KERSTETTER v. STATE (1999)

Plaintiff Dr. Jon Kerstetter appeals the district courts judgment for defendants on his claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code chapter 216.   We affirm on appeal.

Dr. Kerstetter is a Native American.   He is a member of the Oneida Tribe of the Iroquois Nation.   Plaintiff completed medical school and was accepted as a resident in the radiology program at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics.   The residency program is a four-year program, but residents receive contracts for only one year at a time.   Plaintiff was one of seven doctors who began the radiology residency program on July 1, 1989.

During the radiology residency program, the doctors rotate through different areas, and are evaluated by various faculty members.   Plaintiff received the lowest scores of anyone in his class.   All radiology residents take a standardized evaluation their first year.   Plaintiff scored in the seventh percentile nationally, the lowest score in his class.   Plaintiff had poor attendance at mandatory educational conferences.

At the end of his first year, in June 1990, Dr. Kerstetter met with Dr. Yutaka Sato, Director of Resident Training.   Dr. Sato advised plaintiff to devote more time to basic reading and to attend the educational conferences.   Plaintiff also met with Dr. Edmund Franken, the head of the Radiology Department.   Dr. Franken advised plaintiff to improve his performance.   Plaintiff was given a contract for his second year of residency, which began July 1, 1990.

In July 1990, plaintiff told Dr. Sato he wished to receive funding to present a paper at the annual meeting of the Association of American Indian Physicians (AAIP), held in early August 1990.   Dr. Sato initially denied the request because plaintiff did not have any documentation.   Dr. Kerstetter informed Dr. Sato he believed the denial was due to a racist attitude.   Eventually Dr. Franken approved the funding, and plaintiff attended the meeting.

Plaintiffs evaluations and his attendance at educational conferences did not improve after his meeting with Dr. Sato in June 1990.   In addition, there were reports plaintiff had not responded to his beeper and had mixed up patient films.   On August 30, 1990, Dr. Sato placed plaintiff on probation.

After being placed on probation, plaintiffs attendance at educational conferences actually decreased.   He told Dr. Sato he was looking for another residency program.   At a faculty meeting on November 8, 1990, Dr. Sato and Dr. Franken decided to seek the input of the full faculty regarding Dr. Kerstetter.   Comments from faculty members were almost uniformly negative.   There was a consensus plaintiffs performance had declined and he had a poor attitude.   After the meeting, Dr. Sato, Dr. Franken, and Dr. Wilbur Smith met and decided plaintiff should not be allowed to continue in the residency program.

On November 12, 1990, Dr. Kerstetter filed a formal complaint with the University of Iowas affirmative action office.   On November 14, 1990, Dr. Franken gave plaintiff a letter dated November 12, 1990, advising him he could finish the 1990-91 academic year, but would not be given a contract for the next year.

On June 9, 1994, Dr. Kerstetter filed a petition against the State, Dr. Smith, Dr. Sato, and Dr. Franken.   He alleged breach of contract, racial discrimination, and retaliatory discharge.   The breach of contract claim was tied to a jury, which found for defendants.   The district court entered a ruling on the discrimination and retaliation claims.   The court found plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination because he failed to show he was performing the essential functions of his job at a satisfactory level.   The court also determined plaintiff failed to show the decision not to renew his contract was based on retaliation.   The court entered judgment in favor of defendants.   The court denied plaintiffs motion made pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b).   Plaintiff appealed.

 I. Our review of discrimination claims tried to the court is for the correction of errors at law.  Falczynski v. Amoco Oil Co., 533 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Iowa 1995).   In our review, we are bound by the district courts findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence.  Boelman v. Manson State Bank, 522 N.W.2d 73, 76 (Iowa 1994).   When reviewing evidence for its substantiality, we view it in the light most favorable to upholding the district courts judgment.  Id.

 II.  Dr. Kerstetter contends the district court did not apply the proper law to his claim of retaliatory discharge.   He asserts the court did not adequately separate the claim of retaliatory discharge from his claim of racial discrimination.   Dr. Kerstetter claims his discharge from the radiology program was made in retaliation for his insistence on attending the AAIP annual meeting.

 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a claimant must show (1) he was engaged in a statutorily protected activity, (2) he suffered adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection existed between the first two factors.  City of Hampton v. Iowa Civil Rights Commn., 554 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Iowa 1996).   The causation standard in a retaliatory discharge is high.   Teachout v. Forest City Community Sch. Dist., 584 N.W.2d 296, 301 (Iowa 1998).   The supreme court has stated:

[T]he filing of the discrimination claim must be a substantial factor prompting the termination.   In other words, the protection afforded by anti-retaliatory legislation does not immunize the complainant from discharge for past or present inadequacies, unsatisfactory performance or insubordination.

Hulme v. Barrett, 480 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Iowa 1992).

Although the district court did not set forth the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation, the court did specifically find:

There was no proof during the course of this trial that any of the three Defendants made any statement or committed any act which could be taken as proof of an intent to retaliate or racially or ethnically discriminate against Dr. Kerstetter for his attendance at the AAIP meeting.

Again, in the ruling on the rule 179(b) motion, the district court found plaintiff had failed to show his discharge was retaliatory.

We determine the district court adequately addressed plaintiffs claim of discriminatory discharge.   Dr. Kerstetter did not present sufficient evidence to show his discharge was causally connected to his engagement in protected activity.   The evidence shows plaintiff was not permitted to continue in the radiology program due to unsatisfactory performance.   Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

 III.  The jury found for defendants on plaintiffs claim of breach of contract.   The district court determined the jury had found plaintiff had not proven satisfactory performance.   The court concluded the doctrine of issue preclusion required its findings to be consistent with the jurys findings on this issue.   Dr. Kerstetter contends the doctrine of issue preclusion should not apply in this case.   He claims the jury could have found for defendants on the breach of contract claim without necessarily finding he had failed to prove satisfactory performance.

Here, plaintiff was claiming as a breach of contract defendants failure to renew his contract for a third year.   Under the terms of the contracts for the first two years, renewal was contingent on satisfactory performance.   Thus, in order to show defendants improperly denied him a contract for a third year, plaintiff was required to show his performance was satisfactory.   In denying the claim of breach of contract, the jury necessarily found plaintiff had not shown satisfactory performance.   The district court properly found it was bound by the doctrine of issue preclusion to adopt this finding.

We affirm the decision of the district court denying Dr. Kerstetters claims of discrimination and retaliation.   Costs of this appeal are assessed to Dr. Kerstetter.

AFFIRMED.

PER CURIAM.