M.W., Mother, Appellant. v. << (2024)

AHLERS, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, born in October 2022. She contends the State failed to establish the statutory grounds relied upon by the juvenile court in terminating her rights. She also argues termination is not in the child's best interests due to the parent-child bond and claims the juvenile court should have instead established a guardianship.

We conduct de novo review of orders terminating parental rights. In re Z.K., 973 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). Our review follows a three-step process that involves determining if a statutory ground for termination has been established, whether termination is in the child's best interests, and whether any permissive exceptions should be applied to preclude termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021). If a parent does not challenge any of the three steps, we need not address it on appeal. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).

The juvenile court found grounds authorizing termination satisfied under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h) (2023). As the mother's rights were terminated on multiple grounds, we affirm if either of the grounds is supported by the record. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012) (“When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the juvenile court's order on any ground we find supported by the record.”). We choose to focus on paragraph (h), which permits termination upon clear and convincing proof that (1) the child is three years of age or younger; (2) the child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance; (3) the child has been removed from the physical custody of the parents for at least six of the last twelve months; and (4) the child cannot be returned to the custody of the parent. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h).

The mother only challenges the fourth element. She contends the child could be safely returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing. See id. § 232.116(1)(h)(4) (“There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time.”); In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (holding that “at the present time” means at the time of the termination hearing).

This case began after the child's umbilical cord blood tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine at birth. The positive test resulted in the child's removal from the parents’ custody. The mother refused an opportunity at substance-use treatment following her discharge from the hospital after giving birth. About four months later, the mother entered an in-patient treatment program but left after only one day. According to the mother, she left to first address her mental-health concerns. Follow-up investigation revealed the mother did not engage in treatment services as she had suggested she would.

As the case progressed, the mother did not. She failed to make any meaningful progress to address her substance-use and mental-health concerns. She even refused to complete drug testing. At the time of the termination hearing, the mother was not participating in therapy, and she was not engaged in substance-use treatment. She was no better situated to resume custody of the child at the time of the termination hearing than she was when the child was initially removed from her custody.

We conclude the State established that the mother could not take custody of the child at the time of the termination hearing. This satisfies the first step in our analysis, and we move on to consider the child's best interests.

The mother argues termination is not in the child's best interests. When considering best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child's safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” Id. at 41.

After reviewing the record, we agree with the juvenile court that termination is in the child's best interests. The mother's parental rights to another child were previously terminated due to her use of illegal substances and mental-health challenges. Those same concerns remain unresolved in this case. The mother cannot provide the child with a baseline of stability. Conversely, the child is currently placed with a family who meets her needs, previously adopted her halfsibling, and has been identified as a long-term placement option.

As part of her claim that termination of her rights is not in the child's best interests, the mother contends a guardianship would be a better option for the child. We disagree. “[A] guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to termination.” In re B.T., 894 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). And it is a particularly poor option in instances where the child is too young to express an informed preference. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 478 (Iowa 2018). This child was just over a year old at the time of termination—far too young to express any informed preference—weighing heavily against a guardianship as a viable alternative to termination. See id.

To the extent the mother contends her parent-child bond with the child is so strong that it justifies forgoing termination, see Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c), she has failed to establish a bond of such magnitude. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 475–76 (recognizing a parent seeking application of a permissive exception to termination has the burden to establish such an exception). While the record contains evidence of a parent-child bond, for the parent to prove an exception to termination based on that bond, it must be so significant that severing it would be manifestly detrimental to the child. See In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021). No proof of such detriment exists here.

Following our de novo review, we affirm the juvenile court's determination that termination, not a guardianship, best serves the child's interests. We also affirm the juvenile court's decision not to apply a permissive exception to termination, as the parent-child bond is not such that termination would be manifestly detrimental to the child.

AFFIRMED.