Myron Mobley, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vaidik, Judge.

[1] In 1993, after a jury trial, Myron Mobley was sentenced to ninety years in prison for Class A felony attempted murder, Class B felony robbery, and Class B felony criminal confinement. In 2023, Mobley, acting pro se, filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15. He claimed that his convictions amount to double jeopardy under the federal and state constitutions. The trial court denied the motion, and Mobley appeals.

[2] Mobley contends that a motion to correct erroneous sentence is a proper vehicle for raising a double-jeopardy claim. He cites our Supreme Court's decisions in Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind. 2000), Reffett v. State, 571 N.E.2d 1227 (Ind. 1991), and Jones v. State, 544 N.E.2d 492 (Ind. 1989). But in Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 787 (Ind. 2004), the Court expressly rejected those holdings and explained the narrow scope of a motion under Section 35-38-1-15:

When claims of sentencing errors require consideration of matters outside the face of the sentencing judgment, they are best addressed promptly on direct appeal and thereafter via post-conviction relief proceedings where applicable. Use of the statutory motion to correct sentence should thus be narrowly confined to claims apparent from the face of the sentencing judgment, and the “facially erroneous” prerequisite should henceforth be strictly applied, notwithstanding Jones, Reffett, and Mitchell. We therefore hold that a motion to correct sentence may only be used to correct sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority. Claims that require consideration of the proceedings before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct sentence.

(Emphasis added). Despite the State's discussion of Robinson in its brief, Mobley returned to Mitchell, Reffett, and Jones in his reply brief, with no mention of Robinson. He does not dispute that his double-jeopardy claims require consideration of matters outside the face of his sentencing judgment. See Micheau v. State, 74 N.E.3d 567, 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that “a double jeopardy claim does not meet the ‘erroneous on its face’ standard”), trans. denied. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of Mobley's motion.

[3] Affirmed.

Memorandum Decision by Judge Vaidik

Judges Weissmann and Foley concur. Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.