonically and a second at which she appeared in person. During the telephonic hearing, Mother requested continuances which the court denied. Mother lodged no objections and did not renew her requests at the second, in-person hearing. Now for the first time on appeal, Mother argues that the denial of her continuance requests was an abuse of discretion and a due process violation. We affirm.

Facts

[2] In 2022, Mother admitted Child was a child in need of services (CHINS) based on substantiated allegations of sexual abuse and neglect. The trial court ordered Mother to participate in reunification services, including drug treatment, but Mother failed to comply. Over the next year, she continued to use illegal drugs when not incarcerated, left drug treatment programs twice, missed scheduled visits with Child, and did nothing to improve her parenting abilities. Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) eventually petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights.¹ The trial court held two hearings: an initial factfinding hearing in January and a supplemental hearing in March.

[3] At the time of the January hearing, and for most of the CHINS and termination proceedings, Mother was incarcerated on various drug-related felonies. Accordingly, she was ordered to attend the January hearing either by phone or in person, depending on the ability of the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) to transport Mother the three hours from her correctional facility to the court. DOC could not transport her, so she joined the hearing by phone.

[4] During this hearing, Mother made multiple oral motions to continue. At the outset, Mother requested time to consult with her attorney, alleging she only spoke with him briefly before the hearing. But her attorney insisted that they had just spoken “ten minutes ago.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 26. Mother then asked about the option of a post-adoption contract. When it was explained that such agreement requires voluntary termination of parental rights, Mother flatly rejected that option: “No, I don't agree to that. No.” Id. at 28.

[5] Mother then read a letter she wrote to the court, stating that she “thought long and hard about the possibility of adoption” but still believed she could raise Child. Id. at 29. She therefore inquired about the possibility of a third party having custody of Child during her period of incarceration. DCS rejected this as a viable option. Finding she had no further questions, the trial court proceeded with the hearing, implicitly denying Mother's motion to continue. Mother did not object.

[6] Soon after, Mother asked the trial court to delay the proceedings until her release from custody. She appeared to believe such continuance would resolve the underlying termination matter. Mother argued she was due to be released in April with time cuts, but her official release date was in October, with a period of work release to follow. DCS objected to the continuance, and the trial court denied her request, finding that it was not in the best interest of Child to delay the matter until Mother's release. Again, Mother did not object.

[7] Mother then requested to appear in person because she found it difficult to hear with her unstable phone connection. The court switched Mother to a landline to improve her connection, after which a supervising DOC employee reported she could hear “perfectly.” Id. at 41. The proceedings were essentially restarted, allowing Mother to answer all questions of her direct examination again. At the close of evidence, Mother confirmed that she heard everything.

[8] Finding Mother's phone participation and representation by counsel adequate, the court denied her motion to continue. The court took the case under advisement and ordered that Mother be transported to appear in person for a March hearing to allow her to present additional evidence.

[9] In March, Mother appeared in court and confirmed that she had the chance to speak with her attorney and the Court Appointed Special Advocate. Mother raised no issues and presented no additional evidence in opposition to DCS's petition. Instead, Mother reiterated that she did not consent to the termination of her parental rights and wanted another chance to raise Child. Following the second hearing, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, claiming the trial court abused its discretion and violated her right to due process by denying her requested continuances at the January hearing. We disagree.

I. No Abuse of Discretion

[11] A trial court's decision to grant or deny a continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, with a strong presumption that discretion was properly exercised. In re B.H., 44 N.E.3d 745, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). An abuse of discretion may be found when a continuance is denied despite a movant's showing of good cause. In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 244 (Ind. 2014). But there is no abuse of discretion when a movant fails to show prejudice by the denial. Id.

[12] Mother did not show good cause for her continuances because the trial court addressed her concerns. During the first hearing, the court entertained her questions about an open adoption and ensured she understood all aspects of the proceedings before moving forward. The court also intervened by switching Mother's phone line when she complained about her difficulty in hearing. Moreover, Mother was transported to the court in March to be heard in person.

[13] We also fail to see how Mother was prejudiced by the denial of the continuances. Mother speculated that she would have entered into an adoption agreement had she discussed the matter further with her attorney. But the record does not support this. Mother had time—two months between the first and second hearing—to review her options with her attorney. Yet at the second hearing, she presented no additional evidence and had not changed her stance against the termination of her parental rights.

[14] Because Mother did not show either good cause or prejudice, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying her continuances.

II. No Due Process Violation

[15] A parent's right to raise their child is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; In re A.H., 751 N.E.2d 690, 701 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Accordingly, the State must adhere to the requirements of Due Process when seeking to terminate parental rights. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011). “[T]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).

[16] On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court violated her right to due process when, during the first hearing, it denied her motions for continuances to consult with her attorney and attend in person. In response, DCS argues that Mother has waived such claim by making it for the first time on appeal.

[17] We agree that Mother has waived her claim. See Pigg v. State, 929 N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (due process claims generally waived when raised for first time on appeal); see also McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 194-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (procedural due process claim waived by failing to raise issues or argue those issues constituted due process violations in the trial court).

[18] Mother, represented by counsel, did not claim a due process violation in the trial court in response to the denial of her requested continuances. In fact, she did not object to the denials at all, during either hearing. This waived her claim.

[19] Waiver notwithstanding, we find no error here. Mother was given ample opportunity to be heard at her two hearings. Her telephonic connection issues were resolved and the proceedings were essentially restarted to ensure her meaningful participation in the first hearing. She was then given another chance to consult with her counsel and present evidence at her second hearing. Throughout all the proceedings, she was represented by counsel.

[20] Finding no due process violation, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Affirmed

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father's parental rights were terminated by default. He does not join in this appeal.

Weissmann, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.