T.T. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Kids’ Voice of Indiana, Appellee-Guardian ad Litem (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] T.T. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights as to her children, A.H. and A.M. (collectively, Children).¹ Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by admitting into evidence the testimony of A.M.’s therapist about statements A.M. made during therapy. Mother also challenges some of the court's findings of fact, claiming the court based them on the therapist's inadmissible testimony. But Mother does not challenge any of the court's conclusions of law or argue that the court's ultimate judgment terminating her parental rights was clearly erroneous. We affirm.

Facts

[2] In August 2019, when A.H. and A.M. were 5 and 6 years old, respectively, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) removed Children from Mother's care due, in part, to Mother's illicit drug use. DCS then filed petitions alleging Children were children in need of services (CHINS) because of Mother's inability to provide Children with a safe and stable home and to ensure their proper supervision. Mother admitted to these allegations, and Children were adjudicated CHINS.

[3] The juvenile court later issued a dispositional order requiring Mother to submit to random drug screens and to participate in home-based therapy and case management services. Mother was non-compliant with drug screens over the next two years, and from August 2022 to January 2023, Mother repeatedly tested positive for THC and methamphetamine. Though Mother was referred to a relapse prevention program, she tested positive for THC at the program's orientation and was asked to leave after indicating she had no interest in sobriety. Mother also failed to complete home-based therapy and case management services despite multiple referrals.

[4] Meanwhile, Children remained removed from Mother's care. A.M. was placed with foster parents, and A.H. was placed with her paternal grandmother. DCS facilitated supervised visitation between Mother and Children, but Mother regularly failed to appear or was late for these visits. When they occurred, Mother was generally unengaged and sometimes behaved erratically. The juvenile court ultimately reduced the duration of Mother's visits with Children from six hours to two hours.

[5] In February 2022, the juvenile court granted DCS's petition to change Children's permanency plan from reunification to adoption by their respective placements. DCS then petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights. Among the evidence offered at the termination hearings was the testimony of A.M.’s therapist about statements A.M. made during her therapy sessions. For instance, A.M. revealed that she had been sexually abused by Mother's boyfriend, feared returning to Mother's care, and wished to be adopted by her foster parents.² Mother objected to this testimony on hearsay grounds, but the trial court admitted it under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(4)’s hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.

[6] The juvenile court ultimately terminated Mother's parental rights as to Children in August 2023, when A.H. and A.M. were 9 and 10 years old, respectively. The court concluded: (1) there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal will not be remedied; (2) continuing Mother's parent-child relationships posed a threat to Children's well-being; (3) termination was in Children's best interests; and (4) there was a satisfactory plan for Children's care and treatment.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights as to Children. When seeking termination of a parent's rights, DCS has the burden of proving the following statutory elements by clear and convincing evidence:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023); see also Ind. Code §§ 31-35-2-8, -37-14-2 (2023).

[8] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings. Id. Second, we decide whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility and will set aside the judgment only if clearly erroneous. Id. “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009) (internal quotation omitted).

[9] Mother challenges eight of the juvenile court's findings of fact, arguing that they were based on the inadmissible hearsay testimony of A.M.’s therapist. Those specific findings are:

133. [A.M.] has been placed in foster care with Brad and Hannah Stutzman since April 10, 2020. This is a pre-adoptive placement. She wishes to be adopted by [her foster parents].

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149. [A.M.] disclosed sexual abuse at the hand of [Mother's boyfriend]. She disclosed that she doesn't feel safe showering or bathing.

150. [A.M.] feels anger towards her mother and [Mother's boyfriend] and she is afraid of [Mother's boyfriend].

151. [A.M.] disclosed the sexual abuse allegation to her mother, but [Mother] did not believe her.

152. [A.M] disclosed to [her therapist] that when she resided with her mother, she and her siblings resided in unsafe environments with insufficient food.

153. [A.M.] expressed repeatedly to [her therapist] that she fears returning to her mother's care and custody.

154. [A.M.] wrote letters to her mother that adoption was in her best interests.

155. [Mother] sometimes accepted phone calls from [her boyfriend] in prison during parenting time sessions with [A.M.].

App. Vol. II, pp. 53-54.

[10] Assuming without deciding that these findings were clearly erroneous, Mother is not entitled to appellate relief because she does not challenge the juvenile court's conclusions of law. Mother also does not contest that the court's conclusions support its judgment. In fact, she makes no claim that terminating her parental rights was clearly erroneous. Mother simply asks that we vacate the judgment because: “The Court relied upon [the challenged findings] as a basis to terminate [her] parental rights and it's likely these facts impacted the Court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights.” Appellant's Br. p. 29. Mother, however, fails to articulate how the juvenile court relied on the challenged findings or how those findings affected the outcome of this case.

[11] Erroneous findings of fact are harmless if the juvenile court's unchallenged or otherwise valid findings still support its judgment. A.J. v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 881 N.E.2d 706, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); see generally Matter of C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“When the juvenile court's findings are unchallenged on appeal, we accept them as true.”). Here, the court's unchallenged findings support its unchallenged conclusions, which in turn support the court's effectively unchallenged judgment terminating Mother's parental rights.

[12] In concluding that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal were not likely to be remedied, the juvenile court specifically found:

[Mother] has had over three (3) years to put forth an effort and has not done so. She has made minimal progress in court ordered services designed to enhance her parenting ability despite multiple referrals. By her own admission, she is addicted to drugs and refuses to obtain treatment or even to submit to drug screens. She has demonstrated no motivation to maintain sobriety. Sobriety and stability remain major concerns.

App. Vol. II, p. 54. Ample other findings detailed Mother's ongoing drug use and failure to complete the home-based therapy and case management services ordered by the court.³

[13] In concluding that the termination of Mother's parental rights was in Children's best interests, the juvenile court specifically found that “[t]ermination would allow [Children] to be adopted into a stable and permanent home where their needs will be safely met.” Id. at 55. The court also identified “adoption” as a “satisfactory plan for the future care and treatment of the children,” and it highlighted that Children's “Guardian ad Litem agree[d] with the permanency plan of adoption as being in the Children's best interest.” Id.; see generally In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that “the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in child's best interests”).

[14] For all these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's termination of Mother's parental rights as to Children.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Neither A.H.’s father, J.H., nor A.M.’s father, J.M., are a party to this appeal. J.H. consented to A.H.’s adoption and was dismissed from the termination case. And J.M.’s parental rights as to A.M. were involuntarily terminated in a prior case.

2.   DCS referred A.M. to therapy for help with “aggressive and emotional behaviors.” Tr. Vol. IV, p. 104. The statements about which the therapist testified were made by A.M. orally as well as in letters, journal entries, and drawings she created in conjunction with her therapy.

3.   Because Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, we need not consider the juvenile court's conclusion that continuing Mother's parent-child relationships posed a threat to Children's well-being. See supra ¶ 7. The court's remedying conditions conclusion alone satisfies the requirements of that subsection. See In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“[T]he trial court need only find that one of the three requirements of that subsection has been established by clear and convincing evidence.”).

Weissmann, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.