PEOPLE v. BARNES (2025)

OPINION

¶ 1 On December 14, 2023, the State charged defendant, Eddie Barnes, with two Class X felonies: unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(g) (West 2022)) and unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, psilocybin (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(11) (West 2022)). In September 2024, defendant moved to suppress the evidence found at the residence, arguing the affidavit supporting the search warrant contains two errors material to the finding of probable cause. The errors identified by defendant are one mention of an irrelevant address and the false statement defendant was the account holder for a utilities company for the residence to be searched. In December 2024, the circuit court agreed with defendant and granted his motion. The State appeals the suppression order. We reverse and remand.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On December 12, 2023, Andrew T. Eagle, an officer with the City of Rock Island Police Department's special investigations unit, filed a complaint for a search warrant. Officer Eagle requested a warrant to search defendant; his residence at 3408 22nd Street, Rock Island, Illinois (target residence); and his maroon Mercedes-Benz. Officer Eagle sought to seize “controlled substances, packaging materials, U.S. currency, drug records, drug paraphernalia, indicia of residency, firearms *** and any other evidence relating to the offense of” unlawful possession or manufacture of controlled substances.

¶ 4 Attached to the complaint for a search warrant is an affidavit signed by Officer Eagle. The affidavit states the following, in part:

“2) That within the last 14 days my fellow Officer received information from a reliable confidential source [(CS)] that drug activity is taking place at 1201 12th St, Rock Island ***. The [CS] advised that [defendant] is currently storing cannabis and other drugs inside his residence of 3408 22nd St Rock Island *** and transporting them to 1732 Fillmore Lane, Davenport, Iowa for the purpose of selling them. Rock Island police has been working with and sharing information with the Davenport Police Department on this investigation;

3) I and my fellow officers have observed [defendant] leave his residence at 3408 22nd St Rock Island *** driving his Maroon in color Mercedes-Benz (hereinafter maroon Mercedes) with IA registration HAY481 *** arrive at 1732 Fillmore Lane Davenport, IA 52804 ([defendant's] grandmother's residence) on multiple occasions;

4) I checked department records and found that [defendant] lists 3408 22nd St Rock Island, IL as his address; with 3408 22nd St Rock Island, Illinois, being a brick and white in color single family home with white trim, single story residence with the number ‘3408’ affixed to the east facing side of the residence.

5) A Mid-American Energy Company [(MidAmerican)] accounts check shows an account for service to 3408 22nd Street Rock Island, Illinois to be i[n] [defendant's] name;

6) That the [CS], herein referred to as ‘Pat Doe’ has shown to be reliable in the past with controlled buys, phone calls and messages confirming drug transactions and information that was later found to be true.

7) I checked Rock Island Police Department computer records and completed a criminal history check for [defendant] which shows a criminal history for the following arrests in IOWA: 6-17-94: Assault causing injury ***, 9-14-94 Drug Possession for which he [pled] guilty and sentenced to a fine ***, 9-19-94: Possession with intent to Deliver Cocaine for which he was sentence[d] to 121 month[s] in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 3-15-96: Distribution of Cocaine for which he was sentence[d] to 6 months[’] consecutive sentence ***, 1-21-2001: 4 counts of Possession with intent to deliver cocaine for which he was sentence[d] to 10 years in prison, 4-16-2007 for a probation violation in which he illegally possessed a controlled substance for which he was sentenced to 9 months in [the Federal Bureau of Prisons] and 24 months[’] supervised release, 3-8-2011 Distribution of Marijuana for which he was sentenced to 85 months in prison ***. 11-23-2019: Driving under the Influence, 5-20-2020: Controlled substance violation. In ILLINOIS: Domestic Battery for which charges were not filed, 6-22-03: Disorderly conduct for which charges were not filed[.]

8) That Pat Doe is currently cooperating with law enforcement for composition benefits.

9) I believe Pat Doe does in fact know what cannabis and narcotics are because Pat Doe admits to in the past using and/or associating with persons using and/or dealing cannabis and/or narcotics.

10) That Pat Doe is personally familiar with [defendant] as Pat Doe admits to having purchased cannabis from [defendant] on multiple occasions in the past.

11) That on or between the dates of 11-16-2023 and 12-7-2023, my fellow officers conducted controlled purchases of cannabis from [defendant] while at his grandmothers’ residence at 1732 Fillmore Ln Davenport, IA 52804. On two of those controlled purchase dates, once the buy is set up, [defendant] is observed by my fellow officers who had previously set up surveillance near the target residence, leave the target residence and proceed to the buy location in Davenport while driving his maroon Mercedes-Benz ***, where he then sells cannabis to Pat Doe;

12) Before the aforementioned controlled purchases, Pat Doe was searched by my fellow officers, looking for the presence of contraband and/or U.S. currency. These searches of Pat Doe's person and vehicle yielded negative results. After the initial searches of Pat Doe, and their vehicle, my fellow officers provided Pat Doe with pre-recorded U.S. currency / Official Advanced Funds (OAF) to be used for the purchase of an ounce of cannabis from [defendant]. Pat Doe then contacted [defendant] via phone to set up the forthcoming drug purchase. Each time, [defendant] directed Pat Doe to meet him at or near 1732 Fillmore Lane in Davenport Iowa;

13) Between December 1 and December 7, another controlled purchase was set up like before by Pat Doe with [defendant] for the purchase of cannabis; [defendant] directed Pat Doe to meet him at 1732 Fillmore Lane; simultaneously, my fellow officers were conducting surveillance at the target residence and observed [defendant] exit the target residence *** and enter his [Mercedes] and arrive at 1732 Fillmore Lane Davenport, Iowa[.]

14) My fellow officers observed Pat Doe arrive to the area on foot without meeting with any other persons, and approach and enter, [defendant's Mercedes] occupied by [defendant] in front of 1732 Fillmore Lane Davenport, Iowa[.]

15) That after approximately 5 minutes Pat Doe exited the Maroon Mercedes-Benz ***, where they met with my fellow officers at a predetermined location.

16) That upon meeting with my fellow officers at a predetermined location, Pat Doe immediately relinquished an amount of suspected cannabis to them. A sample of said cannabis later field tested positive for the presence of [tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)]. Pat Doe advised my fellow officers that the cannabis was purchased from [defendant] while inside [defendant's Mercedes].

17) A second search of Pat Doe's person and vehicle was conducted by my fellow officers looking for the presence of any contraband and/or any U.S. currency. This second search of Pat Doe yielded negative results.

18) That on December 5, 2023, I and my fellow officers conducted a trash survey on trash that had been set out in a trash receptacle at the target residence and retrieved the trash within which we located a clear plastic baggie containing white residue that field tested positive as cocaine along with indicia of residency in the form of U.S. mail addressed to [defendant] at 3408 22nd Street Rock Island Illinois;

19) That it has been my experience that cannabis and/or controlled substances are easily passed from one individual to another, and person(s) who sell cannabis and/or controlled substances often possess firearms and hide or store cannabis and/or controlled substances and the money derived from the sale of cannabis and/or controlled substances on their person, in their residence or in their vehicle(s), and often maintain drug records and financial records pertaining to the sale of cannabis and/or controlled substances in their residence, including packaging material, firearms, firearm ammunition, cell phones, indicia of residency, scales, drug equipment, United States Currency, and police scanners.”

¶ 5 That same day, a search warrant for the target residence was issued. Warrants were also issued to search defendant and his vehicle.

¶ 6 After the search was conducted, Officer Eagle signed an affidavit, presenting to the circuit court “an inventory of all instruments, articles, or things seized” on the search warrant issued for the target residence. No items were located on defendant's person. The search warrant for defendant's vehicle was “Not Served.” The inventory for the items found at the target residence included cannabis, psilocybin, United States currency, THC cartridges, a digital scale, and a drug ledger.

¶ 7 In September 2024, defendant moved to suppress the evidence found at the target residence, arguing the search warrant was invalid. In the motion, defendant emphasized two errors in the affidavit supporting the complaint for the search warrant. Defendant maintained—although the search warrant indicated drug-related activity at 1201 12th Street, Rock Island, Illinois—that location had no tie to defendant and was irrelevant to any issue in the case. Defendant also argued that paragraph 5 of the affidavit falsely stated “[a] Mid-American Energy Company account check shows an account for service” to the target residence was in defendant's name. Defendant argued this error “was, at best a material misstatement of the facts and worst an outright lie.” Defendant attached a copy of the bills for November 2023 and December 2023, which show the account holder for the target residence is “Veronica Garrard.”

¶ 8 The State filed an opposition to defendant's motion. The State argued that the two errors were “technical irregularities that did not affect” defendant's rights. The State maintained, because probable cause supported the warrant regardless of the two errors, the motion to suppress should not have been granted.

¶ 9 A hearing was held on December 13, 2024. At the hearing, Officer Eagle testified that the reference to a 12th Street address in Rock Island was a mistake, resulting from a “cut and paste” use of a prior affidavit in support of a complaint for a search warrant. Officer Eagle acknowledged the inaccuracy of the statement in paragraph 5 regarding the MidAmerican account. Explaining the error, Officer Eagle stated he spoke to MidAmerican and was advised defendant was “an authorized user of that account.” Officer Eagle was also informed that the authorized user could make changes to the account, pay the account, and receive billing information.

¶ 10 At the close of the hearing, the circuit court ruled for defendant. The court found the mistake in paragraph 2 was, by definition, a clerical error. The court found “[t]he hardest part” was paragraph 5, the misstatement regarding the MidAmerican account. The court found the error “unintentional, but yet at least somewhat misleading statement of what the actual facts are in terms of the electrical bill.” The court found the mistake “honest” but “material.” After observing the issue was “close,” the court granted the defendant's motion to suppress.

¶ 11 This appeal followed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, the State contends the circuit court's suppression order should be reversed for two reasons. First, the State contends, absent the errors identified by defendant, the affidavit contains an ample basis for a finding of probable cause. Second, the State argues the court entered a finding the mistakes were unintentional, that finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and defendant, therefore, cannot make the showing necessary for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) (Franks hearing), or the granting of a motion to suppress.

¶ 14 Defendant counters he has made the requisite showing for the suppression order and, at a minimum, a Franks hearing. Defendant argues the circuit court properly granted his motion to suppress, as he made a showing of a false statement material to probable cause. Defendant further contends the error regarding his name on the MidAmerican account was material to the finding of probable cause and, without it, there is not a sufficient connection between his alleged criminal activity in Iowa and the target residence in Illinois.

¶ 15 In Franks, the United States Supreme Court determined a criminal defendant has, in certain circumstances, the right under the fourth and fourteenth amendments (U.S. Const., amends. IV, XIV) to challenge in a hearing the truthfulness of statements of fact made in the affidavit supporting the ex parte issuance of a search warrant. People v. Chambers, 2016 IL 117911, ¶ 34, 399 Ill.Dec. 863, 47 N.E.3d 545 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155, 98 S.Ct. 2674). A defendant may do so at a hearing when he or she “ ‘makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit,’ ” and when “ ‘the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.’ ” Id. ¶ 35 (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674). In reviewing a suppression order, we presume the affidavit supporting the search warrant is valid. See id.

¶ 16 The test for the Franks hearing shows neither a suppression order nor an order for a Franks hearing needs to be granted “ ‘[i]f, after the alleged untruths in the warrant affidavit are set aside, the remaining statements in the affidavit are sufficient to establish probable cause.’ ” People v. Heibenthal, 2024 IL App (4th) 221109, ¶ 23, 478 Ill.Dec. 291, 245 N.E.3d 557 (quoting People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 218, 307 Ill.Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178 (2006)). The question of whether probable cause exists depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances. See People v. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 29, 432 Ill.Dec. 598, 129 N.E.3d 1141. The facts and circumstances must be “ ‘sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the law was violated and evidence of it is on the premises to be searched.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 77, 227 Ill.Dec. 338, 687 N.E.2d 820 (1997)). The standard for determining whether probable causes exists is the probability of criminal activity, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Commonsense considerations govern when the necessary probability of criminal activity exists. Id. ¶ 30.

¶ 17 A ruling by the circuit court on a motion to suppress presents both factual and legal questions. Id. ¶ 25. Findings of fact will be afforded deference and will be reversed only when such findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. If, on review, the appellate court accepts the factual findings, review of the suppression order is de novo. Id.

¶ 18 We agree with the State and find, excluding the errors, the remaining statements are sufficient to establish the probability of criminal activity at the target residence. The CS, who had worked with officers in the past with controlled buys, informed the police officers defendant stored cannabis and other drugs at the target residence. Department records indicate that defendant listed his address as the address of the target residence. Mail addressed to defendant and a baggie containing cocaine were found in the trash of the target residence. Once the controlled buys were set, officers twice observed defendant leave the target residence in Illinois, where the purchase and possession of cannabis, with limitations, is legal (see 410 ILCS 705/10-5(a)(1) (West 2022)), and drive to Davenport, Iowa, where cannabis is illegal (Iowa Code § 124.401 (2023)), to deliver cannabis to the CS. Defendant also had a history of convictions involving the sale of drugs.

¶ 19 Defendant urges this court to give no weight to Officer Eagle's vague reference to the United States mail addressed to defendant found in the trash, arguing the reference is unconvincing on the issue of probable cause. In support, he cites People v. Maldonado, 2015 IL App (1st) 131874, ¶ 29, 394 Ill.Dec. 249, 35 N.E.3d 1218, as showing a single piece of junk mail had little to no evidentiary value.

¶ 20 An address on United States mail is admissible to establish proof of residency at trial (see People v. Neal, 2020 IL App (4th) 170869, ¶¶ 3, 145, 440 Ill.Dec. 136, 150 N.E.3d 984) and, therefore, is certainly admissible and relevant to the question of probable cause. Maldonado does not establish otherwise. Maldonado involves a conviction based on constructive possession of contraband. Maldonado, 2015 IL App (1st) 131874, ¶ 1, 394 Ill.Dec. 249, 35 N.E.3d 1218. It does not involve a suppression order, which, in contrast, does not require proof of residency beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 29, 432 Ill.Dec. 598, 129 N.E.3d 1141). In addition, the Maldonado court did not find the address on the mail inadmissible but found, in the particular circumstances of the case, that it would not infer residency based on mail addressed to a defendant who was “not present during the execution of a search warrant and other indicia of residency or an admission of residency is not shown.” Maldonado, 2015 IL App (1st) 131874, ¶ 29, 394 Ill.Dec. 249, 35 N.E.3d 1218. Here, the affidavit contains additional indicia of residency.

¶ 21 Moreover, defendant's cases, particularly those he relies upon to show no nexus between the target residence and the alleged criminal conduct, are distinguishable. For example, People v. Lenyoun, 402 Ill. App. 3d 787, 795, 342 Ill.Dec. 172, 932 N.E.2d 63 (2010), involves a “single drug sale conducted from a car by a defendant.” In People v. Rojas, 2013 IL App (1st) 113780, ¶ 18, 376 Ill.Dec. 25, 998 N.E.2d 567, the only evidence linking the address searched to drug activity was the fact the defendant spoke to a drug trafficker via phone and told him to meet him close to the searched address. There was no evidence that a transaction occurred at that meeting. In Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 43, 432 Ill.Dec. 598, 129 N.E.3d 1141, there was no evidence that the suspected drug dealer lived at the searched defendant's home or visited there frequently. In Heibenthal, once the untruths were removed from the affidavit—that the defendant's sister lived with him and she did not have a valid medical cannabis card—all that remained to support probable cause was an assertion that the sister was growing cannabis plants at the defendant's address. See Heibenthal, 2024 IL App (4th) 221109, ¶ 41, 478 Ill.Dec. 291, 245 N.E.3d 557. The conduct described by the remaining statements could become illegal only under certain truthful facts not set forth in the affidavit. Id.

¶ 22 As the remaining statements in the affidavit here are sufficient to establish probable cause, a Franks hearing was not required, and the motion to suppress should not have been granted.

¶ 23 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 24 We reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 25 Reversed and remanded.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Steigmann and DeArmond concurred in the judgment and opinion.