HOLLINS v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Donnie W. Hollins appeals his conviction for Level 1 felony child molesting. Hollins raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence a medical report created by a sexual assault nurse examiner, which report was based on out-of-court statements made to the nurse by the eight-year-old victim. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2019, Rita Coalson and her two children began living with Hollins, Coalson's boyfriend, in Marion. Coalson's daughter L.C. was eight years old at the time.

[3] Shortly thereafter, Hollins began to molest L.C. One evening, Hollins woke L.C. up from her sleep, pulled down her underwear, and attempted to insert his penis into her vagina. On another occasion, Hollins performed oral sex on L.C. On still other occasions, he would touch L.C.’s vagina and anus with his hand, and he would force L.C. to touch his penis until he ejaculated.

[4] In October 2019, Coalson and Hollins ended their relationship, and Coalson moved into a women's shelter with her children. There, L.C. reported Hollins's molestations of her to Coalson. Coalson contacted local law enforcement, and officers advised Coalson to transport L.C. to the Fort Wayne Sexual Assault Treatment Center for an evaluation.

[5] Coalson took L.C. to the treatment center as advised. The treatment center's lobby “is much like that of a doctor's office.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 101. Once L.C. had been called back into an examination room, she met with Leslie Cook, a sexual assault nurse examiner who was dressed in scrubs. Cook told L.C. that she was a “nurse” and that she was there “to provide care for you today.” Id. at 119. Cook “explain[ed] the room,” which had a “[v]ery medical looking setting.” Id. at 102, 119. Cook explained “the process” that she would engage in, and she offered to answer any of L.C.’s questions. Id.

[6] Cook asked L.C., “do you know what nurses do[?]” Id. at 119. Cook then “talked about [her] role as a nurse, that [she] needed to know what happened for medical exam[ination] and treatment.” Id. at 122. L.C. “expressed an understanding that she was [t]here for medical exam[ination] and treatment, stating that nurses help people.” Id.

[7] Cook then asked L.C. why L.C. was there, and L.C. responded in relevant part as follows:

One time somebody touched my pee pee—his name is Donnie. My mom used to be with Donnie. My mom didn't know about it. My mom [and] brother were sleeping. He touched it (clarifies “pee-pee”)[.] He started rubbing it [and] stuff and I didn't like it. He was touching where I pee—his hand—on my skin. Sometimes he would tell me like to take off my clothes and sometimes he would reach down my pants․ Where he did all the things it hurted [sic]. His hands [and] fingers were doing it—sticking it up my butt․ He wanted me to suck it or play with it (clarifies “his wee-wee”)[.] I didn't want to but he made me. Like suck on it like a lollipop—put my mouth on it or rub it ․ Stuff came out of it, the top of it ․ It was in my mouth. I tried to spit it out but he wouldn't let me ․ He tried to put it (clarifies “wee-wee”) in my pee-pee [and] my butt. I said it hurted [sic] and he said he wanted to do it again when I was older. He said he wanted to get me pregnant when I got older. He always wanted me to keep it a secret. He said he wanted to get me pregnant doing that. I didn't like it [and] I didn't want to even think about it․

Ex. Vol. 1, pp. 63-65. Cook recorded L.C.’s response as “patient history” in her examination form.

[8] The State charged Hollins with Level 1 felony child molesting. Coalson, L.C., and Cook testified at his ensuing jury trial. The trial court admitted Cook's testimony as to L.C.’s statements to her at the treatment center and the accompanying examination form over Hollins's objections.

[9] The jury found Hollins guilty of Level 1 felony child molesting. After a sentencing hearing, the court entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced Hollins to fifty years with two years suspended. This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[10] Hollins appeals the trial court's admission of evidence against him. A trial court has broad discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and its decisions are reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Ind. 2021). We will reverse only if the trial court's ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it and the errors affect a party's substantial rights. Id.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence L.C.’s out-of-court statements to Cook.

[11] Hollins specifically argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted Cook to testify to L.C.’s out-of-court statements to her at the treatment center, which testimony was accompanied by the admission of Cook's examination form in which Cook had written down L.C.’s statements.

[12] Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay is generally inadmissible. See Evid. R. 802. However, Evidence Rule 803(4) permits statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment to be admitted into evidence, even when the declarant is available. As our Supreme Court has explained:

[Such] statements must be made by persons who are seeking medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Rule 803(4)’s exception is grounded in a belief that the declarant's self-interest in obtaining proper medical treatment makes such a statement reliable enough for admission at trial—more simply put, Rule 803(4) reflects the idea that people are unlikely to lie to their doctors because doing so might jeopardize their opportunity to be made well. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356, 112 S. Ct. 736, 116 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1992) (“a statement made in the course of procuring medical services, where the declarant knows that a false statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of credibility”).

VanPatten v. State, 986 N.E.2d 255, 260 (Ind. 2013) (some quotation marks and citations omitted).

[13] To have an out-of-court statement to a medical professional admitted into evidence under Rule 803(4), the State must first show that “the declarant [was] motivated to provide truthful information in order to promote diagnosis [or] treatment.” Id. For most declarants, such as adults, “this is generally a simple matter,” as seeking medical treatment in the first instance is usually indicative of a subjective belief that statements made to the medical professional will be for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment. Id. at 260-61.

[14] But more is required when the declarant is “a young child brought to the medical provider by a parent.” Id. at 261. As our Supreme Court has made clear:

young children may not understand the nature of the examination, the function of the examiner, and may not necessarily make the necessary link between truthful responses and accurate medical treatment. In that circumstance, there must be evidence that the declarant understood the professional's role in order to trigger the motivation to provide truthful information. This evidence does not necessarily require testimony from the child-declarant; it may be received in the form of foundational testimony from the medical professional detailing the interaction between him or her and the declarant, how he or she explained his role to the declarant, and an affirmation that the declarant understood that role. But whatever its source, this foundation must be present and sufficient.

Id. (emphases added; quotation marks and citations omitted).

[15] According to Hollins, the State failed to provide a sufficient foundation for the admission of Cook's evidence because “[n]o evidence was presented that [L.C.] knew she was seeking medical diagnosis or treatment rather than simply allowing the authorities to gather evidence of what Hollins had allegedly done to her.” Appellant's Br. at 15. But Hollins is mistaken. Our Supreme Court in VanPatten made clear that foundational testimony from the medical care provider that the child “understood” the care provider's role is sufficient to permit the care provider to relay to the fact-finder the child's out-of-court statements. 986 N.E.2d at 261. Here, Cook testified that she had asked L.C., “do you know what nurses do”; that she then “talked about [her] role as a nurse, that [she] needed to know what happened for medical exam[ination] and treatment”; and that L.C. “expressed an understanding that she was [t]here for medical exam[ination] and treatment, stating that nurses help people.” Id. at 119, 122.

[16] Accordingly, the State presented a sufficient foundation for the admission of Cook's testimony and examination form under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(4). The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in the admission of that evidence, and we affirm Hollins's conviction.

[17] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.