RELIABLE AUTO PARTS WRECKERS INC v. THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (2001)

ORDER

This replevin claim against the Secretary of State for the return of the Claimant's confiscated motor vehicle and alternatively for damages, is before the court on the issue of this court's jurisdiction to issue writs of replevin. This jurisdictional issue was raised by the court (order of October 13, 2000), and has been separately briefed by the parties. Also pending is the Claimant's motion for summary judgment and the Claimant's motion to amend his complaint to abandon the damages claim, both of which were deferred pending disposition of the jurisdictional issue. (Ibid.)

The Respondent contends that this court lacks authority to issue writs of replevin, based on the limited jurisdiction granted in/8 of the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505/8), and this court's decisions in Garimella v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 50 Ill.Ct.Cl. 350 (1996) (Court of Claims lack authority to issue injunctions) and Rudolph v. State of Illinois et al., 53 Ill.Ct.Cl58 (No. 94 CC 0311, filed October 4, 2000) (Court of Claims lack authority to issue writs of mandamus).

The Claimant urges that because the replevin claim asserts that the Secretary of State and its police acted within the scope of [their lawfully authorized duties when the police seized plaintiff's [sic] vehicle. [and] does not allege that the State agency or employee acted outside the scope of its authority or in violation of the law, exclusive jurisdiction must lie in the Illinois Court of Claims Healy v. Vaupel, 131 Ill.2d at 311. Claimant contends that the issue in this case concerns the Secretary of State's interpretation of the Vehicle Code and that this court is the sole forum in which to resolve those statutory construction issues. Claimant also relies on Management Association of Illinois, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Northern Illinois University, 248 Ill.App.3d 599, 618 N.E.3d 697 (1993) and Ellis v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, 102 Ill.2d 387, 466 N.E.2d 202 (1984) for the proposition that this court has jurisdiction to grant injunctions against the State.

We agree with the Claimant that this court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute concerning the Secretary of State's seizure of Claimant's property pursuant to a State statute. That much is clear under our jurisdictional statute (/8, Court of Claims Act; 705 ILCS 505/8) and is confirmed by Healy v. Vaupel, supra. Thus we have jurisdiction to hear and determine this claim under/8 and could render a declaratory judgment or could award damages if appropriate.

However, our jurisdiction in the sense of authority or empowerment to grant the remedy of a writ of replevin is a very different matter. This court has simply not been authorized by statute to issue orders mandating or prohibiting actions by any State officer or agency. What we said in Rudolph, supra about mandamus applies identically to replevin:

The jurisdictional issue concerns our authority to issue writs of mandamus. Although, mandamus was one of the common law writs, and is a legal rather than equitable remedy as a matter of law and of history, we believe that the issue of this court's authority to grant such relief is governed by Garimella v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 50 Ill.Ct.Cl. 350 (1996)

In Garimella, we held that this court lacks the authority to grant injunctive (equitable) relief, because the legislature had not conferred such power upon this court. Writs of mandamus directed at State officials or agencies are functionally equivalent to mandatory injunctions. The General Assembly has not conferred such remedial powers on this court in any form. (Moreover, in the years since Garimella, supra, the General Assembly has not statutory overruled our decision or empowered us to issue directives to State agencies or officers Rudolph, supra at 62).

The decisions in Management Association of Illinois, Inc., supra, and Ellis, supra, on which Claimant also relies, were reviewed and distinguished in our opinions in Garimella, supra. Neither decision provides or identifies a source of authority for this statutory court to issue any kind of mandatory or prohibitory directives against the State.

Accordingly, we must dismiss the Claimant's plea for a writ of replevin for lack of jurisdiction. That, however, does not dispose of the entirety of this claim. There remains a pending alternative claim for damages, and claimant may seek to amend to pursue other relief as well. We will allow the claimant time to amend its complaint or to renew either or both of its pending motions.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. Claimant's prayer for a writ of mandamus is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction;

2. This claim shall remain on the active docket, and Claimant's motions for summary judgment and for leave to amend its complaint are continued; and

3. Claimant is granted leave to file an amended complaint that does not contain a plea for a writ of replevin within 35 days after the date of this order;

4. Within 35 days after the date of this order, Claimant shall file a pleading renewing or abandoning its pending motions to amend and for summary judgment.

EPSTEIN, J.