CHRISTI TURPIN v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY (2013)

OPINION

Nature of the Claim

Claimant filed a complaint for breach of contract, injunctive relief, specific performance, tortious interference with a business expectancy and promissory estoppel against the Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale (“SIUC”). Claimant alleges SIUC failed to post her Ph.D. degree in 1999 after she purportedly fulfilled all the degree requirements. Claimant argues the Dissertation Committee Chair John Deichmann's approval of the final revisions. Claimant further asserts that Deichmann approved the final revisions on April 8, 1999. In contrast, Respondent argues Claimant failed to complete revisions required by two members of the Dissertation Committee following her March 11, 1999 oral defense. As a result of SIUC's failure to post Claimant's Ph.D., Claimant asserts she has been damaged due to loss of employment and lost earning capacity.

The substantive requirements of a Ph.D. degree from SIUC are: 1) complete the requirement of coursework; 2) pass preliminary examinations; 3) have a Dissertation Committee comprised of University faculty approved by the Graduate School; 4) have dissertation thesis approved by the Graduate School; 5) pass the oral defense of the dissertation before the Dissertation Committee; and 6) have approval of the written dissertation by the Dissertation Committee. To evidence completion of these requirements, SIUC supplies a number of forms for completion by the candidate. Specifically, there is an “Oral Defense Form” establishing that the candidate has successfully defended his/her dissertation. Secondly, there is a “Dissertation Approval Form,” which must be signed to prove that the Dissertation Committee approved the final draft of the written dissertation. Lastly, there is a “Departmental Clearance Form,” which is an internal Graduate School from that must be signed to demonstrate a candidate has completed all requirements and shall graduate.

On March 11, 1999, Claimant defended her Ph.D. dissertation before a Dissertation Committee. The Committee was comprised of Dr. John Deichmann as Chairman, Dr. William Coscarelli, Dr. John Evans and Dr. Nancy Mundschenk. Claimant claims that all Dissertation Committee members approved the dissertation on March 11,1999 and signed five Dissertation Approval Form, subject to Chairman Deichmann's final approval. Dr. Mundschenk unequivocally denies she ever signed the Dissertation Approval Forms and alleges Claimant has forged her name on documents. Claimant asserts she personally witnessed Dr. Mundschenk sign the Dissertation Approval Forms on March 11, 1999. In addition to challenging the veracity of Mundschenk's signature, Respondent alleges Claimant presented other forged documents including an April 1999 email and a May 13, 1999 memo allegedly sent from Dean John Pohlmann. Respondent argues the memo came from a facsimile number and on letterhead that do not belong to Dean Pohlmann.

The first witness at the hearing was Dr. William Coscarelli. Dr. Coscarelli served on Claimant's Ph.D. Dissertation Committee and testified that Claimant's Ph.D. dissertation subject was vocational rehabilitation counselors and the utilization of performance technologies. Prior to March 1999, Dr. Coscarelli served on sixteen Dissertation Committees. He chaired eight of those committees. Dr. Coscarelli testified that a typical Ph.D. program involves 64 hours of course work plus preliminary exams before a Dissertation Committee is formed. The Ph.D. candidate then presents an oral defense of his/her dissertation in front of the Dissertation Committee. Pending approval from the Dissertation Committee, the dissertation is sent to the SIUC Graduate School for final review and editing. Dr. Coscarelli testified that Claimant's dissertation oral defense took place on March 11, 1999, with John Deichmann serving as the Chairman of the committee. Dr. Coscarelli testified that he, Dr. Deichmann and Dr. Nancy Mundschenk were physically present during the oral defense. According to Dr. Coscarelli, the other committee member, Dr. John Evans, was not physically present at the oral defense but participated via teleconference.

Following the oral defense, Claimant was excused from the room for the Dissertation Committee's final discussion. During this discussion, Dr. Coscarelli recalled that Mundschenk and Evans desired revisions to the dissertation. According to Coscarelli's testimony, Dissertation Committee members always request some written revisions. He further testified he did not personally request any changes and he signed the Dissertation Approval Forms at the March 11, 1999 oral defense. Dr. Coscarelli stated that he could not recall Mundschenk refusing to sign the forms and testified that Evans orally authorized Claimant to sign his name to the Dissertation Approval Forms. At that time, Coscarelli stated he expected Claimant had her Ph.D. degree and would graduate in the summer of 1999. Following the oral defense, Coscarelli testified it is the Committee Chair's responsibility to ensure the candidate completes the requested revisions. He further stated that he had experienced situations in which a Dissertation Committee member refused to sign the Dissertation Approval Form pending the requested revisions. Coscarelli testified he met in 2007 with the Chair of Education Psychology, Lyle White, and Dr. Nancy Mundschenk. At that time, Mundschenk denied ever signing the Dissertation Approval Forms. At a subsequent meeting with the Dean of the Graduate School, John Koropchak, Coscarelli stated that his understanding for the denial of Claimant's Ph.D. was because Claimant didn't have the required signatures and the revisions were never satisfactorily completed.

On cross examination, Coscarelli stated that the final form and a copy of the dissertation must be turned into the Graduate School for processing of the Ph.D. Additionally, he testified that the March 1999 revisions were to be completed in conjunction with Committee Chair Deichmann. Coscarelli conceded that during a deposition in this case he stated that both Mundschenk and Deichmann were to work on the final revisions. He acknowledged that this is contrary to his testimony that if a Dissertation Committee member signs the Dissertation Approval Form that only the Chair of the Dissertation Committee ensures the revisions are completed. Following March 1999, Coscarelli stated he did notice some “date changes” to Claimant's dissertation but he was unsure what the revisions were and does not know if the requested revisions were completed. Coscarelli also identified two of Claimant's Exhibits as the Departmental Clearance Form utilized to ensure completion of all the degree requirements. Lastly, Coscarelli testified that it is up to the Department to verify the completion of a Ph.D.

Also testify before the Commissioner was the Dissertation Committee Chair, Dr. John Deichmann. Deichmann retired from SIUC in 2001 after serving on 30-40 Dissertation Committees and Chairing 20-30 of those committees. He described the role of a Dissertation Committee Chair as working with the candidate in approving and developing the dissertation subject and assisting the student in finding faculty members to serve on the Dissertation Committee. Deichmann testified that it is common for a committee member to sign the Dissertation Approval Form while still desiring revisions to the final project. When this occurs, the Committee Chair withholds signature until the requested revisions are satisfactorily completed. Deichmann could not recall if he signed the Dissertation Approval Forms on March 11,1999 or at a later date. Deichmann testified that he has never experienced a situation wherein a Dissertation Committee member prevented the issuance of Ph. D. after signing the Departmental Clearance Form, requiring only the Committee Chair's signature, was for the graduate Department to process the student's degree. Deichmann testified he sent Claimant a letter on October 3, 2007 indicating she had completed all of the requirements for the issuance of the Ph. D. degree.

On cross examination, Deichmann conceded that Dissertation Committee members requested revisions to Claimant's dissertation. Further, He acknowledged sometimes a student would not obtain the Ph.D. degree in the expected term because he/she failed to complete the dissertation revisions. Additionally, Deichmann identified the April 1, 1999 Departmental Clearance Form which states that Claimant was not expected to complete the program requirements at that time. Deichmann testified he signed another Departmental Clearance Form on April 8, 1999 stating that all degree requirements were completed. After April 8, 1999, Deichmann acknowledged he signed yet additional Departmental Clearance Forms, on April 1, 2000 and June 30, 2000, stating that to the contrary, Claimant had not completed the degree requirements. In his testimony, he was unable to reconcile the conflicting Departmental Clearance Forms.

The next witness was Claimant, Christi Turpin. She testified she received an undergraduate degree and a Master's degree in Psychology from Southeast Missouri State. She stated she enrolled in the SIUC Ph.D. program in the summer of 1988 and completed her Ph.D. course work in 1999. At that time, Claimant proceeded with an initial dissertation topic which was delayed because of a lingering illness affecting her dissertation advisor. In 1995 the dissertation advisor released his students and Claimant then pursued the dissertation topic which is the subject of this claim under the authority of Dr. Deichmann and the Dissertation Committee. On March 11, 1999, Claimant presented her oral defense to her Dissertation Committee and received suggested revisions from the Committee with Mundschenk requesting to see the revisions. Specifically, Claimant stated she witnessed Coscarelli and Mundschenk sign the Dissertation Approval Forms but Chairman Deichmann did not sign because he had to ensure the requested revisions were satisfactorily completed. She testified that Committee Member Evans (participating via teleconference) agreed that someone could sign his name. Following the oral defense, Claimant stated she completed the required revisions and returned the revised dissertation to Deichmann and Mundschenk on March 15, 1999. As of April 1, 1999, Deichmann had not signed the Departmental Clearance Form because Deichmann wanted to give Mundschenk another week to respond to the revised dissertation. According to Claimant, on April 8, 1999, Deichmann agreed to move forward by signing the Dissertation Approval Forms and the Departmental Clearance Form. At this time, Claimant testified she went to the Graduate School office with two copies of her dissertation, the five Dissertation Approval Forms and the Departmental Clearance Forms, wherein Dean Hillkirk signed three of the Dissertation Approval Forms. Following Hillkirks's signatures, Claimant left a fully executed Dissertation Approval Form and two Departmental Clearance Forms with Diechmnn. Additionally, Claimant testified she left two copies of the dissertation and two signed Dissertation Approval Forms with the Graduate School. At this point, Claimant stated she believed she had obtained her Ph. D. degree.

Subsequently, on December 2002 an issue arose with Claimant's employment with the Parkway School District when their Human Resources Department could not verify her Ph.D. degree. In response Claimant contacted David Wilson, the Associate Dean of the Graduate School who said he would look into the issue. On December 13, 2002, Associate Dean Wilson emailed Claimant indicating she had completed the Ph.D. requirements. Subsequently, on January 23, 2003, Wilson again emailed Claimant and sent a letter to the Parkway School District indicating Claimant had completed the Ph.D. requirements but paperwork had not been completed in order to process the degree. It was at this time that Wilson checked SIUC files and discovered that there was an Oral Defense Form and Graduate Clearance Form indicating that Claimant had not completed her degree requirements. At the hearing, Wilson testified that he sent the January 23, 2003 letter to Parkway School District indicating that all requirements of Claimant's degree had been completed even though he was not able to discuss the situation with all the Dissertation Committee members. Because Parkway School District could not verify Claimant's Ph.D., Claimant's employment was terminated.

Around this time, Claimant testified a meeting was held with the Graduate School wherein she was informed the Graduate School did not have the required Dissertation Approval Form or the Departmental Clearance Form. At this meeting, Claimant testified she also learned that there were issues raised by Mundschenk indicating Claimant never satisfactorily completed the required revisions following the March 11, 1999 oral defense. Claimant stated she began to work on these revisions to appease Mundschenk because Claimant did not have a copy of the original, allegedly signed Dissertation Approval Form. Claimant testified she was under the misconception that her original copies of the form had been destroyed in a 2001 fire in her home. In 2007 Claimant applied for a job at McCarthy Construction but the process was halted because McCarthy could not verify her Ph.D. In September 2007, Claimant called SIUC and set up a meeting with Dean Korochak. Claimant testified that at this point she had found her copies of the Dissertation Approval Form containing the various committee members' signatures which she gave to Dean Koropchak along with a memory stick containing the 2003 version of her dissertation. Associate Dean Wilson testified that in the fall of 2007, he informed Dean Koropchak that the Dissertation Approval Forms presented by Claimant were fraudulent because Mundschenk told him that she had not signed them. Wilson testified that in December 2007 he had a conversation with Harry Steen from McCarthy Construction wherein he said to Mr. Steen that Claimant had not completed her Ph.D. degree.

On Cross examination, Claimant acknowledged she did not receive a diploma but stated she requested not to be sent a diploma. Claimant conceded she does not have a final transcript. Claimant also conceded that at some point in time she declined to follow and complete the revisions requested from Mundschenk. Additionally, Dr. Ratna Sinha, the Associate Director from the Graduate School, requested formatting changes in 2003 that Sinha testified were never completed. On November 12, 2007, Phyleccia Cole, counsel for SIUC sent Claimant a letter from Dean Teitelbaum and Dean White outlining what Claimant needed to complete to receive her Ph.D. degree. Instead, Claimant refused to make the requested revisions and initiated this lawsuit. Throughout the cross examinations Claimant reiterated that she relied on the January 2003 letter from Wilson indicating she had completed her degree requirements.

The next witness was Professor Nancy Mundschenk. She testified that she was present at Claimant's March 11, 1999 dissertation oral defense and she did not sign the Dissertation Approval Forms knowing that her signature was required in order for Claimant to obtain her Ph.D. Mundschenk stated that she required substantive revisions to the dissertation before he would approve it and because of this she did not sign the Dissertation approval Forms. She stated that if she had signed the Dissertation Approval Forms her signature would indicate she either approved the required revisions or she was entrusting that the required revisions would be accomplished. She conceded that the signature on the Dissertation Approval Forms presented by Claimant did look like her signature but maintained that she did not sign the form. She testified that her understanding after the oral defense was that Dr. Coscarelli and Dr. Deichmann were satisfied but that she and Dr. Evans required revisions. Mundschenk testified that in 2003 she received revisions but cannot remember what the revisions were and does not remember the method of contact at that time. However, Mundschenk did reference an April 2003 memo, Respondent's Exhibit 7, wherein she contacted Claimant outlining the specific revisions Claimant needed to complete in order to obtain her signature on the Dissertation Approval Form. Following the April 2003 memo, Mundschenk testified she never received the requested revisions. In September 2007, Mundschenk as contacted by Professor White who wanted to know the status of Claimant's dissertation. During this time, Claimant's updated dissertation did not satisfy her requested revisions and because of this she never signed the Dissertation Approval Form. On cross examination, Mundschenk testified that Claimant's case is the only time in her career that she refused to sign a Dissertation Approval Form.

The Dean of the SIUC Graduate School, John Koropchak, also testified. Dr. Koropchak stated that his involvement began in the fall of 2007 when he initiated an investigation to resolve Claimant's Ph.D. issues. He stated that Claimant provided him with a copy of a Dissertation Approval Form on September 21, 2007. He held a meeting on October 30, 2007 with Dean Wilson, Professor Coscarelli, Professor Mundschenk and others. At this meeting, he testified Mundschenk unequivocally stated that she did not sign the Dissertation Approval Form and the ultimate conclusion of the meeting was that SIUC would not award the Ph.D. to Claimant without revisions to the dissertation. Koropchak said he did not independently seek to verify Mundschenk's signature on the Dissertation Approval Form. However, he testified that at the time of the meeting, his main focus was figuring out a way for Claimant to fulfill the remaining requirements to receive her Ph.D. On cross examination, Koropchak testified that in addition to the lack of a signed Dissertation Approval Form, the Graduate School had no records indicating that Claimant had completed her degree. Koropchak stated that the Graduate School was satisfied that Claimant completed the oral defense but that she had not completed the required revisions to the dissertation. Further, he stated that if a Dissertation Committee member wanted to see revisions to the dissertation that the Chair of the Committee and the student must provide the member with the revisions.

Another witness at the hearing before the Commissioner was Dr. John Evans, a member of the Dissertation Committee. Evans served at the request of Committee Chair Deichmann. During his time on the Committee, Evans met Claimant a few times regarding data concerns and voiced concerns to the Committee Chair regarding the dissertation's statistics. Contrary to testimony presented by other witnesses, Evans stated he was present in person at the March 11, 1999 oral defense of Claimant's Dissertation and testified that Claimant's performance was incomplete because of a lack of supporting statistics. Further, Evans stated he requested revisions and did not sign the Dissertation Approval Forms and never authorized anyone to sign on his behalf. His understanding was that the revisions would be made and presented to him and if found acceptable he would then sign off on the Dissertation Approval Form. However, according to Evans, Claimant never provided him with the required revisions to his satisfaction. In 2003, Claimant contacted Evans regarding the Ph.D. but the dissertation continued to lack his requested revisions. When contacted again in 2007, Evans stated he did not believe that he had standing to serve on the Dissertation Committee because he was no longer a SIUC faculty member.

Finally, Claimant provided rebuttal testimony asserting she did in fact make the revisions suggested by the Committee in 1999. She stated that she never notified SIUC that she was no longer seeking her Ph.D. degree at any point between 1999 and 2007 and that she had taken numerous steps to resolve the issues but nothing has ever been resolved. On cross examination, she conceded that the only proof that she has submitted the revisions of her dissertation is her testimony.

Analysis

The question for this Court is whether Claimant completed all of the SIUC Ph.D. requirements and obtained the necessary signatures on the required forms. The required forms have signature blocks for the Chief of the Dissertation Committee, the Dissertation Committee members and the Head of the Department. The Parties agree that all signatures are required in order for a candidate to receive his/her Ph. D. It is undisputed that Chairman Deichmann and Dr. Coscarelli signed the Dissertation Approval Forms. The signatures of Committee members Dr. Nancy Mundschenk and Dr. John Evans are disputed. Mundschenk signed the Dissertation Approval Forms in person and alleges Evans authorized Claimant to sign his name.

The first and second counts of Claimant's Complaint are breach of contract claims. Claimant asserts that by enrolling in the SIUC Ph.D. program a contractual relationship between Claimant and SIUC was created, whereby Claimant agreed to perform all of the responsibilities and duties of enrollment and SIUC agreed to confer a degree upon Claimant's successful completion of the degree requirements. Claimant argues that she performed all of her duties under the educational agreement but that SIUC breached that agreement by failing to confer upon her the Ph.D. degree. As a remedy, Claimant seeks an order compelling SIUC to confer the Ph.D. degree and to pay her damages resulting from SIUC's breach.

In order to plead a cause of action for breach of contract, Claimant must allege: 1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract; 2) substantial performance by Claimant; 3) a breach by Respondent; and 4) damages resulting from the breach. W.W. Vincent and Company, et al. v. First Colony Life Insurance Co., 351 Ill. App. 3d 752, 789, 814 N.E. 2d 960, 967, 286 Ill. Dec. 734 (1st Dist. 2004); Wagner v. State of Illinois, 60 Ill. Ct. Cl. 248 (2008). In a breach of contract claim, the Claimant bears the burden of proving each element of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Weidmann v. State of Illinois, 57 Ill. Ct. Cl. 209 (2005).

In a breach of contract claim involving a State University, the Court must defer to the judgment of the University Faculty and Board of Trustees in determining a student's performance within academic standards. Specifically, the issue of whether a dissertation meets the academic requirement qualifying it for Ph.D. approval involves the subjective assessment of the student by the faculty of the University. As such, this Court will only find a breach of contract in the University context when the faculty “maliciously or in bad faith by arbitrarily and capriciously refusing to award a degree to a student who fills the requirements for a degree.” Tanner v. Board of Trustees, 48 Ill. App. 3d 680, 363 N.E.2d 208, 6 Ill. Dec. 679 (1977); see also Lewis v. State of Illinois, 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 224 (1999).

This Court finds the allegations of forgery in this claim troublesome. But those allegations are irrelevant to our analysis whether Claimant performed the required revisions to her dissertation. As stated, the only issue of contention in this case is whether Claimant satisfactorily completed the required revisions of her dissertation and whether she obtained the necessary signatures from her Dissertation Committee approving the dissertation. Both parties agree that all the other Ph.D. degree requirements were satisfied. Thus, this Court must consider whether Claimant fulfilled her dissertation requirement to the satisfaction of the Dissertation Committee members and whether SIUC's faculty maliciously, arbitrarily and capriciously denied Claimant her Ph.D. degree. After reviewing the record, this Court finds that following the March 11, 1999 oral defense, Claimant was required to provide Mundschenk and Evans with revisions to her dissertation and neither Mundschenk nor Evans ever approved these revisions. Regardless of whether Mundschenk and Evans signed the Dissertation Approval Forms on March 11, 1999, all witnesses agreed that Mundchenk and Evans insisted on reviewing the revisions and neither approved the final form of the written dissertation. Evans had specific statistical data concerns yet Claimant failed to present Evans with his required revisions at any point from the 1999 Oral Defense to the present proceedings. Despite all of the testimony and presented evidence, no one in this case was able to produce a Dissertation Approval Form with all required signatures, including the head of the Department signature. Because Claimant did not fulfill her degree requirements in ensuring the Dissertation Committee received and approved the required revisions to the dissertation, this Court finds that SIUC did not maliciously, arbitrarily and capriciously deny Claimant a Ph.D. degree. Thus, Counts I and II of Claimant's complaint are denied.

In Count III of Claimant's complaint, Claimant seeks damages for tortious interference with a business expectancy. The elements for a claim for tortious interference with a business expectancy are: 1) the existence of a valid business expectancy; 2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the interferer; 3) an intentional interference inducing or causing a termination of the business expectancy; 4) resulting damages. Fryman v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 132 (1989). Claimant must prove each element of the tort by a preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, Claimant argues that in 2007 SIUC was aware that her employment with McCarthy construction was dependent upon her acquisition of a Ph.D. degree and yet SIUC refused to post her degree resulting in losing her position with McCarthy. In contrast, Respondent argues that Claimant never completed the degree requirements and thus, SIUC did not wrongfully refuse to award her a Ph.D. degree. This Court agrees with Respondent. In order to prevail on a tortious interference with a business expectancy claim, the Claimant must prove the interference was intended, unjustified and malicious. In contrast, if the interference was justified or within just cause, the interference is not actionable. Id. In this case, Respondent did not award Claimant her Ph.D. because she failed to complete the degree requirements. As such, it was Claimant who must accept culpability for the McCarthy termination in 2007 since she was aware SIUC disputed her Ph.D. completion, yet she continued to advertise herself as successfully completing a Ph.D. to McCarthy personnel. Thus, Count III of Claimant's complaint is denied.

Lastly, Count IV of Claimant's Complaint is a promissory estoppel claim. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is a common law doctrine and has been incorporated into the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as section 90. That section provides in relevant part:

Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance:

A promise which the Promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promise or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts §901(1), at 242 (1981).

Courts have held that to establish a claim under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must prove that 1) defendant made an unambiguous promise to plaintiff, 2) plaintiff relied on such promise, 3) plaintiff's reliance was expected and foreseeable by defendants and 4) plaintiff justifiably relied on the promise to its detriment. Quake Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 141 Ill. 2d 281, 565 N.E. 2d 990, 152 Ill. Dec. 308 (1990).

Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine offering relief where no legal remedy may be available. The Court of Claims has consistently held that it lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding in equity. Ace Coffee Bar, Inc. v. the University of Illinois, 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 395 (1999) Garimella v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 50 Ill. Ct. Cl. 350 (1996). This Court is not a court of general jurisdiction where it is empowered to consider the equities of a dispute. Instead, the Court of Claims is a creature of statute and its jurisdiction is controlled by §505/8 of the Court of Claims Act. 705 ILCS 505/8. As such, a promissory estoppel claim may be beyond our jurisdiction.

Even assuming arguendo that this Court did have jurisdiction to entertain Claimant's promissory estoppel claim. Claimant's Count IV fails to satisfy the doctrine's elements. Specifically, Claimant asserts that she relied upon the January 23, 2003 letter from Dean Wilson stating that she had completed the degree requirements and that SIUC would be posting her Ph.D. degree. Claimant argues she relied on this representation to her detriment forming a claim for promissory estoppel. If the January 23, 2003 letter from Dean Wilson stood alone perhaps Claimant could argue that at that time she justifiably relied on Dean Wilson's letter. However, Claimant's own testimony establishes that Claimant clearly knew, at the time of Dean Wilson's letter, SIUC was asserting that she had to finish the revisions before posting her Ph.D. degree. In fact, at that time, Claimant testified she was submitting revisions to Dissertation Committee members, Mundschenk and Evans, while attempting to get their approval on the Dissertation Approval Form. The core of any promissory estoppel claim is justifiable reliance on the assertions from Respondent. In this case, Claimant had no justifiable reason to rely on Dean Wilson's letter, knowing that the Dissertation Committee was waiting on her revisions. Further, Claimant's testimony that she was attempting revisions proves Claimant failed to rely on Dean Wilsons 2003 letter. Claimant is seeking damages under the doctrine of promissory estoppel for losses that arose nearly four years after she was fully informed on SIUC's position regarding the incompleteness of her Ph.D. degree. Thus, Claimant cannot sustain a promissory estoppel claim and Count IV is denied.

The Court notes that following the hearing the Commissioner granted leave for the Parties to submit simultaneous Post-Hearing Briefs on November 22, 2010. On July 17, 2012, Claimant filed an additional Post-Hearing Brief asserting its content as a “correction to the Respondent's summary to correct the many false and inflammatory comments it contained.” On or around August 3, 2012, Respondent filed a Motion to Strike Claimant's Additional Post-Hearing Brief. This Court agrees with Respondent that it did not grant Claimant leave, nearly two years following Respondent's Post-Hearing Brief, to file an Additional Post-Hearing Brief responding to Respondent's Post-Hearing Brief. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's Motion to Strike Claimant's Additional Post-hearing Brief is GRANTED and Claimant's Additional Post-hearing Brief will be stricken from the record.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Claimant's claim is DENIED.

Petition for Rehearing- Elements- The rules of the Court of Claims provide that a Petition for Rehearing must set forth points that were allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the Court together with supporting authorities and suggestions. New trials are addressed at the sound discretion of the trial court.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Claimant's Petition for Rehearing filed on February 11, 2013 as well as her Motions to Strike the Testimony of David Wilson and Nancy Mundschenk and a Motion to Strike Respondent's Answer to Rehearing. These motions were filed on March 29, 2013. For purposes of this Order we consolidate and rule on all four motions.

Section 790/220 of the Rules of the Court of Claims provides that a Petition for Rehearing must set forth points that were allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the Court together with supporting authorities and suggestions. In a motion or petition for rehearing, the motion or petition is to state the points supposed to have been overlooked or misapprehended by the court, with authorities and suggestions stated in support thereof. 74 Ill.Admin.Code 790.220. New trials are addressed at the sound discretion of the trial court. Wells v. State, 38 Ill.Ct.Cl. 142, 148 (1985), citing in re Marriage Hopkins, 106 Ill.App. 3d 135 (1982). Generally, motions for a rehearing include reconsideration by the trial court for a “misapprehension” of the law. Wells at 148. At other times, such motions allege that there is “newly discovered” evidence for the courts consideration. Id. citing Drury v. Catholic Home Bureau, 34 Ill.2d 84 (1996).

Claimant has not provided the Court with any case law that would alter the decision in any way, nor any evidence that the Court's decision was based upon any misapprehension of the law. This Court has consistently held that in the absence of a showing in support of these points that Motion for Rehearing must be denied. Vargas v. State, 42 Ill.Ct.Cl. 168 (1990).

On March 4, 2013, Respondent filed an Answer to Claimant's Petition for Rehearing. On March 8, 2013, Claimant filed a Reply to No Response from Respondent for the Petition for Rehearing. Regardless of whether this Court or Claimant received Respondent's Answer in a timely manner, Claimant's Petition for rehearing and subsequent Motions to Strike fail to make a showing that a rehearing is warranted. As such, the Petition for Rehearing is DENIED. Claimant's Motion to Strike Respondent's Answer and the Motion to Strike the testimony of Wilson and Mundschenk are DENIED.

BIRNBAUM, PETER J.