SCOTT WEBB v. STATE OF ILLINOIS (2011)

ORDER

This case comes before the Court on the Respondent's motion to dismiss under Section 2-619(a)(1) and (5) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-619. Respondent filed its motion on September 20, 2010. Claimant did not file a response. The Court having reviewed the matter and being fully advised in the premises:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondents motion to dismiss is GRANTED for the following reasons: the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over individuals, and the Claimant did not timely file either his notice or his claim.

On August 6, 2008, the Claimant allegedly was severely injured when the vehicle in which he was driving collided with another vehicle driven by Ivan Scott Maxwell, an employee of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), on Illinois State Route 154 near Sesser, Franklin County, Illinois. On August 6, 2010, the Claimant filed a two-count complaint against Maxwell and IDOC alleging negligence. Claimant seeks $100,000 in damages.

Pursuant to the Court of Claims Act (the “Act”), the Court has jurisdiction over all claims against the State in cases founded upon any law of the State of Illinois. See 705 ILCS 505/8(a). The Court has held that its jurisdiction under the Act only extends to the State and its agencies. Gedaminsas v. State, 55 Ill.Ct.Cl. 429 (2002). The Court may, via the doctrine of respondeat superior, hear cases against a state employee alleged to have violated a duty while acting within the scope of his or her employment, but the individual employee then is only a nominal party and the claim is really against the State. O'Connor v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 49 Ill.Ct.Cl. 153 (1996). Here, the Complaint alleges that Maxwell was operating a vehicle within the scope of his employment by the State (see Complaint, paragraph 2). As a result, the State is the proper respondent and Count I of the Complaint, against Ivan Scott Maxwell in his capacity as an agent and/or employee of the State, must be dismissed.

Turning to Count II, against the State, the Court notes that Section 22-1 of the Act requires any claimant seeking recovery for personal injury to file a notice of intent to sue within one year of the date of accrual of the alleged injury. See 705 ILCS 505/22-1. In addition, pursuant to 74 Ill.Admin.Code §790.50(b)(1), a copy of said Notice of Intent shall be attached to the Complaint. Here, the Claimant neither filed a notice of intent to sue nor attached any Notice to his Complaint.

The statutory notice requirement of Section 22-1 is a condition precedent to filing a complaint in this Court and is jurisdictional. Cummings v. State, 43 Ill.Ct.Cl. 357 (1991). Strict compliance is required. Hines v. State, 51 Ill.Ct.Cl. 1 (1998); Slepcevich v State, 41 Ill.Ct.Cl. 197 (1989). The Claimant alleges his injuries occurred on August 6, 2008. Claimant filed his complaint on August 6, 2010. Since the Claimant did not file either notice of intent to sue, or the complaint itself¹ , within one year of the date of accrual of the injury, as required by Section 22-1, Claimant's Complaint must be dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, the Respondent's motion to dismiss is granted. The Claimant's complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

FOOTNOTES

1.  Section 22-1 allows a claimant to bypass the notice requirement if he or she files is or her claim within one year of its accrual. See 705 ILCS 505/22-1.

Burns, J.