III v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Weissmann, Judge.

[1] William Glesing stole a high-end speaker system and later lied to police about his identity. For this, he was convicted of theft and identity deception. On appeal, Glesing challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting these convictions. We affirm.

Facts

[2] When Kathy Antle left her job at a hotel early in the morning, she learned that her vehicle, a Lincoln, was missing. She called the police and reported the vehicle as stolen. That same day, police also responded to a theft at the same hotel of a “high end” and “expensive” speaker system from James Casto's vehicle. Tr. Vol. II, p. 135. The speaker system included an amplifier, a specialized speaker box, 12-inch speakers, a pair of subwoofers, and other items needed to operate the equipment. Casto valued the system between $4,500 to $5,000.

[3] Investigating officers suspected the two crimes were connected because security cameras showed the Lincoln parked next to Casto's vehicle before the thefts. Cameras later captured a U-Haul trailer traveling alongside Antle's Lincoln on a nearby interstate.

[4] The Lincoln manufacturer was able to track Antle's vehicle via its global positioning system (GPS). Police quickly located the Lincoln at a rest stop off the interstate and recovered it. The U-Haul was later spotted in a nearby town. Police issued an alert for the U-Haul, believing it to be connected to a spate of local thefts. Later that morning, Officer Eric Surgrue observed the U-Haul run a red light, swerve on the road, and follow other vehicles too closely. Officer Surgrue stopped the U-Haul, which Glesing was driving.

[5] Officer Surgrue asked Glesing for his identification, driver's license, and registration, all of which Glesing refused to provide. Glesing also refused to exit the vehicle when requested to do so, which ultimately led to officers breaking the U-Haul's window. A search of Glesing's U-Haul revealed Casto's speaker system, the missing spare key to Antle's Lincoln, and Glesing's cell phone, which was playing a police scanner program.

[6] When asked to identify himself, Glesing said that his name was David Smally and that his date of birth was August 1, 1986. This information was found false after police viewed a Bureau of Motor Vehicle photograph of an individual with that name and birth date. When asked again, Glesing identified himself as Jason Smith, born December 1, 1976. Glessing even provided a phone number and email address. But this information did not match Glesing either. Next, Glesing identified himself as either “Daniel Smith,” “Edward Smith,” or some combination of the two, like “Daniel Edward Smith.” Id. at 166. After nearly an hour spent on the side of the road, police figured out Glesing's true identity.

[7] The State charged Glesing with multiple offenses, including Level 6 felony identity deception, Level 6 felony theft, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended, Class C misdemeanor refusal to identify oneself, two counts of Level 6 felony auto theft, and Class A misdemeanor theft. The State also alleged that Glesing was a habitual offender.

[8] Glesing proceeded pro se at his jury trial. While testifying in his own defense, Glesing admitted that he falsely identified himself to police but only because he feared going to jail. The jury found Glesing guilty on all counts and determined that he was a habitual offender. Glesing was convicted accordingly, and the trial court sentenced him to a total of four years in prison.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Glesing challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for Level 6 felony identity deception and Level 6 felony theft. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court considers only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). The Court does not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. The Court will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We construe conflicting evidence in the way most favorable to the judgment. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007).

I. Sufficient Evidence Supports Glesing's Conviction for Identity Deception

[10] To prove the crime of identity deception, the State must allege that the defendant acted “with intent to harm or defraud another person” and knowingly or intentionally obtained, possessed, transferred, or used identifying information to profess to be another person. Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3.5(a). “It is not a defense ․ that no person was harmed or defrauded.” Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3.5(d). “Identifying information” is defined as “information, genuine or fabricated, that identifies or purports to identify a person” and includes a name or date of birth. Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1(i)(1). Glesing concedes that he intentionally used identifying information to profess to be another person. He argues only that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove his intent to defraud.

[11] “Intent to defraud” means to “deceive and thereby work a reliance and an injury.” Diallo v. State, 928 N.E.2d 250, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “Because intent is a mental state, the fact-finder often must ‘resort to the reasonable inferences based upon an examination of the surrounding circumstances to determine’ whether—from the person's conduct and the natural consequences therefrom—there is a showing or inference of the requisite criminal intent.” Id. (quoting M.Q.M. v. State, 840 N.E.2d 441, 446 (Ind.Ct.App.2006)). Further, “ ‘there must be a potential benefit to the maker or potential injury to the defrauded party.’ ” Id. at 252 (quoting Jacobs v. State, 640 N.E.2d 61, 65 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).

[12] In Indiana, lying to police about one's identity is a hallmark of an intent to defraud. This is so because “a criminal suspect gains a very real advantage when ․ he is thereby able to at least temporarily hide from the authorities his prior criminal history and his true identity.” Thornton v. State, 636 N.E.2d 140, 141-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting People v. Kirk, 115 A.D.2d 758, 758 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985), aff'd, 68 N.Y.2d 722 (1986)). That said, Glesing contends that his acts were not meant to defraud because they were trivial and founded on his fear that the police were “violat[ing] his civil rights.” Appellant's Br., p. 9; see also Eifler v. State, 570 N.E.2d 70, 77-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (finding no intent to defraud where defendant merely backdated a letter with no other evidence of an intent to harm). We disagree.

[13] Here, the evidence establishes that Glesing intended to deceive the police in a bid to escape justice. This evidence includes Glesing's efforts to provide the police with several incorrect identities, using false names with various spellings and fictional dates of birth. Glesing was also listening to a police scanner when he was apprehended. Moreover, Glesing knew that he was breaking the law. He was driving with a suspended license, had Casto's stolen speaker system, and possessed the missing spare key to Antle's stolen Lincoln. And Glesing's argument that he misrepresented his identity to police because he believed he was being illegally detained is an impermissible request to reweigh the evidence and reach an alternative conclusion. Hall, 177 N.E.3d at 1191.

[14] From all this, we find sufficient evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that Glesing intended to misrepresent his identity in a bid to escape justice. See generally Thornton, 636 N.E.2d at 141-42 (affirming conviction for identity deception based on evidence that defendant misrepresented his identity to mislead police).

II. Sufficient Evidence Supports Glesing's Conviction for Felony Theft

[15] Theft occurs when an individual “knowingly or intentionally exert[s] unauthorized control over another person's property, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of the property's value or use.” Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a). Theft becomes a felony when “the value of the property is at least seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) and less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).” Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(A). Glesing argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove Casto's speaker system had a value greater than $750.

[16] Casto testified that he valued the speaker system at around $4,500 to $5,000. This testimony alone was sufficient to prove the system's value was greater than $750. See Joy v. State, 346 N.E.2d 604, 606 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (finding sufficient evidence of felony theft where the only evidence of stolen property's value was the uncontradicted testimony of the property's owner). But Casto's testimony was supplemented by an investigating police officer testimony that the speaker system was “high end” and “expensive.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 135. Additionally, the State showed the jury pictures of the speaker system, allowing it to see its quality first-hand. Glesing's argument therefore lacks merit.

Conclusion

[17] Finding sufficient evidence to support Glesing's convictions for identity deception and theft, we affirm.

[18] Affirmed.

Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.

Memorandum Decision by Judge Weissmann

Judges Vaidik and Foley concur.