KIRKLAND v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Dohjae William Kirkland (Kirkland), appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony, Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Kirkland presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting certain statements made by the investigating officers.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] In September 2022, Detective William Wogan (Detective Wogan) with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department was tasked with locating Kirkland and serving him with an arrest warrant. On September 27, 2022, Detective Wogan noticed Kirkland enter a home. The detective set up an arrest unit and called the occupants of the residence to exit the home. Kirkland exited the residence while wearing a black holster on his waistband. After obtaining a search warrant for the residence, law enforcement located a SIG Sauer pistol and a loaded magazine wedged in the living room couch. In the bedroom, they found a Glock handgun inside a purse and a purple holster on top of a Glock gun box. Inside the Glock gun box, the officers located three loaded magazines, a box of live ammunition, and some loose rounds. They also found a rifle round inside a plastic tote, two live rounds on a nightstand, live rounds inside a backpack, a gun cleaning kit inside a backpack, a live round on the floor, and a Taurus gun box in a hallway closet. Inside the residence, the officers also located mail addressed to Kirkland. A search warrant for Kirkland's Facebook page yielded a photo—posted a day before his arrest warrant was executed—of Kirkland wearing a holster and magazine on his pants. Further investigation of the firearms collected in the residence revealed “moderate support” of Kirkland's DNA being on the sight barrel, rear slide, top round, and magazine of one of the firearms. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 243).

[5] On January 22, 2024, the trial court conducted a jury trial. During the proceedings, Detective Wogan listed as his credentials that he was a member of the Indiana Crime Guns Task Force and testified that he became familiar with Kirkland when trying to locate him to serve an active warrant. Detective Wogan explained that he set up an arrest unit outside the residence and ordered the occupants of the house to exit the residence. Sergeant Jose Navarro (Sergeant Navarro) testified that he was also a member of the Indiana Crime Guns Task Force and informed the jury that he became familiar with Kirkland because Detective Wogan had opened an investigation of him. Sergeant Navarro assisted with surveillance on September 27, 2022. Detective Jonathan Phelps (Detective Phelps) testified that he was assigned to the Indiana Crime Guns Task Force, and that he was in charge of Kirkland's investigation. At the close of the bifurcated jury trial, the jury found Kirkland guilty as charged. On February 22, 2024, the trial court sentenced Kirkland to nine years in the Department of Correction.

[6] Kirkland now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[7] Kirkland contends that the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting certain statements made by the investigating officers. Specifically, Kirkland focuses on the officers’ testimony establishing that “Kirkland was the subject of an active arrest warrant; (2) the Indiana Crime Guns Task Force had an open investigation on Kirkland; (3) Kirkland was under surveillance; and (4) the police called Kirkland out of a house on the day of his arrest.” (Appellant's Br. p. 10).

[8] Kirkland failed to object to this testimony at trial but now argues that the admission of this evidence constitutes fundamental error. When a defendant fails to object to the admission of evidence, he waives review of the issue on appeal unless he can demonstrate fundamental error. See Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013). The fundamental error exception is

extremely narrow[ ] and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process. The error claimed must either make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process. This exception is available only in egregious circumstances.

Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

[9] Mindful of this heightened burden of proof, Kirkland argues that the contested testimony of Detective Wogan, Sergeant Navarro, and Detective Phelps made a fair trial impossible because their statements that Kirkland was the subject of an active arrest warrant, that he was under surveillance, and that he was the target of a police investigation by members of the Indiana Crime Guns Task Force invited the jury to make the forbidden inference which Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b)(1) seeks to prevent. Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Evid. R. 404(b)(1). Such evidence may be admitted, however, “for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2). Evidence Rule 404(b) is designed to prevent the jury from making the “forbidden inference” that prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt. Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 681. Evidence Rule 404(b) seeks to “prevent[ ] the State from punishing people for their character, and evidence of extrinsic offenses poses the danger that the jury will convict the defendant because ․ he has a tendency to commit other crimes.” Bassett v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (Ind. 2003) (internal quotation omitted). “The effect of Rule 404(b) is that evidence is excluded only when it is introduced to prove the forbidden inference of demonstrating the defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime.” Laird v. State, 103 N.E.3d 1171, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Rogers v. State, 897 N.E.2d 955, 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), trans. denied.

[10] Here, the officers’ statements that they were members of the Indiana Crime Guns Task Force assigned to serve an active warrant on Kirkland, had placed Kirkland under surveillance, and had ordered him to exit the residence do not amount to evidence of ‘prior bad acts’ committed by Kirkland which can trigger the forbidden inference, but rather are mere statements related to the current, ongoing police investigation in the charged offense. In essence, the statements were introduced to explain the officers’ reason for conducting surveillance on Kirkland's residence and did not amount to evidence of Kirkland's prior wrongful conduct which could have inferred guilt for the present offense.

[11] In a similar vein, Kirkland contends that the officers’ statements amounted to inadmissible character evidence pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 404(a)(1) which prohibits the admission of evidence of an individual's character or character trait to show action in conformity with that character or character trait. See Rule 404(a)(1). However, statements of being members of the Indiana Crimes Gun Task Force and attempting to serve an active warrant are solely demonstrative of the officers’ actions and are not reflective of Kirkland's character or define a specific character trait.

[12] We are likewise not persuaded by Kirkland's attempt to recast the statements as inadmissible course-of-investigation testimony. In support of his argument, Kirkland relies on case law revolving around the admission of out-of-court hearsay statements introduced by the officer to indicate the reason of his investigation. See Craig v. State, 630 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1994) (hearsay statement to show the reason a police report was made in a child molesting case); Kindred v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind. App. 2012) (hearsay statement offered as course of investigation statement); Hernandez v. State, 785 N.E.2d 294 (Ind. App. 2003) (officer made hearsay statement to show course of police investigation). Here, no hearsay statements were introduced because the officers merely described their own credentials and actions and therefore Kirkland's cited case law is inapposite to the situation before us.

[13] Nevertheless, even if the statements were admitted erroneously,“[w]here evidence of guilt is overwhelming any error in the admission of evidence is not fundamental.” Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 683 n.7. The probable impact of the fleeting references to a warrant and an investigation were minor in light of the other evidence of Kirkland's guilt. Several firearms and ammunition were found in the residence, including paperwork in Kirkland's name. Evidence offered moderate support that Kirkland's DNA was on one of the firearms. He was wearing a gun holster when he was taken into custody and a photo from his social media page depicted Kirkland wearing a gun holster and magazine.

[14] Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion, let alone committed fundamental error making a fair trial impossible, by admitting the officers’ testimonies.

CONCLUSION

[15] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not commit fundamental error by admitting certain statements made by the investigating officers.

[16] We affirm.

affirmed

Riley, Senior Judge.

[17] Kenworthy, J. and Felix, J. concur.