IN RE: the Matter of N.T. (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.U. (“Mother”) is the biological mother of N.T., N.U., N.W., and N.C.W. (collectively, “the Children”).¹ The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned the juvenile court to have the Children found to be children in need of services (“CHINS”) after it had received information that Mother had been selling and using illegal drugs out of her home and had been abusive to one of the Children. After a fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court found the Children to be CHINS. Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the juvenile court's determination that the Children are CHINS. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In February of 2023, DCS received a report that Mother had been selling and using illegal drugs from the home where she and the Children were living, that Mother had been physically abusive to one of the Children, and Mother had been neglecting the Children. Two months later, DCS petitioned the juvenile court to find the Children to be CHINS because of Mother's inability, refusal, or neglect to care for the Children. The petition also noted Mother's criminal history, which includes convictions for public intoxication, disorderly conduct, and resisting law enforcement. DCS removed the Children from Mother's care and placed them in relative care.

[3] The juvenile court assigned family case manager (“FCM”) Ashlyn Ray to work with Mother and the Children as DCS investigated Mother. Mother cooperated with FCM Ray initially, but FCM Ray became concerned after receiving Mother's initial drug screen. During DCS's investigation, Mother tested positive for methamphetamines, amphetamines, cocaine, and oxycodone in February and twice in March of 2023. Thereafter, lack of communication with Mother became “a big concern” because DCS could not “ensure that the [C]hildren were [ ] safe in the home[.]” Tr. Vol. II pp. 44–45.

[4] In April of 2023, the juvenile court held an initial hearing, after which it issued a provisional order. The provisional order, among other things, required Mother to cooperate with all caseworkers, the guardian ad litem (“GAL”), and the court-appointed special advocate; refrain from criminal activity; submit to drug screens; provide signed and current consents for the release of certain information relating to the Children; submit to a diagnostic assessment and follow all recommendations; obtain a drug and alcohol assessment; and undergo a psychiatric evaluation.

[5] Mother neglected to comply with various requirements in the juvenile court's order. For example, from May to October of 2023, Mother missed 110 calls with service providers, took a total of forty-five random drug screens, and had forty-five unexcused missed screens. Moreover, the juvenile court found that Mother had “interfered with the [C]hildren's care by altering their medical and mental health records and canceling appointments.” Ex. Vol. II p. 33. The juvenile court also found that N.T. had been hospitalized four times in 2023 for mental-health concerns. Additionally, DCS attempted to provide services through Lifeline Youth and Family Services; however, Mother declined those services and alleged that she and the Children had been receiving services through the Park Center. Mother, however, refused to execute releases to Park Center so that DCS could verify the services she and the Children had been receiving.

[6] In October of 2023, the juvenile court conducted a fact-finding hearing over the course of two days (on the first of which Mother failed to appear). At the hearing, FCM Zachary Kincaid, who had taken over the case from FCM Ray, testified. FCM Kincaid reported that referrals had been opened for Mother to participate in services, including a diagnostic assessment, a substance-use assessment, home-based case services, and random drugs screens. FCM Kincaid further noted, however, that Mother had not taken any steps to benefit from those referrals, with Mother claiming that she had already set them up. Throughout the pendency of the CHINS case, Mother “refused to participate in drug screens, as well as other services recommended by [DCS], which include [․] a drug and alcohol assessment, diagnostic assessment [․], family therapy with the [C]hildren, and home-based services for Mother and the [C]hildren.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 155. FCM Kincaid also testified that “to [his] knowledge” Mother was unemployed but “that she does babysit from time to time[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 87.

[7] GAL Jennifer Young, who served as the GAL to all the Children, testified that DCS began investigating Mother due to her drug use and “the [C]hildren not receiving necessary services.” Tr. Vol. II p. 107. GAL Young further testified that she believed the Children were CHINS because she had been “concerned about the initial drug use and the constant refusal to take subsequent drug screens.” Tr. Vol. II p. 109. Mother's refusal to engage in the drug screens caused GAL Young to believe “that there is still ongoing drug use or in the alternative or combination severe mental health issues that are not being treated.” Tr. Vol. II p. 109. GAL Young noted that Mother has been “extremely combative and aggressive whenever we even try to discuss the [C]hildren or the services” and she has “interfered at every step at trying to get the [C]hildren services.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 109–10. Mother was disruptive and erratic during the fact-finding proceedings. For these reasons, GAL Young concluded that it is in the Children's best interests to remain in their current placement and for Mother to be ordered to participate in services with the goal of reunification. In January of 2024, the juvenile court issued an order in which it found the Children to be CHINS.

Discussion and Decision

[8] “A CHINS proceeding is a civil action; thus, ‘the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.’ ” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)). In reviewing a juvenile court's determination as to whether a child is a CHINS, we will “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. In fact, we will “consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and [the] reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. We will reverse the juvenile court's decision only if it was clearly erroneous. Id.

[9] In this case, DCS alleged that the Children were CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 for Mother's inability, refusal, or neglect to supply the Children with the necessary care. That statute provides that:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) The child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; and

(2) The child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that;

(A) The child is not receiving; and

(B) Is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the Court.

Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to “protect the children, not punish parents.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106. Consequently, the process of a CHINS adjudication focuses on “the best interests of the child[ren], rather than guilt or innocence as in a criminal proceeding.” Id. However, a juvenile court need not wait until a tragedy occurs before making a CHINS adjudication. In re R.S., 987 N.E.2d 155, 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[10] Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's adjudication of the Children as CHINS. For its part, DCS argues that the record establishes that Mother's conduct—or lack thereof—seriously endangered the Children and that the Children's needs were unlikely to be met without court intervention. Based on our review of the record, we agree with DCS.

A. Mother's Inability to Provide Necessary Care Seriously Endangered the Children

[11] The record indicates that Mother has failed to meet her parental responsibilities and obligations to the Children. When a parent is unable, unwilling, or otherwise fails to fulfill her parental duties, “the [S]tate has the authority, pursuant to its parens patriae power, to intervene.” Lake Cnty. Div. of Fam. and Child. Servs. v. Charlton, 631 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).

[12] Mother argues that her drug use alone is insufficient to support the juvenile court's determination that the Children are CHINS. In making that argument, Mother, inter alia, cites In re D.S., 150 N.E.3d 292, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), in which we concluded that the mother's admitted drug use and failure to participate in drug screens was insufficient to support the juvenile court's CHINS adjudication when the FCM conceded that “the basic needs of the [Child] are being met.” We, however, are unconvinced by Mother's argument because it is not just her drug use endangering the Children.

[13] The record contains evidence to support a reasonable inference that the Children's needs are not currently being met. The juvenile court found that Mother had “interfered with the [C]hildren's care by altering their medical and mental health records and canceling appointments.” Ex. Vol. II p. 33. Additionally, Mother endangered the Children because, under her care, the “[C]hildren [are] not receiving necessary services.” Tr. Vol. II p. 107. More specifically, at the time of the fact-finding hearing, N.T. had been hospitalized four times for mental-health health issues and suffered behavioral issues. Finally, GAL Young noted that Mother had been “extremely combative and aggressive whenever we even try to discuss the [C]hildren or the services[,]” and she had “interfered at every step at trying to get the [C]hildren services.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 109–10. We cannot say that the juvenile court's determination in this regard is clearly erroneous.

B. Court Intervention was Necessary

[14] When “weighing the ‘coercive intervention’ element, courts should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” Matter of E.K., 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (cleaned up), trans. denied. A CHINS finding cannot be entered if DCS fails to prove that coercive intervention is necessary. Id. To determine whether court intervention is necessary, we ask “whether the parents must be coerced into providing or accepting necessary treatment for their child.” Id. at 1262. “The same evidence used by the court to determine that a parent's acts or omissions injured or endangered a child may also support that coercive intervention is necessary to safeguard the child.” In re N.E., 198 N.E.3d 384, 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[15] DCS sufficiently proved that court intervention is necessary for the Children to receive necessary services. For example, the juvenile court noted that “Mother has refused to participate in drug screens” and “other services recommended by [DCS,]” including drug and alcohol assessments, diagnostic assessments of Mother and the Children, family therapy with the Children, and home-based services for Mother and the Children. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 155. Moreover, DCS attempted to provide services to Mother and the Children through Lifeline Youth and Family Services; however, Mother declined those services, claiming instead that the Children had been receiving services through the Park Center. Notably, “Mother has refused to execute releases to Park Center to verify the services being received.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 155.

[16] Additionally, since the opening of the CHINS case, Mother has “interfered at every step at trying to get the [C]hildren services.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 109–10. Mother has also “interfered with the [C]hildren's care by altering their medical and mental health records and canceling appointments.” Ex. Vol. II p. 33. Based on evidence provided at the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court found “that Mother has interfered in ensuring the [C]hildren receive services for their own wellbeing that she does not dispute they require.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 155. Therefore, the juvenile court concluded that “without coercive intervention of the Court, services will not be provided to remedy the use of illegal substances and remedy apparent mental needs of all parties.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 156.

[17] A parent's “lack of cooperation with DCS shows that they are unlikely to provide the care and supervision [their children] need[ ] without the coercive intervention of the court.” Matter of D.P., 213 N.E.3d 552, 562–63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Given our deference to the juvenile court in CHINS adjudications, we cannot say that the juvenile court's CHINS adjudication regarding the Children was clearly erroneous. See In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253. Mother's argument to the contrary essentially amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See id.

[18] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Children's fathers do not participate in this appeal.

Bradford, Judge.

Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.