CHANDLER v. STATE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Travis S. Chandler appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court following his guilty plea to level 5 felony operating a motor vehicle as a habitual traffic violator. He contends that the court abused its discretion by failing to consider several mitigating circumstances in its sentencing determination. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 7, 2020, Chandler operated a motor vehicle in Brown County, knowing that his driving privileges had been forfeited for life. In January 2021, the State charged Chandler with level 5 felony operating a motor vehicle after forfeiture of license for life. At his initial hearing, a plea of not guilty was entered on his behalf. Later in 2021, in a separate case from Monroe County, Chandler was granted specialized driving privileges (SDP), allowing him to operate a motor vehicle until 8:30 p.m.

[3] In February 2022, Chandler and the State entered into a felony pretrial diversion agreement in the instant case. Under the terms of the agreement, Chandler was to “[c]ommit no criminal offenses for a period of thirty-six (36) months[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 37. However, in March 2023, the State filed a notice of withdrawal of the agreement based on a citation Chandler had received in January 2023 while driving in Monroe County. Chandler had allegedly operated a vehicle “outside the boundaries” of his SDP. Tr. Vol. 2 at 35. The citation led to Chandler being charged in Monroe County with class C misdemeanor violation of driving conditions. Chandler was convicted of the offense in May 2023.

[4] On February 5, 2024, Chandler withdrew his not-guilty plea and pled guilty to level 5 felony operating a motor vehicle as a habitual traffic violator. In exchange, the State dismissed the remaining count and recommended that the executed portion of Chandler's sentence not exceed one year but left his sentence open to argument by the parties. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 73.

[5] At the sentencing hearing held on March 5, the trial court found as aggravating circumstances Chandler's criminal history, “delinquent behavior[,]” recent conviction for operating a vehicle in violation of conditions, and violations of probation and parole. Appealed Order at 1. The court found Chandler's guilty plea to be a mitigating circumstance but noted that he had “receive[d] a benefit [from the plea] in the form of a cap [on his sentence] of one year executed.” Id. The court also found that his risk to reoffend was high. The court “considered” the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced Chandler to a four-year term of imprisonment, with 180 days executed in the Brown County Jail and the balance suspended to probation. Id. This appeal ensued. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.¹

Discussion and Decision

[6] Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-6(b) provides that a “person who commits a Level 5 felony ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between one (1) and six (6) years, with the advisory sentence being three (3) years.” In sentencing Chandler to four years, with 180 days executed in the Brown County Jail and the balance suspended to probation, the trial court imposed a sentence that was slightly above the advisory sentence permitted by statute. In challenging his sentence, Chandler contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider several mitigating circumstances.

[7] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. As long as a defendant's sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions drawn therefrom. Id. A trial court may abuse its discretion by failing to enter a sentencing statement, identifying aggravators and mitigators that are unsupported by the record, omitting reasons from the sentencing statement that are clearly supported by the record, or entering reasons in the sentencing statement that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91.

[8] “When a defendant offers evidence of mitigators, the trial court has the discretion to determine whether the factors are mitigating, and it is not required to explain why it does not find the proffered factors to be mitigating.” Johnson v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citation and quotations omitted), trans. denied (2007). The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's arguments as to what constitutes a mitigating factor and is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors as the defendant does. Healey v. State, 969 N.E.2d 607, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. A defendant who alleges that the trial court failed to identify a mitigating factor has the burden to establish that the proffered factor is both significant and “clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493.

[9] Chandler claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find four potential mitigating circumstances: (1) his physical condition; (2) the hardship incarceration would impose on himself and his family; (3) his “character and attitudes” indicate that he is unlikely to reoffend; and (4) he “led a law-abiding life for a substantial period” of time before he committed the instant offense. Appellant's Br. at 7.

[10] Turning first to Chandler's physical condition, Chandler testified at sentencing that in 2021, he was involved in a motorcycle accident and sustained a double compound fracture to his leg, a broken back, and a collapsed lung. Chandler asserts that the trial court should have considered the “lasting effect of those injuries” as a mitigating circumstance in reaching its sentencing determination. Id. at 11. However, the trial court considered Chandler's physical health when it sentenced him, stating that “I see a lot about you, especially in the wake of that accident[,] that you're ․ trying a lot harder than you used to [to] obey the law.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 121. The court then told Chandler that it was “going to ․ sentence [him] to the ․ Brown County Jail for 4 years” but showed leniency, adding that “I'm only going to sentence you to serve 180 days executed. I'm not even going to go up to the year.” Id. Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing by failing to consider Chandler's physical health as a mitigating circumstance.

[11] As for the hardship on Chandler and his family as a result of his imprisonment, we note that “[m]any persons convicted of serious crimes have one or more children and, absent special circumstances, trial courts are not required to find that imprisonment will result in an undue hardship.” Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 1999). Although Chandler desired the opportunity to work so he could pay the child support arrearage for his two children, both now adults, and also get a chance to establish a relationship with his children, he has advanced no special circumstances to demonstrate that the hardship to his family would be any worse than that normally suffered by a family whose relative is imprisoned. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to identify this factor as a significant mitigating circumstance.

[12] As for Chandler's assertion that he is unlikely to reoffend, we note that in general, this factor may be mitigating when it is based on the defendant's character and attitudes. See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(8) (providing that trial court may consider as mitigating factor that defendant's character and attitudes indicate that defendant is unlikely to commit another crime). Here, the trial court found that the likelihood that Chandler would reoffend was high. And Chandler offers nothing to support his argument to the contrary other than his bald assertion. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find this proffered mitigator.

[13] As for Chandler's criminal history, he asserts that he led a law-abiding life “for some four and one-half years” before he committed the current offense. Appellant's Br. at 12. Although a trial court may consider a defendant's lack of criminal history to be a mitigating circumstance, the court is under no obligation to give that circumstance significant weight. Townsend v. State, 860 N.E.2d 1268, 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. And here, while Chandler's instant offense may be somewhat remote in time from his most recent prior offense, his criminal history is extensive. Between 1996 and 2016, Chandler was convicted of at least nine misdemeanors and eight felonies. His misdemeanor convictions include disorderly conduct, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, resisting law enforcement, domestic battery, driving while suspended, criminal trespass, possession of marijuana, and violation of driving conditions. His felony convictions include operating a vehicle in a manner that endangered a person with a previous conviction, operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator, battery resulting in bodily injury on a law enforcement officer, criminal confinement, and operating a motor vehicle after forfeiture of license for life. In addition, Chandler has violated probation and parole numerous times. In light of Chandler's extensive criminal history, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find that his relatively brief hiatus from the criminal justice system was a mitigating circumstance. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that although the executed portion of Chandler's sentence likely has been served, the argument he raises on appeal is not moot, as he is still serving the suspended portion of his sentence.

Crone, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.