Morgan L. Bell, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Brown, Judge.

[1] Morgan L. Bell appeals her convictions for aiding, inducing, or causing murder, a felony, and attempted obstruction of justice as a level 6 felony. She contends the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Bell and Robert Scott, III, were in a romantic relationship and began living together in January 2020. The couple separated just before July, but reconciled and began living together in a house on West 9th Street in Muncie in August 2020. On February 5, 2021, Bell, who was pregnant, had a miscarriage. She blamed Scott for the miscarriage because he had allegedly “kneed [her] in the stomach” and “pistol whipp[ed]” her during an argument. Transcript Volume III at 226. Sometime thereafter, Bell went to stay with her mother at a house on South Jersey Street “because of domestic violence” between her and Scott. Transcript Volume IV at 61.

[3] In the early morning hours of February 28, 2021, Bell picked up her longtime family friend, Brandon Hodge, and went to the West 9th Street home. Bell drove her sister's silver PT Cruiser. Hodge was armed with a semi-automatic shotgun. Bell and Hodge parked several houses down from the West 9th Street home in the alley behind the house, so as not to be detected by Scott. At some point, both Bell and Hodge exited the vehicle, and Hodge shot Scott three times with the shotgun. One of Scott's neighbors, Austin Kiser, heard two to three gunshots around 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. When he looked out his window, Kiser saw a silver PT Cruiser speeding down the alley behind his house. Kiser ran outside, cut across another neighbor's yard, and found Scott lying on the ground. Kiser observed that Scott was unconscious and had a “humongous wound in his chest.” Transcript Volume II at 70. Kiser ran back to his house and got towels in order to apply pressure to Scott's wounds while his mother called 911. Scott was taken to the hospital where he was pronounced dead at 5:01 a.m. on February 28. Police subsequently located the PT Cruiser and Bell, and arrested her. An autopsy revealed that Scott suffered gunshot wounds to his left arm and chest, his upper right leg, and his buttocks. The wounds to his buttocks, which traveled upwards through Scott's body and were consistent with being fired into him as he was lying face down on the ground, were determined to be fatal.

[4] The State charged Bell with aiding, inducing, or causing murder, a felony; conspiracy to commit murder as a level 1 felony; and attempted obstruction of justice as a level 6 felony. The State subsequently filed a notice of intent to seek a sentence enhancement for use of a firearm. A jury trial began on May 8, 2023.

[5] The State's theory of the case was that Bell plotted an express scheme to kill Scott as revenge for his cheating and abuse, and that she enlisted Hodge's help. The State presented evidence that, after Scott's death, officers searched the area surrounding where he was found. They located two spent shotgun shells and observed muddy tire ruts in the grass. In the front of Scott's garage, they found blood, a red jacket with red stains on it that tested presumptively positive for blood, and some money. Near where he was found lying on the ground, officers found a cell phone, a belt, several patches of blood, more money, and what appeared to be a smoking device. Officers also located a metal pipe with electrical tape wrapped around it on the ground. Muncie Police Department Detective Ryan Plummer testified that he and other investigators began searching for the silver PT Cruiser that Kiser had identified, and they located it outside the South Jersey Street residence around 10:00 a.m. on February 28, 2021. The vehicle was registered to Bell's mother. Officers arrested Bell after observing her and her friend, Desiree Atkins, approach the PT Cruiser while carrying cleaning supplies and begin to clean the vehicle. During the arrest, officers seized several items from Bell with red stains that tested presumptively positive for blood, and subsequent DNA analysis matched the items to both Bell and Scott. Atkins's phone was also subsequently searched and revealed that at 10:07 a.m. on February 28, she repeatedly searched “[w]hat cleans gunshot residue” on her phone's internet search browser. Transcript Volume III at 2.

[6] Muncie Police Seargent Bryan Ashton testified that officers searched the South Jersey Street home and found muddy footprints on the porch and in the house, and a pair of boots in a sink that were wet with dish soap on them. Officers also found a pair of pants, a muddy fleece sweatshirt, an empty bottle of dish soap, as well as a towel with dried mud and a red substance on it that tested presumptively positive for blood. The PT Cruiser had mud on its tires, tire wells, and the driver's side mirror. Seargent Ashton testified that inside the car, officers found dish soap, rags, a can of Armor All, and a bottle of olive oil. Seargent Ashton observed that the driver's door panel was “strikingly like gleaming” appearing that it had been wiped down with olive oil, which is something in his experience he did not “commonly see.” Transcript Volume II at 232.

[7] A search of Hodges's home revealed shotgun shells that had been burned in a barrel, muddy clothes, and a 48 Remington Sportsman 12-gauge shotgun which was determined to be the murder weapon. The State presented further evidence that forensic examinations of Bell's and Hodge's cell phones revealed that Bell and Hodge called each other fifty-four times in the three days before Scott's death, while they had only made calls to each other five times over the preceding five months. Hodge used his cellphone on February 25, 2021, to search for directions to Scott's home, and on February 28, he made internet searches for specific types of guns at 1:15 a.m. and 1:16 a.m. He later searched the news and also made internet searches for police radio codes and searched an attorney listed as “best attorney in [I]ndiana on attempted murder.” Exhibit Volume VI at 223. Both Bell's and Hodge's phones contained further incriminating videos and recordings from approximately four hours after the shooting, including recordings discussing destroying evidence and how to behave in order to evade law enforcement. Police also searched the phone of Scott's cousin, Kyler Musick, which revealed a text message from Bell two days before Scott's death that read, “thinking about killing [Scott].” Id. at 173. A search of Scott and Bell's West 9th Street home revealed a note written by Bell to Scott in which she told him to “go to hell” and “try not to kill yourself.” Transcript Volume III at 233.

[8] Bell claims that she went to the home on the morning of February 28 to retrieve some personal items and that “the killing was an unhappy accident” that was precipitated by “Scott's rage, as he attacked her and then Hodge – not at all a calculated, intended outcome.” Appellant's Brief at 9. Bell testified that Scott began abusing her in March of 2020 when he used methamphetamine. She claimed his violence against her caused her early February 2021 miscarriage and that on February 25, 2021, he stole the urn with her baby's ashes and her wallet. She admitted that she sent a text message to Musick on February 26, 2021, stating that she was thinking about killing Scott. She testified that on February 28, she wanted to retrieve the urn and her wallet from Scott's house so she and Hodge drove there and circled the block several times to check if Scott was home before eventually parking several houses away in the alley. According to Bell, Hodge remained in the car as she walked to the house and opened the garage in order to enter. She testified that while opening the garage, she heard Scott's voice and was hit by something hard and metallic on the back of the head which caused her to fall to the ground. She stated that she saw Scott run toward the PT Cruiser, heard two gunshots which she believed was Hodge shooting Scott, got up seconds later, ran towards Scott, and then saw the ”muzzle flash” of a third gunshot. Transcript Volume IV at 52. She testified that when she reached the PT Cruiser, Hodge got in the passenger seat and instructed her to “[g]et in the car,” and she quickly fled the scene with Hodge. Id. at 14.

[9] Based upon the evidence presented, the parties agreed on a self-defense instruction, which included language from the pattern jury instruction as well as language based on revisions to Ind. Code Section 35-41-3-2, which was read to the jury as final instruction No. 11. Over Bell's objection that it was “duplicative” and a “misstatement of the law under the statute,” the trial court agreed to read to the jury an additional self-defense instruction proffered by the State, final instruction No. 13. Id. at 122-125. The State objected to Bell's request to read to the jury her proposed instruction No. 6, also regarding self-defense, which was an instruction indicating that the jury should consider whether the amount of force used in self-defense was necessary based solely upon the subjective belief of the defendant. The State argued that the instruction was an incorrect and incomplete statement of law, and duplicative of the court's final instruction No. 12. The trial court sustained the State's objection and denied Bell's request to read to the jury her proposed instruction No. 6.

[10] The jury found Bell guilty of aiding, inducing, or causing murder and obstruction of justice, but acquitted her of conspiracy to commit murder. After the jury returned its verdict, the trial proceeded to the second phase on the firearm enhancement; however, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict regarding the enhancement and the court declared a mistrial as to that phase. Following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Bell to an aggregate executed fifty-seven-year sentence.

Discussion

[11] Bell challenges the trial court's instruction of the jury. Specifically, Bell argues the court abused its discretion and committed reversible error in giving final instruction No. 13 over her objection, and abused its discretion in denying her request to give her proposed final instruction No. 6. She asserts that instruction No. 13 was “incorrect, confusing, and misleading” and that her proposed instruction No. 6 “was a correct statement of the law, there was basis in the evidence to support giving it, and it was not covered by the remaining instructions.” Appellant's Brief at 10, 18.

[12] “The purpose of a jury instruction ‘is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.’ ” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 199 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001)). We review a trial court's jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 484 (Ind. 2015), reh'g denied, cert. denied. “An abuse of discretion arises when the instruction is erroneous and the instructions taken as a whole misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury.” Id. at 484-85. In reviewing a trial court's decision to give or refuse a tendered jury instruction, we consider: “(1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions which are given.” Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1144 (Ind. 2002). “Jury instructions are to be considered as a whole and in reference to each other; error in a particular instruction will not result in reversal unless the entire jury charge misleads the jury as to the law in the case.” Pattison v. State, 54 N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Whitney v. State, 750 N.E.2d 342, 344 (Ind. 2001)). A defendant has the burden to affirmatively show that the erroneous instruction or lack thereof prejudiced his substantial rights. Lee v. State, 964 N.E.2d 859, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted), trans. denied. An error is to be disregarded as harmless unless it affects the substantial rights of a party. Id.

[13] Final instruction No. 13 provided as follows:

To prevail on a claim of self-defense, the Defendant must show the following:

1. That he was in a place where he had a right to be.

2. That he acted without fault, did not provoke, instigate or participate willingly in the violence; and

3. That he had a reasonable fear or apprehension of death or serious bodily injury.

Once the defense of self-defense has been raised by the Defendant, in order to negate that claim the State has the burden of disproving one of the three elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The State may meet this burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing that the Defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief.

Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 178.

[14] Bell asserts that this instruction “improperly modified the burden of proof in order to establish a claim of self-defense by requiring Bell to prove that she (or Hodge) reasonably feared death or serious bodily injury” when the applicable statutory law provides that preventing the commission of “a forcible felony will also justify the use of force --- including deadly force.” Appellant's Brief at 13. Without citation to authority, Bell argues that “regardless of whether a person apprehends death or serious bodily injury, they can use deadly force to protect themselves if they reasonably believe it's necessary to prevent a forcible felony,” and therefore final instruction No. 13 as given was an incorrect statement of law. Id. at 14.¹ Bell concedes that final instruction No. 11 correctly tracks the statutory language in providing that a person is justified in using deadly force; and does not have a duty to retreat “if the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or the commission of a forcible felony.” Appellant's Appendix at 241; Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c). However, she argues that the commission of a forcible felony language provided in final instruction No. 11 “will not and cannot save” the impact of the “contradictory” statements provided by instruction No. 13. Appellant's Brief at 14.

[15] First, we disagree with Bell's assertion that final instruction No. 13 is an incorrect statement of the law. Indiana courts have long held that “a claim of self-defense in a homicide prosecution requires that the defendant acted without fault, was in a place where he had a right to be, and was in reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm.” Driver v. State, 760 N.E.2d 611, 612 (Ind. 2002) (emphasis added); see Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021) (“When self-defense is asserted, the defendant must prove he was in a place where he had a right to be, ‘acted without fault,’ and reasonably feared or apprehended death or great bodily harm.”). Indeed, in Dixson v. State, 22 N.E.3d 836, 839 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied, which addresses instruction of the jury on self-defense in a case not involving the use of deadly force, this Court held that while it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury that to prevail on his self-defense claim the defendant must have had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm, we acknowledged and contrasted that “a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm is undoubtedly required in a case involving deadly force.” See also Degenias v. State, 179 Ind. App. 684, 687, 386 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (1979) (“As a matter of law, the use of force which results in the death of the attacker cannot be justified unless the accused reasonably feared death or great bodily injury.”). We reject Bell's unsupported assertion that final instruction No. 13 as given was an incorrect statement of the law.

[16] We similarly disagree that instruction Nos. 13 and 11 are contradictory. Rather, they each instructed the jury as to distinct aspects of a self-defense claim, and to Bell's benefit, they both instructed that the State had the burden of disproving her self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. We discern that Bell's main concern is that final instruction No. 13, which lacks any reference to the statutory language indicating that a person is justified in using deadly force if the person reasonably believes deadly force is necessary to prevent “the commission of a forcible felony,” when taken together with final instruction No. 11, which includes that statutory language, could have caused confusion to the jury. After reviewing the record, we do not believe that these two jury instructions misled or confused the jury such that Bell's substantial rights were prejudiced. Even assuming the combination of the two instructions could have caused some confusion, given the totality of the trial court's instructions, coupled with the fact that the lion's share of the evidence directly contradicted Bell's version of events and showed that her version was highly implausible, reversal is unwarranted. To be sure, even if we find a challenged instruction to be erroneous and presume the error affected the verdict, reversal is not warranted “if the verdict would have been the same under a proper instruction.” Gammons v. State, 148 N.E.3d 301, 303 (Ind. 2020). Under the circumstances presented here, we can say with complete confidence that a reasonable jury would have rendered a guilty verdict even had final instruction No. 13 not been given.

[17] Regarding the trial court's refusal to give Bell's tendered instruction No. 6, we find no abuse of discretion. That instruction provided as follows:

When one charged with murder defends on the grounds that the killing was done in self-defense, the existence of danger to the Defendant, the necessity of defending himself, and the amount of force necessary to employ can only be determined from the standpoint of the defendant at the time and under the existing circumstances, as shown by the evidence.

Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 178. Instead, the trial court read to the jury instruction No. 12 which provided that “to employ self-defense a person must satisfy both an objective and subjective standard; he must have actually believed deadly force was necessary to protect himself or someone else, and his belief must be one that a reasonable person would have held under the circumstances.” Id. at 242.

[18] In Russell v. State, 997 N.E.2d 351, 353 (Ind. 2013), the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that a defendant's tendered self-defense instruction that focused solely on the subjective belief of the defendant and ignored the objective reasonableness of the defendant's belief, was “incomplete and incorrect” and therefore the trial court did not err in refusing to give the tendered instruction. We reach the same conclusion here. Bell's proposed instruction focuses only on the subjective belief of the defendant and fails to mention the objective reasonableness of that belief. Accordingly, the instruction was incomplete and incorrect. Moreover, the subject matter of the instruction was properly and adequately covered by final instruction No. 12. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Bell's proposed instruction.

[19] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Bell's convictions.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State does not assert waiver; however unlike her arguments in her appellant's brief, Bell's trial objection to final instruction No. 13 did not focus on or draw the trial court's attention to the “commission of a forcible felony” statutory language, nor did she argue that something less than a fear of death or great bodily injury could justify the use of deadly force in the prevention of a forcible felony. Indeed, she conceded in her trial objection that, at the very least, a defendant using deadly force must “fear serious bodily injury.” Transcript Volume IV at 125.

Memorandum Decision by Judge Brown

Judges May and Pyle concur. May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.