CARLOS SANTIAGO v. THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (2002)

OPINION

This cause is before the court on Claimant Carlos Santiago's verified complaint seeking $60,090 damages for wrongful or negligent disciplinary action of Respondent's Department of Corrections, in which Claimant is an inmate. Jurisdiction over this claim, sounding in tort, is based on/8 (d) of the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505/8(d)).

The Claimant served a period of discipline, imposed by IDOC for an alleged offense committed while he was incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center (SCC). The discipline report was later expunged by IDOC. Claimant testified at the hearing on this matter before this court's commissioner.

The Facts

On December 27, 1997, Claimant was charged with violations of IDOC rules, as stated in the Disciplinary Report, concerning possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. On December 24, 1997, Claimant and Inmate Munoz had been in the shakedown room of the visitor center at SCC after completing visitation with outside persons. After both left the shakedown room, a plastic bag containing marijuana was found. Both inmates were charged with rules violations. Claimant was found guilty of the offenses.

Claimant stated that he believed there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty of the offense because the marijuana was not found in the area immediately adjacent to where he was located in the room. The Correctional Officer (CO) who conducted the shakedown of claimant stated, inter alia, in Disciplinary Report, that:

During that time C/O Murphy was shaking down an apprehensive Inmate Munoz N23975. This reporting officer assisted C/O Murphy and returned to shaking down Inmate Santiago, nothing was found on Santiago at the time but 20 seconds after the two inmates left the shakedown room this reporting officer found approximately one gram of marijuana on the floor of the shakedown room in the vicinity [sic] of Inmate Munoz, but since Inmate Santiago was in the room at the same time he too must be charged with Rule 203 Drugs and Drug Paraphernalia, although Inmate Santiago complied and was not apprehensive.

At this time of the incident, Claimant was in segregation for an offense unrelated to the one at issue in this case. He had been placed there on November 8, 1997, and was to serve one year. According to Claimant, the one year period was later reduced to six months. It appears from the Departmental Report that this reduction took place on July 15, 1998.

Claimant filed a grievance on the finding of guilt by the Adjustment Committee. On January 23, 1998, a Grievance Officer (GO) recommended that the matter be referred to the Assistant Warden for polygraph recommendation. On April 2, 1998, the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) concurred in the GO's recommendation. (Department Rept., at 10.) In a second Grievance Officer Report, dated April 10, 1998, the same GO indicated that the Assistant action be taken. On May 21, 1998, the CAO concurred in the recommendation. The final decision was appealed to the Administrative Review Board (ARB).

The ARB met on August 12, 1998, and recommended that Claimant be afforded the opportunity to submit to a polygraph examination concerning his possession or knowledge of the marijuana. The polygraph examination took place on November 23, 1998. Claimant produced a copy of the examination results at the hearing before the Court. The results stated that in the opinion of the examiner, claimant tested truthful on two questions: (i) if he knew for sure who brought that marijuana into the shakedown room; and (ii) did he ever have the marijuana in his hand. He answered no to both questions. Claimant was released from segregation on December 3, 1998. While in segregation he had other rule violation and his period of segregation had been extended an additional thirty days.

On February 23, 1999, the ARB recommended that the disciplinary report be expunged. The Director concurred in the recommendation. On March 2, 1999, the GO recommended that Claimant be compensated $50 for the time he was in segregation for the expunged offense. A March 3, 1999 Memorandum from the Grievance Officer indicates that the amount of $50 would be placed into Claimant's trust fund account.

Claimant indicated that the six months of good time credit was restored. The ARB did not expressly address the six month loss of commissary privileges. Claimant believes that $50 is not sufficient to compensate him for being in segregation and losing commissary privileges for six months. On cross-examination, Claimant stated that he suffered emotional distress, continuous migraine headaches, stomach aches, possible ulcers, nervous condition and insomnia because he was denied medical attention while in segregation.

Prior to being placed in segregation on November 8, 1997, Claimant was earning $15 month for attending school. The unassigned rate was $10 a month.

The Law

The jurisdiction of the Court is limited to those categories of claims specified in/8 of the Court of Claims Act (705ILCS 505/8). A decision to impose discipline on an inmate is within the administrative discretion of IDOC. Complaints challenging an administrative decision fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by this court. Hassen v. State of Illinois (1997), 49 Ill.Ct. l. 134; Homes v. State of Illinois (1978), 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.275.

In White v. State, 49 Ill.Ct.Cl. 187, 189 the Court stated that the Court does not have jurisdiction to review the disciplinary and administrative policies and decisions of the IDOC. In White, the Claimant alleged that SCC employees refused to examine evidence or witnesses material to his defense at the prison disciplinary hearing or to conduct an investigation of his defense. (Id. At 188.) The Court held that the disciplinary procedures that SCC has in place and their application to the Claimant in this case are within the administrative discretion of the facility. (Id. at. 189.)

In his complaint, Claimant alleges that his due process protections were violated as well as his Eighth Amendment rights when the institutional adjustment committee found him guilty of [the drug offense] without any physical evidence, supporting evidence, or even an observing comployee or confidential source to the charges. (Complaint, f4(b).) The allegations alleging imperfections in the hearing process are similar to those made in White.

At the hearing, Claimant did not expressly request review of the disciplinary procedures that were applied to him. To the extent that Claimant seeks review of the procedures utilized by SCC employees, this Court is unable to provide it for the reason stated in White v. State. To the extent that Claimant complains that his federal constitutional rights were violated, the Court also lacks jurisdiction to consider those allegations. Smart v. State of Illinois (1996), 48 Ill.Ct.Cl.38.

Claimant has the burden of proof to establish a claim against Respondent. Caine v. State (1995), 47 Ill.Ct.Cl.393. In Caine, the ARB recommended that the disciplinary report be expunged and that the Claimant receive unassigned State pay for the time spent in segregation. Even though the Claimant was successful in pursuing his grievance, the Caine court held that no further damages were to be awarded. (Id. at 294-5.)

In the case at bar, a portion of Claimant's case is properly before the Court. We have addressed the issue of expungement in the context of a Disciplinary report. Nance v. State (2001), 00 CC 0928. In Nance (slip. Op., at 3) the court noted that the record there did not include any reference or allegations to IDOC's rules or practices when a disciplinary report is expunged:

The record is silent whether IDOC is subject to any statute, rule or regulation that requires or permits compensation under the circumstances presented here. There is nothing in this record to explain the meeting of expunged or the ramifications of expungement.

The Court noted that the plain language meaning of expungement was to destroy or obliterate. It implies a physical act, and the legal analogue is obvious The Nance court determined that a decision to expunge a discilplinary report was administrative or disciplinary decision wholly within the discretion of IDOC. Based on the record in Nance, the Court could not ascertain whether the ARB decision was a reversal on the merits, or a discretionary determination. Id. at 3. Although Nance suggested that liability might be imposed if a Claimant could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the State breached a duty (or violated an administrative rule), that decision held that the record there was insufficient to determine if the respondent had breached a duty or violated a rule so as to cause damage to Claimant.

In the case at bar, the Commissioner inquired whether the State agreed that the Claimant should not have been found guilty of the charges. The Attorney General did not acknowledge that the State made a mistake as to whether Claimant had violated IDOC rules, but stated that, apparently upon review and after Mr. Santiago's polygraph examination they determined that was sufficient evidence with which to reverse any previous disciplinary action taken in response to the charge. (Emphasis added)

For the reasons previously state, the Court will not review decisions made by IDOC in the performance of its disciplinary and administrative discretion. However, the narrower issue presented here is whether there is redress for a Claimant when IDOC itself expunges a prior disciplinary action, which clearly vacates and voids that decision, whether or not that constitutes a reversal of the original findings or conclusions that had lead to the imposition of discipline.

On the facts of this case, the Court can not conclude that it can provide an award to Claimant for a wrongful disciplinary action. The decision to expunge the disciplinary report was made in part by the ARB in reliance on the results of polygraph examination. This was additional evidence not available at the time of the initial disciplinary decision. The initial decisions were made on a review of all available facts. There is nothing that indicates an inmate is entitle to a polygraph examination when charged with an offense; that decision too is one of discretion. Therefore, the relief sought by Claimant is paragraphs 11(b) and (c) of this Complaint are denied.

In Pippion v State (1990), 43 Ill.Ct.Cl.327, the court ruled that Claimant was not entitled to back pay for the time period he was improperly placed into segregation, based on the premise that an inmate is not entitled to a job. For the same reasons, we determine that an inmate is not entitled to be in school. This Claimant was not even in school when he was disciplined, having already been placed in segregation. Therefore, the portion of Claimant's complaint seeking compensation, at $0.50 a day for not receiving school pay is denied.

Under Pippion, a Claimant may entitled to unassigned rate of pay if he is improperly placed into segregation. However, in this case there does not appear to be sufficient facts on which we can conclude that this Claimant was improperly placed into segregation in the first instance. Additionally, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the unassigned rate of pay was withheld from Claimant.

SCC awarded Claimant the sum of $50 as compensation. No reason for the award is stated. Claimant was already serving a one year term of segregation at the time of the disciplinary report on the drug charge. This pre-existing term of segregation was terminated early, on July 15, 1998, but it appears that at some point he received an additional thirty days for an unrelated rules infraction. He testified that he was released from segregation on December 8, 1998. According to this timetable, Claimant might have been released from segregation as early as mid-July, or as late as mid-August, but for being held as result of the drug charge. If a Claimant were to prove that he was improperly held four or five months too long (i.e. August or July to December) then he would be entitled to $10 (unassigned rate, if withheld) times four or five months. This is the exact amount this Claimant has received from SCC. Claimant also received another benefit expungement, because his good time credit was restored.

The Court is sympathetic to Claimant's plight. But we are bound to follow the law. As much as the Court may believe that IDOC should have procedures in place for thorough review of cases prior to the term of discipline being completed, or that the IDOC should have procedures that outline the impact of an expungement, the Court does not have the authority to impose its beliefs on IDOC administrative procedures or on its discretionary authority. This court also cannot arbitrarily award damages in the absence of supporting law (or regulation) which we cannot find in this case.

For the reasons stated above, the claims is denied.

EPSTEIN, J.