HANNON v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (2005)

OPINION

In this case the State has filed a Motion to Dismiss Claimant's Complaint alleging that the accident did not arise out of the operation of a motor vehicle and that Claimant had settled a case in Circuit Court for an amount in excess of $100,000.

Claimant's Complaint alleges that on or prior to January 20, 1999 the State undertook to plow snow for LaGrange Road at or near its intersection with 165th Street in the City of Orland Park, Illinois. The Complaint further alleges that the State piled the snow in mounds at intersections. It is further alleged that the mounds of snow obstructed the view of motorists traveling on the intersecting streets. Claimant claims she was injured when her vehicle was struck by another vehicle in the intersection as a result of the snow piles blocking the vision of the driver of the other vehicle.

The issue involved in the Motion to Dismiss is the language in 705 ILCS (d) 505/8(d) which reads: “The $100,000 limit prescribed by the Section does not apply to an award of damages in any case sounding in tort arising out of the operation by a State employee of a vehicle owned, leased or controlled by the State.” Claimant relies on the case of Schuett v. State of Illinois, 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 61 (1984). The facts in that case are similar to this one in that a driver was injured because the piles of snow created by snowplowing obstructed the vision of both drivers involved in the accident. This Court correctly ruled that Claimant was entitled to receive an award. However, that case did not answer the question presented by this case concerning the $100,000 limitation on liability.

There are no Illinois cases directly dealing with this issue. In the case of Chilcote v. San Bernardino County, 218 Cal. 444, 23 P. 2d 748 (1933), the California Supreme Court held that to be in operation within a statute rendering a county liable for injuries from the negligent operation of a county motor vehicle by county employees, the vehicle must be in the active exercise of some specific function by performing work or producing effects at the time and place the injury is inflicted. In that case the Court denied recovery for a motorcyclist's death from encountering pools of oil spread on the highway by county's oil truck. In the case of Mount Pleasant Independent School District v. Estate of Lindburg, 766 S.W. 2d 208 (1989), the Supreme Court of Texas held that the evidence did not demonstrate as a matter of law that a student's death was caused by “operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle,” and recovery against the state was barred. The student was killed while crossing the highway after the bus had dropped her off and had proceeded 100 to 200 yards from her.

This Court finds the reasoning of these two cases persuasive. To remove the $100,000 damage limitation the vehicle must be in the active exercise of some function by performing work or producing effects at the time and place of the injury. To hold otherwise could create some ridiculous results. For example, the liability limit could be lifted from an injury caused by a pothole in the road that was not properly repaired because the crew that repaired it drove a truck. The liability limit could be lifted for a traffic signal failing to properly work because the crew that installed it drove a truck. A lot of different scenarios could be thought of to nullify the liability limit.

In this case the snow plow was not in the active exercise of some specific function by performing work or producing effects at the time and the place of the injury. Therefore it is ordered that the limit of liability in this case is $100,000. The Motion to Dismiss is not granted at this time because the Court feels there is no clear evidence in the record that shows exactly what the Circuit Court settlement was. If the settlement was in excess of $100,000 the Motion to Dismiss will be granted.

ORDER

The parties have filed a joint stipulation showing that the settlement in Circuit Court was in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars. It is hereby ordered that the above case is dismissed pursuant to the Court Order dated April 26, 2005.

SPRAGUE, C.J.

Sprague, C.J.