WILLIAMS v. STATE (2023)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Dashawn Williams appeals his sentence following his conviction for murder, a felony.¹ We affirm.

Issues

[2] Williams raises two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.

2. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Nineteen-year-old Williams met eighteen-year-old Michael Williams (“Michael”)² at a gas station on October 25, 2020, and the two exchanged phone numbers so that Williams could buy “high grade weed” from Michael. Ex. Vol. 1 at 149. While at the gas station, Williams also observed that Michael had a gun that Williams wanted. Later that day, Williams sent Michael a text message arranging to purchase “two Gs” of marijuana. Id. at 153. Williams also texted Michael the next day to purchase more marijuana.

[4] On October 27, Williams again arranged to meet Michael to purchase marijuana. On that occasion, Williams “randomly” selected a nearby apartment complex for the exchange. Id. at 188. Williams went with Nathanial Williams (“Nathaniel”)³ and two other individuals in Nathanial's car to the exchange. When they arrived, Williams exited the car and got into the passenger seat of Michael's car and purchased marijuana. While he was in the car, Williams was able to observe that Michael “had [the] gun [he] had seen” at the gas station. Id. at 170. Williams returned to Nathaniel's car briefly. Williams and two other armed individuals then exited the car and approached Michael's vehicle again. Williams “point[ed]” a gun at Michael and “start[ed] feeling around” Michael's car for his gun. Id. at 191. At some point, a “shot went off” striking Michael, and Williams and the other individuals fled. Id. at 170.

[5] Shortly thereafter, officers with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department responded to reports of a vehicle crash. When officers arrived at the scene, they discovered that a car had crashed into a tree line and that the driver of the car, Michael, was deceased. Officers also found a bag of marijuana, a digital scale, money, and a “fired bullet” in the car. Tr. at 107. A subsequent autopsy revealed that Michael had died from a bullet wound to the head.

[6] During the ensuing investigation into Michael's death, officers analyzed the contents of his cell phone. During the search, officers identified a phone number that belonged to Williams as a number that had communicated with Michael. On November 9, officers arrested and interviewed Williams. During the interview, Williams admitted that he “knew [Michael] had [a] gun” and that he “tried to rob” Michael. Ex. Vol. 1 at 169. He further admitted that, after he returned to Nathaniel's car on October 27, he made “a plan to take” Michael's gun with the other occupants. Id. at 173. And he admitted that he “wanted to take the gun from [the] dude.” Id. at 188. However, he maintained that he did not know who had fired the shot that killed Michael.

[7] The State charged Williams with murder, a felony.⁴ The court held a two-day jury trial on October 24 and 25, 2022. During the trial, the State admitted as evidence the recording of the interview Williams had given to officers following his arrest. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Williams guilty, and the court entered judgment of conviction accordingly. During a sentencing hearing, the court identified as mitigating the fact that Williams “has no history of delinquency or criminal activity” other than a minor charge for “driving while suspended.” Tr. at 243. However, the court found that this was “a terrible case” that involved Williams “want[ing] something that didn't belong to him,” “tak[ing] a gun,” and “doing a drug deal on top of it.” Id. Accordingly, the court sentenced Williams to fifty-three years at the Indiana Department of Correction. The court then ordered three of those years to be suspended, two of which would be served on probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[8] Williams first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.⁵ Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted).

[9] A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind.), clarified on reh'g on other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).

[10] The sentencing range for murder is forty-five to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a) (2022). Here, at sentencing, the court identified as a mitigator Williams’ lack of criminal history. And while the court did not specifically identify any aggravators, it found that this was “a terrible case” that involved Williams taking a gun that “didn't belong to him” and a “drug deal on top of it.” Tr. at 243. The court then sentenced Williams to a slightly reduced sentence of fifty-three years in the Department of Correction, with three years suspended.

[11] On appeal, Williams contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to identify certain mitigating factors. It is well settled that the finding of mitigating circumstances is within the discretion of the trial court. Rascoe v. State, 736 N.E.2d 246, 248-49 (Ind. 2000). An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating circumstance requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Id. at 249. The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance. Id.

[12] Williams maintains that the court should have found as mitigating his young age, the fact that his father was unknown and his mother lived in another state, that he had used drugs since he was ten years old, that he had taken Xanax on the day of the shooting, that he had expressed “suicidal thoughts while in jail,” and that he is married with a three-year-old daughter. Appellant's Br. at 15. Williams contends that those mitigators were “before [the court] and clearly shown by the presentence investigation report.” Id.

[13] However, while the trial court is obligated to review the presentence investigation report and consider all aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented in it, “the court is not required to comb through it and present mitigating arguments on behalf of the defendant when the defendant fails to act.” Bryant v. State, 984 N.E.2d 240, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). And the “[f]ailure to present a mitigating circumstance to the trial court waives consideration of the circumstance on appeal.” Id. Here, Williams did not make any argument that his family history or his mental health should be considered mitigating. As such, he has waived our review of either circumstance. See id.

[14] As for the remaining proffered mitigators, Williams has not met his burden to demonstrate that they are significant. Regarding his drug use, Williams has used drugs since a very young age without seeking treatment. Further, he acknowledged that his use of drugs on the day of the offense was “voluntary.” Tr. at 240. And other than an argument that his use of Xanax on the day of the offense caused him to not “remember a lot of it,” he made no argument to explain how his voluntary use of Xanax caused him to commit the offense. Id. at 241. As for his age, other than his statement that he was only nineteen years old, he has not made any argument to explain why he was not fully aware of his actions or their possible consequences. Regarding his wife and young child, Williams again does not suggest why this purported mitigator would add weight not accounted for by the trial court in its imposition of an already-reduced sentence. Regardless of whether he serves the minimum sentence or the below-advisory sentence that the court imposed, his daughter will be well into her adulthood when he is released. Williams also does not explain how any purported mitigator detracts from the seriousness of the offense. As the trial court found, this was a case of Williams wanting a gun that did not belong to him and setting up a drug deal in order to take it, which offense resulted in the death of an eighteen-year-old boy. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion when it did not identify Williams’ age, drug use, or dependents as mitigating.

Issue Two: Inappropriateness of Sentence

[15] Williams also contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” This Court has recently held that “[t]he advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). And the Indiana Supreme Court has recently explained that:

The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers ․ but not achieve a perceived “correct” result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind.), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (omission in original).

[16] Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court's judgment “should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[17] As discussed above, the sentencing range for murder is forty-five to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. I.C. § 35-50-2-3(a). The court identified Williams’ lack of criminal history as a mitigator and, while it did not explicitly identify any aggravators, it noted that this was “a terrible case.” Tr. at 243. The court then sentenced Williams to fifty-three years in the Department of Correction, with three years suspended.⁶

[18] On appeal, Williams contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense because there is nothing “to suggest that the offense in this case was significantly different from any other murder in the commission of a felony.” Appellant's Br. at 13. He further contends that “[n]othing showed that Williams intended or foresaw the incident including a shooting.” Id. And he maintains that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character because he was only nineteen years old at the time of the offense, “it is apparent that he has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period” before the commission of the crime,” he is “married and the father of a three-year-old child” and because he “confessed his involvement to the police.” Id. at 15-16.

[19] However, Williams has not met his burden on appeal to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate. With respect to the nature of the offense, Williams arranged a series of drug deals with Michael in order to rob him of a gun that Williams wanted. Williams then approached Michael's car with two other individuals, pointed a gun at Michael, and began to feel around Michael's car for the gun. And while there is no evidence to demonstrate which of the three individuals actually fired the shot that killed Michael, the evidence shows that Williams was the person who had orchestrated the event that resulted in the death of a young individual and that he had pointed a gun at Michael. Williams has not presented any evidence to show any restraint or regard on his part. He has therefore not presented compelling evidence portraying the nature of the offenses in a positive light. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[20] As for his character, we acknowledge that, at only nineteen years old, Williams does not have a criminal history. However, Williams gained the trust of a stranger through a series of drug buys in order to ultimately rob him at gun point simply because Williams wanted Michael's gun. Further, Williams admitted that he had taken several Xanax prior to the offense such that he had little to no memory of the event. And Williams has a long history of substance abuse for which he has not received treatment, which reflects poorly on his character. Williams has not presented compelling evidence of substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character. We therefore cannot say that Williams's below-advisory sentence is inappropriate in light of his character.

Conclusion

[21] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to identify certain mitigators. And Williams’ sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We therefore affirm his sentence.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2) (2022).

2.   Williams and Michael are not related.

3.   Nathaniel is also not related to Williams, and it is unclear if he is related to Michael.

4.   The State also charged him with armed robbery, as a Level 3 felony, and robbery, as Level 2 felony. However, the charge for armed robbery was dismissed. And while the jury found him guilty of robbery, that conviction was vacated.

5.   While Williams has conflated his abuse of discretion argument and his argument regarding the appropriateness of his sentence, we address each argument separately.

6.   We note that Williams incorrectly asserted that he “received the advisory sentence of 55 years.” Appellant's Br. at 12. The court clearly sentenced Williams to fifty-three years, with three years suspended.

Bailey, Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.