IN RE: the Adoption of J.M.W. (2024)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] T.C. (“Mother”) is the biological mother of J.M.W., III, and J.K.G.W. (collectively, “the Children”), born in 2015 and 2017, respectively.² After being removed from Mother's care and declared children in need of services (“CHINS”), the Children were ultimately placed into foster care with H.H. A few years later, H.H. petitioned to adopt the Children without Mother's consent, which the juvenile court granted. Mother asserts that the juvenile court's decision to dispense with the parental-consent requirement for adoption was clearly erroneous. We disagree and affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2018, the Children were in Mother's care. In June of 2018, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned the juvenile court to find the Children to be CHINS after J.M.W., III, who was three years old at the time, had been found wandering unattended outside Mother's home. As a result of that incident, Mother was convicted of neglect of a dependent.

[3] Shortly after DCS had removed the Children from Mother's care, it placed them with Father. Just one month later, J.M.W., III, was again found wandering by himself outside of Father's home while Father was passed out in his home due to intoxication. Father was arrested and charged with resisting law enforcement, disorderly conduct, possession of marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia. Consequently, DCS removed the Children from Father's care.

[4] The juvenile court found the Children CHINS in July of 2018, and placed them in H.H.’s care. When H.H., who works as a special-education teacher, received the Children, they were “significantly delayed in their development.” Ex. Vol. p. 4. During the CHINS proceeding, DCS offered Mother supervised visits, which were terminated in March of 2020, after Mother had missed too many visits. Mother has not seen the Children since.

[5] As part of its order on the CHINS proceeding, the juvenile court ordered Mother to undergo a mental-health assessment. That assessment found that Mother suffers from generalized anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, and cannabis-use disorder. The administering clinician recommended that Mother complete a more thorough psychological evaluation, which Mother neglected to do. The juvenile court also ordered Mother to submit to drug screens, most of which tested positive for marijuana. Mother stopped submitting to random drug screens when “COVID hit[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 73.

[6] In 2019, Mother “was jailed for a significant time [․] due to drug charges in Howard County and a probation violation[.]” Ex. Vol. p. 6. In July of 2020, Paternal Grandmother petitioned the juvenile court to modify the Children's placement to be with her. In October of 2020, medical professionals diagnosed J.M.W., III, with global development delay disorder, language disorder, attention deficient hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and autism-spectrum disorder. According to DCS reports, J.M.W., III, exhibits “challenging” behavior at times, including defiance, hitting, and yelling. Medical professionals diagnosed J.K.G.W. with ADHD and oppositional-defiant disorder. Throughout the CHINS proceeding, DCS reported that the Children would get into physical altercations and “have greater issues and needs than most other children their age[,]” which H.H. responded to “attentively and appropriately.” Ex. Vol. p. 4.

[7] In April of 2021, the juvenile court conducted a permanency hearing, after which it made the following findings regarding Mother's compliance with the Children's case plan:

Mother has been semi-compliant at best with the children's case plan. Certainly, her level of participation has not been in keeping with her working toward reunification. She was jailed for a significant time in 2019 due to drug charges in Howard County and a probation violation associated with her Neglect of a Dependent conviction in Miami County. Notwithstanding her history of substance abuse, she has not been participating in random drug screens on a consistent basis as ordered. Rather than participate in services and work toward reunification, Mother appears to be content to leave it to Father or Grandmother to pursue the placement of the children with them.

Ex. Vol. p. 3–4. The juvenile court also noted that placement with Paternal Grandmother and reunification with Mother “is not in the [C]hildren's best interests” given the “length of time” the Children had been with H.H. and the “numerous concerns” it had about Mother and Paternal Grandmother. Ex. Vol. p. 6. Consequently, the juvenile court changed the Children's permanency plan to adoption by H.H.

[8] In its April of 2021 permanency order, the juvenile court explained that Mother could exercise visitation with the Children if she participated in services for at least three weeks, including home-based case management, a mental-health evaluation, a psychiatric evaluation, counseling, and drug screens. While Mother completed the mental-health evaluation, she did not participate in a psychiatric evaluation or drugs screens. Mother neglected to reach out to DCS or family case manager (“FCM”) Kelli Ritchie to complete these services, despite FCM Ritchie informing Mother of what she had to do, because Mother admitted that she had “basically just given up[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 79.

[9] In January of 2022, H.H. petitioned the juvenile court to adopt the Children, to which Mother and Father objected. On November 21, 2022, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on parental consent to adoption, at which Mother and Paternal Grandmother appeared, but not Father. At the hearing, Mother testified that she had not fully understood the permanency order or what had been expected of her to receive visitation. The juvenile court found Mother's testimony to not be credible because she had been consistently represented by counsel throughout the CHINS proceedings and FCM Ritchie had told her what she had needed to do. Mother also testified that she had not reached out to DCS over the past year to determine what she had needed to do to exercise visitation because, in her own words, “I don't think about it, I guess.” Tr. Vol. II p. 74.

[10] In December of 2022, the juvenile court entered its order dispensing with the requirement to obtain parental consent to the Children's adoption. In August of 2023, the juvenile court entered its adoption decree. Later that month, Mother appealed the adoption decree, and, in September, Paternal Grandmother appealed it. Mother subsequently moved to consolidate the appeals, and, in January of 2024, Paternal Grandmother filed a notice of intent to join Mother's brief, which we approved.

Discussion and Decision

[11] When reviewing a juvenile court's ruling in an adoption proceeding, we will not disturb the ruling “unless the evidence leads to only one conclusion and the [juvenile] court reached the opposite conclusion.” E.W. v. J.W., 20 N.E.3d 889, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Moreover, we will not reweigh evidence, and, instead, will consider “the evidence most favorable to the decision together with reasonable inference drawn from that evidence.” Id. The juvenile court is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, discern family dynamics, and observe the parent-child relationship. Id.

[12] Here, the juvenile court sua sponte issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon in accordance with Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). When that occurs, we apply a two-tiered standard of review, in which we: (1) we determine whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and (2) whether the findings support the judgment. In re Adoption of A.S., 912 N.E.2d 840, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. The juvenile court's findings or judgment will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the record lacks evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support it. Id.

[13] As a general matter, a petition to adopt a minor child may be granted only if written consent to adopt has been provided by the biological parents. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1. However, there are numerous exceptions to the consent requirement. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8. For example, a juvenile court may dispose of the parental-consent requirement when a child has been in the custody of another person for at least one year and the parent fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with their child while able to do so. Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(2)(A)–(B). A petitioner for adoption without parental consent has the burden of proving, “by clear and indubitable evidence,” one of the statutory criteria allowing for adoption without consent. In re Adoption of J.T.A., 988 N.E.2d 1250, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[14] Here, Mother (who does not dispute that the Children had been in H.H.’s custody for over one year) argues that the juvenile court's decision to dispense with the parental-consent requirement was nonetheless clearly erroneous because (1) she had, in fact, significantly communicated with the Children and (2) even if she had not done so, she had had justifiable cause for failing to do so. First, we reject Mother's argument that her participation “in a group chat with Father and the FCM” to get updates about the Children amounted to significant communication. Appellant's Br. p. 13. Mother's participation in this group chat that did not even include the Children did not amount to significant communication with them. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(A).

[15] Throughout the life of the CHINS case, Mother appeared disinterested in maintaining a relationship with the Children. For example, in its April of 2021 permanency order, the juvenile court noted that, “[r]ather than participate in services and work toward reunification, Mother appears to be content to leave it to Father or [Paternal] Grandmother to pursue the placement of the [C]hildren with them.” Ex. Vol. p. 4. Moreover, while DCS had originally offered Mother supervised visitation during the CHINS proceedings, it had terminated those services in March of 2020 after Mother had missed too many visits. The last time Mother saw the Children was in February of 2020—three-and-one-half years before the juvenile court entered its adoption decree.

[16] As for Mother's argument that she had justifiable cause for her failure to communicate, she claims that the COVID-19 pandemic and corresponding public-health emergency orders in Indiana had curtailed DCS's operations and prevented her from communicating with the Children. Mother further claims that she had become ill during the CHINS proceeding and could not leave her home. Moreover, Mother alleges that, at some point, DCS had terminated her visitation with the Children and that, if she had tried to contact them, she would have been violating a court order. We, however, disagree. Contrary to Mother's argument, neither the COVID-19 pandemic nor DCS's termination of her visitation referral constitute a “justifiable cause” for her failure to communicate with the Children. Appellant's Br. p. 10. For example, Mother had missed multiple supervised visits with the Children even before Indiana's first COVID-related emergency order in March of 2020. Further, “[d]espite the Court providing that Mother could exercise visitation with the [C]hildren if she were to comply with services for at least three weeks, she never even came close to satisfying that requirement.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 92. At the November of 2022 consent hearing, Mother testified that “she had not reached out to DCS in the past year to see what she needed to do for visits” because “she did not think about it.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 92. Finally, Mother even admitted that “she is not opposed to the [C]hildren being adopted[,]” she just “does not want [H.H.] to adopt them.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 92. The record indicates that Mother's lack of significant communication with the Children was primarily the product of her apathy, which is hardly a justifiable cause.

[17] Given that the Children have been in H.H.’s care for over one year and Mother has failed to communicate significantly with them without justifiable cause, we conclude that the juvenile court's decision to dispense with the parental-consent requirement is not clearly erroneous. Mother's arguments essentially amount to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.³ E.W., 20 N.E.3d at 894.

[18] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   A review of the record shows that Father does not participate in this appeal and Mother does not raise arguments on his behalf in her Appellant's Brief.

3.   For the same reasons, we also affirm the juvenile court's order as it relates to Paternal Grandmother, who made no separate arguments relating to Father or her attempt to become the Children's guardian.

Memorandum Decision by Judge Bradford

Chief Judge Altice and Felix concur. Altice, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.