A.G., Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE OF INDIANA (2002)

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Defendant-Appellant A.G. (A.G.) appeals her convictions of residential entry, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5; and battery, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.

We affirm.

A.G. presents two issues for our review which we consolidate and restate as one: whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support A.G.’s convictions.

The facts most favorable to A.G.’s convictions follow. In March 2000, A.G. and two friends knocked on the door at the home of Lee Ann Hildabridle (Hildabridle). Hildabridle opened the door, but, when she recognized A.G., she shut the door again. After pounding on the windows around the outside of Hildabridle's house, A.G. and her friends forced the front door open and forced Hildabridle to the floor. The women kicked Hildabridle in the face three times and then left the home. Based upon this incident, A.G. was found guilty of residential entry and battery following a bench trial. It is from these convictions that A.G. now appeals.

A.G. contends that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to sustain her convictions of residential entry and battery. We will address each conviction in turn.

Our standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well settled. We neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we consider only the evidence favorable to the verdict and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn therefrom. Newman v. State, 677 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the conviction. Id. A conviction may be sustained by the uncorroborated testimony of the victim. Arhelger v. State, 714 N.E.2d 659, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Moreover, we are mindful that the trier of fact is entitled to determine which version of the incident to credit. Barton v. State, 490 N.E.2d 317, 318 (Ind. 1986), reh'g denied.

In order to obtain a conviction for residential entry, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) A.G. (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) broke and entered (4) the dwelling (5) of another person (i.e., Hildabridle). Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5. A.G. challenges the sufficiency of the State's evidence on the first of these factors only.

The evidence reveals that Hildabridle testified she had been introduced to A.G. on at least two prior occasions and had seen her at least three other times. She stated that when she saw A.G. on her front porch in March 2000, A.G. looked familiar. However, Hildabridle did not know exactly who it was until she asked, and A.G. responded, “Hacia.” Tr. at 9. Hildabridle knew “Hacia” to be A.G.’s nickname. Hildabridle identified A.G. at trial as one of the women who entered her house and battered her in March 2000. Additionally, Hildabridle's daughter, who was present when the incident occurred, also identified A.G. at trial as the perpetrator of these offenses. A.G. is merely asking us to reweigh the evidence. We decline the invitation and affirm her conviction of residential entry because the State presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

Next, A.G. asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support her conviction of battery. In order to obtain a conviction for battery as a Class A misdemeanor, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) A.G. (2) knowingly or intentionally (3) touched (4) another person (i.e., Hildabridle) (5) in a rude, insolent, or angry manner (6) resulting in bodily injury to another person (i.e., Hildabridle). Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1. In addition, Ind. Code § 35-41-1-4 defines the term “bodily injury” as any impairment of physical condition, including physical pain. With respect to her conviction of this offense, A.G. challenges the sufficiency of the State's evidence of the first and sixth factors.

The evidence discloses that, as stated above, Hildabridle and her daughter both identified A.G. at trial as one of Hildabridle's attackers. In addition, the State introduced pictures of red marks on Hildabridle's face and scratching and bruising on her arm. This court has held that red marks, bruises and minor scratches constitute bodily injury. Tucker v. State, 725 N.E.2d 894, 898 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied, 735 N.E.2d 231. Further, Hildabridle testified that she was grabbed by the arms, dragged to the ground and kicked in the face. The testimony at trial provided evidence to the trier of fact from which it could properly find that A.G. caused Hildabridle to incur physical pain. Although the State introduced photographs of Hildabridle's injuries showing scratches and bruising, it is not necessary that physical trauma to the body be shown. Lewis v. State, 438 N.E.2d 289, 294 (Ind. 1982). Rather, it is sufficient that the victim experienced physical pain by the defendant's actions. Id. There was sufficient evidence to establish A.G.’s identity as one of Hildabridle's attackers, as well as to demonstrate Hildabridle's bodily injury as a result of the attack.

Based upon the foregoing arguments and authorities, we conclude that the State presented evidence sufficient to sustain A.G.’s convictions of residential entry and battery.

Affirmed.

HOFFMAN, Senior Judge

SHARPNACK, J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.