BROWN v. STATE (2026)

Appellant Dewey Brown was convicted of malice murder in connection with the strangling death of Roosevelt Williams.¹ In this appeal, Brown contends that the evidence presented at his trial was not constitutionally sufficient to support his conviction; the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on accident and involuntary manslaughter and abused its discretion by ruling that Brown could not ask a witness about his probation status; and Brown's trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. As explained below, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at Brown's trial showed the following. In August 2018, Brown, his friend Williams, and Hurie Franklin were hired to install flooring in an apartment in Augusta. According to Franklin, on August 20, they worked in the apartment in the morning and eventually went to lunch at a restaurant, where Brown seemed “zoned out” and had a “dazed look.” When they returned to the apartment, Williams was getting ready to continue his work when Brown suddenly “charged him.” Williams and Brown fought, and Williams told Franklin to “go get help.” Franklin ran outside, asked a neighbor to call 911, and waited with the neighbor until a responding investigator arrived about 10 minutes later.

When the investigator entered the apartment, he saw Williams lying on the floor; Brown was “on top of” him, with his arm “wrapped around Williams’[s] neck.” The investigator told Brown, who was “extremely exhausted” and “[p]anting for breath,” to get off Williams. Brown released Williams and lay on the floor; Williams was unresponsive. As the investigator and other emergency responders who arrived tried to revive Williams, Brown cried and said, “[C]an you help my brother?” When one of the responders asked Brown what happened, he replied, “[T]hey jumped on me.” Williams was pronounced dead at the scene.²

Brown was taken to a hospital and treated for non-life-threatening injuries, which included several lacerations to his head, scratches, bleeding to his gums, broken teeth, bruising under his eye, several abrasions on his ear and jaw, a bite mark on his arm, and a laceration on his thumb. The lacerations to his head were cleaned and stapled, and he was given ibuprofen for pain.³

The medical examiner who performed Williams's autopsy determined that he had bruising on both sides of his head; lacerations on his lips; and abrasions on several fingers and on his chest, shoulder, and neck. The medical examiner noted that Williams's hyoid bone, which is located “above the Adam's apple,” was fractured and that there was bleeding and bruising in his neck muscles, which was caused by “trauma or squeezing the neck.” The medical examiner concluded that Williams's cause of death was “asphyxia due to manual strangulation.” In addition, the medical examiner testified that when a person is strangled, he “can be unconscious in about 10 seconds or less” and “can be brain dead,” such that he would be “unrevivable,” within about three to five minutes.

Brown elected not to testify, and opening statements and closing arguments were not transcribed.

2. Brown contends that the evidence presented at his trial was not sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support his conviction for malice murder. This claim fails.

In evaluating the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict and consider whether any rational juror could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). “We do not weigh the evidence on appeal or resolve conflicts in trial testimony. Instead, we defer to the jury's assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.” Whittaker v. State, 317 Ga. 127, 130, 891 S.E.2d 849 (2023) (quotation marks omitted).

A person commits the crime of malice murder “when he unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being.” OCGA § 16-5-1(a). The element of “malice incorporates the intent to kill.” Whittaker, 317 Ga. at 130, 891 S.E.2d 849 (quotation marks omitted). “[T]he malice necessary to establish malice murder may be formed in an instant, as long as it is present at the time of the killing,” and whether a killing is intentional and malicious is for the jury to determine. Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 720, 873 S.E.2d 166 (2022) (quotation marks omitted).

Brown argues that the evidence was not constitutionally sufficient to establish his malice-murder conviction because Franklin was the only witness to the fight between Brown and Williams and because, Brown says, there was no evidence showing that he acted with malice. But “the testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact,” Ward v. State, 316 Ga. 295, 298, 888 S.E.2d 75 (2023) (cleaned up), and there was ample evidence from which the jury could determine that Brown acted with malice. To that end, the jury was authorized to credit Franklin's testimony that just before the murder, Brown suddenly attacked Williams, who asked Franklin to get help. And the first responding investigator testified that when he arrived, Brown was “on top of” Williams, with his arm “wrapped around Williams’[s] neck.” Although the evidence presented suggested that Brown was bleeding more than Williams, it also showed that his injuries were non-life threatening—whereas Williams's hyoid bone was fractured, and there was bleeding and bruising in his neck muscles. The medical examiner testified that Williams's injuries were caused by “trauma or squeezing the neck” and that although Williams would have been unconscious within about 10 seconds of being strangled, the strangulation would have had to continue for about three to five minutes to cause Williams's death.

This evidence authorized the jury to conclude that Brown intentionally and maliciously killed Williams, such that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder. Thus, the evidence was sufficient as a matter of due process to support his conviction for that crime. See, e.g., Munn, 313 Ga. at 721, 873 S.E.2d 166 (holding that the evidence, which showed that the appellant shot the victim “multiple times, despite [the victim] raising his hands,” such that he “was unarmed and unthreatening,” was constitutionally sufficient to support the appellant's conviction for malice murder).⁴

3. Brown claims that the trial court erred by refusing, over his objections, to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of accident and on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct. As explained below, the trial court correctly concluded that these instructions were not supported by even slight evidence, so Brown's claims fail.

(a) Accident

Brown argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on accident because the court incorrectly stated during the charge conference that Brown was required to admit killing Williams in order to raise an accident defense. He also asserts there was at least slight evidence to support the instruction.

To begin, Brown is correct that he was not required to “admit” anything—that is, he was not required to admit that any particular facts were true—in order to raise an accident defense. We held in McClure v. State, 306 Ga. 856, 834 S.E.2d 96 (2019), which was decided about six months after Brown's trial, that “a trial court errs in denying a defendant's request for a jury instruction on an affirmative defense solely on the basis that the defendant did not admit for all purposes the truth of the allegations in the indictment.” Id. at 864, 834 S.E.2d 96. But as Brown acknowledges in his appellate brief, the trial court's refusal to give an accident instruction was not based solely on Brown's failure to admit that he killed Williams. The trial court ultimately concluded at the charge conference that an accident instruction was not warranted because there was not even slight evidence to support it. We conclude that the court did not err by refusing to give the instruction on that basis.

“A person shall not be found guilty of any crime committed by misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily appears there was no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal negligence.” OCGA § 16-2-2. To justify a jury instruction on the defense of accident, “there need only be slight evidence supporting the theory of the charge.” Stepp-McCommons v. State, 309 Ga. 400, 403, 845 S.E.2d 643 (2020) (quotation marks omitted). But “when the evidence shows that a defendant acted with criminal intent, was engaged in a criminal scheme, or was criminally negligent, then the affirmative defense of accident is unavailable and a jury charge on accident is not warranted.” Bennett v. State, 320 Ga. 580, 588–89, 910 S.E.2d 601 (2024) (quotation marks omitted).

Brown contends that there was at least slight evidence to support his accident theory because there was evidence from which the jury could infer that Williams used an object or tool to inflict injuries on Brown and because Brown asked responders to “help” Williams. But that evidence did not indicate that Brown lacked the intent to strangle Williams, such that the killing was the result of an accident. See, e.g., Stepp-McCommons, 309 Ga. at 404, 845 S.E.2d 643 (holding that the appellant's testimony that he acted in self-defense and “never had the intention to ‘murder’ ” the victim did not constitute slight evidence to support an accident instruction); Bonner v. State, 311 Ga. 466, 469, 858 S.E.2d 496 (2021) (explaining that “[c]onclusory claims by a defendant that he ‘didn't mean to do it’ and ‘it was an accident’ are insufficient without more to authorize a charge on accident” (cleaned up)). Compare Schmitt v. State, 318 Ga. 835, 843–44, 901 S.E.2d 102 (2024) (concluding that the trial court erred by declining to give an accident instruction because there was at least slight evidence to support the instruction, and distinguishing cases in which such an instruction was not supported on the basis that “evidence of intentionality was strong and there was no theory of accident that would not have necessarily constituted criminal negligence”). Rather, the evidence showed that Brown attacked Williams; they fought; and he then strangled Williams for three to five minutes until Williams died. Because the evidence showed only that Brown acted with criminal intent, and there was not even slight evidence suggesting that he accidentally strangled Williams, the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on accident. See, e.g., Stepp-McCommons, 309 Ga. at 404, 845 S.E.2d 643; Bonner, 311 Ga. at 469–70, 858 S.E.2d 496.

(b) Involuntary Manslaughter

“A person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act when he causes the death of another human being without any intention to do so by the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony.” OCGA § 16-5-3(a). A trial court should give a requested instruction on involuntary manslaughter if there is slight evidence to support it, but if all of the evidence presented at trial shows that the defendant intentionally caused the victim's death by committing a felony, an involuntary-manslaughter instruction is not warranted. See Scott v. State, ––– Ga. ––––, ––– S.E.2d ––––, S26A0454, slip op. at 8 (Ga. May 19, 2026) (2026 WL 1391043).

Here, there was no evidence indicating that Brown caused Williams's death “without any intention to do so.” OCGA § 16-5-3(a). Indeed, all of the evidence presented showed that Brown intentionally attacked, strangled, and killed Williams. See Wynn v. State, 313 Ga. 827, 836, 874 S.E.2d 42 (2022) (explaining that “the force involved in strangling a person to the point of unconsciousness ․ is simply inconsistent with the lack of intent to kill[,] which is a prerequisite in involuntary manslaughter” (quotation marks omitted)); Stepp-McCommons, 309 Ga. at 404, 845 S.E.2d 643 (concluding that the appellant was not entitled to an involuntary-manslaughter instruction because “all the evidence presented showed that [the appellant] intentionally shot [the victim]”).

Moreover, to warrant a charge on involuntary manslaughter, “the unlawful act underlying the unintentional death of the victim must be an act other than a felony.” Hood v. State, 303 Ga. 420, 428, 811 S.E.2d 392 (2018). Here, there was not even slight evidence to support the theory that Brown caused Williams's death by committing the misdemeanor of reckless conduct, rather than the felony of aggravated assault. In this respect, there was no evidence indicating that Brown strangled Williams by “consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk” of harm that was “a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” OCGA § 16-5-60(b)(2). Instead, all of the evidence presented at trial—including the evidence that Brown attacked Williams, squeezed his neck to the point that his neck muscles were bleeding and bruised, and fractured his hyoid bone—showed that Brown committed the felony of aggravated assault. See, e.g., Scott, S26A0454, slip op. at 9–10 (holding that an involuntary-manslaughter instruction was not warranted because there was not even slight evidence to support the theory that the appellant committed reckless conduct, and the evidence at trial showed that he committed an aggravated assault); Moon v. State, 311 Ga. 421, 424, 858 S.E.2d 18 (2021) (holding that the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct because the evidence showed that the shooting of the victim “indisputably occurred as a result of [the appellant] committing a felony,” which “precluded any instruction on involuntary manslaughter as a matter of law”).

For these reasons, the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter under OCGA § 16-5-3(a).

4. Brown asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that he could not cross-examine Franklin about the fact that he was on probation at the time of the murder due to a juvenile adjudication “involving burglary.” At trial, outside the presence of the jury, Brown's trial counsel asked the trial court's permission to question Franklin about his juvenile adjudication to show that he was biased in favor of the State. Specifically, counsel pointed to the evidence that although Franklin told investigators that he was not involved in the fight between Brown and Williams, he later told Williams's sister, Cassandra Dallas, that he was involved in the fight. Counsel argued that the evidence of Franklin's probationary status at the time of the murder would show that Franklin had an incentive to lie to investigators because, if he had been involved in the fight, “he could have been charged with aggravated assault, which would have been grounds to have his probation revoked.” The trial court concluded that evidence of the juvenile adjudication was not admissible under OCGA § 24-6-609(d).⁵ Assuming (without deciding) that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding this evidence, any such error was harmless.

A nonconstitutional evidentiary error is harmless if it is “highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Wilson v. State, 319 Ga. 550, 555, 905 S.E.2d 557 (2024) (quotation marks omitted). In determining whether an error was harmless, “we review the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have weighed it.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Here, the evidence of Franklin's juvenile adjudication would have had little, if any, impact on the jury's assessment of his credibility. Franklin's statement to investigators was corroborated by other evidence, including an investigator's testimony that when he interviewed Franklin shortly after the murder, he did not observe any marks or blood on Franklin and saw nothing indicating that Franklin had participated in the fight. And Franklin provided a plausible explanation for lying to Dallas—that he was “scared” about how Williams's family would react when they learned that he did not try to help Williams by joining the fight.

But in any event, even if the evidence of Franklin's probation status would have led the jury to discredit his statement (and testimony) that he was not involved in the fight and to instead credit his statement to Dallas, that evidence would not have significantly influenced the jury's determination of Brown's guilt. Franklin's statement to Dallas that after Williams and Brown were fighting, Franklin “w[as] fighting and jumped on [Brown], as well,” did nothing to undermine Franklin's testimony that Brown started the fight when he suddenly “charged” Williams while Williams was preparing to return to work. And the undisputed evidence showed that Franklin left the apartment to get help before Brown killed Williams, so even if he did participate in the fight at some earlier point, he was not involved at the time Brown strangled Williams to death. For these reasons, it is highly probable that any error in the exclusion of the evidence of Franklin's probation status did not contribute to the verdict. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 321 Ga. 495, 499, 915 S.E.2d 557 (2025) (concluding that any error in the exclusion of certain evidence was harmless because it “would have had little impact on the jury's assessment of the evidence as a whole”); Wilson, 319 Ga. at 555, 905 S.E.2d 557 (holding that any error in the exclusion of evidence was harmless because it would not have “meaningfully” helped the defense, as it “did nothing to rebut other strong evidence”).

5. Brown contends that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in three respects. To prevail on these claims, Brown must establish that trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Troutman v. State, 320 Ga. 489, 494, 910 S.E.2d 173 (2024). To prove deficient performance, Brown must show that counsel performed at trial “in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all of the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Troutman, 320 Ga. at 494, 910 S.E.2d 173 (quotation marks omitted). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–91, 104 S.Ct. 2052. And to prove prejudice, Brown must establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Troutman, 320 Ga. at 494, 910 S.E.2d 173. We need not address both parts of the Strickland test if Brown does not meet his burden of establishing one. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Troutman, 320 Ga. at 494, 910 S.E.2d 173. As discussed below, Brown's ineffectiveness claims fail.

(a) First, Brown appears to argue that trial counsel's handling of her request for a jury instruction on accident amounted to ineffective assistance. Noting that counsel testified at the hearing on Brown's motion for new trial that she had tried only one murder case before Brown's trial, Brown asserts that even though counsel requested an accident instruction, counsel told the trial court during a preliminary charge conference, “I don't think there's been any evidence showing that this was an accident.” Citing McClure v. State, Brown also claims that when the trial court stated during the charge conference that Brown was required to admit killing Williams in order to raise an accident defense, trial counsel should have “accept[ed] for the sake of argument” that Brown killed Williams. 306 Ga. at 857, 834 S.E.2d 96. Brown has not established that counsel performed deficiently.

To begin, counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that at the time of Brown's trial, she had worked as a public defender for three years; she met with Brown “numerous times”; and although she had tried only one other murder case, her supervisor served as co-counsel for Brown's trial, and she relied upon her supervisor's “advice and assistance.” See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 287 Ga. 767, 769, 700 S.E.2d 346 (2010) (rejecting the appellant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective because he was inexperienced and noting that counsel “was assisted by a seasoned criminal attorney”). And trial counsel's statement during the initial charge conference that there was no evidence of accident seems to be a slip of the tongue that she immediately corrected. Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court understood that statement as a withdrawal of the request for an accident instruction. Indeed, after counsel made the statement, the trial court said that it would not decide whether to give the instruction at that point; when the court took up the issue again later during the trial, counsel repeatedly requested an accident instruction; and the parties and the court discussed at length whether the instruction was warranted. See, e.g., Collins v. State, 312 Ga. 727, 745, 864 S.E.2d 85 (2021) (rejecting the appellant's claim that trial counsel performed deficiently because the claim was based on a “faulty factual premise”).

As for Brown's argument that counsel should have accepted for the sake of argument that Brown killed Williams, the trial court's concern that Brown was required to admit killing Williams in order to assert an accident defense was supported by case law existing at the time of Brown's trial in March 2019, which held that when a criminal defendant “does not admit to committing any act which constitutes the offense charged, he is not entitled to” a jury instruction on an affirmative defense, like accident. Kellam v. State, 298 Ga. 520, 522, 783 S.E.2d 117 (2016) (quotation marks omitted). See also, e.g., McLean v. State, 297 Ga. 81, 83, 772 S.E.2d 685 (2015) (“[T]o assert an affirmative defense, a defendant must admit the act, or he is not entitled to a charge on that defense.” (quotation marks omitted)). Although McClure overruled that case law and held that, in order to raise an affirmative defense, a defendant need not “ ‘admit’ ” that any alleged facts are true but can accept certain facts as true for the sake of argument, that decision came about six months after Brown's trial. 306 Ga. at 864, 834 S.E.2d 96. Brown's trial counsel was not required to anticipate that change in the law, and given the precedent existing at the time of trial, her failure to argue to the trial court that Brown was not required to admit killing Williams and that he could instead accept that fact as true, for argument's sake, in order to raise an accident defense, was not objectively unreasonable. See Mitchell v. State, 317 Ga. 107, 114, 891 S.E.2d 915 (2023) (holding that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to request a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of self-defense and failing to object to the trial court's instruction that self-defense was not at issue on the basis that the appellant did not admit to firing a weapon in self-defense, because at the time of his trial, the court's action was supported by existing case law, which was not overruled by McClure until a year later, and explaining that “[i]t is well settled that trial counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to anticipate changes in the law”). See also Tyson v. State, 312 Ga. 585, 598, 864 S.E.2d 44 (2021) (“In making litigation decisions, there is no general duty on the part of defense counsel to anticipate changes in the law, and only in a rare case would it be ineffective assistance by a trial attorney not to make an objection that would be overruled under prevailing law.” (cleaned up)).⁶ For these reasons, Brown has not shown that trial counsel performed deficiently in her handling of the request for an accident instruction, and he does not succeed on this claim.⁷

(b) Brown also claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because she failed to move for a mistrial after Dallas, who was sitting in the audience in the courtroom, had an “outburst” during the trial. Brown has not shown that counsel performed deficiently, so this claim fails.

By way of background, the trial transcript shows that when a video recording from the responding investigator's body camera was played at trial, Brown's trial counsel suddenly asked to “pause” the video and “approach.” The jury was sent out of the courtroom, and counsel said that “what just happened is ․ very prejudicial” to Brown and asked that Dallas be removed from the courtroom if she could not “keep it together or can't stand watching this.” The prosecutor and the trial court agreed, and the prosecutor then told the audience in the courtroom that outbursts were not permitted and that if anyone believed she could not remain calm, she needed to “step out in the hallway.” At the hearing on Brown's motion for new trial, trial counsel testified that she did not remember Dallas “saying something verbally per se,” only that “she did speak loudly in court.” Counsel also testified that she discussed with Brown the possibility of requesting a mistrial after the outburst, but Brown was “adamant” that he wanted to “complet[e] the trial.”

In rejecting this claim of ineffective assistance, the trial court was authorized to credit trial counsel's testimony that after Dallas's outburst, she consulted with Brown, and that Brown did not want a mistrial. See, e.g., Anthony v. State, 311 Ga. 293, 297, 857 S.E.2d 682 (2021) (“Although the trial court made no express factual findings or credibility determinations in its order denying [the appellant's] motion for new trial, it was nonetheless authorized to credit the testimony of [trial] counsel, and in the absence of explicit factual and credibility findings by the trial court, we presume implicit findings were made supporting the trial court's decision.” (cleaned up)). Moreover, the trial transcript does not show, and Brown has presented no evidence indicating, what Dallas said or did during her “outburst,” only that she “sp[oke] loudly in court.” Thus, Brown has not established that a mistrial was essential to preserve his right to a fair trial, such that even if counsel had moved for a mistrial based on Dallas's outburst, the trial court would have granted that motion. Accordingly, Brown has not shown that trial counsel performed deficiently. See Troutman, 320 Ga. at 498–99, 910 S.E.2d 173 (“Because the trial court would have acted within its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial, the failure of [trial] counsel to make a motion for mistrial does not establish deficient performance.”); Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 189–90, 850 S.E.2d 110 (2020) (explaining that a trial court's exercise of discretion in denying a motion for mistrial “will not be disturbed on appeal unless a mistrial is essential to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial” and holding that the appellant had not shown that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move for a mistrial because he did not establish that the court would have granted the motion (quotation marks omitted)). See also Williams v. State, 276 Ga. 384, 385, 578 S.E.2d 858 (2003) (explaining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a mistrial motion based on a witness's outburst because “[t]he record d[id] not contain any evidence that [the witness] became hysterical or made any prejudicial comments” (quotation marks omitted)).

(c) Finally, Brown asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for eliciting certain testimony from Dallas during her direct examination. Specifically, counsel asked Dallas if she had “ever observed Brown or heard of him being violent,” and Dallas responded: “I don't know for myself, but I heard before that he had beat up his child[’s] mother. He was abusive to his child[’s] mother.” Assuming that trial counsel performed deficiently by eliciting this testimony, Brown has not established prejudice.

Dallas's comment was brief, and immediately after the comment, trial counsel elicited Dallas's testimony that she did not personally observe Brown abusing the mother of his child and that it was merely a “rumor[ ].” And Brown does not argue, and the record does not indicate, that Dallas's remark was referenced during any other portion of the trial. Moreover, the evidence of Brown's guilt was strong. Under these circumstances, Brown has not shown a reasonable probability that Dallas's comment affected the outcome of his trial. So this claim, like Brown's other claims, fails. See Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 400, 408–09, 877 S.E.2d 232 (2022) (holding that trial counsel was not ineffective for calling a witness who opened the door to evidence that the appellant had been convicted of violent crimes because the appellant could not show prejudice, as the evidence did not include details of the appellant's violent acts and the evidence of his guilt of the charged crimes was strong); Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 366, 882 S.E.2d 289 (2022) (holding that the appellant did not establish prejudice from trial counsel's failure to object to certain testimony from an investigator because “the investigator's comment was brief” and the record did not reflect that the prosecutor made any improper use of the testimony).⁸

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Williams was killed on August 20, 2018. In October 2018, a Richmond County grand jury indicted Brown for malice murder and felony murder. At a trial from March 25 to 28, 2019, a jury found him guilty of both counts. The trial court sentenced him as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7(a) to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder. The court purported to merge the felony-murder count, but that count was actually vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371–72, 434 S.E.2d 479 (1993). Brown filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended through new counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion in March 2023. Brown filed a timely notice of appeal, which he later amended, and the case was docketed to the April 2026 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

2.   The responding investigator and an emergency responder testified about what they observed when they entered the apartment, and a video recording from the investigator's body camera was admitted into evidence without objection.Investigators interviewed Franklin shortly after the murder, and he said that he was not involved in the fight between Brown and Williams; he reiterated that assertion during his testimony at trial. On cross-examination, Franklin admitted that later on the day of the murder, Franklin told Williams's sister, Cassandra Dallas, that Williams and Brown “were fighting” and that Franklin “w[as] fighting and jumped on [Brown], as well.” He testified that he lied to Dallas because he was “scared,” as people were “blaming” him for Williams's death and he did not know how Williams's family was “gonna take it” or “what they were gonna do to [him].” An investigator testified that Franklin seemed “scared” during his interview; the investigator did not observe any marks or blood on Franklin; and nothing indicated that he had been involved in the fight. Dallas testified that Franklin told her “that he was fighting [Brown], as well.”

3.   Brown's trial counsel elicited testimony at trial that there was blood spatter on the walls and floor in the living room of the apartment and that Brown's injuries could have been caused by someone hitting him with an object or tool. One of the investigators who testified explained that the blood spatter was not tested to determine whether the blood was Williams's or Brown's because the blood likely came from Brown, as he was bleeding more than Williams when responders arrived. And another investigator testified that although some of the tools in the apartment had “transfer blood” on them, none contained blood spatter indicating that the tool was used as a weapon.

4.   To the extent Brown also contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict, that claim fails for the same reasons. See, e.g., Rooks v. State, 317 Ga. 743, 750–51, 893 S.E.2d 899 (2023) (explaining that “the standard of review for the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is the same as for determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction” (cleaned up)).

5.   OCGA § 24-6-609(d) says, in pertinent part:Evidence of juvenile adjudications shall not generally be admissible under this Code section. The court may, however, in a criminal proceeding allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.

6.   We have applied McClure’s holding in cases pending on direct review at the time that opinion was issued, see, e.g., Henry v. State, 307 Ga. 140, 144, 834 S.E.2d 861 (2019), but that “does not alter the long-standing precedent that, when addressing a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, the reasonableness of counsel's conduct is examined from counsel's perspective at the time of trial.” Tyson, 312 Ga. at 598–99, 864 S.E.2d 44 (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “a new decision does not apply in a manner that would require counsel to argue beyond existing precedent and anticipate the substance of the opinion before it was issued.” Id. at 599, 864 S.E.2d 44 (quotation marks omitted).

7.   Although we conclude that trial counsel did not perform deficiently as to this claim, we note that Brown also has not shown that trial counsel's handling of her request for an accident instruction caused him prejudice. As discussed above, Brown was not entitled to a jury instruction on accident because there was not even slight evidence to support it. And any arguments counsel might have made about why such an instruction was warranted would not have changed the fact that the instruction was not authorized by the evidence. Thus, Brown has not shown a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the deficiencies he alleges, the trial court would have given an accident instruction or that the result of his trial would have been different. See, e.g., Mosby v. State, 300 Ga. 450, 455, 796 S.E.2d 277 (2017) (holding that trial counsel was not ineffective because the appellant did not show that any deficiency in counsel's failure to consult with a ballistics expert prejudiced him, and explaining that even if the expert could have helped the appellant establish that she fired the fatal shot while attempting to flee from the victim, the appellant was not entitled to a finding of justification because the undisputed evidence established that she was the initial aggressor, and consultation with the expert did “not change th[at] analysis”).

8.   Above, we assumed that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Brown from asking Franklin about his probation status and that trial counsel performed deficiently by eliciting Dallas's testimony that she had heard that Brown “beat up his child[’s] mother.” Brown does not contend that this assumed error and deficiency cumulatively resulted in prejudice sufficient to order a new trial, and we discern no cumulative prejudice warranting reversal. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 18, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020) (“[A] defendant who wishes to take advantage of the [cumulative-error] rule ․ should explain to the reviewing court just how he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of multiple errors.”).

Warren, Presiding Justice.

All the Justices concur.