LUCIO DIAZ v. STATE OF ILLINOIS (2015)

OPINION

This claim is before the Court upon a recommendation from the Commissioner following an evidentiary hearing.

Claimant, Lucio Diaz, is seeking damages for a collision between an Illinois Department of Transportation (“IDOT”) truck and a City of Chicago van (“van”) in which Claimant was a passenger. Claimant is seeking damages of $13,900.16 for medical bills, $13,860.00 for lost wages, $50,000.00 for pain and suffering, and $20,000.00 for loss of normal life activities. Claimant alleges that the collision was caused by the negligence of the driver of the IDOT truck.

FACTS

An evidentiary hearing was conducted before the Commissioner in which three witnesses provided testimony. All three witnesses, Mr. Benjamin Hampton, the driver of the van, Claimant Lucio Diaz, a passenger in the van, and Mr. Kim Steele, the driver of an IDOT truck immediately in front of the van, provided testimony related to the collision between the van and the IDOT truck.

In addition, two depositions were admitted as evidence depositions. The first deposition was of Dr. Douglas Dirk Nelson, M.D. and related to the medical condition of Claimant. The second deposition was a discovery deposition of Mr. Kelvin Brown, the driver of the IDOT truck involved in the accident. Mr. Browns deposition related to the collision between the van and the IDOT truck. Mr. Browns discovery deposition was admitted as an evidence deposition because Mr. Brown died between the time of his deposition and the hearing.

Four trial exhibits were admitted into evidence including a summary of damages, photographs of the damage to the van, a copy of doctor medical records and the doctors curriculum vitae, and detailed medical bills.

The facts of the case are as follows: On Wednesday, August 27, 2008, Claimant was a passenger in a van driven by his co-worker Benjamin Hampton. Claimant and Mr. Hampton were both employees of the City of Chicago. Mr. Hampton testified that he was driving the van from the Chicago “Loop” to a work assignment. Mr. Hampton testified that he drove westbound on Interstate 55 and took the exit to the Dan Ryan Expressway, I-90/I-94 eastbound (which actually travels in a southbound direction at this location). Mr. Hampton was planning to merge into the local lanes. Along the route, the van came in between two IDOT trucks, a lead truck driven by Mr. Kim Steele and a backup truck driven by Mr. Kelvin Brown. The timing and manner in which the van came in between the two IDOT trucks is in dispute.

Mr. Brown testified at his deposition that the two IDOT trucks were entering the Dan Ryan Expressway from the 22nd Street entrance in the Chinatown neighborhood of Chicago and traveling to the Dan Ryan Expressway local lanes. The two IDOT trucks were traveling in tandem with Mr. Steele driving a lead truck carrying debris and Mr. Brown driving a rear truck to assist Mr. Steele with lane changes. Both Mr. Steele and Mr. Brown testified that they had the strobe lights on their trucks activated at the time since they were traveling as part of a work assignment. At approximately 11:00 a.m. to 11:15 a.m., or thereabouts, the two IDOT trucks arrived at the spot where the entrance ramp merges into the Dan Ryan Expressway local lanes. The entrance ramp only has one lane of traffic. The entrance ramp merges from the left into the Dan Ryan Expressway local lanes on the right. At this point, the van driven by Mr. Hampton was in between the two IDOT trucks. As previously stated, the timing and manner in which the van came in between the two IDOT trucks is in dispute.

Mr. Hampton testified that he had been driving behind the lead IDOT truck for a distance prior to reaching the merge into the Dan Ryan Expressway local lanes. However, Mr. Brown testified that the van suddenly merged from the traffic lanes on the right into the lane of traffic on the ramp.

Mr. Steele testified that at the point where the entrance ramp merges into the Dan Ryan Expressway local lanes, there was a truck blocking part of the merging lane and part of the shoulder. Mr. Steele could not recall how fast he was traveling at the time, but in a previous statement given on November 24, 2010, Mr. Steele stated he was traveling approximately 25 to 30 miles per hour. Mr. Steele testified that he came to a gradual stop.

Mr. Hampton testified that he saw the IDOT truck in front of him slow down and come to a halt. Mr. Hampton testified that it was not a sudden stop, yet it was not a gradual stop. Mr. Hampton testified that he was traveling about 20 to 25 miles per hour at the time. In response to the IDOT truck stopping in front of the van, Mr. Hampton testified that he slowed and stopped the van in a similar manner.

Mr. Steele did not hear any squealing tires or brakes. Mr. Brown did not see the van skid. Mr. Brown testified that the van was fully into his lane. Mr. Brown testified that he was traveling approximately 35 to 40 miles per hour at the time which was approximately the same speed as the IDOT truck being driven by Mr. Steele. Mr. Brown testified that when the van stopped in front of him, he applied the brakes and tried to evade the van by moving to the shoulder. Mr. Brown testified that traffic to the right was moving faster than the IDOT trucks at the time. Despite attempting to stop or evade the van, the front bumper of Mr. Browns truck struck the rear bumper of the van driven by Mr. Hampton. Mr. Brown testified that his truck was moving about 10 to 15 miles per hour at the time of impact.

Mr. Hampton described the impact as heavy. Claimant also described the impact as heavy. Mr. Brown was driving a truck that weighed at a minimum three tons. The van driven by Mr. Hampton was a full size cargo van.

As a result of the IDOT truck striking the van, Claimant testified to being moved into the vans dashboard. Claimant testified that he hit his left side, neck, shoulder, knee, hip, and everything else on his left side. Dr. Nelson testified at his deposition that when he examined Claimant, Claimant had a contusion to the left shoulder and scapular region, a contusion and sprain of the lumbar spine, and a contusion to the left knee. Dr. Nelson testified that his opinion is that a motor vehicle accident would be a competent cause of such injuries. Dr. Nelson also testified that Claimant experienced a temporary aggravation of existing degenerative conditions. Dr. Nelson testified that Claimant had some minor pinched nerve symptoms, joint inflammation, and a muscle injury to the scapulei.

Claimant testified that he was in so much pain that he was not able to work. Claimant attended physical therapy three days a week for about three months. Claimant attempted to return to work, but still was in too much pain to work. Claimant was able to return to work on February 3, 2009. Counsel for Claimant submitted into evidence a schedule of medical expenses for $13,900.16 with supporting documents. Claimant testified that he missed 14 weeks of work. Counsel for Claimant submitted a computation for $13,860.00 in lost wages (14 weeks x 40 hours per week x $24.75 rate of pay per hour = $13,860). Claimant is also seeking $50,000 for pain and suffering and $20,000 for loss of normal life. Claimant testified that his injuries affected his ability to do daily activities like playing with his children, throwing balls, and performing household chores. Claimant testified that he sometimes feels back pain even while sitting down to watch television.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

In a negligence action, the Claimant has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent was negligent and that the Respondents negligence was the proximate cause of the Claimants injury. Koepp v. State, 46 Ill.Ct.Cl. 344 (1993). At the evidentiary hearing, the evidence is uncontested that the van driven by Mr. Hampton, in which Claimant was a passenger, was struck from behind by the IDOT truck driven by Mr. Brown. While a motorist struck from the rear is not always entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the facts of each case must be considered in resolving rear-end collisions, it is the driver approaching another from the rear who has the duty to maintain a safe lookout and it is he who must consider the possibility of having to stop suddenly. Gildehaus v. State, 46 Ill.Ct.Cl. 176 (1993). Furthermore, a driver is required to maintain a reasonable speed so that his vehicle may be safely stopped within the distance that objects may be seen ahead. Henning v. State, 46 Ill.Ct.Cl. 199 (1993). In this case, it is Mr. Brown that had the duty to maintain a reasonable speed while traveling and to keep a safe distance between his truck and any vehicles in front of him as traffic did have to stop suddenly due to a truck partially obstructing the ramp merging onto the local lanes of the Dan Ryan Expressway.

The evidence in the record indicates that Mr. Brown breached his duty of care by striking the van in which Claimant was riding. The testimony from the parties indicate that the vehicles were traveling somewhere between 20 to 40 miles per hour while attempting to merge to the right from an entrance ramp onto the local lanes of the Dan Ryan Expressway. The lead IDOT truck had to stop to avoid striking another vehicle which was partially blocking the lane of traffic on the entrance ramp. Mr. Steele testified that he brought the lead truck, which was carrying a load of debris, to a gradual stop. Mr. Hampton brought the van to a stop as well. While the vans stop is not described as gradual, Mr. Hampton's testimony was that the stop was not sudden. Also, Mr. Steele and Mr. Browns testimony do not indicate a sudden stop by the van. Mr. Steele did not hear any squealing tires or brakes and Mr. Brown did not see the van skid. Despite two vehicles coming to a stop in front of his truck in a gradual and not sudden manner, Mr. Brown was not able to stop his truck before it collided with the van. Mr. Brown breached his duty by not maintaining a safe distance between his truck and the van in which Claimant was riding.

Respondent's version of events is that Mr. Hampton entered the lane of traffic in between the two IDOT trucks suddenly. Mr. Brown testified that the van cut in front of him. However, Mr. Hampton testified that he had been following the lead IDOT truck for what he termed “a distance”. Mr. Hamptons testimony is the more credible testimony. As the entrance ramp that merges into the local lanes of the Dan Ryan Expressway terminates at this point, it is not reasonable for a driver to suddenly merge from the lanes of the Dan Ryan Expressway to the left onto the entrance ramp since that driver must immediately merge back into the local lanes of the Dan Ryan Expressway to the right. It is the Courts finding that Mr. Hamptons actions were not the cause of the collision. The sole cause was the truck driven by Mr. Brown striking the van in which Claimant was riding.

Respondent has also cited Section 625 ILCS 5/11-908(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code for the proposition that Mr. Hampton was obligated to give the right of way to the IDOT trucks since they were traveling with their strobe lights on. However, the plain language of Section 11-908 indicates that this section of the Vehicle Code applies “within any highway construction or maintenance area indicated by official traffic-control devices.” None of the evidence in the record indicates that this event occurred in a construction zone or a maintenance area. The IDOT trucks were traveling along an ordinary stretch of the roadway. Therefore, Section 625 ILCS 5/11-908 (b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code is not applicable in this situation.

Under the law, Claimant is entitled to recover damages. The record includes medical bills related to this incident that total $13,900.16. Therefore, Claimant is awarded $13,900.16 for the medical bills incurred from his injuries. The record indicates that Claimant missed 14 weeks of work at a rate of pay of $24.75 per hour for a 40 hour work week. As such, Claimant is awarded $13,860.00 for lost wages.

Claimant also seeks damages for pain and suffering and a loss of normal life. Claimant testified that he was in so much pain that he was unable to work. Dr. Nelsons deposition established that Claimant suffered from contusions and the temporary aggravation of existing degenerative conditions. The evidence on record shows that Claimants injuries caused him pain. Claimant is awarded $12,000.00 for the pain and suffering from his injury. With respect to the loss of normal life, Claimant provided testimony that there are some daily activities that still cause him discomfort or pain. However, Claimant is not seeking or receiving treatment for continuing pain. In addition, Dr. Nelsons testimony in his deposition states that his opinion is that Claimants injuries are not permanent. Overall, there is insufficient evidence on record to prove that Claimant has incurred injuries that affect Claimants ability to perform daily activities and deprive Claimant of a normal life.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Claimants claim is awarded $39,760.16.

STORINO, J.