IN RE: APPLICATION OF: JANE DOE. (2012)

ORDER

This cause is before the Court following a hearing before the assigned Commissioner. This case involves the criminal sexual abuse of a young girl. Because of the sensitive nature of this crime, the Court, sua sponte has redacted the actual names of the victim and her mother and substituted them with Jane Roe and Jane Doe respectively.

This claim arises out of repeated acts of sexual abuse occurring over a period of several years, against the minor child. The abuse was reported by the victim to her mother in October of 2007. But the crime was not reported to law enforcement until February 3, 2009. An Application for Benefits under the Crime Victims Compensation Act was submitted by Claimant on June 15, 2009. Claimant sought compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”, 740 ILCS 45/1, et seq., (2000). On February 1, 2010, this Court denied Claimant compensation under the Act. This order was based upon the Court's finding that the appropriate law enforcement officials were not notified within seven (7) days of the perpetration of the crime. The Court also found that Claimant failed to establish that notification was timely under the circumstances, an exception to the seven (7) day rule. On February 26, 2010, Claimant appealed this Court's denial of compensation on the basis that Claimant was not aware of the crime being committed until the minor child told a school counselor on February 3, 2009. Because of this, Claimant argues notification was timely.

A hearing was held before Commissioner Timoney on August 19, 2010. Commissioner Timoney filed his recommendation together with a transcript of the hearing and exhibits. This Court has reviewed all of the documents including the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing before the Commissioner. Following that review, THIS COURT FINDS:

1. That commencing in 1999 and lasting for a period of several years, the minor victim, described herein as Jane Roe was the victim of a violent crime, as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act, to-wit: Criminal Sexual Abuse, 720 ILCS 5/12-15 (2000), by an offender, her step-father.

2. That in late October or early November, 2007, while living in the State of Arizona, Claimant was advised by her minor daughter that her step father had been “touching her” in a way the daughter thought to be abusive. The child told her mother that the abuse took place over several years beginning when they were living in Illinois. Claimant confronted her husband about the allegations. He denied any abuse. Claimant's mother came to Arizona from her home in Florida to provide comfort and assistance to her daughter and granddaughter. Within a matter of days, Claimant moved with her minor daughter to her mother's home in Florida to get away from the offender. Claimant did not then, nor did she ever report the crime to a law enforcement official. It was not until February, 2009, after Claimant and her minor daughter moved back, to the State of Illinois, that the child confided the abuse to a counselor at Champaign Central High School. This counselor promptly notified law enforcement officials of the crime.

3. That pursuant to Section 6.1(b-l) of the Act, a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the appropriate law enforcement officials were notified within seven days of the perpetration of the crime allegedly causing the death or injury to the victim, or in the event such notification was made more than seven days after the perpetration of the crime, the applicant establishes that such notice was timely under the circumstances.

Here a little girl was subjected to unspeakable abuse by her step father for a period of several years. When she tried to communicate this to her mother, the mother fled the home (and the jurisdiction) with her daughter. But for misguided reasons the mother never notified the police, child welfare services or health care professionals. In fact, as of the date of the hearing the mother stated that she and her daughter have never discussed the abuse in any direct manner. The mother, at least initially, chose to believe it possible that the abuse never occurred.

But the abuse did occur and the child suffered greatly.

In Nunez v. State, 02 CV 2627, we found, “A child should not be punished because the parent or guardian failed to protect the child's rights by applying to the compensation program in a timely manner”. We find that the same principle in Nunez has (in these factual circumstances) the application to the issue of timely notification.

When this child confided the abuse to her high school counselor the Champaign County Police and DCFS were immediately notified. In their first interview with the child the police and DCFS sought to gain her confidence. When they did they asked her what she wanted. She said, “therapy”. The mom testified that following her report to the police and the charging of the offender, the child had engaged in self mutilation by cutting herself. This has required hospital visits on at least two occasions.

The avowed goal of the Crime Victims Compensation Act is to provide services to children such as these.

It would do violence to the framers of this legislation and more importantly to this child to conclude that the child should be denied benefits because of her mother's failure to notify police. In fact, it was the child in this case who demonstrated the courage to disclose this abuse to a person in a position of authority who in turn made notification to the police.

While the mother failed to make timely notification, we find that the victim's notification to the authorities was timely given the circumstances. This child, despite great emotional trauma, showed the courage to cooperate in the investigation of this abuse including the indictment and conviction of the offender. To deny compensation to this child would have a chilling effect on victims in cases where the parent or guardian fails to report abuse. To do otherwise would tell these children that the misguided actions or negligence of their parent is a bar to recovery.

Accordingly, we reverse our order of February 2, 2010 and find that this child is entitled to benefits under the Act.

IT IS ORDERED THAT this matter is referred back to the Office of the Attorney General to determine the benefits to which this child is entitled.

BIRNBAUM, J.