JOHN TAYLOR JR JERRY TAYLOR v. STATE OF ILLINOIS (2014)

OPINION

This claim arises out of monetary damages sought by Claimant, John D. Taylor as Guardian of Jerry Taylor, a disabled person (“Claimant”), as a result of child support payments made by Jerry Taylor (“Jerry”) following a Uniform Order for Support on December 20, 2000, in IDPA ex. rel. Kellee Bobek v. Jerry Taylor, McDonough County Case Number AO-F-2. On August 31, 2001, the Second District Appellate Court held that state courts are prohibited from deducting child support payments from Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Department of Public Aid ex. Rel. Lozada v. Rivera, 324 Ill. App. 3rd 476 (2nd Dist. 2001). SSI was Jerry's only source of income for the entirety of his child support payments. Claimant was appointed as Jerry's guardian and subsequently received an Order based upon the Lozada decision vacating the December 20, 2000, Uniform Order for Support. Claimant seeks retroactive damages of $5,418.00 for child support payments previously made to Respondent and distributed to Kellee Bobek-Dewitt.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At the time of hearing, Jerry was a 42-year-old father of three children, including two minors, and was previously married to Kellee Bobek-Dewitt. Claimant is Jerry's brother and has since been appointed Jerry's guardian. According to Claimant's testimony, Jerry attended special education classes as a child and did not graduate from high school. Claimant further testified that he lived with Jerry on and off during their younger years and he and his wife, Rebecca Taylor (“Mrs. Taylor”), have lived with Jerry for approximately the past twelve years. When Jerry was in his 20's he briefly worked at the Macomb Journal, a newspaper in Macomb, Illinois. Since then Jerry has not worked.

Following the divorce of Jerry and Ms. Bobek-Dewitt, a Uniform Order for Support to pay child support was entered in McDonough County on December 20, 2000. At the time of the support hearing, Jerry lived with Claimant and Mrs. Taylor, but did not have a legal or court- appointed guardian. Jerry attended the support hearing accompanied by Mrs. Taylor, who, for the most part spoke on behalf of Jerry. Mrs. Taylor testified that Jerry understood that the hearing was to seek child support and he also understood what child support meant when he signed the support order. She further testified that in 2000, Jerry was able to make decisions and communicate them to others. Further, at the time of the hearing, Jerry had not been adjudged mentally incompetent or disabled. After the hearing, she informed Jerry of what happened at the support hearing.

At the support hearing, the court found that Jerry's total income consisted of $400 per month in Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and therefore ordered him to pay $100 per month as child support for his two minor children. Jerry approved the Order for Support and signed the document. After the hearing, Jerry did not file an appeal to challenge the Order for Support.

According to the testimony of Mrs. Taylor, the payments first went through the McDonough County Courthouse, but at some point the payment procedure was changed and the payments were sent to the State Disbursement Unit. The payments were made to the State Disbursement Unit, forwarded to the State of Iowa, and subsequently paid to Kellee Bobek-Dewitt.

On August 31, 2001, the Second District Appellate Court decided Department of Public Aid ex. rel Lozada v. Rivera, 324 Ill. App. 3d 476 (2nd Dist. 2001). In Lozada, the court held that state courts are prohibited under 42 U.S.C. §407(a) from subjecting SSI payments to child support obligations. Id. at 484. Prior to the decision in Lozada, Illinois had not addressed the issue of whether SSI payments could be subject to obligations of child support.

Claimant testified that in an effort to protect Jerry from alleged victimization, Claimant wanted to obtain guardianship over Jerry's estate. On May 18, 2006, through a Petition for Appointment of Guardian for Disabled Person, Claimant sought the court to adjudge Jerry- a disabled person and appoint Claimant as Guardian of Jerry's estate. McDonough County Judge John Clerkin entered an Order on July 11, 2006, finding that Jerry was a disabled person and appointing Claimant as the plenary guardian of Jerry's estate.

After becoming Jerry's guardian, Claimant attempted to terminate Jerry's child support payments and obtain reimbursement because in light of the Lozada decision he believed SSI should not be subject to child support obligations. On January 11, 2007, an Order vacating the December 20, 2000, Uniform Order for Support was entered in McDonough County Case Number AO-F-27. Both parties agree that the January 11, 2007, Order does not rule either 1) Claimant is entitled to a refund for child support payments previously paid; or 2) Respondent must refund Claimant of such child support payments.

Claimant asserts that Jerry's SSI should not have been subjected to any child support obligation and, therefore, the child support payments previously made should be refunded to Jerry. Claimant therefore seeks to recover, on behalf of Jerry, child support payments made as a result of the December 20, 2000, Uniform Order for Support. Those payments total $5,418.00.

ANALYSIS

I. Claimant was not deemed mentally incompetent on or before December 20, 2000, and therefore the Uniform Order for Support was valid.

Claimant alleged that Jerry was “mentally incompetent and lacked capacity to defend himself in court” at the time of the Uniform Order for Support on December 20, 2000. To suffer from a “legal disability,” one must be “entirely without understanding or capacity to make or communicate decisions regarding his person and totally unable to manage his estate or financial affairs.” In re John Doe v. Catholic Archbishop of Chicago, 301 Ill. App. 3d 123, 126-127 (1 st Dist. 1998), citing Estate of Riha v. Christ Hospital 187 Ill. App. 3d 752, 756 (1st Dist. 1989); Sille v. McCann Construction Specialties Co., 265 ILL.-App. 3d 1051, 1054-1055 (1st Dist. 1994). “Many impairments, both physical and mental, may be termed disabilities. All disabilities, however, are not legal disabilities….” Sille, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 1054.

Claimant's argument lacks merit because there was no evidence presented proving that Jerry was mentally incompetent at the time of the support hearing. In fact, the evidence points to the contrary. The only evidence that Claimant admitted regarding Jerry's mental and physical health was a report by Dr. John Arnold of an examination on April 6, 2006. The report makes no findings concerning the mental or physical condition of Jerry on or before December 20, 2000 and therefore is irrelevant to the issue of whether Jerry lacked capacity to defend himself at the support hearing. In addition, both Claimant and Mrs. Taylor testified that Jerry was able to make decisions to the best of his ability and was able to communicate his decisions to others. Mrs. Taylor further testified that Jerry understood the hearing was to seek child support and he understood what child support was when he signed the Order for Support. Based on this evidence, Claimant has failed to prove that Jerry was mentally disabled at the time of the support hearing.

Not only has Claimant failed to prove that Jerry was mentally incompetent at the December 20, 2000, support hearing, the evidence also establishes that Jerry did not have an appointed guardian at the time. Therefore, on the day of the support hearing, Jerry's decisions were his own to make and were final. Because Jerry was not mentally incompetent he was in a position to make his own decisions and he made the decision to sign the Order for Support, the Uniform Order for Support was valid.

II. The decision in Lozada v. Rivera does not instruct recovery of the damages sought by Claimant.

The Lozada decision does not support Claimant's assertion that Jerry is entitled to relief in the form of a refund of all child support payments previously paid under the December 20, 2000, Order for Support. The revised Order entered on January 11, 2007, stated that Jerry had been ordered to pay child support for two minor children until October 13, 2010. The Order further stated that the December 20, 2000, Uniform Order for Support must be vacated. The January 11, 2007, Order does not state that Jerry is entitled to a refund for child support payments previously paid. More specifically, it does not provide that Respondent is liable to refund Jerry of such child support payments.

Not only does the January 11, 2007, Order fail to support Claimant's argument, the Illinois Public Aid Code and the Illinois Marriage Dissolution Act do not allow for recovery of past child support payments as Claimant seeks. 305 ILCS 5/10-10; 750 ILCS 5/505. The guidelines and standards in Sections 505 and 505.2 of the Illinois Marriage and Marriage Dissolution Act (“MMDA”) are to be followed when a court determines the amount of child support a person is to pay. Id. Similarly, any modification or termination of child support must also follow the standards in Section 510 of the MMDA. Id. Section 510 of the MMDA provides that child support orders cannot be retroactively modified past the date a petition for modification was filed. See In re Marriage of Elenewski, 357 Ill. App. 3d 504 (4th Dist. 2005); In re Marriage of Pettifer and Mathias, 304 Ill. App. 3d 326 (3rd Dist. 1999); In re Marriage of Peterson, 2011 IL 110984. Specifically, Section 510(a) states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided…, the provisions of any judgment respecting maintenance or support may be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to due notice by the moving party of the filing of the motion for modification…” 750 ILCS 5/510(a).

It is evident from the courts' interpretation of Section 510 of the MMDA that Claimant's theory that Jerry is entitled to retroactive relief based on the Lozada decision is incorrect because the award would directly conflict with the MMDA. Claimant asserts that Jerry should be refunded for all prior payments, yet Section 510 of the MMDA states that child support modifications only begin at the time the motion for modification was filed. It therefore follows that Jerry would only be entitled to recover payments made after Claimant filed the Petition to Vacate Child Support Orders. Although there was no evidence to establish the date that the Petition to Vacate Child Support Orders was filed, a time period can be established from the facts. The petition must have been filed between July 11, 2006, the day Claimant was appointed as Jerry's guardian, and January 11, 2007, when the Order vacating the Uniform Order for Support was granted. Further, Claimant's own evidence produced at hearing is that Jerry made no child support payments after October 17, 2005. As such, there were no payments actually made after July 11, 2006, and no damages incurred during the potential time period for recovery. Following the standards set forth in Section 510 of the MMDA and the facts established in this case, Jerry has no recoverable injury and is not entitled to a refund of past child support payments.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, this Court finds that Claimant has failed to meet his burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent is liable to compensate Jerry for child support payments previously made under the December 20, 2000, Order for Support. Jerry was mentally competent when he agreed to and signed the December 20, 2000, Order for Support, making it valid until the Order vacating the December 20, 2000; Order for Support was decided on January 11, 2007. The Lozada decision, which was Claimant's basis for relief, does not instruct the type of retroactive recovery of past child support payments as Claimant seeks.

Accordingly, Judgment is entered in favor of Respondent and Claimant's claim is hereby denied.

BIRNBAUM, J.