LATISA MOORE v. STATE OF ILLINOIS ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (2014)

OPINION

This matter comes before this Court after an evidentiary hearing before the assigned Commissioner. This Court having reviewed the parties' post hearing briefs, the transcript of the healing and the evidence presented therein, hereby finds as follows:

Facts

On January 3, 2011, Claimant, Latisa P. Moore, filed a complaint against Respondent, State of Illinois Department of Transportation, seeking damages for her personal injuries sustained as result of a vehicular accident caused by Respondent's snow plow truck. On May 8, 2012, an evidentiary hearing was held before the assigned commissioner.

At the hearing in this matter, the evidence revealed that on January 10, 2010, at approximately 8:40 a.m., Claimant, Latisa P. Moore was involved in a single-vehicle car accident on the Interstate 94 (1-94) expressway while she was driving to work. Claimant asserts that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the State of Illinois Department of Transportation (“IDOT”). Specifically, Claimant testified that while she was driving southbound in the far left lane on 1-94, an IDOT snow plow which was traveling northbound in the far left lane propelled snow over the highway median onto her windshield causing her to lose control of her vehicle, spin across the southbound lanes of traffic and hit the retaining wall on the west side of the highway.

Claimant testified specifically that on the morning in question the road conditions were poor and 1-94 was being plowed and salted due to a snow storm that occurred during the preceding 24 hours. Claimant testified that she was driving south on 1-94 in the far left lane of the highway when she observed brake lights and turn signals from vehicles ahead of her. Claimant then saw an orange snow plow truck traveling in her direction in the far left lane on the opposite, northbound side of 1-94. As the snow plow truck approached her car, Claimant could see that a great quantity of snow was being propelled across the center wall of 1-94 into the southbound lanes. Claimant attempted to change lanes and move her vehicle into the lane immediately to her right, however a semi-truck blocked her ability to change lanes. As the snow plow truck passed her in the opposite direction, a heavy shower of wet snow flew across the center wall of the expressway and completely covered her car and windshield. Claimant lost control of her car due to her inability to see. Claimant's car spun across all of the southbound lanes of the expressway and struck the retaining wall located on the far west side of the expressway. The snow plow truck did not stop. Claimant testified that she sustained injuries as a result of the car accident, for which she was immediately treated. Claimant further testified that State Trooper Jonathan Randle-El assisted Claimant on the expressway after the accident.

At the hearing, IDOT presented only one witness, IDOT yard technician for 1-94, Hiram White¹ . Mr. White testified that IDOT was the agency responsible for the maintenance and snow clearance for 1-94 and that no other agency operated snow removal equipment on 1-94 on the morning in question. Mr. White also testified that IDOT has written rules and policies which govern snow related operations for IDOT employees. These rules were also admitted into evidence at the hearing. Specifically, the rules mandate a speed limit of 40 miles per hour for snow plow drivers when driving on the interstates. The rules also require that “plowing speeds shall be reduced to prevent throwing snow over bridge parapets, signs, roadways and sidewalks, etc.” Mr. White testified that this rule is to be interpreted to prohibit and prevent snow plow drivers from throwing snow across the center wall of expressways such as 1-94. Mr. White further testified that snow plow drivers under his supervision were trained as to this rule and if a driver were to operate a snow plow truck so that snow was propelled against a center wall, such operation would be in violation of IDOT's policies and procedures.

Legal Analysis

It is the duty of the State to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance and care of highways in order that defective and dangerous conditions likely to injure persons lawfully on the highway shall not exist. The exercise of reasonable care requires the State to keep its highways reasonably safe. Kraemer v. State, 42 Ill.Ct.Cl. 236 (1990); Blair v. State, 47 Ill.Ct.Cl. 242, 242-43 (1994). This Court has held that the State of Illinois is chargeable with only maintaining its roads in a reasonably safe condition for the purpose for which they are intended and that Claimant must, in order to prevail, prove by a preponderance of evidence that Respondent breached its duty and that breach proximately caused the injuries to Claimant. Calvert v. State, 38 Ill.Ct.Cl. 104 (1985); Louis v. State, 35 Ill.Ct.Cl. 741 (1983).

The evidence is uncontroverted that an IDOT snow plow propelled a shower of snow across the center wall of 1-94, as IDOT was the only agency to operate snow plows on 1-94 on the date and time in question. The evidence also illustrates that the IDOT snow plow truck was operated in violation of IDOT's policies and procedures in that such operation caused snow to propel over the center wall of 1-94. Accordingly, this Court finds that the State breached its duty of reasonable care. In addition, the evidence is uncontroverted that the actions of the IDOT snow plow driver created a dangerous condition in that he operated the truck so that a heavy shower of snow was propelled over the center wall and onto Claimant's car, which dangerous condition was the proximate cause of Claimant's accident. As such, Claimant has met her burden of proving her negligence claim.

Respondent argues that liability is precluded in this case because Claimant failed to show that IDOT failed to exercise reasonable care with respect to its plowing procedures on the date of the accident. Respondent argues that the instant matter is factually similar to the case of Schmit v. State, which was previously decided by this Court and barred liability in a snow plow matter. (59 Ill.Ct.Cl. 246 (2007)). In Schmit, the claimant alleged that IDOT's snow plow driver negligently piled snow at an intersection, blocking view of drivers, and causing claimant's car accident. The evidence presented by IDOT in Schmit illustrated that the snow was plowed in accordance with IDOT policies and procedures, which is directly in opposition to the facts of the case at hand. In this case, Respondent presented zero evidence that the policies and procedures were followed by IDOT. In fact, the only evidence before this court is contrary evidence that clearly illustrates that the operation of the IDOT snow plow was in direct violation of IDOT policies and procedures. As such, Respondent's argument in this vein is without merit.

Respondent also asserts that liability is precluded due to the contributory or comparative negligence of the Claimant. With respect to Respondent's affirmative defense of contributory or comparative negligence, the Court finds that Respondent has failed to meet its burden of proving such affirmative defense as Respondent presented no evidence at trial in this regard. As such, this Court must rely solely on the testimony of the Claimant. Claimant testified that she was driving with caution and within the proper speed limits as mandated by the weather. As this testimony is unrebutted, this Court accepts Claimant's testimony as true. Accordingly, Respondent's affirmative defense of contributory or comparative negligence is denied.

Damages

Claimant seeks damages for her medical expenses, loss of work, pain and suffering and loss of normal life. At the hearing Claimant admitted into evidence bills and records for certain medical providers totaling $4,534.00. Claimant also lost 2 days of time from work and introduced a wage loss verification totaling $291.31. Claimant also seeks $20,000.00 as damages for pain and suffering and $15,000.00, as damages for loss of a normal life. Claimant testified as to her pain and suffering and loss of a normal life. Specifically, Claimant testified that her injuries consisted of blunt trauma to various parts of her body including her head. She testified that she suffered sprains and contusions to her neck, left shoulder, thigh and knee. Claimant testified that most of her symptoms resolved within several weeks or months after the incident. However, Claimant testified that she continues to suffer knee pain and post-traumatic headaches, which pain she treats with over-the-counter medication. Claimant also testified that she continues to experience fear of driving in snowy conditions and along the subject portion of 1-94.

Claimant must prove her damages by a preponderance of the evidence. Williams-El v. State, 52 Ill.Ct.Cl. 11,16 (1999). Claimant's medical treatment, as set forth in the medical bills and records introduced at the hearing, was reasonable and necessary for the injuries she sustained following the accident. Claimant's medical expenses totaled $4,534.00. Accordingly, Claimant is entitled to an award for medical expenses in the amount of $4,534.00. Claimant also submitted evidence of a wage loss claim of $292.31, accounting for her loss of work because of the accident. Accordingly, Claimant is entitled to an award for loss of wages in the amount of $292.31. Claimant testified as to her pain and suffering. Based upon Claimant's testimony, this Court awards Claimant $7,500.00 for said damages.

With respect to Claimant's claim for loss of a normal life, Claimant has failed to present sufficient evidence which would show that the injuries caused by the accident continue to impair her lifestyle to the extent that she has incurred the loss of a normal life. As such, Claimant is not entitled to such damages.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Claimant awarded an amount of $12,326.31.

FOOTNOTES

1.  respective testimony at the hearing. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 212(a) bars the use of discovery depositions as evidence at trial and sets forth certain specific and limited exceptions to this rule. The depositions of Mr. Johnson and Trooper Randle-El fail to meet the exceptions identified in Supreme Court Rule 212(a). Therefore, this Court will not consider the testimony contained in the discovery depositions of Mr. Johnson and Trooper Randle-El.

STORINO, J.