Y.S., Mother, Appellant. v. << (2023)

A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her five children, D.N., S.N., A.S., D.S., and S.S.¹ The mother challenges the statutory grounds authorizing termination, argues termination is not in the children's best interests, and contends her parent-child bonds with the children should preclude termination. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts

In August 2021, D.N. confided in her grandfather that her stepfather had molested her. This revelation spurred the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services’ involvement with this family. The department's investigation eventually revealed additional abuse within the home. S.N. disclosed the stepfather had also sexually abused her. Both D.N. and S.N. reported the mother punched them in the face with enough force to cause their noses to bleed. The children also reported the father of the youngest three children—A.S., D.S., and S.S.—would beat them with a belt, leaving marks that would last several days. The children were removed from parental custody and placed in family foster care.

By June 2022, the juvenile court adjudicated the children as children in need of assistance and confirmed their removal. The mother appealed. This court affirmed the adjudication of the children as in need of assistance and their removal from her custody. In re D.N., No. 22-1262, 2023 WL 386705, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2023). In doing so, this court relied on the physical and sexual abuse that occurred in the home, the mother's refusal to believe her husband sexually abused her daughters, and the mother's continued cohabitation with her husband. Id.

The State charged the husband with second- and third-degree sexual abuse in relation to D.N.’s and S.N.’s allegations. He ultimately pled guilty to two counts of lascivious acts with a minor. Yet the mother continued to claim her daughters lied about the sexual abuse and instead believed her husband's denials.

To her credit, the mother completed some therapy in 2022. However, she did not continue that therapy into 2023. She discontinued therapy because she believed it would not be beneficial to her because she didn't need any help.

Given the lack of progress, the State filed for termination of the parents’ rights. At the termination hearing, the mother finally stated she believed her husband had sexually abused her daughters, though she could not say what abuse she believed occurred. She also explained she was separated from her husband and probably intends on divorcing him. However, she also conceded she is in frequent communication with him, and the State presented evidence she visited her husband's family in Kansas City after the first day of the termination hearing. The mother also admitted she has done nothing to address her own physical abuse of the children.

The juvenile court found multiple statutory grounds for termination satisfied, concluded termination would be in the children's best interests, and declined to apply any permissive exception to termination. The mother appeals.

II. Standard of Review

Appellate review of termination-of-parental-rights proceedings is de novo. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). Our paramount concern in termination proceedings is the best interests of the children. In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 529 (Iowa 2019).

III. Statutory Grounds

The juvenile court terminated the mother's parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d), (f), and (i) (2022). When the juvenile court terminates on multiple statutory grounds, we may affirm if the record supports termination on any one of those grounds. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We focus our attention on section 232.116(1)(f). With regard to that ground for termination, the mother only challenges the fourth element, which is satisfied when the State establishes the children cannot be safely returned to the parent at the time of the termination hearing. See In re T.W., No. 20-0145, 2020 WL 1881115, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020) (discussing the fourth element under section 232.116(1)(h), which we interpret as the same as the fourth element under section 232.116(1)(f)).

The mother argues the children could have been returned to her at the time of the termination hearing because she had participated in therapy, participated in visits with the children, had housing independent from her husband, and “was committed to providing a safe and stable living environment for the children.” She also notes her husband consented to termination of his rights to the three youngest and “would be a non-issue for involvement with the children moving forward,” and she urges “with [her husband] no longer having legal rights to any of the children, [she] would be able to protect them.” In making these arguments, the mother fails to adequately address our main concerns about her ability to safely parent the children. Yes, the mother attended some therapy, but it seems she did not glean much from that process as evidenced by her testimony at the termination hearing that she did not require therapy. Nor does the mother address her failure to reconcile her prior physical abuse of the oldest two children. Left unresolved, the children would be at risk to the mother's physical abuse once again.

With respect to the mother's relationship with her husband, we question whether her association with him is truly at an end. She would not testify definitively that she intended on divorcing him. And at times during the termination hearing, she testified that she no longer had any contact with him, but she eventually admitted to frequent contact with him. We also question the veracity of the mother's claim that she now believes the father sexually abused her daughters given her repeated and long-standing comments to the contrary, particularly because the mother could not state what she believed occurred. So we think it is more likely that the mother was giving lip-service to the court rather than expressing her true belief.²

On our review of the record, it is reasonable to conclude the mother is still significantly involved with her husband and remains unable to credit her daughters’ reports of sexual abuse perpetrated by her husband. As we stated in our prior opinion discussing this family, “it is ‘folly to think the mother will stand sentinel to protect against a foe she doesn't acknowledge exists.’ ” D.N., 2023 WL 386705, at *2 (quoting In re D.D., 955 N.W.2d 186, 193 (Iowa 2021)).

Given these unresolved concerns, we agree with the juvenile court that the children could not be safely returned to the mother at the time of the termination hearing.

IV. Best Interests

Termination also must serve the children's best interests. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2). When considering the children's best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)).

Here, the mother has historically been unable to provide the children with a home free from violence, either at her own hands or another's. Given her lack of progress or accountability, we have no reason to believe she would now be able to provide a safe home. See In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997) (“[W]e look to the parents’ past performance because it may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future.”). The children deserve safety and permanency as soon as possible. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (“It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” (citation omitted)). These goals can be best effectuated through termination. Accordingly, termination serves the best interests of all of the children.

V. Permissible Exceptions to Termination

Once the State has proven grounds for termination, the burden shifts to the parent to prove a permissive exception under section 232.116(3). In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 475–76 (Iowa 2018). The mother claims the closeness of the parent-child bonds should prompt the court to apply an exception to termination. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). Certainly, the children are bonded to the mother. D.N. has expressed an interest in returning to the mother's custody under certain conditions.³ S.N.’s bond with the mother was highlighted when she contacted the mother for help when she ran away from her foster home. And the three youngest also share strong bonds with the mother. While these children are bonded to the mother, these bonds are not strong enough to preclude termination in light of the trauma they have suffered and risk of harm they face. Application of the exception under paragraph (c) “requires clear and convincing evidence that ‘termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.’ ” In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c)). The mother has failed to establish termination of her rights will be detrimental to any of the children.

We affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of the children's respective fathers. Neither father appeals.

2.   We note the termination court's observations and conclusions regarding the mother's testimony and behavior:The court notes that throughout the termination trial, the mother was repeatedly disrespectful to the court, attorneys and witnesses. This included making a face in [S.N.]’s direction and repeatedly disregarding the court's directives [regarding] controlling herself. The written trial record cannot adequately represent the mother's extreme behavior and mental health needs. She blatantly provided inconsistent statements, in her trial testimony and acted bizarrely when confronted with the inconsistencies. The Court did not find the mother to be credible.

3.   At one point, D.N. expressed a desire to return to the mother's custody if the mother's husband is out of the picture.

DANILSON, Senior Judge.