CHRIS BRADLEY v. STATE OF ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (2012)

OPINION

Claimant filed a Complaint for personal injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident on May 20, 2000. The Complaint alleges that Claimant was driving on Illinois Route 15, also known as Missouri Avenue, near the 3300 block of East St. Louis, Illinois when he encountered standing water on the roadway. He suffered personal injuries when he lost control of his vehicle and struck a utility pole. A hearing was held before Commissioner Ysursa on August 8, 2011. Edward Szewczyk represented Claimant, and Assistant Attorney General Jamie Knodel represented Respondent.

I. Preliminary Issues

Respondent filed twelve (12) motions in limine. Oral arguments were held on the motions in limine. Motions in limine 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 were denied. Motions in limine numbers 8 and 12 were granted.

Respondent objected to the Supreme Court Rule 237 Notices served by Claimant on August 5, 2011, for four former and/or current Illinois Department of Transportation (herein after IDOT) employees. Respondent objected due to two reasons: (1) the 237 notices were improper due to the untimely service; and (2) two of the persons sought to attend by Claimant, Christin Braunbauer and Mary Lanny, were not included in any Supreme Court Rule 213 disclosures. During argument it was noted that Braunbauer and Lanny no longer work for IDOT and as such are not under Respondent's control, mooting the issue. The other two IDOT employees contained in the Rule 237 notices were Steve Wheeler and Angela Blackburn. After a recess counsel for both parties resolved the remaining 237 notice issues by Respondent stipulating that the State of Illinois owns and controls Route 15 in the area in question and as such has a duty to maintain the roadway in a reasonably safe condition, including the removal and/or warning of standing water on the roadway.

II. Background

East St. Louis Police Officer Rodell Andrews, Jr. was the first witness called by Claimant. Officer Andrews testified that he has been employed by the East St. Louis Police Department for over 15 years starting in January 2006. Officer Andrews responded to the Claimant's accident on the evening of May 20, 2000, around 8:10 p.m. He was presented Claimant's Exhibit 9, a copy of his police report of the accident, in order to refresh his memory. Officer Andrews testified that the accident occurred on Missouri Avenue near the intersection with 33rd Avenue. Officer Andrews stated that he arrived at the scene and observed Claimant and his vehicle. He testified that the vehicle had hydroplaned and struck a telephone pole on the northbound side of westbound Missouri Avenue. Officer Andrews was presented Claimant's Exhibits 10-21, which were photographs of the area of the accident, and testified that while not taken on the evening of the accident, the pictures accurately depict the condition of Missouri Avenue around the time of the accident. Officer Andrews stated that he did not remember seeing a sign stating “Water on Pavement” at or near the accident scene. Officer Andrews was then shown Claimant's Exhibits 15, 16 and 17 that show the pole that Claimant hit. He testified that the photographs accurately and fairly depict the pole that Claimant's vehicle struck on the night of the accident except there was more water on Missouri Avenue on the evening of the accident than depicted in the photos. Officer Andrews testified that he regularly patrolled the area in question as a normal part of his duties. He stated that it was common knowledge that the westbound lanes of Route 15 frequently flooded in the area of the accident. He said that the area typically flooded up to the center lane of the road and that the water remained on the roadway for days until the water evaporated. Officer Andrews said that he never reported the flooding to IDOT or other authorities. He stated that he did not measure the depth of the water on the pavement on May 20, 2000, but stated it was deep enough for a vehicle to lose control and hydroplane.

Officer Andrews observed Claimant at scene of the accident. He testified that Claimant had injuries to his head and was bleeding from his head. He stated that an ambulance took him from the scene. Officer Andrews observed damage to Claimant's vehicle on the front end and testified that Claimant's Exhibit 22 fairly and accurately depicted Claimant's vehicle on date of accident. Officer Andrews testified that the water covered the entire right lane of westbound Illinois Route 15.

After Officer Andrew's direct examination, Claimant's Exhibits 10 through 21 were admitted into evidence over Respondent's objection. Claimant's Exhibit 9 was admitted without objection. Claimant's Exhibit 22 was admitted into evidence over Respondent's objection.

On cross examination Officer Andrews did not recall how long the water was on the roadway on the night of the accident. On re-direct Officer Andrews was shown Claimant's Exhibit 26 which was admitted into evidence over Respondent's objection.

The second witness called to testify was Claimant, Chris Bradley. Claimant stated that he was in an accident on May 20, 2000, on Illinois Route 15 (Missouri Avenue) around 8:00 p.m. Claimant stated that he was travelling on westbound Missouri Avenue going over an overpass heading into East St. Louis. He testified that he had headlights on and nothing was obstructing his view. He stated it was not raining that evening and it had not rained that day. He testified that it did rain the day before on May 19th. He said that he lived most of his life in Nebraska but returned to Cahokia in 1998 in order to live with his mother and graduate from high school. He testified that he was not that familiar with the particular area of Missouri Avenue where the accident occurred and that prior to the accident he had never observed standing water on the roadway in the area in question. He stated that at the time of the accident he was travelling the speed limit in the far right westbound lane and he hit a pool of standing water, his vehicle hydroplaned, and the vehicle's front end struck a utility pole on north side of Missouri Avenue. He stated that he did not see any warning signs advising of water on pavement. He testified that Claimant's Exhibits 10 through 21 fairly and accurately depict the roadway and the pole he struck. Claimant did not testify as to the amount of standing water on the roadway on the evening in question.

After hitting the pole, Claimant stated that his head hit the windshield and he was “woozy” but not unconscious. He stated that his head and forehead were injured plus his left leg and his neck and back. He testified that after the accident he was taken via ambulance to St. Mary's Hospital (currently Kenneth Hall Hospital) and was treated and released. Claimant testified that Claimant's Exhibit 7 is a bill from Kenneth Hall Hospital and was paid. Claimant testified that he then received treatment for his injuries from Frick Chiropractic Clinic in Cahokia. He stated that Claimant's Exhibit 8 is a bill from Frick Chiropractic Clinic in Cahokia and had been paid. Claimant testified that at the time of the accident he was employed at Casey's General Store. He stated that he missed work due to his injuries and suffered lost wages in the amount of $1,100. Claimant presented no documentary evidence of his wages at the time of the accident to support his testimony. Claimant testified that Claimant's Exhibit 23 is a photo of his left leg showing abrasions and Claimant's Exhibit 24 depicts his forehead after the accident. Claimant testified that he received stitches in his forehead and has about an inch scar from about the midpoint of his forehead near his hairline down towards his left eye.

After direct examination Claimant's Exhibits 23 and 24 were admitted into evidence. Claimant's Exhibits 7 and 8 were admitted into evidence over Respondent's objections.

On cross examination Claimant was asked about his familiarity with Illinois Route 15 and he said he was not that familiar with it. Respondent's counsel showed him his deposition demonstrated that he stated that he had driven on Illinois Route 15 once or twice a month before May 20, 2000. Claimant could not remember traffic conditions on evening in question. He testified as to lost wages of $1,100 but could not answer how he calculated lost wages in 2000; specifically, he could not recall how much his wages were back in 2000. On re-direct Claimant clarified that while he had driven on Route 15 prior to the accident, he was not familiar with stretch of Illinois Route 15 where the accident occurred because his experience driving on Route 15 was between Cahokia and Belleville, IL, which took him on a different stretch of road from the accident site. On re-direct he was shown the answers to interrogatories and stated that he missed 3 weeks of work that formed his claim for lost wages. On re-cross Claimant testified that he did not work the week of May 21st — June 3 rd and disputes Casey's General Store records that show he worked 12 hours that week. He stated in deposition that his wages were $7 per hour but he testified at the trial that his deposition testimony was incorrect.

Claimant then called Joseph Dean Monroe, an IDOT employee for the last 17 years, as an adverse witness. Monroe has worked out of the IDOT facility in Collinsville, IL for the vast majority of his 17 years with IDOT. He testified that he currently is the District Operations Engineer for District 8 and has been in that position for the previous 6 years. Monroe has a masters degree in civil engineering. He testified that District 8 includes Missouri Avenue where the accident occurred in this case. He stated that prior to being the District Operations Engineer for District 8 he was a Field Operations Engineer beginning in 2000. In May 2000 he testified he was working as a Traffic Operation Engineer and Field Operations Engineer. As a Traffic Operation Engineer he was responsible for signage and striping of the roads within his District. He stated that as a Field Operations Engineer he was responsible for the safe operations and upkeep of roadways in his zone. He testified that in May 2000 Steve Wheeler was the field technician for Bowman Maintenance facility located at Seventh and Exchange in East St. Louis, IL. Wheeler was responsible for repair and maintenance for stretches of road including Route 15.

Monroe testified that since May 2000 he has become aware of standing water on Missouri Avenue. He stated that as of May 2000 he was unaware of any flooding issues near the 3300 block of Missouri Avenue. Monroe testified that standing water covering a full lane of traffic is a potential driving hazard to the motorist public. He testified that it is reasonable for a person to expect a dry road surface when driving and it is not raining. He further stated that if IDOT is aware of standing water on a roadway then the appropriate action is to place a warning sign in the area. In this area he stated that IDOT could not make drastic changes to the roadway because the drainage of water from the roadway was the responsibility of the City of East St. Louis as it owned the drainage sewers. Monroe testified that Claimant's Exhibits 10, 11, 12, and 13 depict IDOT warning signs placed near the accident site shortly after accident.

Monroe testified that he became aware of the recurrent flooding in the areas after 2000. He testified that IDOT generally drives all roadways in a District on a regular basis. He stated that there is no set routine but workers should regularly drive the district's roads to check out the condition. He stated that as of May 2000 the majority of “maintainers” drove past the 33 hundred block of Missouri Avenue on their way to work. Monroe also testified that in May 2000 there was a 24 hour communication center wherein the public could report dangerous conditions on the roadway and during normal working hours the public would call the safety and claims bureau to report dangerous conditions. Monroe also stated that IDOT relies on local governmental agencies such as police departments to report problems with roadways. After this testimony Claimant rested.

Respondent called Mr. Monroe in its case in chief to testify. Monroe reviewed Supplemental Departmental Report pages 12 through 31 which contained the IDOT call in logs and motor safety logs from May 19 to 24, 2000. He testified that he was familiar with IDOT's processes on these logs and these logs were maintained in the regular course of business. He reviewed the logs and there was no reference to a complaint of standing water on Missouri Avenue at 3300 block between May 19th and 22nd. Monroe stated that at some point an IDOT employee must have received a report of standing water on Missouri Avenue near the 3300 block due to an IDOT Memorandum from R.D. Reeves to Angela Blackburn. The Memorandum, dated July 6, 2000, stated that Mr. Reeves observed water in several locations of Missouri Avenue on May 22nd. Monroe also testified that there was an agreement with East St. Louis wherein IDOT maintains the roadway, shoulders and right of way and East St. Louis maintains the drainage sewers.

On cross examination Monroe was shown Claimant's Exhibit 6 which contained a memorandum from Gary Smith that denotes Claimant filing a complaint about road conditions on May 22nd. Monroe testified that the May 22nd complaint from Claimant was not contained in the logs he was referred to previously. Monroe further testified that even if an employee going home observes a dangerous condition on a roadway, the employee has a duty to take some action. If there is a recurrent problem then it should be addressed. Monroe also testified that at the request of East St. Louis IDOT did assess the area in question in relation to the flooding problems. He stated that flooding in the area was caused by a large rain event or by discharge of waste water into the combined sewer system from a nearby industrial plant, or a combination of both. Monroe stated that the first time he knew that the IDOT Bowman facility became aware of flooding in the area in questions was on May 22, 2000, and that IDOT acted appropriately by erecting a warning sign.

The Supplemental Departmental Report was admitted into evidence as Respondent's Exhibit #1. The Original Departmental Report was admitted into evidence as Claimant's Exhibit #6.

III. Analysis

Claimant has made a claim for negligence. In order to prevail, Claimant must establish a duty owed to Claimant by Respondent, a breach of that duty by Respondent, and damages resulting proximately from that breach. Chandler v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 207 Ill. 2d 331, 340, 798 N.E.2d 724, 729 (2003). There is no question that Respondent owes a duty of ordinary care to maintain its roadways in a reasonably safe condition, Reidy v. State, 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 16 (1975), but Respondent is not a guarantor of the safety of all drivers on its roads. This duty of ordinary care only arises when the Respondent has notice of the defect at issue. Sutter and Fleming v. State, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 84 (1996). The duty of ordinary care extends to the warning of potential dangerous conditions on the roadways of which the State has notice. Sutter and Fleming v. State, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 84 (1996).

In this case, Claimant alleges that Missouri Avenue near the 3300 block near East St. Louis contained a defective condition, specifically it was prone to frequent flooding that posed a danger to the motorist public. Claimant asserts that Respondent negligently failed to inspect, repair and maintain Missouri Avenue free of standing water and/or failed to warn the motorist public of the dangerous condition of water on the roadway. There are really two issues to be considered: (1) whether Respondent is liable for the negligent inspection, repair or maintenance of the road thus causing flooding; and (2) whether Respondent is liable for failing to warn of the condition.

Claimant's first theory of liability, the failure to inspect, repair or maintain the roadway fails. IDOT engineer Monroe testified that there is an agreement between IDOT and the City of East St. Louis wherein IDOT maintains the roadway, shoulders, and land within the right of way and East St. Louis is responsible for sewers and drainage. Claimant presented no evidence to indicate that the flooding was caused by any condition of the roadway itself. The only evidence as to the actual cause of the flooding on the roadway was from Monroe who stated that he personally observed flooding on the location in question from the manhole cover on westbound Route 15. Monroe testified that it was his understanding that there was a flooding problem on Route 15 near the 3300 block due to the fact the sewers maintained by East St. Louis in that area were in a combination sewer system that accepted industrial, residential and storm runoff. As there was no evidence presented that the flooding was caused by a failure to inspect, maintain or repair the roadway by Respondent, Claimant's first theory of liability fails.

The second theory of liability is that Respondent had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition on the roadway and failed to warn the motorist public. The Court of Claims has held that when Respondent has actual or constructive notice of recurrent standing water on a roadway that the Respondent has a duty to warn the motorist public. Scott v. State of Illinois, 43 Ill.Ct.Cl. 85 (1990). The key inquiry is the reasonableness of Respondent's actions in light of the notice it had.

In this case the only testimony as to the recurrence of standing water on Route 15 as of May 20, 2000 is that of East St. Louis Police Officer Andrews. Officer Andrews testified that it was common knowledge that Missouri Avenue flooded whenever it rained. He further testified that the standing water would remain on the roadway until such time that it evaporated. Mr. Monroe testified that the flooding in the area even occurred due to non-rain events. The evidence at trial indicates that the flooding in the area in question was not a case of a flashflood that quickly recedes; but rather was a recurrent flooding problem wherein the water remains for a period of days. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that not only did the flooding occur during wet weather but sometimes when it was not raining due to the sewer discharge.

If in fact Respondent had actual knowledge of flooding on Missouri Avenue prior to the accident then Mr. Monroe testified that IDOT had a duty to place a warning sign up. As such if no warning sign was placed then Respondent breached its duty. A preponderance of the evidence weighs in favor of the fact that Respondent had actual knowledge, or with any degree of due diligence would have gained actual knowledge, of recurrent flooding on Missouri Avenue. While Respondent was not responsible to repair the sewers nothing prevented Respondent from erecting a sign to warn motorists of the possibility of water on the roadway. As such Respondent breached its duty to warn.

The next inquiry is whether the water on the roadway caused the accident. The testimony from Claimant is that around 8:00 p.m. he was travelling on westbound Missouri Avenue. He stated that it was dark and his vehicle was working properly. He stated that he went over an overpass and after reaching the bottom of the other side of the overpass he hit the standing water, hydroplaned and struck a utility pole on the north side of the road. Officer Andrews, while not a witness, opined that Claimant lost control due to the standing water and struck the pole. Respondent offered no evidence to contradict this version of events. As such the accident was proximately caused by the standing water on the roadway.

The final element of his case is damages. Claimant seeks damages for his medical expenses, pain, suffering and disability, disfigurement and for lost wages. Claimant stated that in the accident he hit his head on the windshield and was woozy. He stated that he cut his forehead and hurt his leg, neck and back. Claimant testified that he was taken via ambulance to Kenneth Hall Regional Hospital (formerly St. Mary's Hospital) in East St. Louis via ambulance. He testified that he was treated and released. Claimant's Exhibit #7 is a medical bill from Kenneth Hall Hospital in the amount of $1,117.60. Claimant stated that the medical bill from Kenneth Hall Hospital was paid. He then testified that he was treated at Frick Chiropractic Clinic in Cahokia, IL after the accident. Claimant's Exhibit #8 is a medical bill from Frick Chiropractic Clinic in the amount of $199.00 and Claimant testified that the bill was paid. Claimant also stated that he has a scar on his forehead from the accident. The scar appears to be about an inch in length and goes from Claimant's hairline in the middle of his forehead towards his left eye.

On the issue of medical expenses Respondent argues that Claimant has not proven a causal link between the accident and the medical services provided because there is no expert testimony. In order to recover medical expenses due to an accident Claimant must establish two things: (1) the medical services were reasonable and necessary to treat the injuries suffered by the Claimant and caused by the negligence of the Respondent, i.e. causally connected to the accident; and (2) the medical services were reasonable and necessary for like services in the area. While generally in order to establish that the medical services are causally connected to the injuries suffered expert testimony is required, if the need for the medical services is so obvious to be within the realm of a layperson's knowledge, no expert testimony is required. Brown v. Baker, 2184 Ill.App.3d 401, 405, 672 N.E.2d 69, 71 (5th Dist. 1996).⁴ In this case the ambulance and treatment at Kenneth Hall Hospital on the evening of the accident are within the realm of knowledge of the layperson. As such Claimant has met his burden by a preponderance of the evidence that the medical services from the ambulance and Kenneth Hall Hospital were reasonable and necessary. The next prong is whether Claimant established that the medical bills were reasonable for like services in the area. The law provides that a paid bill is prima facie evidence of the reasonableness of the charges. Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill.2d 72, 82; 833 N.E.2d 847, 853 (2005). Since those bills were paid the Claimant has met his burden of proving the services were reasonable to treat the injuries he suffered. As such Claimant has met his burden to recover the $1,117.60 medical bills from Kenneth Hall Hospital. The Frick Chiropractic Clinic services are a different story. The layperson cannot ascertain whether said chiropractic services were reasonable and necessary to treat the injuries of Claimant. As such Claimant failed to meet his burden of proof that the Frick Chiropractic Clinic services were causally connected to treat the injuries Claimant suffered due to the accident.

Claimant seeks pain and suffering due to his injuries. Claimant did not suffer any broken bones but was involved in a motor vehicle accident nonetheless. As such Claimant is awarded $2,000 for pain and suffering.

Claimant also seeks $1,100 in lost wages. Claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof on this issue. Claimant failed to present any documentary evidence of his wages in May of 2000. He further could not remember his hourly wage at the time of the accident. As such Claimant has not proven his claim for lost wages.

The final damage for Claimant is the scar on his head. In light of the location and prominence of the scar Claimant is awarded $5,000 for the scar.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Claimants' claim is granted. Claimant is awarded $8.117.60 in total damages.

FOOTNOTES

4.  “Generally, a plaintiff in a personal injury case must present the testimony of a medical expert to establish causation if the relationship between the claimed injury and the event in question requires special knowledge and training to establish. For example, if a plaintiff suffers a cut in an accident, the jury can readily determine without expert testimony that the accident caused the cut. But, if the nature of plaintiffs injury is complex or if the condition could be the result of some event or condition other than the accident in question, then expert testimony may be needed to establish the particular event that caused the pain and the underlying medical condition. This proof of causation is usually accomplished by presenting testimony from a physician on the causation issue.” See Brown v. Baker, 2184 Ill.App.3d 401, 405, 672 N.E.2d 69, 71 (5th Dist. 1996).

SPRAGUE, C.J.