COLOTL v. STATE (2011)

Following a jury trial, Jessica Colotl appeals from her conviction for driving without a valid driver's license.¹ Colotl relies on statutory language providing that a person “shall not be guilty” of the offense if the person “produces in court a valid driver's license,”² and she argues that the trial court erred by not dismissing the case because she produced a valid instruction permit (“learner's permit”) to the court. Because Colotl's permit did not authorize her to drive unsupervised, as she was when cited, we affirm.

Construed in favor of the verdict,³ the evidence shows that Colotl was observed by a law enforcement officer driving in a parking lot and searching for a parking space. While the officer watched, Colotl paused to wait for a parking space to open; upon noticing the officer, she circled around the lot, and paused again to wait for the parking space to open. After the second pause, the officer executed a traffic stop based on his belief that she was impeding the flow of traffic,⁴ and he requested Colotl's driver's license and proof of insurance. Colotl could not produce a driver's license and explained that she had a valid Mexican driver's license. The officer gave her 24 hours to appear at the police station and produce her Mexican license. Colotl appeared at the police station the next morning, but she explained that she could not find her license. At that time, Colotl was arrested and cited for driving without a license and impeding the flow of traffic.

At trial, Colotl testified that she did not have a valid Georgia driver's license at the time of the arrest, but her attorney proffered evidence of a Class C⁵ Georgia learner's permit, which she had obtained six days before trial.⁶ The trial court denied Colotl's pretrial motion to dismiss made on the ground that she produced a valid driver's license to the trial court. The jury then heard the evidence, was instructed on the law, and rendered a guilty verdict only on the driving without a license charge. Colotl moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the motion was denied, giving rise to this appeal.

1. On appeal, Colotl argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion notwithstanding the verdict. As in the trial court, she relies on OCGA § 40–5–20(a), which provides as follows, in relevant part:

No person, except those expressly exempted in this chapter,7 shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has a valid driver's license under this chapter for the type or class of vehicle being driven․ Any violation of this subsection shall be punished as provided in Code Section 40–5–121, except ․ if such person produces in court a valid driver's license issued by this state to such person, he or she shall not be guilty of such offenses ․ 8

Thus, the emphasized language operates as a safe harbor for defendants who are cited for driving without a license, but who later produce a valid license in court.⁹

Based on this language, Colotl argues that the trial court should not have entered a judgment on the verdict of guilt because she presented to the court evidence that she had obtained, prior to trial, a valid learner's permit issued by the State of Georgia.¹⁰ Colotl argues that this learner's permit should be considered a “valid driver's license,” so she should be deemed not guilty as provided by the safe harbor language.

Pretermitting whether the permit was exculpatory despite being obtained after her arrest,¹¹ we note that the statute requires drivers to have a license that is valid “for the type or class of vehicle being driven.”¹² Thus, the statute provides that not all driver's licenses are valid for all purposes and vehicles.

Colotl's learner's permit is classified as a Class P “[i]nstruction permit applicable to all types of vehicles for which an applicant desires a driver's license but is not presently licensed to drive.”¹³ OCGA § 40–5–24(a)(1)(A) provides that such a permit for Class C vehicles (such as the one Colotl drove)

entitle[s] the applicant, while having such permit in his or her immediate possession, to drive a Class C vehicle upon the public highways for a period of two years when accompanied by a person at least 21 years of age who is licensed as a driver for a commercial or noncommercial Class C vehicle, who is fit and capable of exercising control over the vehicle, and who is occupying a seat beside the driver.¹⁴

Thus, a learner's permit, like any license, only authorizes driving under the specified circumstances.

It is undisputed that Colotl was not accompanied by a licensed driver as required above. Therefore, Colotl's learner's permit was not valid for the purpose of driving unsupervised, as she was on the day of the traffic stop, and she cannot qualify for the safe harbor under OCGA § 40–5–20(a). Should we hold otherwise, a person could avoid prosecution for driving a class of vehicle they are not licensed to drive simply by presenting any other license. This would defeat the basic statutory requirement that drivers hold a valid license “for the type or class of vehicle being driven,” and the licensing distinctions would become meaningless.¹⁵ We decline to read such a result into the language of OCGA § 40–5–20(a). “It is the duty of the [C]ourt to consider the results and consequences of any proposed construction and not so construe a statute as will result in unreasonable or absurd consequences not contemplated by the legislature.”¹⁶ By its plain terms, the statute requires that the accused have or present to the court a license valid for the purpose of driving the vehicle in question, not merely any license or permit. Accordingly, the permit Colotl presented to the trial court did not entitle her to a not guilty verdict under OCGA § 40–5–20(a).

2. Colotl's remaining enumeration is moot.

Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.  OCGA § 40–5–20(a).

2.  Id.

3.  See Short v. State, 234 Ga.App. 633, 634(1) (507 S.E.2d 514) (1998).

4.  The officer's authority to execute the stop was not challenged at trial or on appeal.

5.  Class C vehicles are typical passenger vehicles, i.e., those with a gross vehicle weight not in excess of 26,000 pounds. See OCGA § 40–5–23(c).

6.  There was no other licensed driver in the vehicle at the time Colotl was stopped by the officer.

7.  Colotl does not argue that she is exempted.

8.  (Emphasis supplied.)

9.  See, e.g., Rocha v. State, 250 Ga.App. 209, 210 (551 S.E.2d 82) (2001) (the “presumption may be defeated, however, if the defendant produces at trial their driver's license and demonstrates that it was valid at the time of the [incident]”).

10.  In light of the holding of this opinion, we need not address the State's argument that Colotl was procedurally barred from making a post-verdict motion for judgment notwithstanding the guilty verdict in lieu of a timely motion for a directed verdict. See, e.g., State v. Canup, 300 Ga.App. 678, 680(1) (686 S.E.2d 275) (2009) (“Because there is no provision in Georgia law authorizing a trial court to entertain a motion for judgment of not guilty notwithstanding a verdict of guilty in a criminal case, the court's action [granting such relief] was procedurally unauthorized.”) (punctuation omitted).

11.  Compare Rocha, 250 Ga.App. at 210 (presumption defeated if the defendant presents a license valid at the time of the incident at issue ).

12.  OCGA § 40–5–20(a).

13.  OCGA § 40–5–23(c).

14.  (Emphasis supplied.)

15.  See, e.g., OCGA § 40–5–23(c) (listing the distinct classes of noncommercial licenses, including for vehicles not in excess of 26,000 pounds, those weighing more than 26,000 pounds, and motorcycles).

16.  (Punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Brooks v. State, 257 Ga.App. 515, 517 (571 S.E.2d 504) (2002).

DOYLE, Judge.

ELLINGTON, C.J., and MILLER, P.J., concur.