HAROLD OLIVER v. THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (2002)

OPINION

Claimant, Harold Oliver, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), brought this claim pursuant to the Illinois Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505/8(d) seeking $2,250 for damages allegedly resulting from Claimant being wrongfully held in segregation for eighteen days in 1999. Claimant's Complaint specifies nine basis for his damages including: (a) denial for Bible Study/Church Service as held in Unit H; (b) denial of showers with hot water; (c) mental duress and anguish; (d) his families refusal to visit because of the conditions of visitation during segregation; (e) denial of telephone calls to his family and friends; (f) denial of yard/gym recreation period; (g) denial of access to dining room for hot meals; (h) denial of access to adequate law library services; and (i) subjected to high noise levels and twenty-four hours of light. Claimant seeks to be compensated at the rate of $125 per day.

This case is before us after trial to our commissioner, Patrick J. Hanley, and is now before us on the complaint of Harold Oliver, the trial record, the Departmental Report and the Commissioner's recommendation.

Claimant testified that he was transferred to segregation at Stateville Correctional Center (Stateville) on February 23, 1999, to serve a thirty-day period. On March 23, 1999, he received an additional sixty days for a separate incident. The second period of segregation was later reduced to thirty days.

On May 6, 1999, Claimant filed an Emergency Grievance indicating that he was to be released from segregation. Respondent agreed that Claimant should have been released from segregation on April 23, 1999 but was not released until May 11, 1999. In addition, the Grievance officer's letter dated August 6, 1999 stated that the Claimant was to be compensated by Stateville at an unassigned rate of pay at $0.34 per day for the nineteen days between April 23, and May 11, 1999. On August 9, 1999, the Administrative Review Board denied any further relief. However, a letter from the Grievance Officer date October 9, 1999 indicated that the Claimant was only compensated a total of $3.74 for 11 days in May and is still owed $2.72 for 8 days in April. A document entitled Order for Deliver dated November 4, 2000 ordered that $2.72 be paid from the Inmate Benefit Fund at Stateville to the Claimant's Trust Fund Account.

A review of Respondent's Departmental Report revealed that the decision by the Chief Administrative Officer to reduce the second segregation period from sixty days to thirty days was made on April 30, 1999 (eight days after the ending of the thirty-day period served). This had the effect of ordering the Claimant to be released from segregation based upon time served. There was no indication that the Claimant was notified of this decision.

The facts of this case present a disturbing pattern of omissions by the Respondent. There appears to be little dispute that Claimant deserved to be place in segregation. The period of confinement was reduced and ended on April 30th. However, Respondent did not act to release him from segregation until eleven days later and apparently only after he pursued an Emergency Grievance for his relief. SCC agreed to compensate him for nineteen days of unassigned pay, but he only received eleven days. On October 9, 1999, Respondent was aware that Claimant had not been compensated for the additional eight days, but did not act to compensate him until November 4, 2000.

Claimant argued that the payment of the unassigned rate does not compensate him for the suffering he incurred as a result of being held in segregation beyond his release date. He cited a federal case, Smith v. Rowe (1985), 761 F. 2d 360, which awarded a prisoner $119 a day for her segregation confinement.

In Pipion v. State (1990), 43 Ill.Ct.Cl.327, the Court addressed a Complaint by a prisoner that had been wrongfully placed in segregation. That Claimant was eventually returned to his job as a chef, but the Court found that he was not entitled to back pay for the time period he was not working as a chef because an inmate does not have a right to a job. The Court ordered the Respondent to pay Claimant the unassigned rate for the period he was held in segregation. Id.

In the case at bar, the Court finds that Claimant was paid, albeit belatedly in part, the unassigned pay for the nineteen day period. Because of the timing of the decision to reduce the segregation period by thirty days, it is apparent that Claimant could not have been released until May 1, 1999, at the earliest. Respondent apparently has a policy of requiring inmates to serve or incur their punishment concurrent with the pendency of any grievances. Therefore, the Court agrees with Respondent that Claimant is entitled to eighteen days of the unassigned rate of pay.

There are two observations that compel the Court to make a further award in this case. First, Respondent agrees that Claimant was held in segregation beyond his release date. Claimant was in fact held only eleven days after the action of the CAO and his claim for further damages shall only be considered for the eleven-day period. Respondent officers no explanation for detaining Claimant beyond May 1, 1999. The fault cannot be presumed to be that of Claimant. Respondent did not offer any evidence on the procedures that would be utilized to review and act on the decision of the CAO to reduce the period to thirty days. The first line of the Committed Person's Grievance Report, which is the written basis of the grievance, clearly states in legible print that it is filed to contest the ticket dated 3-23-99. One of the Respondent's employees should have noted that the effect of the April 30th decision was to cause the immediate release of Claimant from segregation.

The second observation is that ordering an inmate to be placed in segregation is intended to be punitive in nature. It is part of disciplinary action taken by the Department of Corrections (DOC) after an inmate is alleged to have violated certain rules. This Court has held that DOC has the right to develop procedures for punishing inmates for violation of rules and the Court does not review those decisions. White v. State (1997), 49 Ill.Ct.Cl. 187. But the instant case is not about administrative action where DOC is granted a wide range of discretion. It is about negligence on the part of the Respondent to act on its own decisions and rules. The failure to release Claimant from segregation violates DOC's duty to follow its own procedures.

If DOC intends to punish with segregation placement, then it must be presumed that wrongful segregation placement causes damages. Claimant stated that he listed the hardships and injuries he suffered in paragraph 9 of his verified Complaint. Respondent does not specifically dispute Claimant's assertions of certain items he was denied in segregation, i.e. Bible Study/Church Service as held in Unit H. Respondent does not provide a list of services or rights that are denied or granted to an inmate in segregation. The Court is left with an incomplete record of the damages that this Claimant may have incurred.

The record taken as a whole shows that Claimant has established a prima facie case of negligence. Generally, the burden is on the Claimant to prove damages in a negligence case. Lonzo v. State (1997), 50 Ill.Ct.Cl.256. The Court finds that a general denial of the facts alleging damages set forth in the Complaint's considered filed pursuant to Section 790.100 of the Court of Claims Regulation.

The Court finds that the record, and all implications arising therefrom, show that Claimant suffered from being restricted in his movements and enjoyment of privileges otherwise available to inmates in general population while in segregation. However, he failed to prove that he was denied church services, hot showers, visitation rights, telephone calls, yard/gym access, hot meals or access to the law library. He has not shown that he suffered mental duress or mental anguish because of the extended segregation stay.

In Lonzo v State (1997), the Court addressed a case where in inmate did not create a record that contained evidence sufficient to make exact awards. However, rather than deny the claim, the court attempted to set fair damages. 50, Ill.Ct.Cl 256, 260. Because of the punitive nature and use of segregation, a presumption of suffering and deprivation of the privileges and comforts afforded to inmates in general population is created and the Court will attempt to set fair damages in the case at bar. Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of Fifty-five Dollars ($55.00).

It is therefore ordered that Claimant Harold Oliver is hereby awarded the sum of $55 in full and final satisfaction of this claim.

EPSTEIN, J.