M.P. (Mother) and B.P. (Father), Appellants-Respondents v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] M.P. (“Mother”) and B.P. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the Shelby Superior Court's termination of their parental rights over their minor children J.P., E.P., H.P., and I.P. (“the Children”). Parents present the following issues for our review:

1. Whether some of the trial court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous.

2. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that the conditions that resulted in the removal of the Children from Parents’ care are not likely to be remedied.

3. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that termination of Parents’ parental rights is in the Children's best interests.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Four of Parents’ children are involved in this appeal:¹ J.P., born December 21, 2017; E.P., born May 9, 2019; H.P., born October 22, 2020; and I.P., born March 29, 2022. Before I.P.’s birth, in February 2021, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed J.P., E.P., and H.P. from Parents’ care due to their inability to provide stable or appropriate housing, a lack of medical care for the children, domestic violence, and substance abuse. Parents agreed to participate in various services, including drug screens, therapy, substance abuse treatment, domestic violence education, and supervised parenting time. On May 20, the trial court found that J.P., E.P., and H.P. were children in need of services (“CHINS”) because of Parents’ substance abuse, lack of housing, and general instability.

[4] Following a substance abuse assessment, in the Fall of 2021, Mother completed an inpatient substance abuse program and began outpatient treatment. Mother underwent additional substance abuse treatment in 2022 and 2023, but her participation was inconsistent. In total, Mother completed four inpatient substance abuse programs, but failed to complete two other programs. When I.P. was born in March 2022, Parents were both using methamphetamine. While DCS had initially let Parents care for I.P., she was found to be a child in need of services and removed from their care in August 2022.

[5] Father did not participate in any substance abuse treatment in 2021. In March 2022, he underwent a substance abuse assessment, and he participated in treatment with limited success on and off throughout that year. Finally, in July 2023, Father completed an inpatient treatment program, but he was “unsuccessfully discharged” from an aftercare program thereafter. Tr. p. 165.

[6] Throughout the CHINS proceeding, Parents struggled to complete services. They were “inconsistent” with drugs screens, therapy, domestic violence treatment, substance abuse treatment, and visitation with the Children. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 72. And “[f]rom February 2023 to around July 2023, Parents continued on a downward spiral, failing to consistently communicate with DCS, visit with the [C]hildren, or participate in services.” Id. at 76. In particular, Father continued to test positive for methamphetamine, and Mother gave birth to another baby in June who “tested positive for Methamphetamine at birth and was removed from Parents’ care.” Id. “Around that time, Parents stated that they did not wish to participate in services.” Id.

[7] After a permanency hearing in August, “Parents began making some progress.” Id. at 77. “Father successfully completed inpatient substance abuse treatment” in August and “transitioned to aftercare” at a facility in Louisville, Kentucky. Id. at 78. But Father was “asked to leave” the aftercare facility after spending only a few months of the expected six-month stay. Id. Father then “transitioned to a sober living home” that did not provide any services. Id. Since Father's move out of state, his visits with the Children have been inconsistent. Mother completed inpatient treatment in September 2023 and entered a long-term aftercare program at Lotus House. But Mother's visits with the Children were also inconsistent despite her progress there.

[8] In August and September 2023, DCS filed petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights with respect to the Children. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted those petitions. This appeal ensued.²

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[9] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the trial court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[10] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[11] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship by requiring DCS to prove four elements by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023).³ We need only discuss two of those elements raised by Parents in this appeal: (1) whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside of Parents’ homes will not be remedied; and (2) whether termination of Parents’ parental rights is in the Children's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i) and (C).

[12] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

Challenged Findings and Conclusions

[13] Initially, we address Mother's contention that several of the trial court's findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous. In all, Mother challenges more than twenty of the findings and conclusions. The majority of her contentions are not well-taken, as she misconstrues the findings and conclusions and/or ignores evidence that supports them.⁴ For example, Mother claims that the trial court erred when it found that she has a long and extensive history of using illicit substances. Mother calls that finding “misleading.” Mother's Br. at 17. But Mother ignores her own testimony that she began using drugs at age sixteen and continued using them “most of [her] adult life” until she reached sobriety in 2014. Tr. p. 109. Mother then testified that she “relapsed” in 2020. Id. Mother's contention on this issue is entirely without merit.

[14] Mother also argues that the trial court clearly erred when it found that she had not begun services until August 2021. Mother points out that she had completed a substance abuse assessment in March 2021 and began other services. But this error is insignificant. Whether Mother began services in March or August 2021 does not change the fact that she did not consistently participate in services over the course of the more than two years between the Children's removal from her care and the final hearing.

[15] Mother contends that the trial court erred when it found that she had not maintained “long-term sobriety” during the CHINS proceedings. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 79. Mother points out that the evidence shows that she had maintained sobriety for more than a year during the proceedings. But Mother's argument on this issue turns on semantics. What constitutes “long-term sobriety” is up for debate. The bottom line is that Mother has struggled to maintain sobriety for many years despite receiving significant substance abuse treatment and support. Indeed, despite several inpatient stays, Mother gave birth to a child in 2023 who had methamphetamine in her system. We reject Mother's contention on this issue.

[16] Mother contends that the trial court's finding that her visitation with the Children was “inconsistent” is “vague and misleading[.]” Mother's Br. at 20. Again, Mother ignores the evidence supporting that finding. Mother has not shown that the finding is clearly erroneous.

[17] Mother argues that the trial court's finding that her substance abuse treatment has been inconsistent is clearly erroneous. She maintains that her treatment has been “more consistent rather than less consistent[.]” Id. at 21. Again, Mother's argument is mere quibbling, and we reject it.

[18] We decline to address the remainder of Mother's challenges to the findings and conclusions in detail. Again, with most of her contentions, Mother merely asks that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. And to the extent certain findings and conclusions do lack evidentiary support, those errors are not substantial and do not render the trial court's ultimate conclusions clearly erroneous.

Reasons for the Children's Removal

[19] Parents contend that DCS failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside of their home will not be remedied. Consideration of this argument involves a two-step analysis: first, identifying the conditions that led to removal, and, second, determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will be remedied. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). In the second step, the trial court determines a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions; in other words, the court must balance a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. In conducting its analysis, the trial court may also consider the reasons for the child's continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[20] Here, the Children were removed from Parents’ care due to their inability to maintain stable and suitable housing, domestic violence, and chronic substance abuse. Mother argues that the trial court erred when it found that she has not remedied those conditions. Mother maintains that she “has flourished at Lotus House” and that the Children can live with her there while she completes her treatment. Mother's Br. at 30. Mother states that, “[b]efore [she] graduates, Lotus House helps her plan what comes next,” including finding suitable housing for her and the Children. Id. at 29. And Lotus House will continue to provide her with “wrap around” services after she leaves. Id.

[21] Likewise, Father contends that he has made tremendous progress since becoming sober in July 2023. He points out that he has been gainfully employed since April 2023, and that he would be “finding housing” soon. Father's Br. at 23. Father states that “Parents’ diligent efforts over the last eight months bode very well for their chances of continued success.” Id. at 25.

[22] Parents’ arguments on appeal amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do on appeal. Parents’ recent progress in overcoming their addictions is, of course, to be highly commended. But their long history of instability stemming from their substance abuse, which is also tied to the domestic violence between them, cannot be ignored. Indeed, FCM Amanda Grossi testified that she did not think Father or Mother had “shown the ability to obtain and maintain long-term stability.” Tr. p. 168.

[23] As the trial court found:

97. Mother and Father's participation in case management services, counseling, and substance abuse treatment throughout the life of the case has been generally inconsistent and Parents have at no time fully completed any of their court-ordered services.

98. Parents have a pattern of participating in services for a period of time followed by a period of time during which they fail to engage which corresponds to their relapses in drug usage.

Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 80. In its broad discretion, the trial court weighed the evidence of Parents’ recent improvements against their habitual patterns of conduct and determined that there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

[24] The trial court's conclusion that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside Parents’ home will not be remedied is supported by the record. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment on this issue.

Best Interests

[25] Parents next contend that DCS failed to prove that termination of their relationships with the Children is in the Children's best interests. In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id.

[26] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Moreover, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the family case manager and court-appointed special advocate to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Id.

[27] Mother contends that she has “achieved sobriety” and is bonded with the Children. Mother's Br. at 33. And Father contends that the evidence shows that he and Mother can care for the Children. Thus, they argue, termination of their parental rights is not in the Children's best interests. But, again, Parents’ arguments amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

[28] The Children have been living with their kinship placement since April and August (I.P.) 2022; they are “closely bonded” with their caregivers; and they are thriving there. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 81. The Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) supports the termination of Parents’ parental rights and adoption by the Children's current caregivers. And FCM Grossi testified that she supports the termination of Parents’ parental rights. In particular, Grossi testified that she did not support giving Parents more time to complete services because “these children deserve permanency in a home that does not require continued DCS oversight. And in order for parents to finish services that would require DCS to stay involved.” Tr. p. 167. Grossi testified that the Children “deserve an opportunity to have th[e] stability” that adoption would provide. Id.

[29] Parents have not shown that they are able to provide the care for the Children that they need. We affirm the trial court's conclusion that termination of Parents’ parental rights is in the Children's best interests.

[30] For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court's termination of Parents’ parental rights over the Children.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father has a total of eleven children, and Mother has a total of six children.

2.   Parents ask that we take judicial notice of the CHINS case involving N.P., their child who was born in 2023. We decline that request.

3.   The legislature has amended this statute effective March 11, 2024. Rather than subsection (b), the relevant provisions are now found in subsection (d).

4.   Mother's challenges to the court's findings regarding Father are completely without merit.

Mathias, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.