IN RE: KENNETH J. (2004)

Respondent Carmen D. appeals from an order of the circuit court, finding her unfit on the basis that she failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of her child, Kenneth J., within the nine-month period following adjudication of neglect or abuse and/or within any nine-month period thereafter and terminating her parental rights.   On appeal, respondent contends that:  (1) the petition for termination denied her due process because it failed to identify the nine-month period at issue;  (2) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a “Parenting Assessment Report” (Report) as relevant and as a business record;  (3) the trial court erred in admitting testimony from case workers;  and (4) the trial court's finding of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence.   For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent and her children first became involved with child protection agencies in October 1990.   On August 7, 1996, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship over respondent's three children, including Kenneth, born February 17, 1996, alleging that Kenneth was abused and neglected on the bases that his two siblings, Michael and Tiffany, had been sexually molested by respondent's paramour on August 28, 1995, respondent refused services, and respondent refused to comply with requests, including counseling.   On August 8, Patrick Murphy was appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) and temporary custody of Kenneth was granted to his maternal aunt, Wanda, respondent's sister, and her husband, Derrick.

On February 20, 1997, an adjudication order was entered, finding Kenneth abused or neglected based on an injurious environment and substantial risk of injury.   On May 30, a dispositional order was entered, adjudicating Kenneth a ward of the court.   At all times thereafter, respondent's visits with her children were supervised pursuant to court order.

[Editor's Note:  Text omitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23.]

[THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL IS NONPUBLISHABLE UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 23]

On November 20, the trial court granted the GAL's motion for a psychological evaluation of respondent.   Apparently, this evaluation was performed by Dr. James Cochran of Forensic Clinical Services on April 8, 1998.1

On July 2, 1998, a permanency order was entered setting the goal as return home pending a status hearing, although this order noted that respondent had not made substantial progress toward that goal.

[THE PRECEDING MATERIAL IS NONPUBLISHABLE UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 23]

On March 4, 1999, the trial court ordered a parenting assessment evaluation to be done of respondent.   This assessment was undertaken in late 1999 by members of a team from Thresholds Mothers' Project, an agency funded by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), whose purpose was to assist DCFS and the juvenile court in evaluating parenting capabilities of mentally ill parents.   The Report, consisting of a summary and four individual evaluations, was subsequently entered into evidence at respondent's termination hearing over respondent's objection.   The Report summary indicated that respondent's case was referred to the team on May 4, 1999.   Respondent and her children were evaluated by Kathleen Pesek, M.Ed., a child development specialist, on November 8, 1999;  Mark Amdur, M.D., a psychiatrist, on October 28;  Nycole Bridle, B.A., a case aide, and Frank Lani, Ph.D., a psychologist, on October 27;  and Barbara White, L.C.S.W., A.C.S.W., a social worker, on October 25.   White's evaluation took place at respondent's home and the other evaluations took place at the team's office.   The summary identified the referral questions and the team's subsequent answers as:

“1. Are there any additional services that would enable [respondent] to regain custody of her children?

[Respondent's] primary areas of difficulty appear to be her limited intellectual resources and her highly abusive, unstable, and traumatic life history.   She does not appear to be suffering from a major mental illness at this time, and does not require any specific therapeutic intervention that would help remediate her circumstances. While [respondent] may personally benefit from a supportive professional relationship, there are no specific services that would enable [respondent] [to] adequately parent her children.

2. With regard to permanency, would a goal of return home for [respondent's] children be in her best interest?

[Respondent] made it clear that she does not feel that her children should have been removed from her care, and that she cares for her children very much and would like for them to return home.   However, it does not appear to be in her best interest for the children to return home, nor in their best interest.  [Respondent's] psychiatric conditions are all of the type that may become particularly problematic under stress.   When this occurs, she responds with agitation, disorganization and threats of self-harm.   The special needs of her children-which [respondent] has a poor understanding of-combined with parenting difficulties are likely to result in an increasing level of stress that [respondent] has been unable to handle in the past which would further tax [respondent's] functioning.”

The summary also identified significant risk factors, including respondent's primary difficulty as being her extremely limited intellectual capacity.   According to the Report, respondent had no clear understanding of why her children were taken away and disagreed with the decision to do so.   As such, the Report indicated that respondent's “lack of insight suggests low probability that problematic issues would change.”   The Report further noted that respondent was driven by her need for the children or how they made her feel and not by their needs.   She tended toward role reversal and held unreasonably high expectations of her children.   The Report continued that respondent's understanding of child development was deficient and that she was “in significant psychological distress.”   As a result of this, her relationships with others tended to be “unrewarding or difficult.”   The Report also indicated that respondent's social support network was very limited.   The Report recommended that, given respondent's difficulties, there were “no additional services that would sufficiently increase her parenting capability to an acceptable level.” ¹

[Editor's Note:  Text omitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23.]

[THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL IS NONPUBLISHABLE UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 23]

In her “Social Assessment Report,” dated January 10, 2000, White indicated that respondent's family first became involved with DCFS on October 10, 1990, when marks were discovered on Michael's collarbone and face.   Other reports indicated that there were no working utilities in the home, there was inadequate food, Michael and Tiffany had been molested by respondent's boyfriend, Michael and Tiffany fought, and respondent was afraid of Michael.   When workers came to respondent's home to investigate, she was hostile and threatened to kill herself if her children were removed.   At this time, respondent also refused services.   White further stated that Kenneth and his siblings were removed in August 1996, which, according to respondent, was because Michael had kicked Tiffany out of bed, causing an injury to her leg for which respondent failed to seek treatment.

White's visit to respondent's home disclosed that it was a one-bedroom apartment with inadequate furniture, it was dusty, the kitchen floor was greasy, and toxic cleaning materials and hair care products were scattered around the floor, easily accessible to small children.   According to White, it was respondent's belief that her home was “spic and span.”

With respect to respondent's history, respondent related to White that she was closer to her father than her mother.   At the time of the evaluation, respondent focused upon the fact that her father was aging and when he died she would inherit money from him.   At the age of three, respondent was severely burned in a home fire when her mother left her, along with five other children under the age of five, home alone.   At the age of four, respondent was “raped” by her mother's boyfriend on two occasions, for which he was jailed.   Additionally, during her childhood, respondent was physically and verbally abused and neglected by her mother.   Respondent also indicated that there was domestic violence in her home and that her mother had been psychiatrically hospitalized and jailed several times.   At the time of the assessment, respondent was working for Community Care Systems as a homemaker, cleaning and shopping for people, and had been at this job for two years.   Prior to that time, respondent worked from 1990 to 1995 doing the same type of services for another company that went out of business.   In 1996, respondent was psychiatrically hospitalized after her children were removed.   Subsequent to that, she received therapy once a week.   However, respondent apparently indicated to White that she only did so because she had to in order to get her children back.

During the home observation, respondent had arranged three chairs in a straight line and she, Kenneth, and Tiffany sat facing the video camera.   Michael laid on the couch with his face away from everyone.   Respondent attempted to engage in conversation with Michael, but he refused.   In addition, all three children refused to play games with respondent.   According to White, respondent's conduct during this visit appeared “contrived for purposes of the videotaping rather than spontaneous, natural interactions.”   Specifically,

“her focus with them was geared around getting them to say they loved her, missed her and wanted to come home and doing this for the camera, as if that would lend greater credibility to what they said.   In addition, she tried to engage them in activity without awareness that the activity was not age appropriate.   Again, this seemed geared to ‘showing off’ rather than an understanding of what her children's needs are.”

According to White, respondent had a limited understanding as to why her children were removed.   White further believed that respondent's apartment was inadequate for a family of four, including the lack of furniture and toxic chemicals on the floor.   White stated that “empathy and nurturing by the primary caretakers was absent in [respondent's] life leaving her with severe emotional deficits.   These deficits would have an affect on her own ability to parent.”   White stated that respondent loved her children and wanted them back, but “she seemed unable to observe that much of her behavior with the children was inappropriate,” something her daughter pointed out during the home observation.   It was White's “recommendation” that “given the long-standing issues which brought this case into the system, it is not clear that any additional services would facilitate family reunification and the children's return home.”

According to Dr. Amdur's psychiatric report, dated October 28, 1999, respondent blamed Michael for her children's removal.   Respondent admitted to Amdur that Michael probably had sexually molested his sister.   Amdur noted that respondent attempted suicide three times:  at the age of 14, 16, and in 1996.   Amdur further noted that in 1996, respondent made homicidal threats to DCFS people.   According to Amdur,

“[respondent's] psychiatric conditions are all of the type that may become particularly problematic under stress.   Conversely, under ideal circumstances, that is without stress, her capacity for childcare may be adequate.   Unfortunately, such stressors as, an abusive boyfriend, having a demanding, special needs child (Michael), and confrontation with DCFS, are all stressors that strained [respondent's] limited resources.  [Respondent] responds to stress with agitation, disorganization and threats of self-harm.”

Dr. Lani and Bridle's psychological assessment, dated October 27, 1999, first detailed the developmental assessment of each of the three children.   It also detailed various tests given to respondent.   With respect to the “Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test,” Lani found that “[respondent's] overall level of functioning places her at the 0.20 percentile, indicating that her intellectual ability is likely to have a significant impact upon her adaptive capacities in general and her parenting capacity in particular.”   With respect to the “Parent Opinion Questionnaire,” Lani found that

“[respondent's] responses to the POQ indicate that [respondent] does not have a reasonable understanding of child development.  * * * [Respondent] is reporting excessively high expectations in areas relating to children's ability to assume responsibilities within the home and to provide support for their parents * * * and she has somewhat high expectations with regard to children conforming their behavior to the needs and convenience of their parents.”

According to Lani, this pattern indicated that respondent “may be inclined toward role reversal.”   Other comments demonstrated to Lani that respondent “[was] likely to engage in erratic patterns of child-rearing.”

After respondent was asked to describe each of the children, Dr. Lani reported that her answers demonstrated she cares for her children deeply, “but she cannot conceive of their internal emotional experience or needs.   She is also much more inclined to evaluate her children on the basis of how they make her feel, than upon a more accurate appraisal of their own perspectives and needs.”   Lani identified the following as his risk factor findings:

“•The parent is reporting a significant level of clinical symptomatology at the present time that is likely to impair her ability to utilize good judgment, function efficiently, and access necessary resources in her caregiving role.

•Given the breadth and severity of her difficulties, the parent does not at present appear to be involved in services of the type and extent necessary to sustain adequate caregiving.

•Her severe intellectual impairment and the resultant limited insight into her difficulties together with her unrealistic goals and expectations will make it difficult for this parent to significantly alter her past problematic parenting behaviors.

 * * *

•Psychological representations are not realistic, accurate, or three-dimensional, which indicates that the parent will respond in a distorted manner to the child's needs or will have limited empathy toward the feelings and experiences of the children.

 * * *

•Limited intellectual and psychological resources limit the ability to appreciate the needs of the children, to render appropriate, complex, and nuanced responses, and to provide an optimal degree of intellectual stimulation.”

Lani's conclusions and recommendations were that

“[d]espite her best efforts, however, she is barely able to manage her own life.   She has not been able to care properly for her children, she does not have a deep appreciation of their needs, and she is not really aware of the ways in which she is lacking.  * * * [I]t is difficult to envision services that would make a substantial improvement in her personal and parental capabilities.”

According to Pesek's “Child Development Specialist Evaluation,” dated November 12, 1999, respondent felt that she had done nothing wrong in connection with her children.   After evaluating parent-child interaction, Pesek concluded that

“[respondent's] interactions with her children were based on her needs as opposed to her children's needs.   She was not able to observe her children and determine how she could interact with them in a way that would be appropriate.  * * * She was not able to demonstrate her ability to be responsive to her children since she spoke with this evaluator when she was not attempting to make her children speak to the camera.

The children also did not approach [respondent].  * * * Neither made an attempt to interact with their mother in any way.   There was no particular warmth expressed on the part of the children toward their mother, although [respondent] gave them little chance to do so with her constant requests to repeat after her.”

Pesek then stated, with respect to risk and protective factors, that

“[respondent] has quite a difficult time taking her children's perspective, recognizing their cues and responding appropriately.   Her relationship with her children is experienced only in terms of how it effects [sic] her.   Neither does [respondent] have a clear understanding for the reasons that her children were placed in foster care, suggesting that there is little chance that those issues could be remediated sufficiently.   For example, [respondent] stated that she would do things exactly the same if her children were returned as she did prior to her loss of custody.   She also believes that Michael is the reason that she lost custody, and that she has not regained custody because the Hearing Officer in Juvenile Court does not like her.   Her tendency to minimize what has clearly occurred in the past and to externalize blame prevents [respondent] from making sufficient progress.”

On May 3, 2000, a permanency order was entered setting the goal as substitute care pending court determination of termination of parental rights.   The reason for selecting this goal is illegible in the record.

[THE PRECEDING MATERIAL IS NONPUBLISHABLE UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 23]

On May 30, 2001, the State filed a supplemental petition to appoint a guardian with the right to consent to adoption.   The petition alleged that respondent was unfit under section (1)(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (Act), failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility, and under section (1)(D)(m), in that she “failed to make reasonable effort to correct the conditions which were the basis for the removal of the children from [her] and/or [has] failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children to [her], within 9 months after the adjudication of neglect or abuse * * * and/or within any 9 month period after said finding.”  750 ILCS 50/1 (West 2002).

Hearings on the termination petition began on May 15, 2002.

[Editor's Note:  Text omitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23.]

[THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL IS NONPUBLISHABLE UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 23]

Respondent testified that she was involved with DCFS at the time Kenneth was born.   According to respondent, in 1996, she visited with Kenneth almost every day, the visits were supervised by Wanda or Derrick, and she was allowed to visit their home any time.   Respondent further acknowledged that she had been admitted to St. Bernard's Hospital after her children were taken away.   However, she initially denied that any incident led to this hospitalization, but then said it was because she was hurt real bad by her children being taken away.   According to respondent, the psychiatrist there stated she did not require any medications.

Respondent further testified that visitation changed in 1997 because she had recorded Derrick cussing at her children and threatening Michael.   She requested a change of location for the visits to a McDonald's, her request was granted, and case workers then supervised her visits with her children.   According to respondent, after 1999, visitation with her children was less frequent because workers refused to set up visits.   She also admitted that when the goal was changed to substitute care, she stopped visitation.

On examination by the GAL, respondent testified that her children were removed from her home because Michael had kicked Tiffany out of bed and that her boyfriend had sexually abused Michael and Tiffany.   Respondent denied knowing about this abuse until her children were taken away from her.

On examination by her own attorney, respondent testified that in June or July 1998, she had a falling out with the foster parents because of threats against Michael.   Respondent further testified that until 2000, she bought gifts for the children for their birthdays and Christmas.   However, after this time, she stopped buying gifts because, according to Kenneth, Wanda would break them.   Respondent further stated that on April 8, 1998, she was evaluated by Dr. James Cochran from Forensic Clinical Services.

On redirect examination by the State, respondent testified that she stopped visits in April 2000 for approximately six months.   According to her, these visits resumed in December, although she had requested them in October or November.   Respondent then stated, however, that she had tried to set up visits between April and October, but the workers did not do so.

Gonwo Dahnweih next testified on behalf of the State.   Dahnweih was employed by Catholic Charities and was assigned to respondent's case in August 1998.   He served as the lead worker and Ramona Dixon was assigned to Kenneth.   Dahnweih identified various client service plans that were admitted into evidence.   He further testified that he never received reports from respondent's therapists, but did speak to them on occasion.   Dahnweih also stated that a couple of respondent's visits with her children were stopped because she engaged in inappropriate behavior.   This conduct was thereafter discussed with respondent.

Dahnweih also testified that, in April 2000, the permanency goal was changed to substitute care.   Dahnweih denied that between April and September 2000 respondent requested that he set up visits with the children.   With respect to the September 27, 2000, visit, Dahnweih testified that respondent told the children that the foster parents were using them for money and that God will curse them and they will be in an accident.   The visit was terminated at this time.   Dahnweih also testified that when he spoke to respondent in October 2000, over the telephone, she threatened to go to the foster home and kill herself in the presence of her children.   Ramona's husband, who was a therapist, was conferenced into the call and then the police were called.

On cross-examination by the GAL, Dahnweih testified that he recommended that the permanency goal be changed because respondent's visits were inappropriate, she was not taking her medications or completing intensive therapy, and the Report demonstrated that respondent was not capable of parenting no matter how much training, education, help, or therapy she would receive.   On cross-examination by respondent's attorney, Dahnweih testified in some detail in connection with the various service plans, tasks, and ratings.

Kathy Pesek, the assistant program director for Thresholds Mothers' Project and the prior coordinator for the parenting assessment team, next testified on behalf of the State.   According to Pesek, cases were typically referred to the team because the case worker was confused about how symptoms of mental illness impacted upon parenting.   The team would then receive the entire agency file, as well as any other files the parent indicated existed.   Pesek identified the Report and stated that this document was created by herself and her team and kept in the ordinary course of business.   The State then moved that the Report be entered into evidence, at which time respondent's counsel objected on the basis of relevancy.   The court examined Pesek, inquiring as to the purpose of the assessment.   Pesek stated that it was to determine if there were any additional services that would facilitate return home of the children and to address the best interests of the children.   The court admitted the Report into evidence as a business record and as relevant.   However, the court noted that it would revisit the issue of relevancy after reviewing the Report should it deem it necessary to do so.

Various client service plans and their subsequent ratings and evaluations were offered into evidence.   Service plans were issued every six months and respondent's compliance was rated approximately six months thereafter.   The January 24, 1997, “Client Service Plan Face Sheet” (face sheet), with respect to the August 8, 1996, service plan, rated respondent as making unsatisfactory progress since her mental health state had been unstable in the last few months, she became hostile with DCFS workers, and she had threatened to kill herself.   The January 23, 1997, evaluation form of the August 8, 1996, service plan rated respondent satisfactory with respect to two goals and unsatisfactory with respect to the other three goals.   With respect to one goal, respondent was rated unsatisfactory because she refused to take medications or follow through with the task and became hostile when workers attempted to discuss services with her.   With respect to another goal, respondent was rated unsatisfactory because she refused to enter counseling or attend intake at “ECHO.” The evaluation noted that respondent was currently in the hospital for a suicide attempt.   With respect to another goal, respondent was rated unsatisfactory because she refused to attend parenting classes based on her belief that she did not need them.   The January 23 “Visiting Plan” rated respondent as satisfactory, noting that she visited the children at least weekly at her sister's home and her conduct was appropriate for the most part.   The worker did note that respondent sometimes became angry and said inappropriate things in front of the children.

The January 26, 1998, face sheet, with respect to the July 1997 service plan, indicated that, in June 1997, respondent completed parenting skills classes with perfect attendance.   The sheet further noted that the court had ordered a psychological/psychiatric evaluation of respondent because of conflicting medical reports as to her need for psychotropic medications.   Respondent was rated as unsatisfactory since the goal of return home had not been achieved due to respondent's continued need for extensive clinical evaluation. The January 26, 1998, evaluation form of the July 1997 service plan rated respondent's progress as satisfactory, with the exception of one goal.   The July 27 Visiting Plan rated respondent satisfactory as she continued weekly visits.

The July 15, 1998, face sheet, with respect to the January 26, 1998, service plan, rated respondent's progress toward the return home goal unsatisfactory since she continued to need intensive therapy, to which she had only recently been referred.   The service plan evaluation indicated that respondent's progress was satisfactory as she “consistently follows through on required services” and she was in the process of following through with a clinical service evaluation.   The July 15, 1998, Visiting Plan rated respondent as satisfactory since she regularly attended visitation and generally engaged in appropriate conduct.   The worker noted that respondent occasionally had outbursts.   Another Visiting Plan, dated July 13, indicated that respondent had engaged in visits with the children frequently until April 1998.   At this time, she and the foster parents requested that the visits be conducted elsewhere due to conflicts between the two.

With respect to the July 15, 1998, service plan, evaluated on January 5, 1999, the goal was return home and respondent was rated both satisfactory and unsatisfactory.   The evaluation noted that respondent continued to need intensive psychological services, which she was not currently involved with and she was not on any medications.   The evaluation further noted that respondent had partially cooperated by engaging in therapy, although it was not the right kind.   Because respondent was engaging in therapy, although not the right kind, she had been rated unsatisfactory.   The Visiting Plan was rated as unsatisfactory since respondent had only seen her children for brief moments when she visited her mother's home, but did not engage in actual weekly visits.

The July 8, 1999, face sheet, with respect to the January 5, 1999, service plan, noted that, in March 1999, respondent's therapy had been transferred to a new therapist at ECHO for intensive psychotherapy.   The evaluation further indicated that, on two occasions, respondent refused to sign consents, which would make the court-ordered parenting assessment possible.   Respondent's progress was rated as unsatisfactory because she refused services aimed at unification, particularly homemaker services, on the grounds that she was not crazy or incapable.   In this regard, the worker noted that respondent's apartment was not appropriate since she slept on a broken love seat, there were dirty clothes everywhere, she had only one stool to sit on, and she had only a hot plate for cooking.   The evaluator recommended that the permanency goal be changed from return home to substitute care.   The sheet also indicated that respondent had called the judge and workers devils and the GAL a demon.   The service plan evaluation form rated respondent as satisfactory, indicating that respondent was overall making progress, although she refused medications and refused to sign consents for the court-ordered assessment.   This evaluation further noted that the return home goal significantly hinged on that assessment.   The Visiting Plan was rated satisfactory because respondent engaged in regular visits, although she acted inappropriately at times.   Specifically, respondent would express hatred and disgust for the foster parents, stating that they were only using the children for money.

The January 27, 2000, face sheet, with respect to the July 8, 1999, service plan, indicated that respondent's progress toward the return home goal was unsatisfactory because she refused services aimed at reunification, including refusing to sign a consent for the court-ordered assessment and refusing homemaker services.   The service plan evaluation rated respondent satisfactory because she was participating in therapy, which she had chosen over medication.   The Visiting Plan was rated as satisfactory because respondent was making a diligent effort at visitation, although her conduct was sometimes inappropriate.   In this regard, respondent occasionally “trash[ed]” the foster parents and once openly wished a crippling car accident on the foster father.

The July 31, 2000, face sheet, with respect to the January 27 service plan, indicated that the goal was now substitute care pursuant to the court's decision in April 2000 based upon the Report. The service plan evaluation rated respondent satisfactory, although it noted that she had not provided any documentation in connection with completing psychotherapy and had refused medications.   The evaluation also noted that respondent visited with her children and was mostly appropriate with them.   However, in April, respondent decided to stop visitation because of the goal change.   The Visiting Plan was rated as unsatisfactory.

The January 18, 2001, evaluation with respect to the July 31, 2000, service plan, rated respondent as satisfactory.   Although it noted that respondent engaged in treatment, she had refused visitation with the children.   According to the evaluation, this was her way of protesting the goal change.   The Visiting Plan was rated as unsatisfactory since respondent refused visitation.   This document also noted that on October 4, 2000, respondent had threatened to kill herself, at which time the Chicago police were called.

The January 18, 2001, service plan, which was evaluated on July 17, indicated that respondent's progress was satisfactory and, although respondent had refused medications, she was involved with psychiatric treatment.   With respect to respondent's visits with her children, the worker noted they were sporadic due to respondent's depression, triggered by the change of the permanency goal.   The Visiting Plan rated respondent's progress as satisfactory.

A letter written by Dahnweih to respondent, dated November 13, 2000, was also entered into evidence.   In this letter, Dahnweih indicated that respondent had rejected his offers to schedule visitation with the children.   This letter further indicated that the permanency goal had been changed as of April 3, 2000, by the court, after a hearing that included testimony and presentation of the Report.3  Dahnweih further indicated that respondent had threatened to kill herself in front of her children on October 6.

Various “Case Entries” were also admitted into evidence.   With respect to a September 27, 2000, visit supervised by Ramona Dixon, Ramona indicated that the visit went well at first.   However, respondent had to be reminded several times not to say negative things to the children.   According to Ramona, near the end of the visit, respondent became angry because Kenneth called her “Carmen” instead of “Momma.”   Respondent then stated:  “Wanda ain't none of your Momma I am your Momma.   She did not lay down to have you I did.   You came out of my pussy not Wanda's.”   Ramona then terminated the visit and told respondent that she should “never say such disgusting, filthy things to the children.”

An October 4 entry indicated that Ramona had a conversation with respondent in which respondent was told that visitation would now only take place one time per month.   According to Ramona, respondent became enraged and stated that she was going to kill herself.   Specifically,

“[respondent] said that she had a gun and planned to use it to shoot herself in front of the children.   She said that she wanted to [sic] Kenneth and Tiffany [to] feel bad because she could not get them back.   I tried to reason with [respondent].   I told her that harming herself in front of the children would scar them for life.   It would cause them a lot of harm.  [Respondent] said that she did not care about that.   She said that it would be good if they had a bad reaction to seeing her kill herself.”

Another entry, dated October 18, indicated that respondent called Ramona and was very angry.   Respondent stated that she “wants the children to feel bad for her [and] that was the reason she wanted them to see her kill herself.”

[THE PRECEDING MATERIAL IS NONPUBLISHABLE UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 23]

After hearing the evidence and the arguments of the parties, the court found respondent unfit only with respect to section (1)(D)(m)(iii) of the Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2002).   Following an immediate best interests hearing, the court concluded that it was in Kenneth's best interests to appoint a guardian with the right to consent to adoption.   On October 15, 2002, the trial court entered a termination hearing order, finding respondent unfit with respect to reasonable progress.   The trial court also entered a permanency order terminating respondent's parental rights and stating that the goal was adoption.   This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

I. Due Process

 Respondent first contends that the State's petition for termination violated her due process rights because it did not identify the nine-month period in which she allegedly failed to make reasonable progress.   Respondent argues that it is impossible to determine from the petition which nine-month period, of the five different nine-month periods existing, the State was going to litigate and, thus, she did not have sufficient notice as required by due process.   Respondent maintains that the law requires the State to set forth a specific and distinct time period.   Respondent further argues that her failure to raise the issue in the trial court did not waive it for review because the failure to state a cause of action, as is the case here, can be raised at any time.

The Guardian contends that respondent waived review of this issue because she failed to object to it in the trial court and give the State an opportunity to cure any alleged defect, that the petition did not deny respondent due process because the State is not required to set forth a specific nine-month time period-the State is only required to allege respondent's unfitness and the statutory ground for same-and, alternatively, even if the State was required to do so, respondent suffered no prejudice and failed to demonstrate how she was surprised or prejudiced by the petition.   The Guardian relies on several cases to support his position that the State need not allege a specific time frame.²  The State presents essentially the same arguments.

Section 1(D)(m) of the Act sets forth the following bases for the termination of parental rights:

  “Failure by a parent (i) to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from the parent, or (ii) to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent within 9 months after an adjudication of neglected or abused minor under Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or dependent minor under Section 2-4 of that Act, or (iii) to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period after the end of the initial 9-month period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor under Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or dependent minor under Section 2-4 of that Act.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2002).

 It is well-settled that “pleading defects must be raised at trial so they may be remedied;  otherwise they are forfeited.”  In re Janine M.A., 342 Ill.App.3d 1041, 1045, 277 Ill.Dec. 809, 796 N.E.2d 1175 (2003).   However, in some circumstances, justice requires relaxation of the forfeiture rule.   As such, “courts have relaxed the rule when the State's termination petition fails to state a cause of action.”  In re J.R., 342 Ill.App.3d 310, 315, 276 Ill.Dec. 519, 794 N.E.2d 414 (2003).   In connection with petitions for termination, “[t]he requirement of pleading with specificity does not require more than setting forth the specific statutory grounds of unfitness.”  In re Andrea D., 342 Ill.App.3d 233, 242, 276 Ill.Dec. 793, 794 N.E.2d 1043 (2003).   The question on appeal then is whether the alleged defects in the State's petition resulted in a failure to state a cause of action.  In re J.R., 342 Ill.App.3d at 316, 276 Ill.Dec. 519, 794 N.E.2d 414.   When a challenge is raised to the sufficiency of a pleading, it is an issue of law, which we review de novo.  In re Janine M.A., 342 Ill.App.3d at 1045, 277 Ill.Dec. 809, 796 N.E.2d 1175;  735 ILCS 5/2-612(c) (West 2002).

Respondent relies on two cases in support of her argument that she did not waive review of this issue because the State's petition failed to state a cause of action, which she may raise at any time:  In re Rauch, 45 Ill.App.3d 784, 4 Ill.Dec. 61, 359 N.E.2d 894 (1977), and In re J.P.S., 198 Ill.App.3d 633, 144 Ill.Dec. 801, 556 N.E.2d 268 (1990).   Neither case supports her position.   In Rauch, the State's petition for termination of the parents' rights did not contain any allegations that the parents were unfit or the statutory grounds for same.  Rauch, 45 Ill.App.3d at 787, 4 Ill.Dec. 61, 359 N.E.2d 894.   After stating that the failure to state a cause of action can be raised at any time, the Rauch court noted that the Act “requires the petition to state that the parent is unfit and the grounds therefore.”   Rauch, 45 Ill.App.3d at 788, 4 Ill.Dec. 61, 359 N.E.2d 894.   According to the court, these allegations are material and are essential elements of a petition.  Rauch, 45 Ill.App.3d at 788, 4 Ill.Dec. 61, 359 N.E.2d 894.   The Rauch court then concluded:

“Under the circumstances presented in this case, the failure to allege the unfitness of respondents and the grounds therefore, as required by the Adoption Act, rendered the petition fatally defective and the cause must be reversed.”   Rauch, 45 Ill.App.3d at 789, 4 Ill.Dec. 61, 359 N.E.2d 894.

Instead of supporting respondent's position here that the petition failed to state a cause of action, Rauch supports the conclusion that the petition did, in fact, under the directives of Rauch, state a cause of action.   Unlike the petition in Rauch, the State's petition in the instant case alleged that respondent was unfit and the grounds therefore, i.e., that she failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest in her children, failed to make reasonable efforts to correct conditions, and failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of her children in the nine-month period following adjudication or any nine-month period thereafter.

In In re J.P.S., the State's petition sought termination of the mother's parental rights on the basis that the minor was adjudicated abused and the mother failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the condition under which the child was removed.  In re J.P.S., 198 Ill.App.3d at 635, 144 Ill.Dec. 801, 556 N.E.2d 268.   The trial court entered a finding of unfitness and terminated the respondent's parental rights.  In re J.P.S., 198 Ill.App.3d at 634, 144 Ill.Dec. 801, 556 N.E.2d 268.   The appellate court reversed, concluding that the statutory ground, based on the specific language of the statute at that time, for finding unfitness based on a failure to make reasonable efforts, applied only to neglected and dependent minors, not to abused minors.  In re J.P.S., 198 Ill.App.3d at 635, 144 Ill.Dec. 801, 556 N.E.2d 268.   Although the court noted that the legislature had subsequently amended the statute to include abused minors, it found that this amendment did not “save” the case before it.  In re J.P.S., 198 Ill.App.3d at 635, 144 Ill.Dec. 801, 556 N.E.2d 268.   Because the statute did not include abused minors, the court further concluded that the State's petition failed to state a cause of action, which the respondent could challenge for the first time on appeal.  In re J.P.S., 198 Ill.App.3d at 634-35, 144 Ill.Dec. 801, 556 N.E.2d 268.   Again, this case does not support a finding in the instant case that the State's petition failed to state a cause of action.  In re J.P.S. involved a situation where the nature of the adjudication was not covered by the termination statute.   Clearly, if a situation is not covered by the statute, the State cannot state a cause of action.   This is simply not the case here.

Since we have found that the State's petition here did not fail to state a cause of action, the rule allowing a respondent to challenge the petition for the first time on appeal is not applicable.   Further, because respondent failed to object to the State's petition in the trial court or request that the State provide specific dates, she forfeited review of this issue.   See In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill.App.3d 239, 255, 284 Ill.Dec. 455, 810 N.E.2d 108 (2004)  (concluding that the respondent forfeited review of her due process challenge to section (iii) of the Act because she failed to object in the trial court or raise any issue at trial in connection with section (iii));  In re Dominique W., 347 Ill.App.3d 557, 565, 283 Ill.Dec. 471, 808 N.E.2d 21 (2004)(holding that the respondent waived review of her challenge to the sufficiency of the State's termination petition because she failed to raise it in the trial court);  In re J.R., 342 Ill.App.3d at 316, 276 Ill.Dec. 519, 794 N.E.2d 414 (same and concluding that where the State's petition “clearly stated what action it sought the trial court to take, and the legal grounds that justify that action[,]” it did not fail to state a cause of action).

 Assuming, arguendo, that respondent had not forfeited her challenge, we would find her argument unpersuasive.   Although no case has directly addressed whether the State's petition must identify the specific nine-month period at issue, several cases offer instruction in this regard.   In In re Jaron Z., the State filed a petition to terminate parental rights under section (1)(D)(m) of the Act, alleging that the respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward return of her child within nine months after the adjudication hearing or within any nine-month period thereafter.  In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill.App.3d at 245, 284 Ill.Dec. 455, 810 N.E.2d 108.   The respondent filed a demand for particulars, asking the State to identify the “exact dates” of the nine-month period at issue.   The State moved to strike this demand, which the trial court granted.  In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill.App.3d at 245, 284 Ill.Dec. 455, 810 N.E.2d 108.   After the State had rested, but before the respondent began her case-in-chief, the respondent moved for a directed finding.  In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill.App.3d at 247, 284 Ill.Dec. 455, 810 N.E.2d 108.   At this time, the court inquired of the State as to which nine-month period it was examining.   In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill.App.3d at 247, 284 Ill.Dec. 455, 810 N.E.2d 108.   The State responded that it was March to December 2000.   During closing argument, the State gave an alternative period of May 31, 2000, to February 2001.   The trial court, in deciding the matter, stated that it could look at the first nine-month period or any other nine-month period thereafter.   It determined that it would take into consideration the period from March 15 to December 15, 2000.  In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill.App.3d at 249, 284 Ill.Dec. 455, 810 N.E.2d 108.   On appeal, the respondent argued that section (1)(D)(m)(iii) was unconstitutional because it violated due process in circumventing the State's burden of proof since

“the State's ability to choose any nine-month time period after the initial nine months following an adjudication of neglect in which to examine a parent's fitness * * * affords no notice to the parent regarding which nine-month period she will be evaluated on and, accordingly, reduces the State's burden of proof in demonstrating the parent's unfitness.”  In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill.App.3d at 255, 284 Ill.Dec. 455, 810 N.E.2d 108.

Although concluding that the respondent forfeited review of the issue because of her failure to raise it in the trial court, the In re Jaron Z. court concluded that even assuming the issue was reviewable, the respondent's argument was without merit because section (iii) provides merely an additional ground to prove unfitness, but does not change the State's burden of proof, i.e., the section does not change the quantum of evidence needed to prove unfitness, only the type.  In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill.App.3d at 256-57, 284 Ill.Dec. 455, 810 N.E.2d 108.   Ultimately, the court concluded:

“In our view, the section is clear with respect to the applicable time:  a parent's actions for a fitness determination may be examined in light of any nine month increment of time beginning following the expiration of the first nine month period after the adjudication of neglect.  [Citation.]”  (Emphasis added.)  In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill.App.3d at 258, 284 Ill.Dec. 455, 810 N.E.2d 108.

In re K.H., 346 Ill.App.3d 443, 281 Ill.Dec. 813, 804 N.E.2d 1108 (2004), is also instructive, although we note that the respondent there did not challenge the sufficiency of the State's petition.   In In re K.H., the minor was adjudicated neglected on October 7, 1999.   On April 2, 2002, the State filed a petition for termination of parental rights on the basis that the mother had failed to make reasonable progress during both the initial nine-month period and any nine-month period thereafter.  In re K.H., 346 Ill.App.3d at 445, 281 Ill.Dec. 813, 804 N.E.2d 1108.   At the hearing on the State's petition, the court heard evidence spanning from December 1999 to at least March 2002.  In re K.H., 346 Ill.App.3d at 446-52, 281 Ill.Dec. 813, 804 N.E.2d 1108.   The trial court concluded that the respondent was unfit in that “she failed to make reasonable progress toward the goal of returning K.H. home in a nine-month period after the initial nine-month period that followed the adjudication of neglect.”  In re K.H., 346 Ill.App.3d at 452, 281 Ill.Dec. 813, 804 N.E.2d 1108.   The appellate court affirmed, stating:

“Simply put, a parent is required to make reasonable progress during a nine-month period.  * * * The trial court had an adequate basis to find that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent failed to make reasonable progress in a nine-month period after the nine-month period that followed the adjudication of neglect.”  In re K.H., 346 Ill.App.3d at 455, 281 Ill.Dec. 813, 804 N.E.2d 1108.

Not once in this decision was any specific nine-month period identified.   Clearly, the cases discussed above demonstrate that the State need not identify the specific nine-month period in its petition for termination.³

In In re Dominique W., which we granted the State leave to file as additional authority in the instant case, the respondent was found unfit under section 1(D)(b) of the Act (failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare).   In re Dominique W., 347 Ill.App.3d at 558, 283 Ill.Dec. 471, 808 N.E.2d 21.   On appeal, the respondent contended that the State's petition was legally insufficient because it merely recited the statutory language without alleging any specific facts of misconduct on her part.  In re Dominique W., 347 Ill.App.3d at 565, 283 Ill.Dec. 471, 808 N.E.2d 21.   The court first concluded that the respondent waived review of the issue because she failed to raise it in the trial court.  In re Dominique W., 347 Ill.App.3d at 565, 283 Ill.Dec. 471, 808 N.E.2d 21.   Waiver aside, the court concluded that the respondent's argument was without merit, finding here that the State's petition was sufficient because it set forth the specific statutory ground supporting unfitness, section 1(D)(b), which, according to the court, was all the State was required to plead and that the petition sufficiently apprised the respondent of the charge against her.  In re Dominique W., 347 Ill.App.3d at 565, 283 Ill.Dec. 471, 808 N.E.2d 21.   This case, although addressing a different statutory ground, further supports a finding here that the State need not allege the specific nine-month period because it, too, held that the State need only allege unfitness and the relevant statutory ground.

Moreover, the language of section (iii) of the Act itself does not support a conclusion that the State need identify a specific nine-month period.   The statute uses the term “any.”  750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(iii) (West 2002).   It does not state “an or any identified” or “a or any specified” nine-month period after the initial nine-month period.   “ Any” means “one, no matter what one,” or “any part, quantity, or number.”   Webster's Third New International Dictionary 97 (1993).   Respondent asks this court to add language to the statute that the legislature did not include.

Lastly, as the Guardian argues, respondent has not demonstrated how she was prejudiced by the failure to identify a specific nine-month period.   Respondent has not identified what additional evidence she would have offered or alternative arguments she would have made to the court that would have changed the outcome of this case.   See In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill.App.3d at 258, 284 Ill.Dec. 455, 810 N.E.2d 108 (noting that “respondent failed before the trial court, and fails now on appeal, to state how she was prejudiced, if at all, by the application of section 1(D)(m)(iii) to her cause.  * * * She made no offer of proof at trial, nor does she assert a basis before us, regarding what different evidence she would have presented or argument she would have made that would have changed the outcome here”);  In re J.R., 342 Ill.App.3d at 317, 276 Ill.Dec. 519, 794 N.E.2d 414 (concluding that because the respondent failed to allege, and the court was not able to ascertain from the record, “any way in which the alleged defect affected respondent's rights or interests,” her claim would fail even assuming it was not waived).

Based on the foregoing, we find that the State's petition did not fail to state a cause of action and, therefore, because respondent did not challenge the petition in the trial court, she cannot do so now.   Further, were we to address respondent's challenge substantively, we would find that relevant case law, as well as the language of section (iii) itself, does not mandate a conclusion that the State must identify a specific nine-month period in its petition for termination.   Accordingly, we would find respondent's challenge unpersuasive.

II. Admission of Parenting Assessment Team Report

Respondent next contends that the trial court erred in admitting the Report because it was irrelevant to the issue of her fitness and it was not a business record.

A. Relevancy

 Respondent first maintains that the Report was not relevant to the issue of her fitness, but rather only to the best interests analysis, and, thus, it was inadmissible.   In this regard, respondent argues that compliance with service plans is the touchstone of reasonable progress and the Report had no relevance to her reasonable progress or whether she made progress in correcting the conditions that resulted in the adjudication in the first instance.

The Guardian maintains that the Report was relevant because it was primarily concerned with respondent's services and was completed for the express purpose of determining whether there were any services available to respondent to assist her in having Kenneth returned to her.   According to the Guardian, the Report directly related to respondent's ability to regain custody of Kenneth and the core of the evaluation was respondent's ability to parent.   The Guardian further argues that the Report was created for the same purpose as service plans are created-as a social service tool-and not for litigation.   The Guardian also maintains that the Illinois Supreme Court has rejected the view that reasonable progress determinations are limited to correcting circumstances occurring when the case started.

The State presents arguments that are the same as the Guardian's.   In addition, the State argues that respondent ignores the first stated goal of the Report and misquotes the second.   According to the State, the first goal clearly addresses issues relevant to reasonable progress.

The cases relied upon by respondent in support of her position that the Report is only admissible with respect to a best interests hearing, In re D.T., 338 Ill.App.3d 133, 272 Ill.Dec. 829, 788 N.E.2d 133 (2003), and In re C.B., 248 Ill.App.3d 168, 188 Ill.Dec. 28, 618 N.E.2d 598 (1993), do not aid her.   In In re D.T., although a team parenting assessment was undertaken of the respondent and two of the doctors involved in the assessment testified, there was no evidence that the report created by the team was admitted as evidence, nor was there any question raised as to its admissibility.   As such, In re D.T. does not address the question posed by respondent here:  the admissibility of the Report.   More importantly, the respondent in In re D.T. was alleged unfit based on her “ ‘[f]ailure to protect the child from conditions within his environment injurious to the child's welfare.’  [Citation.]”  In re D.T., 338 Ill.App.3d at 145, 272 Ill.Dec. 829, 788 N.E.2d 133.   Evidence of the respondent's conduct after removal of her child was not relevant to this ground of unfitness.  In re D.T., 338 Ill.App.3d at 145, 272 Ill.Dec. 829, 788 N.E.2d 133.   Rather, only evidence of the respondent's conduct before the child was removed was relevant.  In re D.T., 338 Ill.App.3d at 146, 272 Ill.Dec. 829, 788 N.E.2d 133.   Therefore, any testimony, including that from the two doctors involved in the parenting assessment, that related to the respondent's conduct after removal, was not relevant to the question of fitness.   In the instant case, we are not dealing with that ground of unfitness, limiting relevant evidence to respondent's conduct prior to removal of her children.   As such, In re D.T. is inapplicable.

Respondent relies on In re C.B. for the proposition that a bonding assessment, and thus here, the parenting assessment, is relevant only to a best interests determination.   Again, this case does not support respondent's position.   In In re C.B., the question of which of two individuals, neither of whom was the natural mother of the minor, should be awarded permanent custody was at issue.  In re C.B., 248 Ill.App.3d at 169, 188 Ill.Dec. 28, 618 N.E.2d 598.   The resolution of this question revolved entirely around a best interests determination.  In re C.B., 248 Ill.App.3d at 176, 188 Ill.Dec. 28, 618 N.E.2d 598.   While it is true that a bonding assessment was done and the expert concluded that the child was attached to one person over the other (In re C.B., 248 Ill.App.3d at 173, 188 Ill.Dec. 28, 618 N.E.2d 598), the appellate court found that the assessment was completely inadequate (In re C.B., 248 Ill.App.3d at 178, 188 Ill.Dec. 28, 618 N.E.2d 598), and ruled that the trial court erred in unreasonably relying on the expert's conclusion simply because it was uncontradicted.   In re C.B., 248 Ill.App.3d at 178-79, 188 Ill.Dec. 28, 618 N.E.2d 598.

First, respondent does not explain or argue how the parenting assessment here is akin to the bonding assessment in In re C.B. or why the two clearly different types of assessments should be treated the same.   More importantly, however, In re C.B. is clearly inapplicable to the instant case.   It did not involve a question of the fitness of a natural parent, unlike the instant case. Moreover, the question of the admissibility of the bonding assessment report or testimony in connection with same was not at issue.   Lastly, the assessment and report were clearly inadequate.   As such, In re C.B. does not aid respondent, nor this court, in determining whether the Report here, which respondent does not contend is inadequate, was admissible in connection with her fitness.

 The question in the instant case ultimately revolves around whether respondent made reasonable progress toward the return of her children.  “The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the circuit court and its ruling will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.   [Citation.]  All evidence must be relevant to be admissible.  [Citation.]  Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove a fact in controversy or render a matter in issue more or less probable.”  Smith v. Silver Cross Hospital, 339 Ill.App.3d 67, 76, 273 Ill.Dec. 935, 790 N.E.2d 77 (2003).   With respect to “reasonable progress,” the case of In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d 181, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030 (2001), relied upon by the Guardian, is instructive on what evidence is relevant to this determination.   In In re C.N., the court first noted that the statute fails to set forth how progress is measured and “does not explain what steps are necessary to reach the goal of ‘the return of the child.’ ”  In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 211, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.   Our supreme court noted that the appellate court was not in agreement as to the appropriate “benchmark” to use to measure a parent's progress.  In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 212, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.   Some courts “have measured progress by looking at the degree to which a parent has corrected the situation which triggered the minor's initial removal or the conditions existing at the time custody [was] taken.”  In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 212, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.   Other courts “have held that once the court, or an authorized agency like DCFS, decides what steps a parent must take to achieve the return of the child, subsequent inquiry into a parent's progress should focus on the parent's compliance with the DCFS service plan, the court's directives, or both.”  In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 212, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.   Still other courts have taken a middle ground.  In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 212, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.

The In re C.N. court rejected the narrow view “that a court may only look to the situation that triggered the minor's initial removal, or the conditions existing at the time custody [was] taken.”  In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 213, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.   In this regard, the court stated that this view “erroneously assumes that the condition which triggered removal of the child is the only condition a parent need ever address in order to achieve the goal of reunification.”  (Emphasis in original.)  In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 213, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.   According to the supreme court, “[t]he parent-child relationship, the environment in the home, and the precise conditions which triggered State intervention do not remain static over time.”  In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 213, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.   Additionally, “other serious conditions * * * may become known only after removal, following further investigation of the child, parent and family situation.”  In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 214, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.   According to the court, “[t]he necessity of considering other conditions that later come to light is reflected in the broad scope of the investigation authorized under the Juvenile Court Act.” In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 214, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.   Specifically, the court noted that service plans are not limited to addressing those conditions that triggered removal, but “must reasonably relate to ‘remedying a condition or conditions that gave rise or which could give rise to any finding of child abuse or neglect.’   [Citation.]”  (Emphasis in original).  In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 214, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.   The In re C.N. court also rejected the narrow view that focus should solely be on the parent's compliance with service plans.  In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 214, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.   However, the court did note that compliance with service plans is “intimately tied to a parent's progress toward the return of the child.”  In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 216-17, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.

Ultimately, the court stated that “the overall focus in evaluating a parent's progress toward the return of the child remains, at all times, on the fitness of the parent in relation to the needs of the child.”  In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 215, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.   The court concluded:

“[T]he benchmark for measuring a parent's progress under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act must take into account the dynamics of the circumstances involved;  the reality that the condition resulting in removal of the child may not be the only, or the most severe, condition which must be addressed before custody of the child can be returned to the parent;  the appropriate role of service plans in addressing these conditions;  and the overriding concern that a parent's rights to his or her child will not be terminated lightly.”  In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 216, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.

Accordingly, the court held:

“[T]he benchmark for measuring a parent's ‘progress toward the return of the child’ under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act encompasses the parent's compliance with the service plans and the court's directives, in light of the condition which gave rise to the removal of the child, and in light of other conditions which later become known and which would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent.”    In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 216-17, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.

Based on In re C.N., relevant evidence with respect to reasonable progress includes:  evidence in connection with compliance with service plans and court directives;  evidence in connection with correction of the conditions leading to removal;  and evidence in connection with any other conditions that may be disclosed through subsequent investigation that a parent must address in achieving the goal of return.   Contrary to respondent's argument here, the sole focus is not on compliance with service plans or correction of the conditions resulting in removal.   Rather, evidence relevant to the reasonable progress analysis includes other conditions that may become known that require correction or addressing.   The Report here certainly falls within the ambit of this.   The Report, although it does contain information and conclusions in connection with the best interests of the children, extensively addresses conditions or circumstances of respondent that relate to her fitness in relationship to the needs of her children.   Certainly, the Report tends to prove a fact in controversy, respondent's fitness, i.e., whether there are any conditions that would prevent the court from returning her children to her.   As such, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Report as relevant.

B. Business Record

 Respondent next maintains that the Report was not admissible as a business record because it was prepared for litigation.   Specifically, respondent argues that it was prepared by a team of experts to assist in litigation and was done at the request of the trial court.   As such, respondent argues that it is not a business record.   Respondent also maintains that the Report contained expert opinions that were not subject to cross-examination.   According to respondent, expert opinions must be given by live testimony.

The Guardian contends that the Report was properly admitted as a business record since it is similar to services plans in nature and purpose.   The Guardian further contends that the current trend of authority allows opinions to be admitted as part of business records, authority that respondent ignores.   In this regard, the Guardian maintains that the Report in fact did not contain expert opinions because none of the authors were qualified as experts.   The State again presents arguments similar to the Guardian's.

 Section 18(4)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act provides:

“Any writing, record, photograph or x-ray of any hospital or public or private agency, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event relating to a minor in an abuse, neglect or dependency proceeding, shall be admissible in evidence as proof of that condition, act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the court finds that the document was made in the regular course of the business of the hospital or agency and that it was in the regular course of such business to make it, at the time of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter.”  705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a) (West 2002).

To be admissible as a business record under this section, the State must establish that the writing was “(1) made as a memorandum or record of the event, (2) made in the ordinary course of business, and (3) made at the time of the event or within a reasonable time thereafter.”  In re A.B., 308 Ill.App.3d 227, 236, 241 Ill.Dec. 487, 719 N.E.2d 348 (1999).

We find that the trial court did not err in admitting the Report as a business record.   First, the case relied upon by respondent in support of her argument, Kelly v. HCI Heinz Construction Co., 282 Ill.App.3d 36, 218 Ill.Dec. 112, 668 N.E.2d 596 (1996), involved admission of evidence under Supreme Court Rule 236, which is not applicable to Juvenile Court proceedings.   See In re A.B., 308 Ill.App.3d at 234-35, 241 Ill.Dec. 487, 719 N.E.2d 348.   As such, the ruling in that case is not applicable here.   More importantly, the requirements for admission under section 18(4)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act were met.   Evidence was presented during the hearing that this document was prepared in the agency's regular course of business and it was clearly made contemporaneously with the events the Report recorded.

With respect to respondent's argument that the Report was prepared for litigation and, therefore, is not a business record, we disagree.   First, it has been noted that “[s]imply because they [client service plans] are used in an adversarial-type proceeding is of no consequence.”  In re A.B., 308 Ill.App.3d at 236, 241 Ill.Dec. 487, 719 N.E.2d 348.   Accordingly, because the Report was used in this termination proceeding and, in fact, was requested by the trial court itself, does not control whether it is a business record.   Moreover, under the Juvenile Court Act, agencies are required to “ ‘assist a Circuit Court during all stages of the court proceeding in accordance with the purposes of * * * the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 by providing full, complete, and accurate information to the court.’ ”  In re A.B., 308 Ill.App.3d at 236, 241 Ill.Dec. 487, 719 N.E.2d 348.   Clearly, the Report serves this purpose.   It certainly provides additional information to the court, necessary for the court to render its decision on respondent's fitness.   The Report was created with family preservation and the best interests of all parties in mind.   More importantly, the Report was “created as a direct result of the ongoing juvenile proceeding and relate[d] to a condition which [was] also directly related to that proceeding.”  In re M.S., 210 Ill.App.3d 1085, 1095-96, 155 Ill.Dec. 671, 569 N.E.2d 1282 (1991).

Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in admitting the Report as a business record.

[Editor's Note:  Text omitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23.]

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C. Judicial Notice

Respondent also maintains that the Report was not subject to judicial notice because it was inadmissible hearsay.   The Guardian does not reply to this argument.   The State contends that because the trial court did not take judicial notice of the Report, but admitted it over respondent's objection, respondent's argument is not proper for appeal.   We agree with the State and decline to address this argument.

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III. Case Worker Testimony

[Editor's Note:  Text omitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23.]

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Respondent next contends that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from Dahnweih with respect to the service plans because the service plans were admitted into evidence and speak for themselves.   Respondent further maintains that she suffered prejudice because the testimony was often inconsistent with information contained in the plans themselves.

The Guardian contends that the trial court properly allowed testimony from Dahnweih.   According to the Guardian, the rule espoused by respondent, that a witness cannot testify with respect to the contents of a document that has been admitted into evidence, applies only when the witness has no firsthand knowledge, which is not the case here because Dahnweih had firsthand knowledge since he prepared most of the service plans.   With respect to alleged inconsistencies, the Guardian argues that it was up to respondent's counsel to cross-examine Dahnweih and impeach him.   Lastly, the Guardian argues that respondent suffered no prejudice because, even without the testimony, the plans themselves were sufficient to find her unfit.

The State contends that respondent waived review of this argument because she did not object to the testimony in the trial court and raises it for the first time here.   In other respects, the State's arguments are essentially the same as the Guardian's.

“Questions not raised in the trial court cannot be argued for the first time on appeal.”  In re D.F., 208 Ill.2d 223, 238, 280 Ill.Dec. 549, 802 N.E.2d 800 (2003).  “Where a party fails to make an appropriate objection in the court below, he or she has failed to preserve the question for review and the issue is waived.”  In re April C., 326 Ill.App.3d 225, 242, 260 Ill.Dec. 6, 760 N.E.2d 85 (2001).   See also In re Jaber W., 344 Ill.App.3d 250, 256, 279 Ill.Dec. 32, 799 N.E.2d 835 (2003) (failure to object to the admissibility of hearsay testimony at trial resulted in waiver of the argument for review).

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We agree with the State's argument that respondent forfeited review of this issue on appeal by failing to object to the testimony in the trial court.   Accordingly, we decline to address respondent's challenge.

IV. Finding of Unfitness

[Editor's Note: Text omitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23.]

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Respondent lastly contends that the trial court's finding of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence when only the properly admissible evidence is considered.   Respondent again maintains that the touchstone of reasonable progress is compliance with service plans, which was clearly demonstrated here, according to her.

The Guardian contends that the trial court's decision, finding respondent unfit, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.   According to the Guardian, respondent was required to demonstrate reasonable progress to the point that Kenneth would be returned to her in the near future, which she failed to do.   The State, too, contends that the trial court's decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.   Each party has set forth the evidence in connection with each nine-month period.

The State must prove unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.  In re Jordan V., 347 Ill.App.3d 1057, 1067, 283 Ill.Dec. 630, 808 N.E.2d 596 (2004).   The trial court's findings are given great deference “because of [the court's] superior opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility.”  In re Jordan V., 347 Ill.App.3d at 1067, 283 Ill.Dec. 630, 808 N.E.2d 596.   We will not disturb the trial court's finding of unfitness unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, “meaning that the correctness of the opposite conclusion is clearly evident from a review of the evidence.”  In re Jordan v., 347 Ill.App.3d at 1067, 283 Ill.Dec. 630, 808 N.E.2d 596.   This court will not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses on appeal.  In re April C., 345 Ill.App.3d 872, 889, 281 Ill.Dec. 312, 803 N.E.2d 933 (2004).  “ ‘Further, because each case involving parental unfitness is sui generis, courts do not make factual comparisons to other cases.’  [Citation.]”  In re April C., 345 Ill.App.3d at 889, 281 Ill.Dec. 312, 803 N.E.2d 933.  “Reasonable progress ‘is an objective review of the steps the parent has taken toward the goal of reunification.’  [Citations.]”  In re Jordan V., 347 Ill.App.3d at 1067, 283 Ill.Dec. 630, 808 N.E.2d 596.   As noted above, the supreme court in In re C.N. set forth the benchmark for measuring a respondent's progress as follows:

“[T]he benchmark for measuring a parent's ‘progress toward the return of the child’ under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act encompasses the parent's compliance with the service plans and the court's directives, in light of the condition which gave rise to the removal of the child, and in light of other conditions which later become known and which would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent.”  In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 216-17, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030.

In In re L.L.S., 218 Ill.App.3d 444, 160 Ill.Dec. 804, 577 N.E.2d 1375 (1991), this court discussed “reasonable progress” under section 1(D)(m) of the Act and held as follows:

“ ‘Reasonable progress' * * * exists when the [trial] court * * * can conclude that * * * the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child returned to parental custody.’  [Citation.]”  (Emphasis in original.)   In re L.L.S., 218 Ill.App.3d at 461, 160 Ill.Dec. 804, 577 N.E.2d 1375.

See also In re Janine M.A., 342 Ill.App.3d at 1051, 277 Ill.Dec. 809, 796 N.E.2d 1175.   The supreme court's discussion in In re C.N. “regarding the benchmark for measuring a respondent parent's progress did not alter or call into question this court's holding in L.L.S.” In re Jordan V., 347 Ill.App.3d at 1068, 283 Ill.Dec. 630, 808 N.E.2d 596.

Based on the case law set forth above, specifically, In re Jaron Z., as well as comments from Senator Karpiel in addressing the amendment that added section (iii) of the Act, we believe that the entire period of time subsequent to the adjudication of neglect or abuse is at issue and that all of the information acquired during that time is relevant to a determination with respect to a respondent's fitness.   Viewing all of the evidence subsequent to the removal of Kenneth from respondent here, we conclude that the trial court's finding that respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward Kenneth's return home was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.   The evidence offered at the termination hearing was set forth in detail above.   The evidence is clearly not close.   While respondent complied with many of the service goals and received some satisfactory ratings, she did not comply with the most important goals, i.e., she refused homemaker services to remedy the defects in her living arrangements, she often failed to satisfy the therapy goals, and she refused visitation when it suited her needs.   Additionally, respondent failed to comply with the trial court's directive in that she refused to sign the consent forms for the parenting assessment evaluation.   More importantly, other conditions following the adjudication became known that would prevent the court from returning Kenneth to respondent in the near future or at any time.   Dahnweih testified that he was never able to recommend unsupervised visits between respondent and her children because of her repeated inappropriate behavior around them and her refusal of homemaker services to correct the inadequacies and unsafe condition of her apartment.   Also, the Report concluded that additional services were unlikely to “make a substantial improvement in her personal and parental capabilities” and there were “no additional services that would sufficiently increase her parenting capability to an acceptable level.”   Most troubling, however, is respondent's repeated suicide threats and the fact that she threatened to commit this act in front of her children so they would feel bad for her and her belief that it would be good for the children if they had a bad reaction to seeing her kill herself.   Clearly, respondent's conduct did not demonstrate conduct aimed at the goal of reunification.

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We have carefully reviewed the record and find that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent failed to make reasonable progress in any nine-month period after the adjudication and that an opposite conclusion is not clearly evident.   Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's finding that respondent was unfit was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.    There is no evidence in the record with respect to this evaluation except for respondent's testimony that she was so examined.

1.   Due to page restrictions, the four individual evaluation reports are not included in the published portion of this opinion, but are detailed in the unpublished portion.

3.    There is no report of proceedings in the record from this court date.

2.   We note that all of these cases were decided prior to January 1, 2000, when section (iii) of the Act became effective.   Accordingly, they can have no bearing on the issue presented to this court since they clearly could not have interpreted this section.

3.   Also enlightening is the following comment made by Senator Karpiel of the Illinois General Assembly regarding the addition of section (iii):“SENATOR KARPIEL:  * * * House Bill 1298 amends the Adoption Act. It amends the grounds of parental unfitness to include failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of a child to the parent during any nine-month period after the end of the initial nine-month period following the adjudication of the child as neglected, abused or a dependent.   At present under the Adoption Act, they-the court can only use evidence in the nine-month period from the adjudication to the filing period of termination.   And since the termination hearing sometimes isn't till maybe a year later, the court would really like to hear-be able to hear evidence during the other-the rest of the period.   This can be good or bad for a-a parent.   Sometimes that first nine-month period, perhaps they don't really get their act together too well, and then they-at the termination hearing, the court can only use a bad evidence of-of their fitness for being a parent, or it can be that they start out good and then they start-start to slowly go back to their old bad ways and that's not so good for the kids.   So either way, but the court would like to be able to use the entire time, look at the evidence during that entire period.   And that's all the bill does.”   (Emphasis added.) 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 6, 1999, 37-38 (statements of Senator Karpiel).

Presiding Justice BURKE delivered the opinion of the court: