RUSSELL v. DOE (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Paul Russell appeals the trial court's dismissal of his complaint against the City of East Chicago. Russell raises three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court properly dismissed Russell's complaint based on the City's statutory immunity from his claims. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In April 2021, the City employed Russell as a firefighter. On April 23, the City required Russell to partake in a drug screen. The medical providers who conducted that drug screen reported to the City that Russell had failed his screen for the use of marijuana. As a result, the City initiated administrative proceedings against Russell.

[3] During the course of the pending administrative proceedings, the City learned of possible conflicting evidence that suggested that Russell had not used marijuana. The City also learned of possible evidentiary issues with the positive test results. Nonetheless, the City continued its prosecution of the administrative proceedings. However, in February 2022, the administrative board dismissed the City's allegations.

[4] Russell then filed his complaint against the medical providers and the City. In relevant part, Russell alleged that the City had engaged in the intentional infliction of emotional distress, willful and wanton conduct, negligence, and reputational harm against Russell. In his complaint, Russell made clear that he was “not alleging that [the City] wrongly or negligently initiated an administrative process” but that “there came a point in [that] administrative process when [the City] knew or had reason to know that [Russell] had not ingested marijuana.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 40; see also Appellant's Br. at 4-5. Russell thus alleged that the City had caused him monetary harm by continuing with the administrative process after having received the conflicting evidence.

[5] The City moved to dismiss Russell's complaint under Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(a)(6) (2021), which provides that a governmental entity “is not liable if a loss results from ․ [t]he initiation of a judicial or an administrative proceeding.” After an oral-argument hearing, the trial court granted the City's motion. The court then entered final judgment for the City, and this appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[6] The trial court's judgment for the City was based on Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6). Where, as here, the trial court dismisses a complaint under that Rule without having considered any materials outside of the complaint itself, our review of the trial court's judgment is de novo. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Blue Sky Innovation Grp., Inc., 230 N.E.3d 898, 901 (Ind. 2024).

Discussion and Decision

[7] The City moved to dismiss Russell's complaint under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA), specifically Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(a)(6). The ITCA “governs lawsuits against political subdivisions and their employees.” Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 852 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 472 (Ind. 2003)). Further:

In interpreting statutes, such as the ITCA, we seek to give effect to the intent of the legislature. We thus look first to the statutory language and presume that the words of an enactment were selected and employed to express their common and ordinary meanings. Where the statute is unambiguous, the Court will read each word and phrase in this plain, ordinary, and usual sense, without having to resort to rules of construction to decipher meanings. Because the ITCA is in derogation of the common law, we construe it narrowly against the grant of immunity.

F.D. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 1 N.E.3d 131, 136 (Ind. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[8] Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(a)(6) provides that a governmental entity “is not liable if a loss results from ․ [t]he initiation of a judicial or an administrative proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) We think that language is clear: a governmental entity is not liable for any loss that arises from the initiation of an administrative proceeding or “results from” the initiation of that proceeding. A loss plainly “results from” the initiation of a proceeding if it occurred during the proceeding and after its initiation.

[9] Russell's claims against the City are expressly premised on information obtained by the City after it had initiated the administrative proceedings against him and while those administrative proceedings were ongoing. Russell's claims against the City therefore seek to hold the City liable for losses that “result from” the City's initiation of the administrative proceedings against Russell. The City is therefore immune from Russell's claims, and the trial court properly dismissed them.

[10] Still, Russell asserts that, insofar as his claims against the City are premised on “intentional misrepresentation” by the City, they should proceed because Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(a)(14) provides that a governmental entity is not liable for only “unintentional” misrepresentations. Appellant's Br. at 10-11. But we conclude that section 34-13-3-3(a)(14) is irrelevant where, as here, the governmental entity has established that it is entitled to immunity under a different subsection of the ITCA on the same facts.

[11] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Russell's complaint against the City.

[12] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Brown, J., concur.