PEOPLE v. CUADRADO (2003)

Following a jury trial, defendant Damaris Cuadrado was convicted of solicitation of murder for hire in violation of section 8-1.2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/8-1.2 (West 1998)) and was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment.   She now appeals and asserts numerous errors ¹ requiring reversal of her conviction including:  (I) the trial court erroneously denied her motion to dismiss the indictment;  (II) her conviction is invalid because the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law;  and (III) she was denied her right to confront State witness Benjamin Jiminez.   We affirm.

[Editor's Note:  Text omitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23.]

[The following is not publishable under Supreme Court Rule 23]

Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly:  (IV) instructed the jury;  (V) allowed the admission of prior consistent statements;  (VI) limited cross-examination;  (VII) allowed the jury to hear that a tape recording was obtained pursuant to a court order;  (VIII) allowed opinion testimony;  (IX) allowed other crimes evidence;  (X) allowed evidence that defendant attempted to evade police;  and (XI) the cumulative errors in this case are so prejudicial that she was deprived of due process and denied a fair trial.

[The preceding excerpt is not publishable under Supreme Court Rule 23]

BACKGROUND

Benjamin Jiminez (Benjamin) testified that he met defendant for the first time in September 1997 when he was introduced to her by Pedro Trinidad.   Benjamin pulled up to Trinidad's house and Trinidad approached Benjamin's car and told Benjamin that defendant was looking for someone to kill her husband.   Benjamin agreed to speak with defendant.

Defendant got into Benjamin's car and told Benjamin that she wanted her husband murdered because he was abusive.   Benjamin noticed that defendant was upset but inquired why defendant did not just divorce her husband.   Defendant responded that her husband had threatened to take their son away from her and she did not want to take that chance.   Defendant then offered to pay Benjamin $10,000.   Benjamin said he would look into it.   Benjamin gave defendant his pager number and the two agreed to meet again.

A week later, defendant paged Benjamin and set up a meeting.   Prior to their meeting, Benjamin set up a micro cassette recorder in his car with the hope that he would be able to record his conversation with defendant.   Once defendant was inside the car, Benjamin pretended that he forgot defendant's name so that she would say it for the tape, which she did.   Benjamin verified that defendant did not want her husband beaten, but wanted him killed.   Defendant replied that she needed him “gone” and wanted him “out of the picture.”   Benjamin again told defendant that he would look into it but had not found anybody yet.

After the meeting, Benjamin wanted to make a copy of the tape.   He went to his mother, who worked for a security firm to see if she had the right equipment.   She did not, but inquired about the contents of the tape.   Benjamin explained to his mother that the tape contained a conversation with a woman who was attempting to hire someone to kill her husband.   Benjamin explained that he was going to blackmail defendant with the tape.   Benjamin's mother listened to the tape and warned her son not to get involved.

In early December 1997, defendant paged Benjamin and they met.   They talked about whether Benjamin had found anyone to kill her husband and Benjamin said he had not.   Sometime after December 14, 1997, defendant again paged Benjamin and told him not to worry about looking for someone.²

The two met shortly thereafter and defendant told Benjamin that she had already had the job done.   Benjamin then informed her that he had secretly tape recorded their earlier conversation.   Benjamin then told defendant that even though the job had already been done, he wanted money or he would go to the police with the tape.   Defendant told Benjamin that she did not have the money because she had just paid the person “to do it” but that she would work on getting it.

Thereafter, defendant gave Benjamin $3,000 in cash and demanded the tape.   Benjamin told defendant he would give her the tape when she gave him more money.   Two days later, defendant gave Benjamin an additional $1,000 in cash.   Benjamin then let defendant listen to the tape.   After listening to the tape, defendant tore up the tape and threw it into a sewer.   Defendant then told Benjamin that she would meet with him one more time and give him more money.

On May 22, 1998, defendant and Benjamin agreed to meet.   Defendant failed to appear for the meeting so Benjamin went to defendant's house and stood across the street.   Defendant approached Benjamin and told him that she did not have the money yet.   As the two were talking, a man approached.   Defendant introduced him as her boyfriend, Darryl Mitchell.   He and Benjamin shook hands.   Defendant told Benjamin she would meet him later.

The next day, defendant paged Benjamin and told him to meet her.   They met and defendant told Benjamin to follow her in his car so she could get his money.   After driving for a time, defendant stopped her car at 57th and Sawyer.   Both defendant and Benjamin exited their vehicles.   Defendant told Benjamin to wait while she got the money.   After Benjamin got back into his car, Darryl Mitchell and another man approached and started shooting at him.   Benjamin was shot in the spine and was instantly paralyzed.

Subsequently, Benjamin was hospitalized and spent three months in rehabilitation.   In mid-June 1998, he told his mother what had happened and she called detectives, who took Benjamin's statement and showed him numerous photographs.   He identified Darryl Mitchell as the person who shot him.   He also later identified Mitchell in a lineup.

On October 21, 1998, police conducted a confidential overhear of a telephone call Benjamin made to defendant.   During that conversation, defendant attempted to pretend that she was someone other than Damaris Cuadrado, but eventually exposed her real identity when Benjamin mentioned that he had another copy of the tape.   During that conversation, defendant denied killing her husband but agreed to meet Benjamin the next day.   Benjamin did not appear for the meeting.

Teresa Jiminez (Teresa), Benjamin's mother, testified she listened to the micro cassette tape that Benjamin had in September or October of 1997.   On that tape, she heard her son's voice and another female voice but did not recognize the female voice.   Shortly after she heard the tape, she saw her son with a bundle of hundred dollar bills although her son did not have a job.

Teresa also testified that she was present when there was a confidential overhear of a conversation between her son and defendant in October 1998.   She subsequently listened to that tape and recognized the female voice as the same voice on the tape that her son had played for her.

After her son was shot, he initially told her that he had been shot by gangbangers.   However, in the middle of June 1998 Teresa called the police after having a conversation with her son wherein Benjamin told her that defendant had him shot and that he did not want her to get away with it.

Later at the police station, Teresa heard police questioning someone in the other room.   Teresa testified that she recognized the voice as the woman she had heard on Benjamin's tape and during the interception of a private communication.

Detective John Murray of the Chicago police department testified that on December 14, 1997, he was assigned to investigate a homicide. When he arrived at the scene, he observed a Hispanic male, identified as Edgardo Cuadrado, lying face down on the grass.   It appeared that he had been shot several times.   Defendant was interviewed and did not mention Benjamin Jiminez or any recording.

On June 17, 1998, Detective Murray received a telephone call from Teresa Jiminez.   He and his partner went to the Schwab Rehabilitation Institute and spoke with Benjamin and his mother.   As a result of his conversations, Detective Murray contacted postal inspector Kevin O'Brien at the United State Post Office and requested a series of photographs from employment identification cards.   Benjamin later identified a photograph of Darryl Mitchell from the United State Post Office employment identification photographs.

On October 21, 1998, Detective Murray obtained a court order allowing him to record a conversation between Benjamin and defendant. The equipment was set up at Benjamin's mother's condominium.   Two calls were placed to defendant's home wherein Benjamin spoke with defendant.   Those calls were tape recorded.   Teresa and Benjamin listened to the tape.

Surveillance was set up around defendant's Palos Hills condominium and several other addresses where defendant was known to visit.   Defendant later voluntarily came to the police station.

Lawrence Rusinyak, vice-president of the claims department with Primerica Life Insurance Company, also testified.   He testified that a life insurance policy in the amount of $240,000 had been issued to Edgardo Cuadrado in 1995, with his wife, defendant, as the primary beneficiary.   The $240,000 was paid out on January 29, 1998.

At the close of all the evidence, a jury found defendant guilty of solicitation of murder for hire.   She was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment.   It is from this judgment that defendant now appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the Indictment

Defendant first challenges the sufficiency of the indictment in this case and argues that it fails to state an offense as required by section 111-3(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.  725 ILCS 5/111-3(a) (West 1998).

Defendant was convicted of solicitation of murder for hire in violation of section 8-1.2 of the Criminal Code of 1961.  720 ILCS 5/8-1.2 (West 1998).   Section 8-1.2 states that a person commits the offense of solicitation of murder for hire when he or she, “with the intent that the offense of first degree murder be committed, he procures another to commit that offense pursuant to any contract, agreement, understanding, command or request for money or anything of value.”  (Emphasis added.)  720 ILCS 5/8-1.2 (West 1998). The charging instrument in the instant case reads:

“DAMARIS CUADRADO * * * committed the offense of SOLICITATION OF MURDER FOR HIRE in that [SHE], WITH THE INTENT THAT THE OFFENSE OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER BE COMMITTED, TO WIT:  THAT EDGARDO CUADRADO BE KILLED, SOLICITED BENJAMIN JIMINEZ TO COMMIT SAID MURDER, PURSUANT TO AN AGREEMENT OR CONTRACT FOR MONEY IN VIOLATION OF CHAPTER 720, SECTION 5/8-1.2 OF THE ILLINOIS COMPILED STATUES, 1994, AS AMENDED, AND contrary to the Statute, and against the peace and dignity of the same People of the State of Illinois.”  (Emphasis added.)

Defendant's argument regarding the sufficiency of the indictment centers around the State's substitution of the word “solicit” for the word “procure.”   Because the statute contains the word “procure” and the state charged “solicit,” defendant maintains, the charging instrument fails to state an essential element of solicitation of murder for hire.

 A criminal defendant has a fundamental right under both the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.VI) and the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 8) to be apprised of the “ ‘nature and cause’ of criminal accusations made against him.”  People v. DiLorenzo, 169 Ill.2d 318, 321, 214 Ill.Dec. 846, 662 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1996).   In accordance with this fundamental right, Illinois law provides that an indictment must be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by:  (1) stating the name of the offense;  (2) citing the statutory provision that is alleged to have been violated;  and (3) setting forth the nature and the elements of the offense charged.  725 ILCS 5/111-3(a) (3) (West 2000).

 When a defendant is challenging the sufficiency of an indictment on appeal, it is necessary to establish whether the defendant initially challenged the indictment in the lower court.   This is important in order to determine which standard of review must be applied in determining the sufficiency of the indictment on appeal.

“When an indictment or information is attacked for the first time on appeal, it is sufficient that the indictment or information ‘apprised the accused of the precise offense charged with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense and allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar to future prosecution arising out of the same conduct.’  [Citations.]  In other words, the appellate court should consider whether the defect in the information or indictment prejudiced the defendant in preparing his defense.   If, however, the information or indictment is attacked before trial, * * * the information must strictly comply with the pleading requirements of [section 111-3(a) of] the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.  [Citations].”  People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill.2d 441, 448, 164 Ill.Dec. 877, 584 N.E.2d 89, 91 (1991) quoting People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d 23, 29, 344 N.E.2d 456, 459 (1976).

 The indictment in question here was challenged neither before trial nor for the first time on appeal.   Defense counsel did not object to the indictment until after the culmination of the State's case and after she had filed a motion for a directed verdict.   Nevertheless, defendant asserts that we review her challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment by determining whether the indictment strictly complies with section 111-3.

Our supreme court, in People v. Benitez, 169 Ill.2d 245, 214 Ill.Dec. 490, 661 N.E.2d 344 (1996), was faced with a similar issue when the defendant raised a challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment two days into trial.   The State's Attorney, after receiving a true bill from the grand jury, prepared an indictment charging defendant Benitez and two other codefendants with murder, attempt murder, aggravated battery and armed violence.

During the time between the filing of the indictment and Benitez's arraignment, the State's Attorney's office determined that the indictment was defective because it did not charge Benitez or another codefendant with any offenses and it erroneously identified a grand jury witness as the victim.   Benitez, 169 Ill.2d at 246-47, 214 Ill.Dec. 490, 661 N.E.2d at 345.   Rather than following proper procedure, secretaries at the State's Attorney's office amended the indictment so that it charged Benitez and his codefendant with murder, attempt murder, aggravated battery and armed violence and so that it stated the correct victim.   This amended indictment was not signed by the grand jury foreperson or the State's Attorney.  Benitez, 169 Ill.2d at 247, 214 Ill.Dec. 490, 661 N.E.2d at 345-46.   At Benitez's arraignment, his attorney received a copy of the amended indictment although he presumed it was the original indictment.  Benitez, 169 Ill.2d at 247, 214 Ill.Dec. 490, 661 N.E.2d at 345-46.

Thirteen months later, on the second day of trial, defense counsel alerted the court that he had just become aware of the original indictment and that the original indictment did not name his client as a defendant.   Defense counsel stated that he wished to obtain the original document and the grand jury transcript to confirm whether the grand jury had returned an indictment against his client, but he agreed to allow the trial to proceed with the understanding that he was “not waiving anything.”  Benitez, 169 Ill.2d at 247-48, 214 Ill.Dec. 490, 661 N.E.2d at 346.   The issue was revisited later during trial and the court ruled that the second indictment, naming Benitez, was valid.   The defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and aggravated battery.  Benitez, 169 Ill.2d at 248, 214 Ill.Dec. 490, 661 N.E.2d at 346.

In his posttrial motion, the defendant challenged his convictions, claiming that they resulted from a void and invalid indictment.   The court held an evidentiary hearing.   The State argued that there had merely been a mistake in the paperwork and asked the court to disregard the first indictment and to find the second indictment valid.   At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that the second indictment was valid as it properly charged and informed defendant of the nature and the elements of the charges against him.   Benitez, 169 Ill.2d at 248-50, 214 Ill.Dec. 490, 661 N.E.2d at 346-47.   This court affirmed the findings of the circuit court (People v. Benitez, 269 Ill.App.3d 182, 206 Ill.Dec. 473, 645 N.E.2d 478 (1994)) and our supreme court granted leave to appeal.

Before our supreme court, defendant challenged his convictions on the ground that the State failed to charge him with an offense.   In considering the defendant's claim, our supreme court looked at both the original and the amended indictments.   With respect to the amended indictment, the court chided the State's Attorney's office for failing to follow accepted methods for altering an indictment and ultimately found that the second indictment was not valid as to Benitez.   In addition, the court rejected the state's argument that the original indictment was “merely a mistyped, superfluous document” that erroneously omitted the defendant's name.  Benitez, 169 Ill.2d at 255, 214 Ill.Dec. 490, 661 N.E.2d at 349.   The court ultimately ruled that because the initial indictment failed to name defendant and the second indictment was invalid, defendant was never properly charged with any offense.  Benitez, 169 Ill.2d at 255, 214 Ill.Dec. 490, 661 N.E.2d at 349.

Furthermore, the Benitez court recognized that the time at which defendant challenges a charging instrument on the basis that it fails to state an offense is significant in determining whether that defendant is entitled to reversal of his conviction on that ground.  Benitez, 169 Ill.2d at 257, 214 Ill.Dec. 490, 661 N.E.2d at 350.   Because counsel objected to the indictment two days into the trial, Benitez' challenge to the indictment did not fall into either of the rules previously announced in People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill.2d 23, 29, 344 N.E.2d 456, 459 (1976) (when an indictment is attacked for the first time on appeal, it is sufficient if it “apprised the accused of the precise offense charged with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense and allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar to future prosecutions arising out of the same conduct”), or People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill.2d 441, 448, 164 Ill.Dec. 877, 584 N.E.2d 89, 91 (1991) (when an instrument is challenged before trial in a motion to dismiss, the rule requiring that a defendant show prejudice does not apply).   The court held that “under the unique circumstances of this case” defendant was not required to show prejudice to warrant reversal of his convictions but rather the instrument must strictly comply with section 111-3.  Benitez, 169 Ill.2d at 259, 214 Ill.Dec. 490, 661 N.E.2d at 351.   The “unique circumstances” the court referenced were:  (1) the State's egregious conduct in amending the indictment without adhering to the rules of criminal procedure;  (2) counsel's objection to the indictment on the second day of trial due to the fact that he was unaware, until that date, of the original indictment;  (3) the untimely discovery of the original indictment that precluded a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment;  (4) counsel's agreement to allow the trial to continue with the understanding that the issue of the indictment was not waived;  and (5) the fact that the issue of the sufficiency of the indictment was raised again in defendant's posttrial motion.  Benitez, 169 Ill.2d at 259, 214 Ill.Dec. 490, 661 N.E.2d at 351.

Subsequently, in People v. Scott, 285 Ill.App.3d 95, 220 Ill.Dec. 731, 673 N.E.2d 1152 (1996), the Second District of this court had before it a challenge to the sufficiency of an indictment that was first raised following the close of the State's case in chief.   Relying on the supreme court's holding in Benitez, the court ruled that when the sufficiency of the complaint is attacked in the trial court either before or during trial, a court determines whether the instrument strictly complies with section 111-3(a) of the Code. Scott, 285 Ill.App.3d at 99, 220 Ill.Dec. 731, 673 N.E.2d at 1154.

Defendant urges us to follow the holdings in Benitez and Scott to determine whether the indictment in question here strictly complies with the requirements of section 111-3.   We decline to do so.   We do not interpret the holding in Benitez to stand for the proposition that every defendant who initially raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment at trial may have his convictions reversed without establishing prejudice.   Looking at the language in Benitez, the court clearly limited its holding to the “unique” facts of the case and left sufficient room in which to distinguish other cases, like the one before us, in which a defendant raises an objection to a charging instrument for the first time at trial after the State has presented it's case.

In Benitez, defense counsel did not have an opportunity to object to the charging instrument in a pretrial motion because he was not aware of the original indictment until after trial had commenced.   Here, unlike Benitez, there was one indictment and it was obtained in accordance with the rules of criminal procedure.   Counsel was provided with a copy and had ample opportunity to read it.   In addition, counsel was not precluded from objecting to the indictment in a pretrial motion.   We therefore find that defendant is not entitled to a reversal of her conviction without demonstrating how the alleged defect in the indictment prejudiced her in preparing her defense.

 Accordingly, we now consider whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss because the charging instrument failed to set forth, with sufficiency, the nature and elements of the criminal charges against her thereby impeding her ability to prepare her defense.

The State contends that the indictment sufficiently alleged the offense of solicitation of murder for hire as the term “solicit” and the term “ procure” are synonymous.   Defendant argues that the terms “solicit” and “ procure” cannot be used interchangeably, as they were here, because the legislature clearly intended that the terms have separate meanings.

Section 2-20 of the Criminal Code of 1961 defines the term “solicit” as, “to command, authorize, urge, incite, request, or advise another to commit an offense.”  720 ILCS 5/2-20 (West 2000).   Although the Code does not define “procure,” section 8-1.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961, which defines the offense of solicitation of murder, does not use the word “ procure.”   Instead, this section clearly uses “solicit.”   Section 8-1.1 states:  “(a) A person commits solicitation of murder when, with the intent that the offense of first degree murder be committed, he commands, encourages or requests another to commit that offense.”  720 ILCS 5/8-1.1 (West 2000).   The legislature's failure to use the word “procure” in this section, defendant maintains, indicates that the legislature intended “procure” to mean something other than “command, encourage or request.”

The common meaning of the word “procure” is:

“1 a (1):  to get possession of:  OBTAIN, ACQUIRE * * * (2):  GAIN, WIN * * *2 a(1):  to cause to happen or be done:  bring about:  EFFECT * * * ACHIEVE * * *:  to bring about by particular care or effort * * * and sometimes by devious means * * * (2):  to bring about by scheming and plotting:  CONTRIVE * * * 3 a:  to prevail upon to do something indicated:  INDUCE * * *.”   Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1809 (1986).

We agree with the State that the terms “solicit” and “procure” can be synonymous.   Roget's Interactive Thesaurus, First Edition (v 1.0.0).   However, we are guided by the well-established principle that when a statute is unambiguous, we must enforce it as enacted and may not depart from the language by creating exceptions, limitations or conditions not expressed by the legislature.  People v. Woodard, 175 Ill.2d 435, 443, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1997).

As previously stated, when considering the sufficiency of the indictment, we must look to whether the indictment alleges sufficient particularity to ensure that the defendant may prepare a proper defense.   We find that defendant was not inhibited in preparing her defense by the substitution of the word “solicit” in the indictment.

Our review of the record in the case sub judice reveals that prior to filing a motion to dismiss the indictment, defense counsel filed and argued a motion for a directed finding alleging that the State failed to prove, in its case in chief, that defendant “procured” Jiminez to kill her husband.   Specifically, defense counsel argued:

“They [the legislature] chose different language, that language being to procure.  * * * I could bring you some cases tomorrow morning which would show that ‘procure’ means to obtain.   You have to obtain a person to agree to do it.   And it's very clear that Jiminez always said he never agreed to do it, and that's why the instructions for these two offenses they have different language.

The fact the indictment may have had inappropriate language doesn't control.   What controls is the statute.   And if there is any doubt concerning what ‘procurement’ means, I ask I be able to bring in cases for that tomorrow.”

Based on counsel's argument above, it is clear to us that defendant was not inhibited in preparing her defense by the use of the word “solicit” in the indictment.   There is no doubt that defendant was apprised of the charge and that defendant was aware of what the State needed to prove to sustain a conviction for solicitation of murder for hire.   Consequently, we find that defendant's conviction for solicitation of murder for hire is not subject to reversal as defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of the State's substitution of the word “solicit” for the word “procure.”

II. Insufficient Evidence to Convict

 Next, defendant argues that even if we accept as true the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to prove that defendant committed the offense of solicitation of murder for hire.   Defendant maintains that because Benjamin Jiminez agreed only to find someone to kill defendant's husband, defendant did not “procure” another to commit the offense of first degree murder as required by section 8-1.2. 720 ILCS 5/8-1.2 (West 2000).

It is not the function of this court to retry the defendant.  People v. Sanchez, 115 Ill.2d 238, 260-61, 104 Ill.Dec. 720, 503 N.E.2d 277, 284 (1986).   Rather, it is our duty to review the evidence to determine whether it is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt.  People v. Manion, 67 Ill.2d 564, 578, 10 Ill.Dec. 547, 367 N.E.2d 1313, 1319 (1977).   The relevant inquiry is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  People v. Smith, 185 Ill.2d 532, 541, 236 Ill.Dec. 779, 708 N.E.2d 365, 369 (1999).

The State argues that the premise of defendant's argument is incorrect because it presumes that someone need actually be found to commit murder before the offense of solicitation of murder for hire can have been committed.   In support of it's position, the State relies on People v. Breton, 237 Ill.App.3d 355, 177 Ill.Dec. 916, 603 N.E.2d 1290 (1992).

In Breton, a jail inmate informed the State's Attorney's office that defendant was looking for someone to kill Wehrmeister, who was scheduled to testify against him.   The State's Attorney's office devised a plan to allow defendant to contact an undercover investigator posing as a hitman.   The inmate was given an untraceable undercover phone number to give to defendant.   Breton, 237 Ill.App.3d at 357, 177 Ill.Dec. 916, 603 N.E.2d at 1292.

Defendant called this number several times and spoke with Investigator Dan Callahan, who was posing as a hitman.   Defendant offered Callahan $5,000 in exchange for killing Wehrmeister.   Intricate plans were laid by defendant to allow Callahan to retrieve the “up-front” $2,500.   Defendant called again several days later and inquired about the “job.”   He was told that Wehrmeister was taken care of.   Defendant offered that the remainder of the money would be available the next day.   Defendant was subsequently charged and convicted of solicitation of murder for hire.  Breton, 237 Ill.App.3d at 357-58, 177 Ill.Dec. 916, 603 N.E.2d at 1293.

On appeal, defendant's main contention was that the State failed to prove the “agreement” element of its solicitation murder for hire.   The crux of defendant's argument was that Investigator Callahan's feigned agreement did not satisfy the “agreement” element of solicitation of murder for hire.   Defendant attempted to analogize the issue to a similar conspiracy law in Illinois that requires an agreement based on the bilateral theory of conspiracy.   Under the bilateral theory of conspiracy, a supposed agreement between a defendant and a government agent only feigning agreement will not support a conspiracy conviction because there is no agreement and actual agreement is necessary.   Breton, 237 Ill.App.3d at 360, 177 Ill.Dec. 916, 603 N.E.2d at 1294.

The Breton court compared the actus reus of conspiracy (an agreement to commit a crime) with the actus reus of solicitation (an attempt to persuade another to commit a crime) and determined that because of the nature of solicitation, the solicitation statute is based on the unilateral theory, which only requires actual agreement by one of the parties.  Breton, 237 Ill.App.3d at 361, 177 Ill.Dec. 916, 603 N.E.2d at 1295, citing I. Robbins,Double Inchoate Crimes, 26 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 29-30 (1989).   The court ultimately held “[p]rocurement of another to commit murder pursuant to an agreement where a defendant agrees with a government agent feigning agreement is sufficient to support a conviction of solicitation of murder for hire.”   Breton, 237 Ill.App.3d at 362, 177 Ill.Dec. 916, 603 N.E.2d at 1295-96.

Here, defendant told Benjamin that she wanted her husband killed and offered to pay him $10,000.   Benjamin told her once that he would not do it himself but told her numerous times that he would look into it.   Defendant inquired several times into whether Benjamin had found someone to kill her husband.   Similar to the investigator “hitman” in Breton, Benjamin's intent is irrelevant.   Whether he intended to do the killing himself or find someone else to do it is not the issue here.   The issue is whether defendant, with the intent that first degree murder be committed, procured someone pursuant to a contract or agreement for money.   We find that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant procured Benjamin to commit first degree murder pursuant to an agreement for money.

III. Right to Confrontation

 Defendant next argues that she was denied her right to confront Benjamin Jiminez because she could only see his profile.   Benjamin, a paraplegic, is confined to a wheelchair and was unable to ascend to the witness stand.   The trial court suggested that Benjamin testify from “in front of the bench” and counsel agreed.   Defendant now faults the trial court for failing to arrive at a more innovative alternative that would have allowed defendant to effectively exercise her right to face-to-face confrontation.

Although defense counsel initially agreed that Benjamin could testify from in front of the bench, counsel subsequently objected to this arrangement after he was informed that Benjamin would be facing the jury.   Defense counsel argued that if Benjamin was facing the jury, he and defendant would not be able to see Benjamin's face.   The trial court replied:

“He will be right in the well of the courtroom.   You can see him.  * * * Certainly better than if he was up in the witness box where my bench cuts him off.

 * * *

He is 10 feet from you and-maybe not 10 feet.   Maybe 8 to 9 feet from you and Miss Cuadrado.   I cannot see how you cannot possibly see his face.

If you're saying you're entitled to see his face from one side of his face to the other, then you may move your seat.   You can see the entire right side of his face and if he turns his head slightly as he just did, you can see the front of his face.   If you want to move, you can move.

 * * *

If defense counsel is asking me to have the witness face away from the jury toward the defense counsel, I am not going to do that.

If you'd like to move you certainly can move.   You can see 75 percent of his face from where he is seated.   And if he turns slightly you can see his whole face.”

The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment provides, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him” (U.S. Const., amend.VI).  This right is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.   Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3162, 111 L.Ed.2d 666, 677 (1990).   In 1994, the Illinois Constitution was amended to remove the “face-to-face” language of article I, section 8, and conform Illinois confrontation clause with the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution.  Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 8 (amended November 8, 1994).   People v. Lofton, 194 Ill.2d 40, 53, 251 Ill.Dec. 496, 740 N.E.2d 782, 790 (2000).

Defendant attempts to persuade us to find an infringement of her right to face-to-face confrontation by analogizing the facts of the case at bar with cases such as Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988) (where Court held that placing a screen between a defendant and child sexual assault victims during their testimony at trial violated defendant's right to face-to face confrontation), and People v. Lofton, 194 Ill.2d 40, 251 Ill.Dec. 496, 740 N.E.2d 782 (2000) (use of podiums that prevented the child witness and the defendant from seeing one another as the witness testified violated defendant's right to confrontation).   We are not persuaded.

This is not a case where defendant was prevented from seeing the witness testifying against her (see Smith v. State, 111 Nev. 499, 894 P.2d 974 (1995)), nor was the witness intentionally shielded or hidden from defendant's view in an effort to spare the witness unbearable emotional distress as in Coy and Lofton.   Rather, it is a case where the witness, because of his medical condition, was placed in a position within the courtroom simply because “there [was] no other place to put him.”   Evidence of the court's intention not to deprive defendant or defense counsel of the opportunity to see the witness's full face is found in the record where the court tells defense counsel that if he is dissatisfied with his view of Benjamin's face, he can move to a position of his liking.

The Supreme Court has recognized that “ ‘the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial.’  [Citation.]” (emphasis in original.)  Craig, 497 U.S. at 849, 110 S.Ct. at 3165, 111 L.Ed.2d at 681.   Accordingly, the confrontation clause has been interpreted in a “manner sensitive to its purposes and sensitive to the necessities of trial and to the adversary process.”  Lofton, 194 Ill.2d at 57, 251 Ill.Dec. 496, 740 N.E.2d at 792, citing Craig, 497 U.S. at 849, 110 S.Ct. at 3165, 111 L.Ed.2d at 681.   The needs of the witness in this case required that special accommodations be made.   We find that, given the circumstances, these accommodations were reasonable and defendant's right to confrontation was not violated.

[Editor's Note: Text omitted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23.]

[The following material is not publishable under Supreme Court Rule 23]

IV. Jury Instructions

Defendant alleges that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury:  (A) when it instructed the jury on an offense not charged;  (B) when instructions were given to the jury that required them to find procurement and there was no instruction defining procurement;  and (C) where the prosecution argued the law of accountability but no accountability instruction was given to the jury.

A.

Defendant maintains that the jury was improperly instructed, over her objection, on an offense not charged.   Specifically, defendant objects to the instructions defining solicitation of murder for hire (Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 6.01B, (3d ed., 1996)) (hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 6.01B) and the issues instruction for solicitation of murder for hire (Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 6.02B, (3d ed., 1996)) (hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 602 B).  Both of these instruction use the term “procure.”   Defendant contends that her due process rights were violated because of the variance between the indictment and the instructions given to the jury (solicit v. procure).

The State urges that this issue has been waived.   A review of the record in this case reveals that defendant objected to the court giving IPI Criminal No. 6.01B and IPI Criminal No. 6.02B on the grounds that neither instruction included the definition of intent for first degree murder.   Defendant did not object to either instruction based on the inclusion of the term “procure.”   A specific objection waives all grounds not specified.  People v. O'Neal, 104 Ill.2d 399, 407, 84 Ill.Dec. 481, 472 N.E.2d 441, 444-45 (1984).   Additionally, defendant did not include this issue in her post-trial motion.  People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1129 (1988).   Accordingly, this claim is waived.

B.

Defendant argues that the instruction given to the jury regarding solicitation of murder for hire required the jury to find that the defendant “procured” but there was no instruction given to the jury that defined the term “procure.”   Defendant claims that “procurement is not a simple term” but is a “legal term of art” and therefore the court's failure to define this term in the instructions violates due process.

Defendant did not offer a jury instruction defining “procure.”   Defendant cannot now claim any error in a lack of an instruction defining “procure” where he did not tender one.  People v. Casillas, 195 Ill.2d 461, 480, 255 Ill.Dec. 382, 749 N.E.2d 864, 877 (2000).   This claim is waived.

Waiver aside, when words in a jury instruction have a commonly understood meaning, the court need not define them with additional instructions.   People v. Manning, 334 Ill.App.3d 882, 890, 268 Ill.Dec. 600, 778 N.E.2d 1222, 1228 (2002).   This is especially true where the pattern jury instructions do not provide that an additional definition is necessary.  People v. Washington, 184 Ill.App.3d 703, 708, 133 Ill.Dec. 148, 540 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (1989).

Here, the jury did not indicate to the court that it was unfamiliar with the common definition of the term “procure.”   In fact, both the State and defense counsel, in closing argument, relayed to the jury the definition of “procure.”   We find defendant's claim to be without merit.

C.

Similarly, defendant claims that she was denied her right to due process when the State argued the law of accountability in closing argument but the court failed to give an accountability instruction.   Again, defendant has waived this argument as she neither asked for nor offered an accountability instruction at trial.  People v. Roberts, 75 Ill.2d 1, 10, 25 Ill.Dec. 675, 387 N.E.2d 331, 335 (1979).

V. Prior Consistent Statements

Defendant next argues that her right of confrontation was denied and due process was violated by improper introduction of prior consistent statements.   Specifically, defendant argues that Benjamin Jiminez's trial testimony was improperly bolstered by the admission of prior consistent statements made by him and testified to by (A)Teresa Jiminez and (B) Detective Murray.

Statements made prior to trial for the purpose of corroborating trial testimony are generally inadmissible.  People v. Heard, 187 Ill.2d 36, 70, 240 Ill.Dec. 577, 718 N.E.2d 58, 78 (1999).   An exception to this rule applies when it is suggested that the witness recently fabricated testimony or has a motive to testify falsely and the prior statement was made before the motive to fabricate arose.  Heard, 187 Ill.2d at 70, 240 Ill.Dec. 577, 718 N.E.2d at 78.   The decision to admit or deny the admission of prior consistent statements is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.  People v. Childress, 158 Ill.2d 275, 296, 198 Ill.Dec. 794, 633 N.E.2d 635, 643 (1994).

A. Teresa Jiminez

Defendant claims that, over her objection, Teresa Jiminez testified to a conversation she had with her son Benjamin shortly after he was shot.   This testimony, defendant maintains, was consistent with Benjamin's trial testimony and constituted hearsay that did not qualify as a prior consistent statement.

The testimony related to a conversation that she had with her son when he was at Schwab undergoing therapy.   Teresa Jiminez testified:

“What about the tape recording?   Said, ‘Mom, I need you to call the detectives.   I need to confess the truth.   That recording, the lady that you heard in the recording, she had this done to me and I don't want her getting away with this.  * * * I need to confess the truth before she gets away with this.’ ”

Our review of the record reveals that Benjamin Jiminez testified on direct examination that after he was shot, he did have a conversation with his mother about what had been happening between him and defendant and about going to the police.   However, Jiminez did not give specific details of what he said to his mother regarding the shooting or his involvement with defendant.

On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Jiminez regarding the fact that after he was shot, he initially told his mother that he was shot by gangbangers.   Furthermore, on cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony from Benjamin that he talked to his lawyer about a civil suit to compensate him for his injuries.   By pursuing this type of questioning, defense counsel certainly attempted to show recent fabrication and motive to lie.

Defendant argues that Teresa's testimony does not qualify as a legally admissible prior consistent statement because Benjamin's motive to lie existed at the time he made the statement to his mother because he wanted to accuse defendant in order to justify his attempts to blackmail her.   We reject this argument.

Teresa Jiminez testified that Benjamin told her that “the lady that you heard in the recording, she had this done to me and I don't want her getting away with this.”   Clearly, Benjamin's motive for telling his mother that defendant was involved in his shooting was not to justify or to excuse his acts of blackmail, but plainly to ensure that defendant would not escape culpability for her actions.

Because counsel, during cross-examination of Benjamin inferred both recent fabrication and a motive to lie, the prior consistent statement was properly used to rebut defendant's charges that the witness was motivated to testify falsely and that he had recently fabricated his testimony.  Heard, 187 Ill.2d at 70, 240 Ill.Dec. 577, 718 N.E.2d at 78.   Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse it's discretion in allowing Teresa to testify to Benjamin's prior consistent statement.

B. Detective Murray

Defendant complains, in a one sentence argument, that “[t]he testimony of Det. Murray as to a prior consistent statement of Benjamin Jiminez (R. 704-705), violated defendant's constitutional rights, pursuant to the authorities cited in Point 3(A), above.”

This argument is waived as defendant did not object at trial nor did defendant include this claim in her motion for a new trial.  People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1129 (1988) (issues not raised at trial or included in a post-trial motion are waived for purposes of review).

VI. Limitation of Cross-Examination

Defendant also argues that she was denied her 6th amendment right when the court improperly sustained the State's objection to cross-examination of Teresa Jiminez.

The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VI), guarantees the right of an accused to confront witnesses against him through cross-examination.  Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965).   A defendant may not be deprived of his right to cross-examine witnesses against him but a trial court may limit the scope of cross-examination.  People v. Criss, 294 Ill.App.3d 276, 279, 228 Ill.Dec. 586, 689 N.E.2d 645, 647 (1998).   With respect to rulings limiting cross-examination, it is well established that the scope of cross-examination rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and unless the court abuses that discretion there is no error. People v. Owens, 102 Ill.2d 88, 103, 79 Ill.Dec. 663, 464 N.E.2d 261, 267 (1984).

At trial the following colloquy took place during cross-examination of Teresa Jiminez:

“MR. COHN [Defense Counsel]:  Now, when you heard the tape-

THE COURT:  There is more than one counsel.

MR. COHN:  The first one.

MR. COHN:  Do you know whether that was in October or November or December?

THE WITNESS:  I don't remember exactly when.   I know I heard this tape.

MR. COHN:  So it could have been October, it could have been November, it could have been December, correct?

MS. FARMAKIS [Assistant State's Attorney]:  Objection.”

THE COURT:  Sustained.

Initially, we note that defendant has waived this issue as he failed to make an offer of proof when the court sustained the objection to defense counsel's questions.  People v. Andrews, 146 Ill.2d 413, 420-21, 167 Ill.Dec. 996, 588 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (1992).

Waiver aside, a careful review of the record reveals that the trial court acted within its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of this witness.   Teresa had already answered defense counsel's question and stated that she did not remember when she had heard the tape.   Therefore, any additional questioning regarding Teresa's ability to remember when she listened to the tape would be repetitive.

VII. Tape Recordings

Defendant objects to Detective Murray's testimony that he obtained a court order to record a conversation between Benjamin and defendant.   Defendant asserts that it is improper for a jury to be informed that a court had previously relied on the accusations of Benjamin.   This error was especially egregious, defendant maintains, given that the defense did not contest the admissibility of the tapes and therefore there was no issue before the jury as to whether the tapes were properly obtained.

Although this court has never been presented with this precise issue, we have considered similar objections to warrant-related evidence.   The procedural steps in obtaining a warrant and an order for intercepting a private communication are similar enough in nature to allow us to analogize defendant's argument here with those raised in objection to warrant related evidence in People v. Gonzalez, 265 Ill.App.3d 315, 202 Ill.Dec. 399, 637 N.E.2d 1135 (1994), People v. Brandon, 197 Ill.App.3d 866, 146 Ill.Dec. 77, 557 N.E.2d 1264 (1990), and People v. Marshall, 165 Ill.App.3d 968, 118 Ill.Dec. 256, 521 N.E.2d 538 (1988).

We initially note that as in Gonzalez, Brandon and Marshall, defendant did not object to Detective Murray's testimony at trial or in his post-trial motion.   Although defense counsel filed a motion in limine seeking to keep out evidence that a court order was obtained to record this conversation, defendant did not object when the testimony was elicited nor did defendant include this issue in her motion for a new trial.   To preserve an issue for appeal, the defendant must have raised the issue in a motion in limine or an objection at trial and also in a post trial motion.  People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 187, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1129 (1988):  People v. Cruzado, 299 Ill.App.3d 131, 140, 233 Ill.Dec. 179, 700 N.E.2d 707, 714 (1998).   Defendant has waived this issue because she failed to include it in her motion for a new trial.

In addition, on cross-examination of Detective Murray defense counsel questioned Detective Murray about the application and affidavit submitted to a court to obtain the order.   In fact, defense counsel attempted to go into the facts contained in the affidavit but was prevented from doing so when the State objected.   Defendant can not claim error when he cross-examined on the same issue.

VIII. Improper Opinion Evidence

A. Teresa Jiminez

Defendant contends that Teresa Jiminez twice offered improper and prejudicial opinion testimony that denied defendant her right to due process and to a fair trial.

First, defendant claims that over defense objection, Teresa Jiminez was allowed to testify why she called the police in June 1998.   Teresa testified that she called police after her son told her:

“Mom, I need you to call the detectives.   I need to confess the truth.   That recording, the lady that you heard in the recording, she had this done to me and I don't want her getting away with this.  * * * I need to confess the truth before she gets away with this.”

As previously discussed, this testimony was properly admitted as a prior consistent statement.   However, defendant also contends that this testimony has the effect of conveying to the jury that she believed what her son said to her;  that defendant was guilty.   It is improper, defendant maintains, for a witness to assert, that what another witness stated out of court, was believed by the witness to be true.

The cases cited by defendant in support of her argument are factually dissimilar and in no way support her claim.   In People v. Barnes, 182 Ill.App.3d 75, 130 Ill.Dec. 620, 537 N.E.2d 949 (1989), the court held that the State improperly sought to elicit defendant's opinion as to the veracity of its witnesses involving the central question to be decided.   Specifically, the State questioned defendant step by step relative to the events leading up to his arrest, each time asking defendant if the statements were true, to which defendant answered “yes.”   The court observed that a prosecutor is prohibited from asking a defendant his opinion concerning the veracity of other witnesses who have testified against him as these questions remove from the jury the responsibility to assessing the credibility of each witness.  Barnes, 182 Ill.App.3d at 85-86, 130 Ill.Dec. 620, 537 N.E.2d at 955.   In People v. Graves, 61 Ill.App.3d 732, 18 Ill.Dec. 829, 378 N.E.2d 293 (1978), during cross-examination defendant was asked a number of times whether those witnesses whose testimony might have conflicted with his were lying.   The Graves court held that this type of questioning was improper as it clearly invaded the province of the jury.  Graves, 61 Ill.App.3d at 739, 18 Ill.Dec. 829, 378 N.E.2d at 299.

In the case at bar, Teresa was not asked whether she believed Benjamin's statement to be truthful or untruthful, nor was she asked for her opinion of Benjamin's statement.   Rather, the testimony in question was given in response to the State's question, “why is it you called the police?”   We cannot see how the testimony that defendant complains of can be construed to be the opinion of Teresa that defendant was guilty.

Defendant also argues that Teresa improperly testified that she believed that defendant killed her husband.   The specific testimony that defendant objects to is as follows:

“MS. FARMAKIS:  Did you tell him what to do in relation to her?

THE WITNESS:  I told him that he better stay away from her and he better Do what I tell him, you know, go to the police.   Stay away from this girl because if she can have her husband killed-

MR. COHN:  Objection.

THE WITNESS:  She could also-

THE COURT:  No, ma'am.   Objection is sustained.   You can proceed, counsel.”

We believe that the trial court's ruling on the objection was sufficient to cure any error.   See People v. Scott, 148 Ill.2d 479, 550, 171 Ill.Dec. 365, 594 N.E.2d 217, 246 (1992).

B. Detective Murray

Defendant claims that Detective Murray was twice allowed to offer his personal opinion of defendant's guilt during direct examination.

The first instance defendant complains of occurred when Detective Murray testified that he believed the testimony of Benjamin Jiminez, that the killing of defendant's husband and the shooting of Jiminez were related.   The State asked Detective Murray if after he began his investigation into Jiminez's shooting, he had any “idea” that the shooting was related to the murder.   Defense counsel immediately objected and the court overruled.   Detective Murray answered that he “had no idea that these cases were related.”   Defense counsel objected for the second time.   Rephrasing the question, the court asked Detective Murray “did you have any information that the cases were connected, not whether you had any idea, but whether you had any information they were connected.”   Detective Murray answered “no”.   Defense counsel objected for a third time.   The court overruled the objection, but struck Detective Murray's answer to the State's question and allowed his answer to the court's question to stand.

We cannot see how the above testimony can be construed, as it has been by defendant, to have been the opinion of Detective Murray that defendant was guilty.   Nevertheless, any conceivable error was cured when the trial court struck Detective Murray's answer to the State's question.   The trial court sustained the objection and ordered the remarks stricken.   This cured any prejudicial error which may have resulted.  People v. Singletary, 73 Ill.App.3d 239, 250, 29 Ill.Dec. 177, 391 N.E.2d 440, 447 (1979).   Furthermore, in view of the strength of the evidence, we are satisfied that this was harmless.

The second instance that defendant contends was improper was when Detective Murray testified that after he interviewed Teresa and Benjamin Jiminez on June 17, he attempted to obtain a photograph of a person who shot Benjamin.   Defense counsel objected and the trial court overruled.   Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial which the court denied.

The steps in an investigation and the events leading up to a defendant's arrest are relevant and necessary to fully explain the State's case to the jury.  People v. Simms, 143 Ill.2d 154, 174, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947, 954-55 (1991).   A trial court has the discretion to decide whether evidence is relevant and admissible and that decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion that results in prejudice to the defendant.  People v. Ward, 101 Ill.2d 443, 455-56, 79 Ill.Dec. 142, 463 N.E.2d 696, 701-02 (1984).

We find that the trial court did not abuse it's discretion in allowing Detective Murray's testimony regarding the photograph.   Clearly, Detective Murray was testifying as to the steps he took in investigating this case.   Defendant's strained characterization of Detective Murray's testimony is insufficient to establish an abuse of discretion here.

C. Officer Warren Becker

Officer Warren Becker of the Palos Hills Police Department testified.   On October 25, 1998, he was called to the Palos Hills Police Station to meet with defendant and Darryl Mitchell to take a report with reference to a harassing telephone call.

Defendant told Officer Becker that on or about October 21 or 22 she received a call from an unknown male caller of a harassing nature.   Defendant also told Officer Becker that she and Mitchell had not been staying at their condo since receiving the call.   Officer Becker was asked to return to the condo with defendant and Mitchell so that they could retrieve some personal items.

Officer Becker testified as follows:

“MR. KELECIUS [Assistant State's Attorney]:  When you got inside, did you have further conversations with Mr. Mitchell and Miss Cuadrado?

THE WITNESS:  I continued to ask questions as to why, you know, if they thought it could be anybody, if they had any problems, just to-kind of odd that they received one call and they didn't want to stay at that apartment any further.

MR. COHN:  Objection to that, your Honor.

THE COURT:  If that's what he said.   I don't know if that's what he said, counsel.   Excuse me.

I don't know if that's what he said.   If that's not what he said, the fact that it was odd, then it will be stricken.   You may ask the witness.

MR. KELECIUS:  The part about it being odd, is that your opinion that it was odd or somebody saying?

THE WITNESS:  It was my opinion.

THE COURT:  Then his opinion will be stricken.   You may proceed.”

Defendant claims that Officer Becker's opinion testimony was improper and prejudicial and infringed on her right to a fair trial.   The State responds and asserts that the opinion testimony was stricken and the court properly instructed the jury to disregard the testimony.

Once again defendant has argued to this court based on a extremely strained characterization of a witness's testimony.   Defendant would like us to believe that when Officer Becker said defendant's behavior was “odd” he really meant “she is guilty”.   This argument is clearly without merit.   Any possible error was cured by the court striking Officer Becker's use of the word “odd” and the subsequent instruction to the jury to disregard stricken testimony.  People v. Kirkwood, 17 Ill.2d 23, 31, 160 N.E.2d 766, 771 (1959).

IX. Prejudice by Admission of Evidence of Other Bad Acts

Defendant next contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of other crimes or bad acts for which defendant was not on trial.

Evidence of other crimes is not admissible for the purpose of showing the defendant's propensity to engage in criminal activity.  Heard, 187 Ill.2d at 58, 240 Ill.Dec. 577, 718 N.E.2d at 71.   Such evidence is admissible however, where relevant to prove motive or intent.  People v. Illgen, 145 Ill.2d 353, 365, 164 Ill.Dec. 599, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).   When evidence of other crimes is offered, it may be excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value.  Heard, 187 Ill.2d at 58, 240 Ill.Dec. 577, 718 N.E.2d at 71․ Defendant's brief lists the evidence the trial court erroneously found admissible.

A. Evidence that Defendant's Husband was Killed

Defendant's first point of error relates to “evidence that defendant's husband was killed.”   Defendant then cites to several cases and argues this evidence was improperly admitted because first, it amounted to a “mini-trial” on the issue of how the deceased was killed and by whom, and second, the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighed the relevance of the evidence.   Defendant provides no further explanation as to why the evidence was improperly admitted or as to how the prejudicial impact of the evidence outweighed its relevance.   Further, defendant does not provide page citations to the record.

Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (188 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(7)) sets out specific points that must appear in appellant's brief.   It provides in part that appellant's brief shall include:  “[a]rgument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefore, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.   Evidence shall not be copied at length, but reference shall be made to the pages of the record on appeal or abstract, if any, where evidence may be found.”   Reviewing courts are entitled to have the defendant's contentions of error clearly defined and are not to be treated as dumping grounds.   See Boeger v. Boeger, 147 Ill.App.3d 629, 630, 101 Ill.Dec. 490, 498 N.E.2d 814 (1986).   Because defendant fails to explain or argue why the trial court erred in admitting evidence that defendant's husband was killed, we are unable to address her contention and therefore reject this alleged error.

B. Evidence that Defendant had Darryl Mitchell shoot Jiminez

Defendant's second point of error of other crimes evidence relates to “evidence that defendant had Darryl Mitchell shoot Benjamin Jiminez.”   Defendant argues this evidence was improperly admitted because it showed “consciousness of guilt.”   Again, defendant cites to several cases for support, but fails to explain why the evidence was improperly admitted or why the evidence was prejudicial.   She merely argues the evidence resulted in “improper jury confusion” and the prejudicial impact outweighed any possible relevance.   Defendant also fails to provide any page citations to the record.   We again reject defendant's contention because she fails to explain or argue how or why the court erred.

C. Other Prior Bad Acts Evidence

Defendant's third point of error of other crimes evidence relates to “other prior bad acts evidence [that] came in through testimony of Teresa Jiminez, that similarly deprived defendant of a fair trial.” Defendant cites to two different parts of the record for the specific testimony to which she objects.   Defendant objects to Teresa's testimony of her thought process as to why she called the police in June 1998.   She testified she called the police as a result of talking with her son in the hospital.   Defendant also objects to Teresa's testimony that her son told her he had a tape recording of a “girl” who wanted him to kill her husband, and her son wanted to blackmail the girl with the tape.   Although defendant provides page citations to the record, and citations to cases, she fails once again to argue why the evidence was inadmissible or how the evidence was prejudicial.   Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention.   Further, the trial court gave a limiting instruction prior to this testimony being admitted.

X. Improper Admission of Evidence regarding “Flight”

Defendant next argues that the State improperly introduced evidence that defendant had attempted to avoid apprehension by the police.   Detective John Murray testified on direct examination that officers went looking for defendant at several different locations.   He also told some of defendant's family members that police were looking for her and needed to speak with her.   When he returned to the station, Detective Murray learned that defendant had voluntarily come into the station.   Defendant objected to the relevancy of this testimony at trial and now argues that evidence which demonstrates that police are looking for someone implies the person is attempting to avoid arrest and is generally interpreted as demonstrating consciousness of guilt.   Absent any evidence to show that defendant knew she was “wanted”, any testimony to this effect is irrelevant and highly prejudicial to defendant.

The trial court in this case overruled defendant's objection to Detective Murray's testimony at trial.   A trial court has the discretion to decide whether evidence is relevant and admissible and that decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion that results in prejudice to the defendant.  Ward, 101 Ill.2d at 455-56, 79 Ill.Dec. 142, 463 N.E.2d at 701-02.   Here, the trial court did not abuse it's discretion in admitting such evidence.

Evidence of intentional avoidance of the police is relevant and admissible to establish consciousness of guilt.  People v. Salazar, 126 Ill.2d 424, 454, 129 Ill.Dec. 1, 535 N.E.2d 766, 778 (1989).   However, whether or not guilt may be inferred from such conduct depends on the defendant's knowledge that a crime has been committed and that he is suspected of committing it.  People v. Harris, 23 Ill.2d 270, 273, 178 N.E.2d 291, 292 (1961).

Here, there was no testimony offered by Detective Murray from which the jury could infer that defendant knew she was a suspect and intentionally avoided police.   Detective Murray testified that he and other officers went to the family residence and inquired if defendant was home and went to defendant's condominium in Palos Hills and got no answer.   They also went to several other places where various family members were living and told those persons that the police were looking for defendant and needed to talk to her.   A short time later Detective Murray learned that defendant had voluntarily come to the police station.

This evidence was properly admitted to describe the circumstances surrounding defendant's arrest and not to show that defendant consciously avoided arrest.   The steps in an investigation and the events leading to an arrest are relevant to explain the case fully to the jury.  Simms, 143 Ill.2d at 174, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d at 954-55.

In a related argument, defendant asserts that because the State presented evidence that implied that defendant attempted to evade arrest, defendant had the right to rebut such evidence.   However, when defense counsel attempted to do so by questioning Detective Murray about whether defendant voluntarily agreed to talk to the police after she had come to the police station, the State's objection was sustained.   Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly excluded this evidence.

The record reflects that a side bar conference was held subsequent to the State voicing it's objection.   In the conference the trial court chided defense counsel for attempting to elicit any conversation that defendant had with officers because the trial court had granted defendant's motion to suppress statements wherein he argued that defendant was denied her right to counsel at the police station and that police had coerced defendant into giving a statement.

We find defendant's argument disingenuous.   Defense counsel cannot use to his advantage evidence which he previously sought to suppress, even if only for rebuttal, where defense counsel presented evidence at the motion to suppress statements that defendant's statement was given involuntarily.

XI. Cumulative Error

Finally, defendant asserts that the accumulation of trial error entitles her to reversal of her conviction.   Given our resolution of the aforementioned alleged errors, we conclude that the cumulative error doctrine does not apply to this case.   See People v. Bradley, 220 Ill.App.3d 890, 904-05, 163 Ill.Dec. 359, 581 N.E.2d 310, 320 (1991)

[The preceding material is not publishable under Supreme Court Rule 23]

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant presents a total of 21 issues on appeal.   Because our court is bound by administrative order of the Illinois Supreme Court limiting the length of our opinions to 20 pages, we have chosen to publish only the portions of our original 40-page Rule 23 decision discussing the sufficiency of the indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the defendant's right to confrontation.   We do so mainly because the defendant raises such unique arguments that have not been addressed previously by this court.   They, therefore, fall within the purview of the rules guiding published opinions.   166 Ill.2d R. 23.   The remaining issues have been excluded from publication. The complete Rule 23 decision can be found in the office of the clerk of this court.

2.   Defendant's husband Edgardo Cuadrado was in fact shot and killed on December 14, 1997, after he left church services to check on his car when his alarm sounded.

Justice KARNEZIS delivered the opinion of the court: