M.B., Mother, Appellant. v. << (2023)

The juvenile court terminated the mother's parental rights to two of her children, A.K. and A.K. (both born in 2012), under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (f) (2023).¹ On appeal, the mother challenges the statutory grounds for termination, claims the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with the children, and argues the loss of her parental rights is not the in the children's best interests. In the alternative, she asks for more time to work toward reunification.

We review the termination of parental rights de novo. In re Z.K., 973 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). Employing de novo review means we review the facts as well as the law and adjudicate the parent's rights anew. Id. That said, we review only those issues that—after being properly preserved—are actually raised and briefed on appeal by the parent challenging termination. See Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 870 (Iowa 1996).

As part of her challenge to whether the statutory grounds were proved, the mother argues the department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with the children because of the lack of visitation. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000) (recognizing the reasonable-efforts requirement, while not “a strict substantive requirement of termination” impacts the State's “burden of proving those elements of termination which require reunification efforts”); In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (“The core of the reasonable efforts mandate is that the [department] must make reasonable efforts to prevent placement or to reunify families in each case.”). But the mother does not point us to—and we have not found—a time when she raised the issue of visits to the juvenile court prior to the termination trial. Our error-preservation rules generally require a parent to complain to the juvenile court directly—not a social worker or family centered services provider—“to demand other, different, or additional services.” In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). And “[i]n general, if a parent fails to request other services at the proper time, the parent waives the issue and may not later challenge it at the termination proceeding.” In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002). So we do not consider the mother's claim the department failed to meet the reasonable-efforts requirement.

When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one ground, we may affirm on any ground we find supported by the record evidence. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). Here, we choose to review termination under section 232.116(1)(f), which allows the court to terminate when:

(1) The child is four years of age or older.

(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.

(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.

(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in section 232.102.

The mother purports to the challenge the fourth element—whether the children could be returned to her custody at the time of the termination trial. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting “at the present time” as the time of the termination trial). But the mother does not actually argue the children could have been returned to her in July 2023, and for good reason. As the mother recognized in her testimony at the termination trial, the children could not yet be returned because she needed inpatient substance-abuse treatment, which she was hoping to begin soon, and the children could not live with her in the room she was renting in a home where, only a few months before, the police executed a search warrant and found methamphetamine.² The State proved the ground for termination under section 232.116(1)(f).

Next, the mother argues the termination of her parental rights is not in the children's best interests. When making a best-interests determination, we focus on the children's safety and their need for a permanent home. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially). And we consider the best placement for furthering their long-term nurturing and growth and their physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs. Iowa Code § 232.116(2). Here, the children were removed from the mother's custody in October 2021—a period of about twenty months as of the termination trial. And the mother was not yet able to resume caring for them. The children lived with their half-sister in her father's home for about a year leading up to trial; both children expressed wanting to continue living there, and the half-sister's father and spouse were taking steps to be approved to adopt them. See id. § 232.116(2)(b)(1) (allowing the court to consider, as part of the best-interests determination, “[t]he length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining that environment and continuity for the child”). Enabling the children to achieve permanency through termination of the mother's rights and adoption by another family is in these children's best interests.

Finally, the mother asks for more time to work toward reunification with the children. To give the mother the extension she requests, we must be able to conclude the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of the extension. See id. § 232.104(2)(b). But we cannot say the mother will be in a position to resume custody of the children in six months. She has used methamphetamine throughout this case—from its initiation following her July 2021 arrest for driving while under the influence with one of the children in the car through her admitted use of methamphetamine one week before the termination trial. And, while she testified she recently obtained a new substance-abuse evaluation and was just waiting for an open bed at an inpatient treatment facility, the mother was not in substance-abuse or mental-health therapy at the time of the termination trial. The mother was not allowed in-person visits with the children and, as of January 2023, phone calls were also discontinued based on the recommendation of the children's therapist. The mother was told that she needed to consistently attend therapy so she could understand trauma, accept responsibility, and genuinely apologize to the children. It was expected that once she was able to do those things, the mother and children would have therapeutic contact. Yet the mother did not attend a single therapy session between the January 2023 recommendation and the July termination trial, so no progress was made on her relationship with the children. For all of these reasons, a six-month delay of permanency is not warranted.

We affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights to A.K. and A.K.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parental rights of the children's father were also terminated; he does not appeal.

2.   There is no indication the methamphetamine belonged to the mother.

POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.