KAREN THACKER v. UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS RIDER PROGRAM BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS (2014)

OPINION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Respondents Motion to Dismiss.

NATURE OF THE CLAIM

Claimant was a participant in an introductory motorcycle class conducted by Respondent at the Joliet Junior College Training Facility. During the course of this class, Claimant alleges that she was ejected from the motorcycle she was operating, and suffered personal injuries— including a broken left wrist.

Prior to participating in the class, Claimant signed a Waiver or Release of Liability (“Waiver”) for potential injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of Respondent. This Waiver provided as follows:

I fully understand and acknowledge that: (a) risks and dangers exist in my use of motorcycles and motorcycle equipment and my participation in the Motorcycle Rider Education course activities; (b) my participation in such activities and/or use of such equipment may result in injury or illness including, but not limited to bodily injury, disease, strains, fractures, partial and/or total paralysis, death or other ailments that could cause serious disability; (c) these risks and dangers may be caused by the negligence of the owners, employees, officer or agents of THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, the negligence of other participants, the negligence of others, crashes, breaches of contract, the forces of nature and other causes. These risks and dangers may arise from foreseeable and unforeseeable causes; and (d) by my participation in these activities and/or use of equipment. I hereby assume all risks and dangers and all responsibility for any losses and/or damages, whether caused in whole or in part by the negligence or other conduct of the owners, agents, officers, or employees of The board of trustees of the University of Illinois [sic], or by any other person.

I, on behalf of myself, my personal representatives and my heirs hereby voluntarily do agree to release, waive, discharge, hold harmless, defend and indemnify the board of trustees of the University of Illinois [sic] and its owners, agents, officers and employees from any and all claims, suits, or causes of action for bodily injury, property damage, wrongful death, loss of services or otherwise which may arise out of my use of motorcycles or motorcycle equipment or my participation in the Motorcycle Rider Education Course activities. I specifically understand that I am releasing, discharging and waiving any claims or actions that I may have presently or in the future for the negligent acts of or other conduct by the board of trustees of the University of Illinois, [sic], the Illinois Department of Transportation, its owners, agents, officers or employees.

I have read the above waiver or release and by signing it agree it is my intention to exempt and relieve the board of trustees of the University of Illinois [sic] from liability for personal injury, property damage or wrongful death caused by negligence or any other cause.

Claimant filed a Complaint seeking recovery for her alleged personal injuries, asserting that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she knew or should have known the danger and possibility of such injuries. Respondent's position is that even when taking all of Claimant's allegations as true, her alleged injuries were foreseeable—and as a result, Claimant's claims are barred by the exculpatory clause contained in the Waiver. Respondent contends that Claimant expressly understood and acknowledged the risks and dangers that coincided with her participation in the class and in the use of the motorcycle equipment, and thus, there is no issue of material fact.

ANALYSIS

In its Motion to Dismiss, Respondent argues that Claimant's claims are barred by the provisions of the exculpatory clause contained in the Waiver agreement signed by Claimant prior to participating in the class. Respondent believes that Claimant waived any and all potential liability of Respondent, whether caused by the negligence of Respondent or otherwise. In response, Claimant argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she knew or should have known the danger and possibility of the injuries she ultimately sustained. Claimant asserts that Respondent's conduct and the risk of injury complained of in this case were not intended by the parties to fall within the scope of the exculpatory clause at issue. Furthermore, Claimant contends that at the time she signed the Waiver, it was not foreseeable that she would inform Respondent of a defect in a motorcycle, and despite her comments, then have Respondent provide her with said motorcycle without first curing the alleged defect.

This Court recognizes that Illinois courts have long held that exculpatory clauses contained in releases and waivers serve as a bar to subsequent litigation for injuries therein sustained. Schlessman III v. Henson, 83 Ill. 2d 82 (1980). Individuals may contract to avoid liability under appropriate circumstances—as with a Waiver or Release of Liability—based on one individual assuming the risk of the particular activity. See Larsen v. Vic Tanny International, 130 Ill. App. 3d 574, 576 (5th Dist. 1984). In this case, Claimant acknowledged that her participation in the motorcycle class and/or the use of class equipment might result in injury or illness, including, but not limited to, bodily injuries. By signing the Waiver, she acknowledged that these risks and dangers might arise from foreseeable or unforeseeable causes and through her participation in class activities and/or through the use of class equipment. As such, this Court concludes that the Waiver is sufficient to bar Claimant's negligence claims against Respondent.

In the alternative, Claimant has requested leave to file an Amended Complaint claiming that Respondent's conduct was willful and wanton. In order to plead allegations of willful and wanton misconduct, there must be facts to show that Respondent exercised conscious disregard for Claimant's safety. Although Claimant has not plead any specific facts to sustain a willful and wanton claim against Respondent, this Court will allow Claimant 60 days to file an Amended Complaint to the extent she can plead any facts to support such a claim.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Claimant's claim is DENIED. Claimant is GRANTED 60 days to file an Amended Complaint pleading facts to support a willful and wanton claim against Respondent.

J. KUBASIAK