PATRICK MILLER WEBB JR v. STATE OF IOWA (2023)

Patrick Miller Webb Jr. appeals the summary dismissal of his fourth application for postconviction relief as untimely under Iowa Code section 822.3 (2022), contending the dismissal violated his federal and state substantive due process rights. While we ordinarily review postconviction-relief proceedings for correction of errors of law, we review constitutional claims de novo. Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021).

On March 31, 2017, Webb pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. He did not appeal. So, absent an applicable exception, the three-year limitations period for Webb to file an application for postconviction relief expired March 31, 2020.¹

Webb did file an application within that period—his first on June 23, 2017. He raised several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including one related to counsel's failure to pursue a previously filed motion to suppress before he pleaded guilty. The district court rejected each of his claims and dismissed the application. Webb appealed the suppression issue, and this court affirmed. Webb v. State, No. 18-0693, 2019 WL 1294795, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2019).

On August 2, 2021, Webb filed a second postconviction-relief application, alleging another claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel (failing to appeal to assert prosecutorial misconduct). And on August 31, Webb filed a third application, asserting his first postconviction-relief counsel was ineffective. The State moved to dismiss those claims on grounds they were barred by the applicable limitations period. On October 21, the district court considered the State's motion in both cases and dismissed them as time-barred under section 822.3.

Another ten months go by, and on April 20, 2022—more than three years after the procedendo issued on the appeal of his first postconviction-relief application—Webb filed this fourth application, asserting “newly discovered evidence,” ineffective assistance of counsel, and “actual innocence.” The State moved to dismiss, noting Webb “has not pled any ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within three years of his conviction.”

In response and resistance, Webb amended the application to assert plea counsel was ineffective in failing to litigate the suppression motion, about which counsel acknowledged “there was a reasonable possibility that a suppression issue could be pursued with some success.” He also asserted his first postconviction-relief counsel did not develop that meritorious claim.²

Recognizing that his application was untimely, Webb sought shelter in the relation-back rule recognized in Allison v. State, 914 N.W.2d 866, 891 (Iowa 2018):

[W]here a [postconviction-relief] petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel has been timely filed per section 822.3 and there is a successive [postconviction-relief] petition alleging postconviction counsel was ineffective in presenting the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, the timing of the filing of the second [postconviction-relief] petition relates back to the timing of the filing of the original [postconviction-relief] petition for purposes of Iowa Code section 822.3 if the successive [postconviction-relief] petition is filed promptly after the conclusion of the first [postconviction-relief] action. The doctrine of relation back is used “to preserve rights as of the earlier date, or otherwise to avoid injustice.”

(Citation omitted). But because Allison was legislatively abrogated by a 2019 amendment to section 822.3, Webb argued that amendment was an unconstitutional infringement on his “fundamental right to counsel and his corresponding fundamental right to a fair trial.”³ See 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, § 34 (codified at Iowa Code § 822.3 (Supp. 2019)); Brooks v. State, 975 N.W.2d 444, 445–46 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022).

After a hearing, the district court dismissed the application, reasoning there is no constitutional right to counsel in postconviction-relief actions, see Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa 2011), and our supreme court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of the three-year time bar. See Perez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 354, 360 (Iowa 2012). The court also noted that even if Allison were still “good law, it would not provide Webb with the relief he seeks.” Because we agree with the district court on this last point, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issues Webb raises—though similar ones have been rejected. See Gines v. State, No. 21-0770, 2022 WL 2155121, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jun 15, 2022).

Webb's attempt to save his untimely application for postconviction relief depends on the Allison relation-back rule. He argues that because “effective postconviction relief counsel is a substantive due process right and [his] claims relate back to his first, timely [postconviction-relief] application, his current [postconviction-relief] application should be allowed to move forward.” Even under the narrow exception Allison recognized, it provides him no relief. This is Webb's fourth application, not his second. See Sandoval v. State, 975 N.W.2d 434, 437–38 (Iowa 2022) (“Allison held only that a second application for postconviction relief could relate back to a timely filed first application.” (emphasis added)). And it was not filed promptly after the conclusion of his earlier applications. See id. (“In addition, Allison held a later-filed application only related back if filed ‘promptly’ after the conclusion of the first [proceeding]. ․ The court of appeals repeatedly has held that a delay of more than six months is not prompt. We agree.” (internal citations omitted)).

We accordingly conclude that Webb's claims in this fourth postconviction-relief application are time-barred and, because the application was not filed promptly after the first appeal concluded, Allison would provide him no relief even if its relation-back rule had not been legislatively abrogated. We affirm.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Iowa Code section 822.3 provides, in pertinent part:All other [postconviction-relief] applications must be filed within three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued. However, this limitation does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period.

2.   Webb did not pursue his pro se claims of newly discovered evidence or actual innocence.

3.   Webb also raised an equal-protection claim that he does not renew on appeal.

BADDING, Judge.